Himalayan

ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL

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

Scale of Miles
200 100 0 200 400 600 800 1000
Chief Railways
ARCTIC OCEAN
Murmansk
Arkhangelsk
LENINGRAD
BERLIN
Warsaw
MOSCOW
Vienna
Ural Mountains
Sverdlovsk
Odessa
R. Volga
Astrakhan
Istanbul
Bosporus
BLACK SEA
Batum
Tiflis
ARAL SEA
Smyrna
ANKARA
TURKEY
Baku
Krasnovodsk
Tashkent
Chimkent
Bukhara
Samarkand
Kashgar
Semipalat
Aleppo
Mosul
SYRIA
Beirut
Haifa
PALESTINE
Port Said
Damascus
Kirkuk
Kazvin
Merv
Stalinabad
Yarkand
CAIRO
Suez
Amman
Jerusalem
TRANS-JORDAN
Aqaba
IRAQ
BAGHDAD
TEHRAN
Bandar Shah
Isfahan
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
KABUL
Peshawar
Basra
Bandar Shapur
Kowait
Kerman
Bushire
Quetta
Indus
DELHI
R. Nile
SAUDI-ARABIA
Medina
Bahrein
Riyadh
Mecca
Port Sudan
TRUCIAL OMAN
Karachi
Muscat
OMAN
AFRICA
Massawa
YEMEN
San'a
HADHRAMAUT
Mukalla
Aden
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ADDIS ABABA
ARABIAN SEA
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10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
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Longitude

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In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this

.... day of .... 19...

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said ....

In the presence of ....

Address of Witness to your signature..

Occupation of Witness ....

BURMA

By COMMANDER THE HON. SIR ARCHIBALD COCHRANE, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., D.S.O.

Luncheon lecture given on November 5, 1941, the Right Hon. Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., in the Chair.

I THINK it will be obvious that in speaking of Burma I can only select a few aspects of the matters of interest in that country to deal with this afternoon, otherwise I should take far too much of your time.

First of all, just a few words about the country and the people who inhabit it. It is perhaps sufficient to say that Burma is considerably larger than France, and to-day has a population of about seventeen millions. Of that population about eleven millions are Burmese Buddhists; and perhaps I might note here that, as a matter of convenience, it is the custom to refer to all the inhabitants of Burma as Burmans and to the Buddhists as Burmese. Of that seventeen millions there are about eleven million Burmese Buddhists. The rest of the population is made up of Indians, Karens, Shans, Chins, Kachins, and a number of small tribes.

I would like to take first, before I come to speak of the Burmese Buddhists, the hill tribes. In the west of the country there are the Chins, inhabiting a range of hills which stretch from north to south between the valley of the Irrawaddy and the Bay of Bengal, a part of the country about which not very much is known. I had hoped to go there early in 1939; in fact, all arrangements had been made, but that tour had to be cancelled owing to the very uncertain position in Europe. On that occasion it was the situation in Europe and not in Burma that caused me to postpone an intended tour.

In the north-east of Burma there is a quite distinct people, the Kachins. Very little is known of their origin, although it is known that they were still migrating to the south up to the time that we took over Upper Burma in 1885; and I think I am correct in saying that, so far as the records go, migration had been continuing for a couple of hundred years. But quite recently, in this Kachin country, there have been some very interesting finds of stone- and bronze-age implements. Their existence in that part of the world was not known until a comparatively few years ago, but that has no connection with the history of the Kachins themselves.

A little further south, on the east of Burma, we have the Shans or Tai. They live in the Federated Shan States, a total of about one and a half million Shans and others. The Shan States are not important in the same sense as the States in India, because the Shans are British subjects and the Federated Shan States are part of British Burma. If a Shan chief dies it does not follow that either his son or, possibly, nephew, whom he had nominated as his successor, would necessarily be permitted to succeed. The Government of Burma have always exercised that control. Of

course, normally, if there is a worthy successor, he would automatically succeed, but we have kept that measure of control.

To come down to the plains, the most numerous people are the Karens, about whose origin little is known. I think there is no doubt that they came down from the north-east. A considerable proportion of the Karens are now Christians. They were not originally Buddhist, and a large number of them have accepted the Christian faith.

In the southern part of Burma there are still remains of the original inhabitants of the country, but numerically they are of very little importance at present.

The next point I would make is with regard to the frontiers of Burma and their importance, and the communications as regards them. To take, first of all, the western side of the country, Burma extends from very nearly the head of the Gulf of Bengal right down to Victoria Point, which is about in 10° N. latitude of that very long coast line. In the southern part of it there is a very interesting collection of islands, the Mergui Archipelago, islands which have a number of very good harbours and are obviously an area which might be very convenient for any Power proposing to attack Burma if they were not adequately supervised. That supervision was the responsibility of the Government of India until Burma was separated from India in 1937. Since then we have succeeded in building a number of patrol vessels, and no doubt an effective and efficient patrol is gradually being established. Mergui Archipelago is also perhaps of interest because one of the islands is the main source of the supply for birds' nest soup, which is so much prized by the Chinese. Personally, when I have tried it, I thought it was extremely dull, but probably my palate was at fault.

To come to the land frontier. There is little or no communication between Burma and India by road, and there is no railway. The natural means of communication are by sea, which is more convenient and cheaper, even if a good road were to be opened up.

To the north you get the frontier with Tibet. That is of little interest except to botanists, such as Mr. Kingdon Ward. From Tibet we have a long frontier with China, and that to-day is the most interesting part of the frontier.

Take Burma from the north and the possible roads into China. A railway runs from Rangoon to Mandalay, about 400 miles, and it meanders on to the north up to Myitkyina on the Upper Irrawaddy. There is an old mule track from there across to Tengyüeh, which is the most important town in the north of Yunnan Province. But little of that road has been modernized, and I do not think it is ever likely to be, because, broadly speaking, although the distance is not very great, the further north you go when you want to make communications between Burma and China the greater the difficulties you are involved in.

The next route of importance is from Bhamo, also on the Irrawaddy, across to Tengyüeh, and that also is an old caravan route. When I arrived in Burma the merchants of Tengyüeh were very anxious for the road to be made, both in their own country and in Burma. The project did not look very promising, because in Burma our alignment for the



By the courtesy of the "British Survey."

road went up the valley of the Taping River. The Chinese, on the other hand, had made an alignment which came down almost on top of the mountains, so it looked as if we would have our road down in the valley and the Chinese theirs up on the mountains and never the twain would meet. But about three years ago we were able to have a joint meeting of engineers, the Chinese and ourselves, and a new alignment was found which avoided most of the difficulties of the old road, and a comparatively easy route could now be developed. Unfortunately, even if that were done—and it is being done slowly now—it is not of great importance for getting materials and supplies into China because you cannot get to Chungking without crossing both the Salween and the Mekong Rivers, which would mean fresh bridges. So I think that even when the road is opened up from Burma to Tengyüeh, it will not be of first-class importance now to the merchants of Tengyüeh.

That does not end the possibilities of taking traffic via Bhamo, which is about 150 miles up the Irrawaddy from Mandalay but is navigable, and there are obvious advantages in taking some of the freight as far up the Irrawaddy as possible.

Although this road to Tengyüeh would probably not be of much assistance, it is possible to have a road running from Bhamo south and east and joining up with the main road from Lashio practically at the Chinese frontier, a distance of somewhere about 120 miles. I am mentioning this road, not because it is of first-class importance, but because it is another illustration of the co-operation between the Central Government in China and the Government of Burma. Forty miles of this road from Burma are in the mountains. It is not a particularly easy road, but it is not a very bad one, and last cold weather we had about two thousand coolies working on it and the road has now been metalled throughout.

Further on, you come down into the valley of the Shweli River on the Burmese side; the ground is just paddy land, and there are considerable foothills running further to the south, with the result that there is a great run-off of water. On the north side of the Shweli there are some very convenient low foothills, and within a few miles of where the road crosses the Shweli is the site of the Loiwing Aircraft factory, put up by an American company a few years ago.

We discussed this question also with the Chinese representatives. There was no agreement on the subject, but the fact of the matter is that the Chinese are making the road on their side of the river, because they were convinced that that was the proper place for a road to go, and it does avoid our having to make a very difficult and expensive road on the south side of the Shweli.

The next means of communication across the frontier of any importance is by road from Lashio, the " Burma road." The other day I met a criticism. I was told it ought to be called the Chinese Road, China being the more important user of the road. I do not agree, because, after all, even Londoners talk about the Great North Road. It is the custom to talk of a road by its destination. It is the road into Burma. From Lashio the road runs about 120 miles to the frontier. There is an interesting comparison between the road in Burma and the road which the Chinese have

built so recently on their side of the frontier. In Burma we had an existing track—partly a mule track, partly for bullock carts—and we improved and developed that. We have given it a metalled and tarred surface over the whole of its length, with the result that the surface is good, but because it follows the old alignment there are a number of hairpin bends and some of the gradients are steeper than are considered safe in these days.

The Chinese, on the other hand, took a completely new alignment, but they have neither metalled, rolled nor tarred it, and the result is that these lorries go over the Burma section of the road without excessive wear and tear, but when they get into China the wear and tear is very great.

Next I come to the extension of the railway from Lashio. You will remember that His Majesty's Government agreed about nine months ago to finance the building of the Burma section of the road to join up Lashio with Kunming. Most of the road which the railway will have to follow was surveyed a number of years ago, and it will run to the south of the road, where it will get an easier alignment. I cannot give you any very recent information about the railway, except that its construction has been approved, but the real difficulty will come when it has to be equipped with rolling-stock.

If you go further east, because the frontier between the Shan States and China is roughly running north and east, you get down into the eastern part of the Shan States, Kengtung. It would be possible to open up roads from that State into the eastern part of Yunnan Province, but although there is not much traffic at certain seasons of the year a great deal of tea comes out that way and finds its way to Tibet. That route has been adopted since there were such troubles on the frontier between Tibet and China that the original caravan routes were closed.

Further south there is a short stretch of frontier with Indo-China, but there the Mekong River runs along the frontier the whole length and there are no roads.

When you come a little further down to the frontier with Thailand it is mountainous country, very thick jungle, and there are no roads of any importance across the frontier; indeed, there is not very much trade.

When you get right down to the southern tip, at Victoria Point, Burma there is very narrow. Victoria Point and the district round about it are, for the purposes of communication with the rest of Burma, of no use at all.

From that I would like to switch for a minute to the question of the internal conditions in Burma. In 1937 Burma, after being a province of India, and one of the lesser provinces of India for a number of years, was separated from India not only in the political but also in the military sphere and started out much more on her own. It was necessary to start a Legislature of two Houses in place of the Legislative Council that had existed before—a House of Representatives with 132 members and a Senate with 36 members; of the Senators half are nominated by the Governor, the other half being elected by the House of Representatives. For a variety of reasons it was necessary to hold the first General Election before separation from India actually took place. The result was that there was no

political party to go to the polls at that election with any policy whatever about the future. That has had an unfortunate effect on the political history of Burma from 1937 onwards, because the electorate was about three and a half millions in 1936—speaking from memory. Most of those would be literate, but very few of them would have any understanding of rival political policies even if they had been put to them, and the result of there being no clear-cut policies was that a number of representatives were returned to the House of Representatives who did not know why they were there, and certainly had no idea of a clear policy which they wished to follow for the benefit of the country. That has been one obstacle to the efficient working of the House of Representatives.

Another matter which I can only just touch on, which is of very great interest, although it is too early to assess what its effect may be on the political life of Burma, is the religious issue, the position of the Buddhist religion in the political life of the country. Under the Burmese kings, the king exercised a varying amount of control over the Buddhist monks. That lapsed when we annexed Upper Burma in 1885, and there had been a considerable deterioration in discipline, though only amongst a minority. The majority of the Buddhist monks live decent lives, helping the people in the villages, and, in fact, living up to the tenets of their religion. But there has been a minority which did not take that high view of their purpose, and the development of party politics has provided an opportunity not only for them to try and get into politics but for the politicians to try and get hold of some of the religious leaders and use them for party political purposes.

I cannot discuss that at any length this afternoon, but in 1938 it was a matter of very considerable difficulty. We had great troubles in 1938. There were serious riots between the Burmese Buddhists and the Muslims, most of whom were Indians. Then some of the Buddhist monks took a prominent and most undesirable part, but since then there has been a considerable improvement for a variety of reasons. I regard it as a matter of first-class importance for the well-being and happiness of the people of Burma that the Buddhist religion should continue to be regarded and to maintain internal discipline.

I am afraid this must of necessity be a very scrappy talk. From that I would like to turn to the problem of defence. As I mentioned just now, when Burma separated from India we were separated in the defence as well as in the political sphere. Before 1937 the defence of Burma had been part of the major problem of the defence of India. The only troops raised in Burma had been raised from the non-Burmese population. The Burmese felt that always as a slur on them. When separation came in 1937 we started at once to raise a company of Burmese sappers and miners and to recruit Burmese for other units. Since then, of course, mainly due to the outbreak of the war, we have raised over 15,000 recruits in Burma. Owing to the fact that the hill tribes were fully recruited, the great majority of those have been Burmese. That is a considerable change from what the position was before 1937, and very naturally I have been asked on various occasions, would the Burmese fight in a modern war?

The only reply anyone can give with any feeling of responsibility is that it is quite impossible to tell until they are tried. With that reservation, my view is that, well led, and understanding the cause for which they were fighting, the Burmese would fight very well indeed. They are intelligent and mechanically minded; the only difficulty we struck with regard to their soldiering was that they did not like routine; they are inclined to get a little bored. On the other side, before I left Burma, a battalion of Burmese territorials, which we had only started to raise two years before, were sufficiently advanced to take over guard duties at Government House and other places in Rangoon. That does show that they were keen.

So much for the defence forces.

With regard to the general attitude of Burma towards the war, no doubt everybody here has seen reports of the statements which U Saw has made recently. I endorse to the full a statement which I heard him make, that Burma had co-operated fully in the general war effort. When the war broke out I set up a defence council. Perhaps I might interpolate a remark here that, under the Constitution of Burma—which incidentally is the same as India would have if the federal scheme were in existence in India—the Governor is under the general control of the Secretary of State and of Parliament. As soon as the war broke out I set up a defence council, for the purpose of bringing Ministers more closely into touch with the many problems which arise in a modern war, also for the purpose of trying to avoid the danger of Government getting into too watertight compartments. On the whole, that defence council worked well. It was naturally a purely advisory body, but what we did was to have an understanding that, when the defence council reached a decision, the competent department would make it effective without further argument unless they were quite certain that the defence council had made a mistake. In that way we did speed up decisions very considerably.

One matter where it was of considerable value was in this very troublesome question of civil defence. If we had had no meeting-ground for everybody who might have to implement a decision there would have been a great deal of delay.

What of the future of Burma? On the whole the Constitution has worked satisfactorily. It is not an easy Constitution to work even in peace-time, and it is far from easy in war-time, but on the whole it has worked satisfactorily. The Burmese, headed by U Saw, are naturally asking for a fuller measure of self-government. Is it reasonable that they should have that, and, if so, in what form? Those are obviously the questions to which Parliament will eventually have to address itself. I can only give you my personal view after an experience of five years in Burma. I think that we are going to do what we all wish to do, and that is to make Burma a contented unit within the Empire. We must be very careful to draw a distinction between self-government and democratic government. I have found a tendency in Burma to regard the terms as synonymous, and that may very well lead us into difficulty.

I have mentioned already briefly the fact that the House of Representatives has not been altogether satisfactory as a legislative body in Burma,

and when the time comes I think serious consideration will have to be given to the question of whether fuller powers should be given to the existing legislature, or whether it may not be necessary to set up one more variant of the different forms of Constitution which already exist in the Empire. But I personally can see no reason why Burma should not progressively become a more contented unit in the Empire. They have done and they are doing their utmost to help in the war effort. At the moment all the forces raised in Burma are necessarily kept in that country. After all, there is a definite threat to Burma. Japanese bombing aeroplanes are within easy range of the country.

It would be a grand thing if some Burmese military units could go out of their country and get experience in Africa or somewhere like that.

I hope that I have given you the impression that on the whole things have gone well in Burma since 1937. There is no reason why they should not go even better, nor why Burma should not be a thoroughly contented unit in the Empire.

Mr. HUGHES: I should first apologize, for I have never administered anything. I have always been on the circumference rather than at the centre. I have also never addressed a learned body. I therefore ask for your indulgence.

Sir Archibald Cochrane, in my opinion, had the hardest job of any Governor of Burma and most faithfully performed it, and in a short time those who criticized him once will be of the other mind.

Sir Archibald said very little about India. All his talk was about China. That is the first trouble in respect of Burma. Burma has, partly for convenience, been attached to India, and now it is swinging away towards China. All its affinities are Mongolian and Chinese. At the same time it owes a tremendous amount to India. The Burman is not grateful to India and has treated Indians shockingly.

Secondly, Burma, lying between India and China, is naturally in a very delicate position. There was a trade agreement between Burma and Japan. There was some connection, not very clear to me, between growing cotton in Burma and doing a deal with Japan as regards rice. A great deal of Burma rice went always to Japan. I came home on top of 8,000 tons of rice two months ago. In order that Burma rice might be disposed of to Japan there was an agitation to compel people to wear a certain kind of Japanese cloth made out of this Burmese cotton, and during that attempt there was very much pro-Japanese underground excitement stimulated, so that in places like Mandalay we had the astonishing spectacle of Burmese women who would not wear it being taken away and caned by Burmese monks, and little condemnation of this expressed by Burmese papers. It shows to what extent Japanese influence had undermined opinion in Burma with regard to its natural affinities with China. The natural development of Burma in the concert of nations in general seems to be towards China. In the past it has been India, and at present the ordinary people are very much drawn towards Japan.

My own contacts have all been with the folk at the bottom of the social

scale. Most of those here who have been to Burma have long forgotten what it was to be a sub-divisional officer or a very young assistant in a firm, and when you get to the top of the tree you look at things very differently. My own feeling is that the Constitution, as it is now, is not giving to people at the bottom a fair deal. Instead of producing more freedom for the ordinary man, my own belief is that he is getting less freedom, that there is less security of life and property, that all that matters is the dispute between one political party and another.

The first Prime Minister of Burma never held office. He was a man with a majority vote and yet could not form a party. He was followed by Ba Maw, who flew over here for the coronation, but he fell out of power partly in consequence of student disorders which he had himself previously encouraged. Many parallels can be drawn between the Nazi rule in Germany and the acts and opinions of the Burmese in Burma to-day. As I see it, there seems to be a great need to increase the security of the ordinary man. In the matter of individual rights and the maintenance of law and order we have been living on our capital in Burma. Instead of running the firm and getting increased income out of it, Burmese Ministers have been living on the capital of the firm. Such security as there is now depends on the Indian and British troops.

My own presence here is to some extent due to the fact that I have felt that the way in which education has been developing is such that I cannot continue in Burma any more. I have been nineteen years in charge of a school in Burma. Lately, the subordination of education to politics has been getting rapidly worse and worse. Something must be done to see that the right element is supported and the wrong element is not.

The lecturer, as was proper in a former Governor, has been dreadfully discreet. I have been indiscreet, because I feel strongly about these things; for twenty years in Burma means that, when you come away, you leave part of yourself there. I do not think the people are going in the straight line towards the development of their own government. On the contrary, partly owing to what has been going on in Siam and in Japan, the politicians have been modelling themselves on Hitler lines; they have been trying to build up similar youth movements. On the surface, things have been developing, but not, I think, in the right direction.

Dr. STEWART: I thank Sir Archibald Cochrane for a most interesting lecture. I have enjoyed hearing many old familiar matters talked over again and learning a lot of new things I did not know.

May I just speak of one or two matters of which my heart happens to be rather full at the present time. I belong to the staff of the School of Oriental and African Studies. The new building in Bloomsbury has been hanselled by an enormous influx of young officers of the British Army. We have had the largest class of Burmese ever taught in this country. They keep asking me for books on Burma. I refer them to this and that book, and tell them they are not bad; but I shall be very pleased to have a copy of this lecture. It would make an excellent little handbook and just what they want.

One of them referred me to a book by the late Sir George Scott, a

handbook of political and commercial information on Burma, and he pointed to a statement by Sir George that it was quite impossible ever to make the Burman into a soldier. This brings me to a little point in regard to the old company of Burma Sappers, whom Sir Archibald did not mention. There was that one Burman unit formed about 1890, which fought in the last war in Mesopotamia and on the North-West Frontier, and after the war it was expanded into a corps of Burma Sappers. Still later, when the economy campaign came along, the whole corps was abolished, simply because the Government of India thought they could get something cheaper. So they could, and they garrisoned Burma with Indian troops, who were good soldiers and also cheaper than anything they could have raised in Burma. Anyhow, I told these young men that the task of educating Burmese to be soldiers was one that should have been started rather more than a century ago, when we took Arakan and Tenasserim, and that the neglect of a century or more was a thing that had to be remedied by them. I hope they will do it.

I do not see that it can ever be safe for Burma to be without its own army in the future. Therefore, it seems to me there can be no possibility of disbanding Burma troops after this present emergency is over.

Just one other little point. I saw in *The Times* this morning a letter from a gentleman in Dundee, who said that he never met a Burman in the hills, that he could not stand the climate, and therefore the Government of Burma would quite possibly prefer to constitute its army of Kachins, Chins, Shans and people with more stamina. My little experience is that the Burman of the plains has got quite as much stamina as any of those tribes. It always struck me as remarkable how he could stand up to every extreme of climate, 125 degrees in the shade at Baghdad or the freezing weather of the Frontier.

But there is a handicap that the Burman labours under which those other people are free from. When a Kachin or a Karen joins the army, he goes up in the social scale. When a Burman joins, I am afraid he does not. In the old company of Sappers we had a sort of unofficial regimental chaplain, U Khanti, the hermit of Mandalay Hill. I once rather rashly took advantage of the visit of a friend of mine, a down-country Buddhist Bishop, to get him to pay a visit to the Sappers. The old gentleman was travelling with quite a tail of followers, among them a young niece with a very beautiful voice. She came along and sang, and was a great success. The old Bishop himself did his best. He told the men they were doing good service to their country. He said, " You may not be very high in the human scale, but you have no reason whatever to be ashamed of yourselves. Lower than you there are fishermen and hunters and all those people who take life for profit," and then he said, " And there are all those who are in confinement there." He waved his arm in the direction of the north-west corner of Fort Dufferin, where the jail is.

So that that is the handicap. A Burman does not raise himself socially when he goes into the army, and the Church has got somehow or other to be made to move with the times, and either produce army chaplains or change its tone by preaching that soldiering is not only a respectable but an honourable calling.

In answering, Sir ARCHIBALD COCHRANE said: Perhaps it will be convenient if I first of all make a comment or two on Mr. Hughes' very interesting statement. I am bound to say that I think he has over-stressed the regard in which Japan and the Japanese are held in Burma. It is true that four or five years ago there was a pro-Japanese party in Burma which had some prominent politicians in it. But as a result largely of the infamous treatment which the Japanese meted out to the occupied parts of China, and owing to the fact that the China Government woke up to the idea of telling the Burmese about this, their ideas have very much changed in the last few years. Japanese propaganda is still a nuisance, but I would not myself say that it is a danger. There are very few people in Burma who have any regard for the Japanese.

Mr. Hughes also mentioned a trade agreement with Japan. The agreement is practically confined to cotton, not to rice. It was not reached by the politicians in Burma but by the Government before Burma separated from India. The agreement was drawn up in 1936. The agreement is, in fact, on exactly the same lines as one reached by the Government of India at the same time.

Thirdly, with regard to the propensity of the Burmese to think of themselves as dictators. It is perfectly true that tendency has shown itself from time to time. In fact, Dr. Ba Maw, the first Premier under the new Constitution, after he had been defeated declared himself as dictator of Burma. He was tried in the ordinary magistrates' court by the civil law, convicted, and sentenced to a year's imprisonment. I think his year's imprisonment is actually over now, but he is still interned.

I rather stress that point because there was a man who had been Prime Minister. It all went to his head and he declared himself dictator. It was not a serious matter. He was tried by the ordinary civil law in Mandalay.

With regard to what Dr. Stewart said, I have recently quite by chance met one of his pupils, who was extremely grateful for the instruction he was getting in Burmese. He believed that by the time he landed in Burma he would have gone some way towards getting a groundwork in the language.

The other point is with regard to the land communication with Thailand. I think the answer is, an invasion across that frontier might be possible at certain times of the year, but there is no road which would support more than a brigade. It is difficult country and would undoubtedly take a long time to make modern roads capable of supporting a large force. The immediate danger to which Burma is exposed is that of aerial attack.

Mr. GULL: Does that apply to French Indo-China too?

The LECTURER: Yes. We constantly get reports of roads being opened up to the south of French Indo-China; but you have the Mekong River there, which is a considerable obstacle.

The CHAIRMAN: I know you would all like me to thank Sir Archibald for his exceedingly interesting and informative talk on Burma, which has helped many of us in dealing with the outstanding problems with which we are faced in regard to Burma to-day.

I am glad that Mr. Hughes spoke of the many difficulties which Sir Archibald had to face as Governor of Burma. Indeed, to take over Burma under its new Constitution was no small enterprise, to find all those new conditions developing there, the difficulties due to the absence of any formed political parties, the difficulty caused by the unusual position occupied by the Church there, and the difficulties caused by the Indian and the Chinese problems in Burma itself.

Added to all this was the growing problem due to changes, and very rapid changes, in the military situation in the Far East. Indeed, it was a task of very unusual difficulty indeed.

Among the difficulties, the greatest of all were the difficulties of the Constitution and the growing aspirations of the Burmese themselves gradually developing towards Dominion Status. It is unfortunate that these constitutional questions have a habit of coming to a head at times very inconvenient for ourselves. It is unfortunate that the Congress Party should again be forcing on us the issue of independence. That is a direct result in India of the war, and to a certain extent it is confusing the issue of the war there. There are few of us who do not feel strongly the sorry history presented by the principal political party in India, the sorry picture that it has shown of its attitude during the war, so much so that one has begun to wonder whether the dislike it so loudly proclaims of Fascism, Nazism and the Germans is real or not, and whether there is not a feeling that any opportunity and any nation is good enough to vent its own old-standing animosity to the British.

There remain a great mass of problems still to be faced, the problems of defence and the problems of the Indian connection. They have to be worked out under this new Constitution, strange to the Burmese, strange always to a people who have not had our own traditions and whose political ideas have not been formed on the same basis as our own.

There was, in what Sir Archibald said, one very significant suggestion. All these great problems have to be worked out under this new form of Constitution, and have to be worked out under a Constitution which bases itself on our form of Parliamentary Government. He has touched on a problem which is troubling us equally in India and will in time trouble us in the Dependencies. It is not that anybody wishes in any way to recede from the undertakings that we have given to these countries that their future shall be one of self-government, but we have begun to have very serious doubts whether some alternative is not possible to parliamentary institutions of the character that we know here, whether we could not find some way of giving these countries a more stable government. That is, I believe, the one problem we have first of all to decide in India before we can apply the lessons we have learnt there to Burma.

In concluding my final vote of thanks to Sir Archibald, we all realize that in his position he has had to be discreet. He has given us much information and we are most grateful to him.

Sir ARCHIBALD COCHRANE: Thank you very much, and, in conclusion, I wish to ask you to give a very hearty vote of thanks to Lord Hailey for taking the Chair this afternoon. (Applause.)

DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN TURKEY

By MAJOR H. M. BURTON
(The Royal Norfolk Regiment.)

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on October 22, 1941, Brig.-General Sir Osborne Mance, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

THE Royal Central Asian Society has listened to many lectures on modern Turkey in recent years, and most of them have naturally been concerned chiefly with descriptions of the great changes and reforms introduced under the Republican régime and the character of that truly remarkable personality, the late Kemal Atatürk. I am not, therefore, going to repeat what has been said many times before, and, as I cannot possibly cover every sphere of national activity within the space of a single lecture, I shall assume that my audience is familiar with the salient features of the Turkish Revolution and the principal reforms instituted by the Republican Government under the guidance of the late President. This afternoon I am going to try to give you a few personal impressions gained during seven months' residence in Turkey last year, and to touch on a few aspects of developments in Turkey, particularly in the fields of industry, culture, and education.

Turkey is a country in which I have been intensely interested ever since I first went there as a language student in 1927, and, as I was one of the first Englishmen to be accorded the privilege of living with a Turkish family, I make no apology for speaking of personal impressions, since they have been gained from an angle seldom experienced by my countrymen. When I returned to Turkey at the end of 1939 I had been absent from the country for about seven years, and I therefore set out for Istanbul "with four eyes," as the Turkish saying goes, and in eager anticipation of renewing many old friendships and of making many new ones. My curiosity was particularly keen, as I had not been in Turkey since the death of Atatürk, and, moreover, the outbreak of war in Europe was bound to prove a disturbing factor to the minds of all peoples, however distant from theatres of war.

During the lifetime of Atatürk one sometimes heard misgivings and doubts expressed as to whether the achievements and progress of the Republic did not depend too much on his personal leadership and that there might therefore be some danger of reaction or backsliding after his death. In an article on Turkey which I wrote several years before his death, I expressed the opinion that such an unhappy event would cause little change in the internal affairs of the country and would certainly entail no change in the Constitution or government of the country, except that his successor would not be granted quite such extensive powers as Atatürk. It must be remembered that Atatürk was President of the Republic, not a dictator, as many people suppose; but he did, in fact, wield exceptional power owing to the unique prestige and confidence

which he enjoyed amongst his fellow-countrymen. This forecast of mine has, in fact, proved remarkably accurate. I was particularly impressed last year in Turkey by the attitude of the people, especially the younger generation, towards the late Kemal Atatürk. I think it is no exaggeration to compare their devotion to his memory as something akin to the reverence accorded to a religious prophet. For Atatürk was, in fact, the prophet of a new ideal and a new way of life to the Turks, since it was undoubtedly due to his boundless energy, enthusiasm, and determination that the Turks were able to rally in the tragic post-war years and found a republic on revolutionary principles, the eighteenth anniversary of which will be celebrated in a few days' time. I wish to emphasize this feeling of intense admiration and affection for the late President because it struck me very forcibly whilst I was in Turkey last year. One finds it amongst all sections of the people, and I do feel that it is an important factor in the political stability of the country.

We can all see plainly to-day the great importance of Turkey's geographical position, but I should like to emphasize that she also occupies a position of peculiar political importance amongst her neighbours in the Balkans and the Near and Middle East. All these countries, and especially the youth of these countries, entertain the greatest admiration and respect for the progress achieved by Republican Turkey. I myself can testify to this from close personal contact with the peoples of other countries in that part of the world during the past fifteen years. We have seen during that period how some of these countries have attempted to follow Turkey's example of Westernization, sometimes with not very happy results. In any consideration of Near and Middle Eastern affairs it is important, therefore, to bear in mind this prestige which Turkey enjoys amongst her neighbours, because it means that Turkey is a natural focus and stabilizing factor in that region.

Turkey has a total area of about 296,000 square miles, or more than three times the size of Great Britain, whilst her population, according to a census taken in October, 1940, is roughly 18 millions. This is a low population for the size of the country if compared with the highly industrialized countries of Western Europe and America, but it is a high density compared with some of her neighbours. Moreover, the population of Turkey has increased considerably in recent years, the census of 1935 showing 16 millions, which was an increase of 18 per cent. on the 1927 census. This is due, amongst other factors, to continued immigration and also the fact that Turkey has one of the highest birth-rates in the world (23 per thousand).

It has frequently been pointed out that Turkey has always been primarily an agricultural country. This is perfectly true, and four-fifths of the total population still depend entirely on the land for their living. But I want to say something about the policy of industrialization which the Turkish Government has been following for several years past. You will have read a good deal in the Press recently about Turkish trade. This has undoubtedly assumed great importance at the present time, owing to the existence of special circumstances created by the war, but I do not propose to dwell upon that aspect of the matter. Quite apart from



By the courtesy of Messrs. Routledge from "Modern Turkey." Parker and Smith, 1940.

the present abnormal situation, the progress achieved in commerce and industrial development in Turkey during the past ten years is sufficiently solid to hold out most encouraging hopes for the future. In considering the progress made under the Republic, it is, of course, most important to remember the conditions during the last years of the Ottoman Empire and the tremendous handicaps, both material and financial, under which the Republic started. Progress must be measured against this background if a balanced view is to be obtained.

Under the Sultans the economy of Turkey was almost entirely directed and controlled by Greeks, Armenians and other Levantines, and foreigners. There was little trade and commerce, and the only exports were tobacco and fruits. Exploitation of mineral resources was scarcely attempted. There was some rather haphazard mining of coal in the Zonguldak region on the Black Sea coast, and of the copper in the Ergani district. The number of industrial workers throughout the country was less than 20,000. Most of the public utility services—telephone, gas, electricity, tramways, railways, and dockyards—were owned or controlled by foreigners. It was a cardinal feature of the Nationalist Turks, or Kemalists, as they have been called, to change all that, and to ensure that the industry and commerce of Turkey should be controlled and developed by Turks and not foreigners. I know that in the early days of the Republic many people shook their heads at this idea, and maintained that the Turks had not the commercial aptitude or instincts to carry out such a policy successfully. I have never shared that view, and I think the pessimists have been proved wrong by events.

During the first ten years of the Republic the Government aimed at encouraging private enterprise without direct State control. Various laws were passed to protect and encourage Turks in various professions and to restrict the activities of foreigners. In 1927 the Government passed a law for the assistance of industry, designed to assist industrial undertakings by such measures as remission of taxes and customs duties. The census of 1927 gave some interesting information on the state of industry. It showed, for instance, that a large proportion of Turkish industry was represented by a great number of small undertakings employing only a few workmen. It gave the total number of industrial enterprises as about 65,000, of which the most important were connected with agriculture, the textile industry, timber, metals, and building. Apart from the large number of small workshops, the Government exercised some control over a number of factories from the year of the foundation of the Republic—1923. This particularly applied to the sugar industry, and by 1933 about half the total sugar consumption in the country was being produced at home. The State also controlled several shoe and cloth factories near Istanbul, whilst it provided assistance and encouragement to a large number of other factories through a State institution known as the Industry and Mining Bank.

During the first decade of the Republic the principal expansion was in agriculture, textiles, wood products, food manufacture, and mining. The number of workers employed in factories and workshops was more than trebled during this period, but the total number of separate industrial

enterprises showed a marked decline from about 1930 onwards, whilst the total value of industrial equipment in use showed a progressive increase. Certain traditional native industries declined sharply, notably carpet weaving, although carpets are still the only manufactured goods of any importance exported from Turkey.

From 1933 onwards the Turkish Government has exercised a more direct control and influence in the expansion of industry. In much the same way that the Soviet Government sought a short-cut to development by State planning, the Turkish Government by initiating a Five-Year Plan hoped to accelerate the process of industrialization which in some of the Western European countries had taken very much longer to develop through private enterprise.

The principal objects of the Five-Year Plan were to render the country economically self-supporting, to provide factories to work the raw materials produced in Turkey (timber, cotton, sulphur, coal, iron, and marble), and to develop other industries in which private enterprise had failed to make much headway. For these purposes the Plan aimed at the establishment of certain consumption goods industries (textiles, porcelain, glass, and paper) and the development of basic industries (iron, copper, sulphur, chemicals, coal, and coke) to provide the means of production. There was no intention or attempt to drive out private enterprise where it was well established; indeed, it was hoped that the setting up of State concerns would facilitate the growth of secondary industries in private hands.

It was estimated that the financing of this Five-Year Plan would require a capital expenditure of about 40 million Turkish liras. In 1933 the Government established the Sumer Bank to replace the former Industry and Mining Bank, with a capital of 20 million liras. In the early years of the Republic the Government was most reluctant to accept any financial assistance from foreign sources, but before the Five-Year Plan was launched a credit of 8 million gold dollars was accepted from the Soviet Union, and in 1934 a further loan of 10 million gold dollars from the same source. This latter was mostly used for the expansion of the textile industry, with which the first Five-Year Plan was chiefly concerned. The total number of spindles rose from 72,000 in 1931 to 189,000 in 1938. New factories were established at Eregli with 16,000 spindles, and at Nazilli with 25,000 spindles, whilst a factory near Istanbul was enlarged by 10,000 spindles. The largest cotton-spinning factory in the Near East is situated at Kayseri with 33,000 spindles.

The siting and distribution of factories was decided by the Sumer Bank after very careful consideration of many factors, such as the location of raw materials, transport facilities, and strategical requirements. The Government was also concerned to ensure an even distribution of industrial development over the whole country, and thus to avoid the dense concentration of factories and population such as has occurred in the Western industrial States. They were also anxious for all sections of the population to participate in the benefits of industrialization and thus prevent the possibility of a widening gap between the industrialized and agricultural sections of the population.

It is interesting to notice that the iron and steel works at Karabuk, one of the largest plants constructed under the Government plans, is situated far from the iron-mines at Divrigi, but near to the coalfield at Zonguldak. This is, no doubt, due to the fact that the iron-ore was not discovered at Divrigi until the construction of the plant at Karabuk was well under way. This was built by the English firm of Brassert, and opened in September, 1939. The development of Zonguldak and Karabuk is the most important part of the Government's programme for the establishment of Turkey's heavy industry, on which the future of Turkey as an industrial country so largely depends. The cotton mills at Kayseri and Malatya, again, are not situated actually in the cotton-growing districts, but are connected with them by rail, and, being well inland, are comparatively safe in case of invasion. Another mill at Eregli is nearer the source of supply, on the railway, and about 100 miles from the coast.

The principal cotton-growing district is the Cilician plain around Adana and Mersin. This is the centre of private enterprise in the textile industry. The cotton farms, anything up to 5,000 acres in extent, are organized on a capitalist basis, and the use of machinery in agriculture has reached a more advanced stage here than in any other district of Turkey. The Government has already done much to encourage the cotton industry, and now has in hand ambitious plans for its further development by means of a vast irrigation scheme based on the damming of the River Seyhan. This project is due to be completed by 1945, and will undoubtedly increase the productivity of the area.

Paper, glass, and ceramics were also included under the Five-Year Plan. A glass factory capable of producing 50 per cent. of the total internal consumption of the country has been erected at Pasabağce, on the Bosphorus near Istanbul, with a capacity of 5,000 tons a year. A paper mill was recently opened at Izmit with a production equal to half the country's total consumption, and a cellulose factory has been erected close to the paper mill to supplement the raw materials already produced in Turkey.

As regards that part of the plan concerning the establishment of basic industries—coal, iron and steel, chemicals, and copper. The developments at Zonguldak and Karabuk have been referred to above. An anthracite works has also been erected at Zonguldak, with an annual output of 70,000 tons. In 1935 a sulphur factory was opened at Keciborlu, with a production of about 4,000 tons per annum. A factory for the production of sulphuric acid has been built at Zonguldak, and another at Izmit for chlorine and caustic soda. Cement factories have been erected at Sivas and Kartal, near Istanbul. Copper had long been produced in small quantities at the rich mines near Ergani, but under the Plan this has been greatly increased, and several other mines in the north-eastern part of the country have also been opened.

In 1937 the Government announced a Three-Year Plan for the exploitation of Turkey's mineral resources under the guidance of a State institution called the Eti Bank. These mineral resources had been greatly neglected under the Ottoman Empire. Coal, for instance, had been mined at Zonguldak for about one hundred years, but in 1923 production

was only about 600,000 tons. By 1939 it had risen to over 2,500,000 tons, and it is estimated that this is still nothing like the maximum capacity of the mines. The export of chromium ore, of which so much has been heard lately in connection with the Turco-German trade talks, has risen from about 3,400 tons in 1923 to about 200,000 tons to-day. This represents about one-fifth of the total world production of chrome ore. Lignite rose from 4,600 tons in 1925 to over 100,000 tons in 1938. In spite of this, minerals still form a very small proportion of Turkish export trade, chrome accounting for only about 3 per cent. of the total value, and other exported minerals (coal, copper, lead, and zinc) about 2 per cent. The principal exports are agricultural products—tobacco, fruits, cotton, mohair, and grain. In 1938 tobacco accounted for 27 per cent. of the total value of all Turkish exports, fruit 26 per cent., grain 9 per cent., and cotton 7 to 8 per cent.

Some of the mines were till recently still owned by foreign concessionaires, and under the Three-Year Plan it was proposed that the Eti Bank should buy out these foreign holders of mining concessions. In every sphere of development the Republic has had to face the additional financial burden of buying out the foreigners, who, under the Ottoman Empire, had been allowed to acquire such a predominating hold over the country's commerce, industry, transport, and finance.

The Eti Bank was also entrusted with the development of power resources. In April, 1940, a contract was signed with Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Co., Ltd., for the construction of a large power station on the Black Sea coast near the Zonguldak coalfield as part of an electrification scheme to cost 1½ millions sterling. After a good deal of drilling for oil, a field was struck near Siirt in the spring of 1940. This is interesting, as its proximity to the 'Iraq frontier and to the adjacent fields in the Caucasus and Northern 'Iraq suggests that it may prove to be an important extension of the vast fields stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian.

On completion of the Five-Year Plan in 1938 the Government announced a new Four-Year Plan. The chief features of this new Plan were the further development of the Zonguldak-Karabuk district, on which the heavy industry was based; the further expansion of the consumption goods industries; improvement in railway communications by the purchase of locomotives and rolling stock abroad; and the partial industrialization of Eastern Turkey. The Plan also provided for the development of shipping by the purchase of twenty-eight ships. This Plan was considerably affected by the outbreak of war, since firms in belligerent countries found it impossible to fulfil their contracts. Some of the more urgent contracts were placed with the Western Powers, preference being given naturally to those parts of the Plan which increased the country's military strength.

As I have mentioned before, Turkey was reluctant in the early years of the Republic to accept financial assistance in any shape or form from foreign countries. But after the Five-Year Plan had been launched she modified her policy in this respect, and large loans have been accepted from England, France, Russia, and Germany. It is proposed that capital and interest will be repaid in exports over a period of years. Turkey also

aimed at increasing her exports to balance the imports of machinery, etc., needed for the programme of industrialization.

Trade between the United Kingdom and Turkey has varied considerably in recent years, but at no time during the past thirty years have the prospects of trade between the two countries been so bright as at present, in spite of the fact that we are engaged in a great war, in which problems of sea transport are such a predominant feature. The British share of Turkey's trade has risen steadily during the past few years, and to-day stands at 17 per cent. of the total of Turkish trade. For the first five months of 1941 imports from the whole sterling group amounted to 28 per cent. of the total Turkish imports, which is about double those of 1940.

Much of this success is undoubtedly due to the activities of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, established in April, 1940, with capital provided by the Treasury, for the purpose of developing trade with Turkey and the Balkans. Only a few weeks ago it was announced that the Corporation had scored a notable success by an agreement with the Turkish Government, involving the purchase of Turkish foodstuffs, chiefly dried figs and raisins, to the value of 4 million Turkish liras. At the same time it was announced that the Corporation had decided, with the approval of the Turkish Government, to spend £250,000 sterling on the improvement of equipment for the discharge of cargo at Alexandretta and Mersin.

Speaking at a dinner in Smyrna on the occasion of the annual Smyrna Trade Fair last month, the British Ambassador to Turkey referred to the great development in commercial relations between the United Kingdom and Turkey during the past three years, and pointed out that during that period Turkish exports had risen from 2 million liras to 35 million liras, whilst British exports to Turkey during the first eight months of 1941 amounted to £3,600,000 sterling. The Ambassador expressed his belief that this development will be permanent. It is very much to be hoped that this will be so, because I do feel that the development of commercial relations must be the most solid basis for the strengthening and maintaining of friendship between our two countries. It is very necessary to develop cultural relations also, but these are rather in the nature of buttresses to the central and fundamental scheme of international trade. The world has come to its present chaotic state primarily owing to world-wide economic dislocation, and if we are to have any hope of an enduring peace in the future the world has got to be planned on an economic basis that will draw all nations closer together and banish the idea of economic nationalism, which has contributed so much to the present appalling chaos.

Railway construction has played a very important part in the development of Anatolia. Before 1923 the only tracks were the Berlin to Baghdad line through Edirne, Istanbul, Eskisehir (with a branch line to Ankara), Konya, Adana, Aleppo, and thence along the Syrian frontier as far as Nusaybin, whence there was a gap to Kirkuk and Baiji in Northern 'Iraq. There was a line connecting with the Berlin-Baghdad track with Izmir, and some local branch lines in the western part of the country, besides a narrow-gauge track constructed by the Russians during the last war from Erzerum to Kars. Since 1923 the length of railway lines has been more

than doubled, and the central part of the country is now well served by rail communications. The important centres of Kayseri, Sivas, Malatya, Diyarbekir, Samsun, Erzincan, and Erzerum are now all connected with the capital.

The Berlin-Baghdad railway, which had reached Mosul in March, 1940, was finally completed in June, 1940, when the first through train from Baghdad arrived at Hayderpasha. Many new lines are under consideration or construction, notably one across the northern part of the country to connect the Zonguldak-Karabuk area with the port of Samsun, and Amasya with Erzerum and Trabzon. It is also proposed to extend the line from Diyarbekir to Siirt and Van.

Roads have not been so well developed, and in most parts of the country are non-macadamized tracks, which renders them extremely difficult for motor transport in bad weather. The Government has recently completed a motor road from Istanbul to the Bulgarian frontier, and another from Trabzon on the Black Sea coast to the Persian frontier, to connect with Tabriz. This latter road is of great importance to the commerce of the Middle East generally. Apart from these two roads, the total length of macadamized roads throughout the country does not exceed about 10,000 miles. In the autumn of 1939 the Government announced a plan for the construction of 20,000 miles of roads within the next ten years, at a cost of about 120 million Turkish liras.

The Government has also paid much attention to the development of sea transport, particularly coastal traffic. The country's long coastline is especially suitable for the transport of goods from place to place by this means, and numerous additions have been made to Turkey's merchant fleet under the Five- and Four-Year Plans.

The policy of industrialization, which has involved the acquisition of much valuable machinery, naturally raised the question of technical experts in an acute form, and the Government has therefore paid great attention to education, particularly higher education. In principle the educational policy of the Government aims at giving the whole population equal opportunities in life. Elementary education from the ages of seven to twelve is compulsory and free in all Government schools, and in certain cases free board and lodging is provided. Except in the minority schools all education is secular, and no religious instruction is given. Co-education is the general rule in most Turkish schools. In spite of the great strides made in the building of village schools in recent years, nothing like universal elementary education has yet been attained. This is partly due to the scattered nature of the population in many districts of Anatolia, partly to the lack of trained teachers, and partly to the urgent need for trained personnel to occupy higher posts in the administration, which has caused more attention to be paid to higher education. I was, however, very much astonished last year, during a tour of some villages in Anatolia with an educational inspector, to find well-built and well-equipped schools in quite small villages. I was also very much impressed by the enthusiasm of some of the young teachers, many of whom live rather lonely lives far from their own families and environment, but they all struck me as being imbued with real zeal for their work. I was particularly interested in one

school situated in a fertile valley in Northern Anatolia, where the students, boys and girls, did literally everything for themselves, from the construction of the bunks in which they slept to managing their own dairy farm, milking the cows, feeding the chickens, growing their own vegetables, fruit, etc. I was much struck by the friendly atmosphere existing between the teachers and students, and everyone seemed so genuinely pleased at the interest taken in their activities by foreigners.

Secondary education is provided for children from twelve to fifteen years of age in a three-year course at junior high schools after completion of their studies at the elementary schools, or, alternatively, they may attend a four- or six-year course at one of the various technical or commercial schools. From fifteen to eighteen education is continued at the *lycées*, which prepare students for qualifying entrance examinations to the universities and various specialist schools and institutes such as the Gazi Institute of Education, the School of Political Sciences, the Higher School of Commerce and Economics, the Agricultural Institute, etc. Some idea of the growth of higher eduation may be gained from the fact that in 1940 there were approximately 7,000 students at the Istanbul University. Before the war a large number of students were being sent abroad for special training at Government expense. One of the most important institutions in the higher educational system is the School of Political Sciences, in which the most successful students from the *lycées* go through a special four-year course to train them for the higher administrative posts in the Government.

Elementary education has been greatly facilitated by the substitution of the Latin alphabet for the Arabic script in 1928, and the introduction of the metric system. It seems to be generally agreed by educational authorities that an illiterate person, whether child or adult, can be taught the Latin alphabet in about one-third of the time required to teach the Arabic. The somewhat drastic attempts to purge the Turkish language of all words of Arabic and Persian origin, which were encouraged by the Atatürk through the Society for the Study and Reform of the Turkish Language, have been greatly modified, though a number of neo-Turkish words and expressions appear to have been accepted as permanent and are in general use.

Whilst speaking of education I should like to mention the great increase in the number of Turks who speak English. I noticed this particularly after an absence from the country for some years. Many of my friends who formerly spoke little or no English had become quite fluent. I often met quite young children who were studying the language and seemed delighted to have the opportunity to converse and practise it with an Englishman. It is truly remarkable how many Turks succeed in acquiring a sound colloquial knowledge of English in Turkey, without ever visiting this country. I have frequently been astonished at the excellent accent of Turks who have learnt their English only in Turkey. In this connection I should like to say that it has often puzzled me why so few Englishmen take the trouble to learn Turkish, which is one of the most interesting, beautiful, and widely spoken languages in the world. The reason may possibly be that the facilities for its study in this country

are so limited. It is a curious thing that, whereas we have Chairs in most of the languages of Asia—Arabic, Persian, Sanskrit, Hebrew, Chinese, Japanese, etc.—at our universities (in some of these languages there are several Chairs at different universities), there should be no Chair in Turkish, apart from a Readership at the School of Oriental Studies, and that was only instituted in 1939. It does not seem to be generally realized that Turkish is spoken by many millions of people from the Mediterranean and the Balkans to the Great Wall of China, and from the northern slopes of the Himalayas to the Arctic Circle. The inhabitants of the Turkish Republic form only one part of the total Turkish-speaking peoples of the world, and, although there are naturally considerable differences of dialect, one could, with a knowledge of Western Turkish, travel from the Golden Horn to the Great Wall of China.

The study of archæology has been greatly encouraged by the Republican Government, and there is certainly almost unlimited material for such studies in Turkey. Many museums have been opened in all parts of the country, and the People's Party encourages the public to take an interest and pride in the ancient history of Anatolia. Much knowledge revealed in recent years has been incorporated in the official history books used in the schools, compiled by the Society for the Study of Turkish History. The Turkish Government has been particularly anxious that Turkish history should be taught in accordance with nationalist ideas and not from books compiled by foreigners. Although some of the official textbooks bear traces of excessive nationalist bias, this is certainly preferable to the distorted views presented in certain works published by foreigners in the past. One learned Turkish friend of mine assured me that the celebrated work of Von Hamer has been proved to be full of errors by recent archæological and other historical discoveries in Anatolia.

The most important medium for the spread of cultural activities and adult education generally are the *Halk Evleri*, or People's Houses. These institutions exist in all the important towns throughout the country. Although the People's Party plays an important part in the management of these clubs and gives financial support to them, membership is free, and anyone may join, whether he belongs to the party or not. The activities of the People's Houses are extremely varied, and include education in history, folk-lore, languages, literature, the drama, music, drawing, theatricals, and cinema shows. All the larger institutes are equipped with libraries and reading-rooms, and in many centres clinics also exist. The People's Houses also provide facilities for social gatherings and sports, and have done much to encourage archæological excavations and the opening of museums. I was shown round a number of these institutions by personal friends of mine who were officials of the party, and I was frequently asked to deliver lectures in Turkish.

A fine new radio station has been erected at Ankara, built on exactly the same lines as our Broadcasting House in London, but more modern. I was shown over it last year by the Director and the head of the Turkish Publicity Bureau in Ankara, and they very kindly allowed me to witness in one of the studios a wonderful performance of "Kara Göz" by an amateur, who took the part of all the characters himself. The wireless is

now very popular in Turkey, both in private houses and also in public restaurants, cafés, etc. The musical programmes combine the traditional Turkish style with Western compositions. The Atatürk himself strongly encouraged the introduction of Western music, and disliked the Oriental type of music, which he felt to be out of harmony with the general policy of Westernization. Some of the modern Turkish composers have attempted to compromise by remodelling some of the Western tunes on Turkish lines, and by giving some of the traditional Turkish tunes a Western air.

Amongst foreign stations that broadcast in Turkish, the B.B.C. news bulletins appeared to be generally appreciated, particularly owing to the fact that the announcers are pure Turks with good Turkish accents, as opposed to the mixture of Levantines employed as announcers in the Turkish programmes of certain other countries.

I should like to conclude my lecture by telling you the following anecdote. Whilst I was in Istanbul last year I attended a series of public A.R.P. lectures given by a Turkish official. In the course of one of these lectures the speaker said: "There are only two countries in the world that have never been beaten—Turkey and England." I was rather puzzled by this statement until he went on to explain that what he meant was that the Turks and the English never admit defeat. I believe the favourite motto of Marshal Pilsudski was: "To be victorious and to rest on your laurels—that is Defeat; to be vanquished, but not to surrender—that is Victory." That might well be written at the top of Lord Gort's despatches published last week, and it might well be the motto for the Victory campaign in this war. When Mustapha Kemal heard that an armistice had been signed in October, 1918, he refused to stop fighting, and he went on fighting for the next four or five years until he had achieved his object and founded a Republic on entirely revolutionary principles. To-day we see all the great national revolutions of the past twenty-five years being tried out in the furnace of war—Bolshevism, Fascism, Nazism. If the Turks should ever be called upon to defend *their* revolution, we may be quite certain that they will do so with all the ardour and vigour of their martial character and in the spirit of their great leader, Kemal Atatürk.

Mr. Goodchild: I am very pleased to have this opportunity to thank the lecturer for his interesting paper. I think I beat him in one respect, and in one respect only, that my acquaintance with Turkey is of thirty-six years' duration. I lived in a Turkish house in 1905, and that gives me, shall I say, a point of view which enables me to appreciate the wonderful details of the evolution of Turkey to which we have listened. May I express most fervently my admiration and gratitude for what I have heard.

Gen. Sir John Shea: I would like to endorse what Major Burton said about the prospects of the action which Turkey would take, and what she would do, if she were called on to defend her country. Some twenty years ago I had the experience of being on the other side to the Turk. That time is now happily passed, but I had enough sense twenty years ago to quite recognize the military virtues of courage, and endurance, and capability of working as a soldier should, that distinguish the Turk. I can speak for the Division and the Corps that I commanded in saying that we always recognized we were fighting a gentleman in the Turk, and that we always knew he was a gentleman with whom we could take no liberty. He was a magnificent foe, and I rejoice to think he is now an even more magnificent friend.

A MEMBER: May I ask a question? I wish our lecturer would tell us how the grandmammas and grandpapas of Turkey get on with their emancipated children.

Major BURTON: I think the tremendous social changes which have taken place have been carried through very smoothly indeed. One would think that with such drastic changes there would be some trouble, but people have settled down extremely well. I must say I have seen no trouble.

The CHAIRMAN: It remains for me to thank the lecturer on your behalf for this very interesting paper. I am sorry his official position prevents him from going into some details or forecast of what the political or military situation might be in that part of the world, but at present he cannot touch that side of it.

As one who has followed very closely developments in Turkey for a number of years, I feel very happy about our relations with the Turkish Government. I believe the late Ambassador here said the Turkish sense of humour was very similar to that of our own. That is a great cement between two people. We have just heard from Sir John Shea how the Turk is a clean and tough fighter, two characteristics we claim to be national to this country. As regards his remark from the military side, "we realized we were fighting against gentlemen," it was not so very long I happened to read a French translation of a leading article from one of the Turkish papers, saying that the reason the British and Turks understood each other was they were both gentlemen. I think there is underlying our alliance something that is much more substantial than merely political influences.

Major Burton has covered a lot of ground and I do not think I will enlarge on any of his points. I will, therefore, ask you to signify your thanks to Major Burton in the usual way.

IMPERIAL STRATEGIC RESERVES

By THE RIGHT HON. EARL WINTERTON, P.C., M.P.

Lecture given on October 1, 1941, The Right Hon. Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., in the Chair.

A note on this lecture was made in the last number of the Journal. Full notes are given below.

"*We need always to keep in mind the vast and world-wide nature of our task in winning the war, and the great dangers, as well as the great opportunities, which will be our companions throughout its accomplishment. Above all, we should never forget the inexhaustible reserve of moral support and physical help which is to be found within the countries of the Empire. If we fail to utilize both to the fullest extent we shall not deserve victory.*" (The closing paragraph of an article on "The Mobilization of the British Commonwealth" by the Right Hon. Earl Winterton, P.C., M.P., in the *Quarterly Review*, April, 1941. It is this article to which he refers in the lecture notes given below.)

I HAVE before me not only a tremendous subject but a formidable task in presenting it, and I am faced at the outset with a distasteful act, distasteful because it seems so egoistic, of explaining my qualifications for the task. That, however, is necessary.

In 1892 I first went to Egypt, where I had many rides and talks with Lord Kitchener, and have visited the country many times since. I have been in Turkey in peace and war; fought in the last war in Gallipoli, Palestine, Sinai, Syria and Arabia, and have ridden over hundreds of miles of those countries. For seven years I was Under-Secretary of State for India in three administrations, the longest period of any Minister at the India Office except my uncle, Lord George Hamilton, and during my term of office paid two semi-official visits to India. I have visited the North-West Frontier Province twice, and motored or flown over thousands of miles of it.

I have been in most of the territories in West, South or East Africa—in the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Portuguese West Africa, the Belgian Congo, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, The Union, Kenya, Tanganyika, Abyssinia and the Sudan, and am a large landowner in Northern Rhodesia.

For a short time I was Deputy Air Minister and member of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Could I have had a wider catholicity of experience?

It was with the knowledge thus gained that I wrote my article, "The Mobilization of the British Commonwealth," in the April number of the *Quarterly Review*. I see no reason to change what I said there, for although events have changed they have not altered the essence of the problem.

I regret only one phrase, "amateur strategist." This is a lack of precision of phrase, for everyone should understand strategy, though few can appreciate tactics.

What then are the strategic points and line to be defended? What

troops available to do so? How may we support and give munitions to the troops in question?

Let us consider what we cannot do. We cannot deny passage of Axis troops across Spain or the present occupation by them of Spanish and French Morocco and Algeria. It will be difficult to prevent them getting into Dakar. But in that event we may hope to invest the place by sea and so stop them getting further south.

Our western Imperial line begins, then, in West Africa, and joins up across friendly French territory to the Sudan, across the Western Desert and Egypt. It is clearly desirable to push back the Axis in Libya with the aim and optimum of taking Tripoli. The importance of the defence of Egypt and the Canal speaks for itself. Further east we must look to the southern Turkish boundary, and concert a common plan with our Russian allies to defend the Caucasian and Persian oilfields. The defence of India on the north-west is less of a problem now that Russia is on our side. Afghanistan, in the most unlikely event of its wishing to attack us, would be in an impossible position with two Great Powers north and south of her, for Kabul could be reduced to a heap of ruins in a few hours. The real danger to India would be from an Axis advance across Persia. Hence the supreme importance of a Caspian *cum* Caucasus "Torres Vedras," in conjunction with our allies, to protect oil and India alike. Tribal revolts in Palestine, Persia, Iraq and North-West Frontier present no great problem, but Burma and Singapore must be held at all costs.

What troops should be available, apart from the Russians, on this vast front? They are not all fully trained and equipped, but this should be remedied next year, and we have a stiffening of veterans. Making a very rough guess of numbers, there should be 1,200,000 Indian, Burmese, and Malayan troops; 150,000 Free French (European and African); Poles and Belgian Africa will also supply regiments; there should be 250,000 Imperial troops of European descent, excluding reserves in Australasia—the term "Australasia" including Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Kenya, Southern and Northern Rhodesia. There should be 200,000 British-African and Sudanese, and 1,500,000 British troops. This makes a grand total of 3,300,000. The probable number of potential Russian first-line troops, even assuming loss of another million of present Russian army, after training and equipment would be not less than 6,000,000. The high birth-rate of Russia, and its vast reservoir of man-power, could largely maintain this figure, despite heavy losses.

Thus, assuming the Axis to be in possession of most of European Russia, but held on the Caucasian front, the Allies could command, say, by early 1943, land forces of close on 10,000,000, in addition to a garrison in the British Isles of 1,000,000 first-line troops (British, Poles, Czechs, etc.), and 1,500,000 Home Guards. With such a card of re-entry we could smash the Axis line and get into Continental Europe somewhere. No racial or coloured prejudices should stop us using the best African troops, for example, against European enemies.

In Timoshenko, Budyenny, Voroshiloff, Wavell, Auchinleck, one or all, or perhaps some lesser soldier, yet unknown, we may have the key to

the problems of who could handle such masses of men. The Slav, let us frankly admit the fact, though cruel in the mass, is kindly, humorous, tolerant in the individual. Thus Russian and British soldiers should understand each other and fight well side by side. All observers agree their discipline is excellent. The great, and unavoidable, disadvantage of training for higher command in the British Army is lack of opportunity of commanding large armies in large areas. In peace-time, working with large armies is impossible anywhere, and in great areas it is only possible in India. But the experience of the last two years has been invaluable. We may add to these nine and a half millions available outside these islands anything from two to three million veteran Chinese troops on our side when Japan declares war on us.

My plan, as disclosed in the article, and my speeches plead for an Eastern, Australasian and African supply group. Slowness of action by the India Office, the Colonial Office and the Government of India in the earlier days of the war has hitherto hindered this, though the situation is improving. The potentialities of railway, ships, oil refineries, palm oil factories of West Africa, the mines of the Congo and Southern and Northern Rhodesia are tremendous.

Here some would continue their peace-time production, others switch over to munitions. South Africa is already rapidly becoming an arsenal in its industrial districts; *a fortiori* this is also true of India, where the potential power is almost unlimited. Australasia is forging ahead, Malay making a useful contribution.

In conclusion, with our usual misuse of language and sloppy thought, we refer to the last war as a " world war," apparently in contrast to this one. But this is likely to become—before it is ended—a " world war " on an even greater scale. The cumulative distress and misery thus inflicted upon the human race is terrible to contemplate, but the alternative—world domination by the bloodthirsty monsters who rule Germany—is worse.

Nevertheless, I believe that, on ethical and moral grounds alone I am justified in saying that, irrespective of any economic, political or constitutional consequence after the war, the whole might of the British Commonwealth should be developed and hurled at Hitler and his accomplices. If we win the war and it thereby heals certain traditional suspicions between us and Russia, both Tsarist and Soviet, she and we and a friendly China can keep a major peace in Asia and Africa and Europe for a hundred years.

Our friends in the United States can do the same in North and South America. I say to those in the audience with young children and grandchildren, Isn't that worth while?

Sir Alfred Watson: I pretend to no competence to deal with the large strategic plans of which Lord Winterton has spoken. These in their sweep carry the war further and further East to the very borders of India itself. They cover the whole Middle East. The special point I would make is that this war is not going to be won without very much more aid from the East, and especially from India itself. We are too accustomed to speak complacently of the inexhaustible resources of the Empire. Let me first point out that the white population of that Empire is one hundred

millions—less by a quarter than the combined populations of Germany and Italy, without reckoning a single man from the countries that have aligned themselves with the Axis. Unless you can call to a greater extent than has yet been contemplated on the four hundred millions of India you are outnumbered in fighting men and in working men from the beginning.

Only yesterday in the House of Commons Mr. Churchill spoke of two millions as the limit of a force that we could place on the Continent from this country. Lord Winterton has calculated to-day that with something like a million Indian soldiers we may have a fighting army of three and a half millions to place alongside our allies. We are still speaking in terms of the first million men from India, a country that could easily give us with proper organization ten million men of fine fighting quality. If we are to win in the field we must enlarge our ideas.

But I am more concerned at this moment with questions of supply. It is not the lack of recruits that is hampering us. They come forward as volunteers in an unending stream, but we have not the means to equip them. The total working population of these islands that can be turned to munitions and to the needs of the civil population is fifteen millions at the outside. Contrast that with the resources that Hitler can command by calling in the man-power of the conquered and occupied countries, none of which are subject to the draft for trained soldiers. We stand in the proportion of one to ten. We are hopelessly outnumbered and no effort that the United States has hitherto made comes near to restoring the balance.

It is in this field that India can give us the preponderance if its resources are fully utilized. There you have a country rich in natural resources of every kind, with a population approaching four hundred millions, with millions of men having inherited craftsmanship and the capacity, with the minimum of training, to handle the most complicated machine tools. You must industrialize India and that at a far quicker pace than has hitherto been attempted, and you must do it without regard to any possible further injury to British commercial interests. It is something of a tragedy of our relations with India that it has required a world war to bring home the manufacturing capacity of that country, although its dependence in the main upon agriculture has, with an ever-swelling population, threatened to present us with one of the great tragedies of history.

If the task of the Eastern Group Conference is pursued with full energy, then we shall see India not only sending millions of men to fight but making itself responsible for the main equipment of these forces and for supplies to a war front that threatens to stretch ever further and further towards the East. Not enough is yet being done and time is short. India wants an army of technicians and probably she also wants capital, and certainly she wants the energy that some Englishmen in the past devoted to the creation of particular industries there. It is to no purpose to condemn the Indian Government for slowness in realizing what would be necessary. None of us realized what would be required, and in normal times the men of the governmental machine in India are over-

worked and in the strain of a tropical climate have little inclination to seek out new tasks for themselves. Help in abundance for organization must be given from Great Britain. Only with that will India be able to realize her full potential, and unless she does we may see the war lingering on for years beyond the point at which it might have been brought to an end. I have not the least doubt that if you give India the tools India will produce the goods.

In thanking the lecturer for his address, Lord HAILEY said that they were indebted to him not only for giving them the benefit of his wide experience but for the frankness with which he had spoken. There was, Lord Hailey agreed, some mistaken thinking on the use of the term "amateur strategist." Tactics were, it is true, a matter for the professional; the major strategy of war was a matter which was, in fact, seldom decided by the professional services. It involved a wide knowledge of the political and economic factors involved, and anyone who had made a serious study of them might legitimately express an opinion on the strategy to be followed. There had been in the course of the present war a continual widening of the strategic horizon which made great claims not only on our knowledge but on our imagination. We had now, in fact (outside the British Isles themselves), three major lines of defence to consider, for we were still at the stage when we could not contemplate undertaking the offensive, until we had broken the back of the attack on us. We had the line of West Africa, necessary to secure sea communications to Cape Town and the East; secondly, the Mediterranean and North African line, necessary to prevent land invasion of Africa which might carry the enemy down to Cape Town and thus cut the Empire in half; and, thirdly, the combined Middle East and Caspian-Caucasus line, necessary to defend the Middle East oilfields and the approaches to India. There might arise a further stage when we should have actively to defend a fourth line commanding approach to Malaya and India from attack from the Far East.

It might well be that, in the end, we could not win through without calling on the great reserves of man-power in Africa and the East to which Lord Winterton had called attention. But we could not make effective use of this merely by the recruitment of great masses of men. We should need a vast industrial and economic organization of which the primary essentials were at the present wanting, and much of which—such as machine tools and highly skilled operatives—could only be supplied now from Great Britain or America. Planning and regulation on a comprehensive and far-reaching scale would be required; but it was a primary requisite of such planning that Great Britain and the United States should expedite their own production of the material needed by the potential industrial man-power of Africa and the East, in order to make it possible to assemble the equipment necessary to make an effective use of the potential military man-power available in those lands.

OUR UNDERSTANDING OF CHINA: PAST AND PRESENT

By W. M. KIRKPATRICK

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on October 29, 1941, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

IN the course of what I have to say, I purpose casting a few reflections on our past attitude, both official and non-official, towards China and the Chinese. If you think what I say is recrimination, then I insist, in words attributed to Mr. Churchill, that "the use of making recriminations about the past is to enforce effective action at the present."

My knowledge of China is not extensive. I claim, however, to have had some helpful background before I visited China proper in 1937. I was in India in business for some thirty years. In 1924 I went on a two years' commercial-financial mission to Japan, where I made intimate friends with Prince Konoye. I also made the acquaintance of two Prime Ministers, Mr. Kato and Mr. Wakatsuki, and some members of the Cabinet, and began to know really well the heads of all the principal Japanese banks and business houses, including Dr. Dan, who was assassinated, and Mr. Ikeda, his successor as head of the Mitsui Company. I believe and hope I became something of a trained and tolerant observer of Far Eastern affairs in which I tried to specialize during my seven years in the House of Commons, where I was an active member of the China Committee.

My first contact with Chinese—as highly skilled craftsmen—was forty years ago in India, when I noted the significant fact that Indians called them *Cheena sahibs*. Later, in Burma and Malaya, I met Chinese business men, including Mr. Lin Ching-tsong, the then leader of the Chinese community in Rangoon, where, as in the West Indies, Canada, Malaya and Calcutta, they had a well-deserved reputation of being notably law-abiding and loyal to their civic and commercial obliagtions. In 1927 I went to HongKong for a month on work which brought me in touch with the heads of the Chinese and British Communities both non-official and official. On my first day in HongKong at the Repulse Bay Hotel I learnt from a Chinese waiter the pronunciation of the first ten numerals in the local dialect. As the names of dishes on the menu were numbered, I ordered my meals in "Chinese." A Shanghai British merchant who heard me thus "talking Chinese," advised me that talking to servants in Chinese was derogatory and face-losing.

I found in HongKong in 1927, and when I was there again in 1937, that, generally speaking, British officials and non-officials adopted the same attitude towards the Chinese as some of our Colonial officials, it may be, are constrained to adopt to all "natives"; at its best, the "father and mother" attitude of the traditional British official in India, at its worst, a pontifical condescension towards, and dangerously near intolerance of, "subject coloured races."

Dining one night with two or three Chinese friends, I was told of a "great event" which had taken place the night before—this was still in 1927—at a British Club dinner party. "To-night," announced the chairman, "is a notable occasion. For the first time in the history of the Colony two Chinese gentlemen have been admitted within the portals of this club." As my Chinese host remarked, he was not sure whether it was intended as a compliment to the Chinese guests or to the club and its members.

In the British Shanghai Club, Japanese are—or were—admitted as honorary members, but Chinese, I believe I am right in saying, not even as guests. Japanese are members of the Social Club in Peking, run by diplomatists, and when I was there in 1937 some British members argued against me when I expressed surprise and asked how and why Chinese were not eligible.

When I was in HongKong in 1927 it was represented to me that views on Far Eastern policy expressed by the Government of HongKong never seemed to get past the Colonial Office; perhaps, it was suggested, because they differed from the views of the Embassy at Peking? At that time our Peking Embassy were not wholeheartedly supporting, if indeed they were not actually hostile to, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, who, however, had a notable sympathizer in our then Consul-General in Canton. The Consul-General at Shanghai, I believe, took yet another line. These known divergencies of opinion were not helpful in our understanding of, or our relations with, the Chinese, and were in a large measure due to our continuing to maintain our Embassy isolated in Peking. The removal of the Embassy from Peking was overdue in 1927.

The Foreign Office tenaciously hung on to this stronghold of a Pinchbeck society till a year or two before 1937. Every Foreign Minister for ten years previously was being continually pressed on the question in the House of Commons, but the views, presumably, of the permanent pandits prevailed, and, as in so many other foreign affairs, subsequent events have proved the Foreign Office to have been uninformed and short-sighted.

When referring to our foreign representatives abroad I would emphasize an impression—a conviction I formed in China, and I am now talking of 1937. It is decidedly the fact that our Consular officials in that country are, in the nature of their work, to a greater extent, diplomatists than they are or are required to be, in other parts of the world. What I believe militated against their full use and value as diplomatists was that the Embassy was their only conduit pipe. With half the Embassy at Nanking and half at Peking, and attachés and counsellors of various sorts many hundreds of miles distant from each other, too frequently letters purporting to emanate from the Ambassador were liable to be issued and signed by some quite junior Embassy secretary. Results accruing from this procedure were to give junior secretaries a spurious degree of authority and a semblance of seniority and superiority over the whole Consular service. Another view I formed in 1927, and was more than ever convinced in 1937 that I was right, and would be immeasurably to the benefit of our relations with China, was that the administrative Civil Services of HongKong should be drawn from the China Consular Service.

Specialists could be recruited as at present. It is also time that we opened the doors wider to the admission of Chinese British-born subjects to administrative appointments in HongKong.

When I was in HongKong in 1937, there occurred a ruffling of the feathers of dignity in Governmental dovecotes because a prominent Chinese Cabinet Minister had at the eleventh hour cancelled his appointment at a tea-party audience the Governor had asked him to attend. The Chinese Minister was passing through HongKong on his way to Canton to work of importance concerning his own country.

I suggest that any Governor of HongKong with Colonial experience is, in the human nature of things, liable to look upon Chinese—whether residents in British territory or in China proper—as he does on the natives he has been used to "looking after," and he expects to be looked up to by, during all his Colonial service. I advocate that the Governorship of HongKong should always be held by a member of our Chinese Consular Services under the "general direction" of our Ambassador to China.

It requires no special vision to foretell, to foresee, that the head of our Embassy in China is going to be one of our most important diplomatic posts abroad, not next but equal in importance to our diplomatic representation in the United States. In China we will assuredly want—it is in the highest degree essential that we must have—say, men of the calibre of Lords Lothian and Halifax. For China we will want a man of the same standing and qualities as a Viceroy of India, a man of the same weight, experience and status in the British Empire as Mr. Wellington Koo has had and has in China. There are many millions of Chinese who live and work and contribute all that is best in citizenship in British possessions, Colonies and Dominions. The goodwill and loyalty and prosperity of these millions of Chinese living in British territories is alone worth while encouraging—for a hundred obvious reasons. For one thing, our good reputation with and the goodwill and co-operation of 450,000,000 of peace- and freedom-loving people is worth cultivating in these days and in the days to come. I make bold to say that, largely due it may be latterly through sitting pretty in Peking, no British Ambassador in China has ever made or left any lasting impression on China or in the eyes of the Chinese. They have been officially efficient, true to the best Foreign Office traditions, amiable or reserved, or punctilious or obscure, or standoffish or pleasing to the British community or popular with the Peking "diplomatic set." It may be they never had the opportunities now afforded to our present Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clerk Kerr—who is doing a job of work no other Ambassador has had to do, and is doing it with zeal and a full understanding of the present situation and of Chinese aspirations beyond praise. I pay equal tribute to Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, who had the advantage of a part-time headquarters in Nanking. It may be opportunity produces the man, but it is the future for which we must have prevision to prepare and make adequate provision.

I repeat, our future Ambassadors to China must be outstanding men of affairs, men of the world, with vision and experience of the doings and goings on and realities of the outer world, learnt in the outside world, in public life in England or the Empire, and not in the pigeon-holes of White-

hall or the cooped Chancelleries of a shattered and broken Europe. China is, and is going to be—it inevitably must be—as important to us as India is; as South America is, and is going to be, to the United States (and also to us);and as China is, and is going to be, to the United States.

If ever there was a democratic people in the world it is surely the Chinese. The British Commonwealth of Nations, the two Americas and China—and now Russia—make a combination which surely can and must secure a return to world-wide sanity and the relegation of Japan and Germany to their proper place—outside the comity of civilized nations—until they have been tamed, and trained, to take a place in a democratic and regulated world.

I arrived in Shanghai on January 7, 1937, and within a few days was disturbed at two things I saw, which made me feel that every Ambassador and Consul-General, both British and U.S.A., and every O.C. British troops in Shanghai of recent years required badly hauling over the coals. One was that throughout the time I was in China—and I understand it had been going on for two to three years previously—regularly at frequent intervals the Japanese army marched in procession up and down the main street of the International Settlement—armoured cars, guns, and lorries full of steel-helmeted Japanese marines with fixed bayonets. Humiliating and provocative not only to the Chinese, equally and more so in its calculated effrontery to us and to the U.S.A. I had not previously heard of this tactless typically Germanic-Japanese bluster—nothing in our Press at home and nothing of the kind ever reported by the China Association or others on whom we rely for information about China. One wondered if either our own or any foreign officials in China ever represented this Japanese insolence to their Governments. If not, why not? And if they did, what action did any or our Government take? Was it ever represented to the Japanese Government that these provocative and humiliating antics were, to say the least, not calculated to improve friendly relations with the Chinese, or with us or the U.S.A.? Secondly, what disturbed me was the housing of our British troops. The Japanese army barracks were within a stone's throw of the river front. The British garrison, one battalion, was quartered some three miles inland. The might of Britain was seldom seen except in couples of Tommies armed with swagger canes walking about the shops or going to cinemas. I visited these British troop barracks—ramshackle wooden huts contiguous to the Zoo, built in a hurry ten years previously, and quite unfitted for the gruelling, steamy, unhealthy hot weather—which was worse than anything I experienced anywhere in India—or the bitter perishingly cold winds of winter. Contrasted with our barracks was the Japanese reinforced concrete, several storied, glorified block-house with steel sliding doors—usually open to display the war paraphernalia which, as I have described, so blatantly took the road so frequently.

When I mentioned my concern about the unsuitability of our barracks, I was told the answer was they were only temporary, and, after all, no troops were ever stationed for more than twelve months in Shanghai. When I asked if I could get a photograph of the Japanese army headquarters I was warned that I would be arrested and beaten up, as had

been the fate of an Englishman who had tried to take a photograph a few weeks previously.

Both these subjects, which I have time to specifically refer to to-day, are a reflection on the hide-bound unimaginative policy and attitude we have too long pursued in our relations with China, in our mistaken desire, one is bound to surmise, to placate the " implacable "—I mean the inconceivably conceited, block-headed Japanese militarists, perfect examples of Japanese aptitude for mimicry.

When we have one of our ex-Ambassadors, after being lulled, and gulled, for two or three years in Japan openly avowing in the Press here, not so long ago, that "no sensible British subject can possibly be pro-Chinese," it is not surprising that since the report of the abortive Lytton Commission, Chinese opinion, Governmental and other, has not always been impressed with our avowals of friendship for China or our protestations of disinterestedness or otherwise in Far Eastern policies, and particularly in Sino-Japanese relations.

Wherever possible when I travelled north, south, east or west I broke away from convention and stayed, for instance, when visiting Canton with my wife, not on (or in) the Shameen but *in* Canton as the guests of the Governor of Canton, or in Hangchow as the guests of the Provincial Governor, Mr. Chu Chia-Hua. It was here in Hangchow also that my wife and I had an informal, nearly two hours' tea with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek in their lakeside, very modest villa. It was through such direct contacts and opportunities not ordinarily attained or obtained through official channels that within a few weeks of my arrival in China I knew that a united China had irrevocably determined to resist Japanese bullying and aggression. Incidentally, I knew that with the certainty of war, opportunities for carrying out the work of my mission would not arise or mature until our Government had decided on what was to be our policy in the event of war between China and Japan.

In Shanghai we have one of the largest and most important British communities living as an entity in any non-European country. Larger even than Calcutta. In the past twenty-five years they have suffered and have patiently and pluckily faced many hardships and many vivid and perplexing vicissitudes. If there remain some, as there certainly were in 1937, among whom still lingers cynicism and surprise and the spirit of the intolerance of the good old days of opium and ignorance, of Chinese achievements and aspirations, the incidents in Shanghai and Nanking of August, 1937, and after, not to mention Tientsin, have, one might expect, opened their eyes to what the Japanese " new order " means for British and American interests and investments in China.

Even when I was there, however, the days when the British or American *taipan*, or even bank clerk, once a year " condescended " to dine with his *comprador* had already passed. I found the younger generation of British and American businessmen—and many of the leading positions in commerce were happily held by young men—sensibly tolerant and sympathetic, without reservations or prejudices and moving, and had indeed gone a long way, towards genuinely friendly social relationships with the Chinese.

We know of the close relations of the Chinese and their important position in our Malayan colonies, whose present-day prosperity is to a large extent due to Chinese enterprise, ingenuity and initiative. If any good can come out of Japanese aggression, may we not hope that it will be in increased understanding and friendly and commercial relations between China and Burma, and China and India? I appeal to all Indian leaders and all interested in India and China—and their 8½ hundred million people—and I urge Mr. Amery to take the initiative to inaugurate and encourage a movement for close, active and effective co-operation between India and China. So far as I know there is none, or it is negligible, or little interest or understanding or knowledge of China in India and *vice versa*. There are surely enormous opportunities and a great need for friendship and trade between the two countries, such as are already developing between China and Burma.

Why should not India and Burma send their own High Commissioners to China and invite China to reciprocate?

It is good news to hear this week that a Chinese Government bank is shortly to open a branch in Calcutta.

Incidentally, it is of great significance to note that, as a general rule, the chief executives and managers of Chinese banks, whom I met wherever I went, and whose advice I sought in a variety of financial proposals and transactions, were almost without exception highly qualified men with English and American University degrees. Our own Far Eastern bankers have no doubt noted this trend and example.

I have said much about the past. But I hope that, based on a realization of past omissions and mistakes and apathy and failure to face facts and recognize the realities of China, and of Japanese intentions as our enemy—and that and nothing less is what the Japanese militarists are and have been for at least the past decade—our whole attitude, official and non-official, particularly the latter, will change.

Nor is it yet too late—nor too soon—for us to come down openly and unequivocally and wholly on the side of China. I would that we could make the decision immediately. The Japanese, including the militarists, are sitting on the fence ready and glad to come down on our side—as certainly every Japanese banker and business man will do—smiling blandly when we win the war—as we will.

In our own interests—economic and material if you will, certainly political—we must and can rely on our Prime Minister to seize the opportune moment to declare, invite and accept China as our unqualified formal ally. As Russia is.

If Japan were convinced of our determination to support China, if only to the extent that the U.S.A. is on our side, Tojo and Togo would think twice. Let us at least declare that we are prepared to lead the way, and our alliance with China would assuredly be joined by Russia, and I believe by the U.S.A. sooner even than we dare to hope.

Mr. GULL: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have been asked to open what I hope will be a lively discussion on the very interesting points which we have had placed before us.

I should like to begin by saying how very valuable I personally, who, as you know, have had a certain amount of experience in the Far East, consider the points which have been made this afternoon. I would like, in particular, to stress the last point of all—the desirability of our recognising China as an ally. Personally, I cannot help feeling that that is going to come; that it is on its way. There are various considerations, of course, weighty considerations, that have to be taken into account, but I think myself that ultimately it is almost certain to come. Incidentally, I may perhaps remark that there was an article in the *Spectator* several months ago by myself in which this possibility of having China as an ally was discussed.

To turn to the other points with which the speaker dealt. He was critical, and justly critical, of a great deal of what has been the attitude, both official and unofficial, in the past towards China. But I am going to ask you to consider his points in relation to a background which he did not touch upon, but from which the behaviour which he noted in China may be held to have emerged. In this Society, as in the Royal Institute of International Affairs and most similar Societies, what phrases are most frequently heard? Surely if we select one as being " British interests " we shall not be far wrong. If we select for another " prestige " we shall not be far wrong. Now, if you transfer your minds to the scenes where British interests have got to be looked after and British prestige has got to be maintained, you will allow that the attitude of residents in China is likely to be somewhat harder and less academic than it has been amongst us who use those phrases in London. I think it is very right that such failures on the part of British residents in China as have been mentioned this afternoon should be criticized, but I do ask you to consider whether those failures have not proceeded from our constant preoccupation, here, in the heart of the Empire, with the twin conceptions of British interests and British prestige.

In regard to another point upon which the speaker touched, the very important one about HongKong being administered by members of the China Consular Service. I do not know to what extent the speaker had projected himself into the future when he made that suggestion; but I would ask you to consider whether the British Consular Service in China is going to remain the kind of Service that it is to-day, when so many of its activities owe their existence to extra-territoriality.

Then I think that the speaker was a little bit unfair in regard to British Ministers in China. He said, if I remember rightly, that no British Minister had made any sort of impression at all upon the Chinese, and that none of them were remembered. I would suggest that Sir John Jordan's name, for instance, is not altogether forgotten in China. I think I could name two or three other Ministers also who, you would agree, made something of a mark in their time.

In regard to Peking and the tenacity with which the British Embassy and the whole diplomatic body hung on to life there, I think it is fair to remind you that for ten years prior to 1927 China had been rent by civil war. He would indeed have been a remarkable prophet who could have foreseen the ultimate outcome of those civil wars. I agree that when the

outcome had declared itself, and when the National Government had been established, it was high time to shift to Nanking, but for the ten years preceding 1927 our hesitation about moving was not unnatural.

Sir DOUGLAS BROWNRIGG: May I touch very shortly and quickly upon three points: (1) Social contacts; (2) accommodation in Shanghai; and (3) the relations between the Ambassador at Peking and the Governor of HongKong.

I was on the Administrative Staff in China for four years, which is my excuse for speaking. First of all, social contacts. I do not think soldiers generally show the way of diplomacy to diplomats, but in this case a soldier did. The first man to take a stand and entertain Chinese in his house was General Sir John Duncan, who commanded the Shanghai Defence Force in 1927. In my own poor fashion, when subsequently I went to HongKong, I was instrumental in getting the three Chinese members of the Governor's Council elected as members of the Polo Club. They did not play themselves, and one of them suggested to my wife that I should hire a boy to play for me whilst I sat in the pavilion and drank tea!

In regard to accommodation in Shanghai, the lecturer mentioned the appalling conditions under which our soldiers lived. It was not for want of the soldiers' asking for better accommodation, but there was a good deal of dispute as to who should pay. Remember, it was an *international* settlement. The troops were accommodated inside and outside it. The anomaly was that the officers of the regiments were the only people paying for anything out there, as the local taipans were not subject to income tax, so did not pay a cent towards the accommodation of the troops who were protecting them!

The third and last point is this: The lecturer suggested that in the future relations with China the Ambassador at Peking should be in control of the Governor of HongKong. That is as if our Ambassador at Madrid was in charge of the Governor of Gibraltar. I don't think *that* would work very well.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK: As to the point made by Mr. Gull about our having an exceptional Ambassador to China, I accept the indictment. I accept Sir John Jordan as having been a very exceptional man. He was from that very service I have been extolling, the Consular Service.

On the other point about HongKong, raised by Sir Douglas Brownrigg, I think I said that I thought the Governor of HongKong should be under the general directions of the Ambassador. That is a popular term as used in the Foreign Office. For instance, Sir Otto Niemeyer is under the general directions of the Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN: Our most interesting lecture has been so admirably summed up and answered by Mr. Gull and Sir Douglas Brownrigg that it only remains for me to thank the lecturer and those who so ably took part in the discussion.

I thank you, Mr. Gull, and you, Sir Douglas, for your very valuable and informative remarks. They have added to the interest of a lecture which has given us much food for thought, and we tender for that our thanks.

THE SHATT-EL-ARAB

By DR. J. V. HARRISON, D.Sc., F.R.S.E., F.G.S.

Notes on an illustrated lecture given on December 10, 1941.

WORLD war No. 1 has had strange repercussions, not the least being that I have to talk to you this afternoon about the Shatt-el-Arab. Little research served to demonstrate my great ignorance, but at length I found a possible reason for the invitation to discourse upon so unfamiliar a subject. I commanded a small unit beside the Shatt for a time and being keen on swimming often bathed in its waters in spite of official discouragement. I plunged in with more or less grace from bank or boat and can therefore claim that I have been entirely immersed in my subject.

The Shatt-el-Arab is a babe amongst rivers; its birth, according to some historical evidence, taking place within the last twenty centuries. In spite of its youth it has grown to be an extremely fine specimen, a good 100 miles long in its course from Qurna to the bar below Fao and seldom less than a quarter of a mile wide. Unlike the brook, it comes from no "haunts of coot and fern" nor makes "a sudden sally," but starts life where the two great rivers of Mesopotamia used to join. It is in Iraq all right, but could it ever have been in Mesopotamia?

Consider its progenitors the Euphrates and Tigris. The former is one of the world's big rivers, but spends its birthright upon riotous living. Before its journey is half done it is reduced from the well-to-do status of a silvery river flowing between rising banks to the poverty of ill-defined swamps. The Tigris, too, a mere stripling compared to the lusty Euphrates, is going strong in early and mature life, but near Kut its broad serpentine winds, its equivalent of the strait and narrow path starts forking and leading it to dispersion. Sloughs are formed where it drops its yearly load of silt, from which, however, some of the water returns by channels between Qaleh Saleh and Ezra's Tomb, feeding the trickle flowing through the Narrows below Amara. At one time the Tigris joined its dissipated neighbour from the west at Qurna, but now the main connection is downstream at Nahr Umar. Below Qurna the river still sets out with a brand new name and maintains a fairly resolute progress for nearly 100 miles downstream. Then the old weakness reappears, and just before it reaches the sea it forks again and ends in a bar!

The history of Mesopotamia goes back about as far as any in the world. Intepretation of human records enables some guesses about the geography to be made for perhaps 5,000 years. Legends go further back and tell of an earlier flood, until, as retailed by generations of fishermen, they say it engulfed the world. The flood seems to have incommoded life in at least a few villages of Mesopotamia for a week or two. The story tells that it affected particularly one called Ṣhuruppek in which Hasis Adra lived. A conjunction of rather simple phenomena would have done all that was necessary. A strong south-east wind during spring tides, accompanied by violent rain with thunder and perhaps with an eclipse or earthquake thrown in, all happening about the month of May would suffice, for at that time the snow water has been released and is

coming down fast enough often to produce floods on its own account. The story of his craft shows that Hasis Adra had already got what pitch he needed for it. In an early account there is mentioned a long period of darkness, which seems to have lasted during the rainstorm. The grounding of the boat may have taken place on such a mound as grows around any ancient village on account of accumulated refuse, possibly in the region of Najaf.

About 4,000 years ago one Rim-Sin records that the Euphrates reached open water at Eridu near Ur of the Chaldees. Lagash, about forty miles to the north, was also on the sea. Sennacherib, on an expedition against Persia, describes the mouth of the Euphrates as being twenty-five miles away from that of the Tigris, and four hundred years later, in 300 B.C., Alexander had a town called Charak built, which perhaps lay somewhere north of Abadan Island. Nearly 2,000 years ago irrigation works on the lower Euphrates had closed its channel to the sea and caused it to flow into the Tigris. This record of Pliny seems to fix the age of the Shatt-el-Arab for us. The plain on both sides is dotted with abandoned towns, many of them now on sites without water, like Kushk, Basri and Kushk Hawiza, but which were at one time close to or on the sea. Qubban, Ubullah and Old Basra were once centres of shipping activity.

Old Basra was built about 637 A.D. near the present Zubeir, on the right bank of the Euphrates, and in the days of Harun al Rashid, Sinbad used to visit it from Baghdad to embark on a fresh expedition down the Persian Gulf. The old town probably fell to ruin after six hundred years, when the Mongols invaded Mesopotamia about 1258 A.D., and by destruction or neglect of up-river irrigation works ruined a flourishing country. The present Basra stands east of the old one and is now about three miles from the Shatt. Abadan was a town standing on the sea nine hundred years ago, and around it at low tide mud flats stretched for six miles to the south. Three hundred and fifty years later the town stood three miles upstream, and is now thirty-six miles from the inner bar. This gives some idea of the way in which the river mouth is building up and moving outwards the great mud flats adjoining the imperceptibly raised land which escapes submergence at the ordinary flood tide, giving promise that more and more land will yet accrue down gulf. Recent estimates put the rate of advance of the river's mouth at one and a half to three miles per century, which, if true, seems to be considerably less than it has been in the past.

Just before 1914, extensive surveys of Mesopotamia had been carried out by Sir William Willcocks and A. T. Wilson in connection with possible irrigation works. The principal interest of these to us is that they put on the map the great area of swamp and lake land that lies beyond an arc running from Nasiriya, near Ur, to Ali Sharki, about twenty miles above Amarah, and extends east and south over an area of 4,700 square miles to the vicinity of modern Basra. They called attention to the higher land forming a tongue forty miles wide and eighty miles long on the right bank of the Karun River, which is not now liable to flood readily. Sir William Willcocks pointed out the "highlands" south of Basra, rising 2·40 metres above high-tide mark and extending to the slopes of Arabia

with only a narrow belt of swamp south of Zobeir. This arrangement of swamp and solid is very suggestive. It seems to me that the Karun and the Karkhah Rivers, coming down from Persia, have built a dam across the shallow Persian Gulf, and have trapped a lagoon behind it into which the Tigris and Euphrates are discharging still and which is consequently being steadily filled in. This may account for the tale of open water to Eridu and Lagash in the last 5,000 years, when possibly the south-west advance of the Karun-built land still left a wide channel leading to what has just been called the lagoon.

The Shatt-el-Arab, from Qurna where it takes the name, to Basra forty-two miles below, keeps to the western edge of the Karun "highlands" and has only a low silt wall between it and the Hammar Lake, which is open water from Basra to near Nasiriya. At Basra, about one hundred miles west-north-west, it enters the "highlands" and cuts across them in a channel lined with date gardens and tending to fork into various components, and these in turn tend to silt up. The Shatt is joined by the Karun at Mohammerah, which junction is due to the Karun having abandoned its old outlet to Khor Musa in 1766 and having taken to a canal that was cut earlier to allow communication to take place between the two rivers. It is probable that the Shatt has not been alone in draining the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris to the sea across the obstructing "highlands," but that a channel near Zobeir leading to Khor Abdulla also played its part, though silting up has now choked it. In all this land a canal cut for transport of irrigation may affect the local geography beyond the dreams of its digger and perhaps divert the whole river from which it started as a ditch.

Since the sixteenth century travellers have visited and recorded their impressions of Basra, sometimes flourishing, sometimes squalid, always with an ocean trade. The Portuguese used it a lot. In 1776 it changed hands, and the Turks took it from the Persians and held it till 1914. Up to this time there was not much volume of traffic. The steamers that called were discharged privately into *mahailas* or lighters, and the Turks provided no more port facilities than a shed where goods could be examined by Customs' officers. The transit trade was important, and most of the imports were carried up the Tigris on a few paddle steamers or on the barges they towed alongside on the five-hundred-mile journey against a strong current on the shoally river. Much of the export trade was of local origin and depended upon the harvest of dates.

Along both banks of the Shatt for a variable distance from it, ditches were cut and the tide served to drive the water up them and so irrigated the date gardens which line the river from Basra to Fao. This belt varies from a few yards to about five miles wide, the distance back from the river being limited by the distance water can make up a canal between tides. It was to increase the width of this date land that Willcocks designed a canal parallel to the Shatt from Basra to Fao which would have enabled water to travel further from the bank, for that alone is needed to extend the area under dates.

There are at present in this region about seven million trees on the Iraq side of the Shatt and about two million on the Persian side. They need

plenty of water at their roots and a long hot summer to bring them on. A palm is raised from cuttings which, under the favourable conditions of the Shatt neighbourhood, develop to the bearing stage in about five years. There are male and female palms and fertilization of the flowers on the latter is done by hand in April. The fruit forms a month later and ripens about September. A palm may yield six or seven bunches of 20 or 30 lbs. each. The harvest is gathered by nomad labour which comes in from the desert and takes payment in kind. About 80 per cent. of the world's market is supplied from the Shatt-el-Arab, roughly 150,000 tons being exported. Before 1914, however, it was barely half this in a good year. Then, as now, *baghalahs*, high-pooped wooden ships, carried some of the harvest away to the coast of East Africa, and an occasional four-masted ship came up for a load for the same destination.

When the Turks became involved in war on November 5, 1914, the bar of the Shatt below Fao was about ten feet deep at low tide. The scour of the tide kept the Shatt itself clear to a depth of nearly thirty feet. The tide at the mouth varied for neap and flood conditions between five and nine feet, so that at best vessels with 19 feet draft could get into Basra. When the expeditionary force from India came to the Shatt, where already two British sloops had been on duty under menacing guns and in danger from ambush, the Turks, to make things more difficult, first mined the mouth and tried to block the river a fortnight after the first troops landed on November 7 near the Sheikh of Mohammerah's palace. However, at the critical moment, one of the four ships in the blockade swung with the tide and left a narrow passage which, though dangerous at night, was of little hindrance during the day.

In the course of the Mesopotamian campaign, congestion of shipping off Basra was often acute, and in the spring of 1916 the lack of adequate equipment for handling stores was so serious that it took six weeks to get a ship unloaded and turned round, and as many as twenty vessels might be waiting their turn to be dealt with. About this time the Inland Water Transport was recruited to relieve this. Wharves were erected along the right bank of the Shatt near Magil, where the scour of the current had moulded a steep bank so that twenty-five feet of water was to be had alongside. A fleet of river steamers, links of railway to Nasiriya and Amara, and commodious store-houses behind the wharves were speedily collected or constructed, so that by the end of 1917 twelve steamers could berth and be unloaded at the same time. Six or seven ships were cleared daily and their waiting period reduced to about three days. Four more berths were erected fifteen miles above Magil at Nahr Umar, where the main outlet of the Hammar Lake enters the Shatt.

Whilst this activity was displayed to improve communications, there was reclamation in progress at some points along the banks of the Shatt near to Ashur. A suction dredger anchored in the stream spouted mud from its discharge over the artificially raised bank, from which the water drained off and left the silt behind to consolidate. A little dredging of the bar was done at this time and the channel deepened by about eighteen inches. A start was made on lighting and buoying the lower reaches of the river so that night traffic became possible. Machine shops, a slipway,

and a small dockyard were part of the services installed by the Inland Water Transport, which by 1919 was using a fleet of more than four hundred boats, some specially designed for the work, as many boats and over seven hundred barges.

At the end of the war the port administration which was in charge of the services on the Shatt was made over in 1921 to the Iraq Government as an almost autonomous department under the Minister of Finance. The port's through-put to and from Baghdad rapidly declined to a normal by 1923, but exports of oil from Abadan were increasing rapidly to far greater tonnage than had ever been sent to Baghdad and had all to cross the bar. An old arrangement between Iraq and the Persian Governments at that time thrust all responsibility for port and conservancy works in the Shatt-el-Arab upon the Basra authorities, and indeed the frontier did not keep to the centre line of the water-way but to its edge near Abadan, a curious point of international law which was cleared up in 1937 by agreement between the two countries, although the Persians still do not share the task of dredging and conservancy of the Shatt with the Basra authority.

A deeper passage than nineteen feet was urgently needed years ago and in 1924 work was seriously started, though with only one dredger. A year later two ships were at work and they kept at it for eleven years, shifting nearly ten million cubic yards of silt annually. A third dredger came into use in 1935 and a fourth two years later, so that the volume of silt handled has doubled. The bar is sixteen miles out to sea from Fao, and by stages it has been cut by a furrow three hundred feet wide and twenty-eight feet deep at first, then thirty, and at last in December, 1930, thirty-two feet deep. This was only done after thorough investigation carried out in 1923 by Mr. F. Palmer, when new surveys were made and a working plan drafted. At first the channel dredged was four and a half miles long in 1925, but by 1939 it was nineteen miles long. All this has been done under the Port Director, Sir John Ward, who hopes with a fifth dredger in his fleet to be able to keep the channel thirty feet deep at low tide and four hundred feet wide, so that shipping may be able to come and go at any state of the tide.

Taking the inner bar as starting point, Fao is five miles off. It is base and depot for the dredging operations. Abadan, at mile 36, is the oil port and refinery, at which there is an array of ten jetties, which handle the freight brought in for construction and the output of oil, which has amounted to 9,000,000 tons in a year. Mohammerah, at the mouth of the Karun, is forty-nine miles from the bar and has been an important port for Persia, though all material there has to be lightered ashore and handled again at the rapids near Ahwaz. Basra, or rather Ashur, comes at mile 64, and Magil, with its eight berths and four temporary ones, the headquarters of the Port Directorate, at mile 69. Beside the wharves there is storage for 120,000 tons of cargo and for 200,000 tons of grain. Cranes for working the ships range from floating shear-legs and the crane Pahwan, which can life 85 and 30 tons respectively, to the electric cranes on land graded to handle 8, 3, and ½ ton each. In spite of this equipment, it is notable that the shipping handled in Iraq export tonnage has only increased to about twice its post-war (1922) figure, and that it has been

the steady increase in the oil exported alone which has made the conservancy works on the lower river and its mouth essential. Nahr Umar, which served its turn during the rush of No. 1 Great War, was shut down some time ago.

With all this coming and going through a tricky and buoyed channel a pilot service has had to be efficiently maintained. At first, before 1914, pilots were by ancient tradition men from Kharaq Island, but they numbered barely a dozen, so that additional men had to be found, and finally the pilot service was maintained under the control of the directorate on a pilot vessel anchored beyond the outer bar. Ancillary was the care of lighthouses to the entrance of the Persian Gulf.

The Shatt-el-Arab used to be a difficult water-way to visualize. It seemed so shut in, and in spite of Sir William Willcock's "highlands" below Basra, the lofty eminence of 2·40 metres, or even the adjoining heights on the Arabian shore above the plain of river silt which rise at once to over 6 metres, hardly gave one a bird's-eye view of the whole. Nowadays, with the common use of the aeroplane, this complaint cannot be made, and the selection of views is possible from the barren mud flats, a grilling waste of slime and meandering channels where only mud tortoises and gulls are to be seen, up the avenue of the Shatt or the Bahmeshir to Magil, with Coal Island just above it, where the lowest channel takes off to Hammar Lake and over the barren stretch upwards to sandfly-infested Qurna. The Shatt is young and it is still growing. The Karun sees to that, and the day will come when the Euphrates and the Tigris have filled in the hole behind the "highlands" and that growth down the Gulf will be tremendously accelerated. It may not be so many centuries before some other Society will have to listen to an earnest explorer explaining that it is almost certain that at one time the sea reached Fao and the ships may have been able to travel still further inland, as a recent expedition had unearthed a strange wooden structure, the full extent of which is not ascertained but may perhaps be interpreted as an ancient pier.

A Guest: We have listened with very great interest to Dr. Harrison's authoritative lecture on the Shatt-el-Arab. This river has been of vital importance through the ages to Iraq, not only on account of the fact that it is the one discharge from the interior to the high seas, but also because of the valuable date gardens on either side of it. It is only comparatively recently—about a hundred years ago—when a magistrate in Wales exonerated a mariner who had returned from the Shatt-el-Arab because of some misdeed on the ground that the reputation of the climate was such that any misdeed could be pardoned on that account. But, as we have seen from the excellent slides shown by Dr. Harrison, conditions have fundamentally changed and the facilities on the Shatt-el-Arab are as modern and up to date as in any port or river in the world.

Mr. Cyril Haworth: I have little to add except to say that having lived in that part of the world for a long time there are one or two points of human interest worth mentioning. For instance, we saw a slide of a ruined tower in old Basra which the lecturer did not tell us is known

locally as Sinbad's Tower, after Sinbad the Sailor. That nearby a modern airport hotel has been built which is the best hotel of its kind in the world. It is remarkable to find such a place on such a site.

But further down the Shatt-el-Arab there is a question of interest I would like to put to Dr. Harrison regarding Khor Musa. It is a harbour of tremendous depth and yet there appears no reason for its existence. It has no river flowing into it. Can Dr. Harrison give any explanation for its existence?

Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes drew attention to the importance of the Shatt-el-Arab both to Iran and to Iraq. By previous treaties Iraq was in full control of this waterway, but, after a dispute between the two countries, an anchorage opposite the island of Abadan was granted to Iran.

Mr. Philby: I do not think the Shatt-el-Arab was all Turkish, at any rate not at the time the League of Nations was called upon to mediate; it was then all Iraq; the actual frontier was drawn before the last war, and no one knows why there was a deviation from all the principles which usually govern the boundary question between two contiguous states separated only by a river, but they gave the whole of the river to one state. I am not going to suggest that there were political reasons why the Turks should be given that river, but it was very convenient, and in fairness we should admit that the Persian Government has always had a very solid grievance in that a river which washes its country cannot be used, or could not until this arrangement was made, by its own ships without the obligation of paying shipping dues to a foreign Government. They came to some sort of compromise, but not the one which is obviously desirable, and it is still to be hoped that some day the boundary will follow the middle line of the Shatt-el-Arab.

I have listened with the greatest interest to the lecture which we have just heard, and I should like to trespass on your indulgence for a few moments to give you some of the recollections which inevitably passed through my mind when I heard Dr. Harrison tell you there were 7,000,000 palm trees on one bank and 2,000,000 on the other. My mind went back twenty-five years ago to the days when I used to walk about these very palm trees to count them, and I have no doubt that his figures are culled from data supplied by myself. Another recollection was of an occasion when there was a gymkhana in the hospital grounds somewhere up above Basra; there were wounded troops, a large number of nurses, and I was among the invited guests. I was standing in a row of people and talking to one of the nurses, and what she said was this: "What we really complain of in Basra is that there is no fruit." I replied: "No fruit! Just look over your head." We were standing in the shade of some of these magnificent date gardens of which you have just seen pictures. Every tree was burdened down with its luscious produce. I used to eat fresh dates for every meal every day. The nurse turned to me and said: "Do you not know that an army regulation has absolutely forbidden the consumption of dates by anybody under army command?" And I said: "If you do not eat the fruit above your heads you cannot blame anybody."

Army people are very curious, if I may say so; and I remember a story which might have been told of Mesopotamia, but, to be truthful, it

actually occurred in Egypt, where there is a great river called the Nile. On one occasion I was at a garden-party standing in the middle of a group containing a number of junior military officers, who were discussing their plans for spending a few days' holiday. They told us their arrangements, but said that their great trouble was water. I said: "Did you not say you were going up the river?" And they said: "Yes." And I said: "What is your difficulty about water, then?" To which they replied: "Do you not know we are not only not allowed to drink the water of the Nile, we are forbidden to bathe in it." And I said: "If you will not take the blessings thrust into your hands by Providence you are making troubles for yourselves." I think we are far too squeamish in doing what is known as "living on the country" we are in, and it is extraordinary that troops should be trained in that way, because circumstances do occur in which they have to live on the country, and they find that their stomachs have been so well taken care of that they have not the resistance to throw off the evil influence of the germs they may consume.

The lecturer told us that the Shatt-el-Arab was a relatively young river. I suppose that is in terms of geological time, but even if it is young it is a good healthy infant, and it is the eldest son or daughter of two very venerable and respectable parents, the Euphrates and the Tigris, which are the first two rivers mentioned in the Bible. These two rivers join at Qurna, which is one of the places said to be the site of the Garden of Eden, and has on its banks a tree which has the reputation of being the original tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.

The Tigris and Euphrates have been dissolute rivers and have met and parted at different places. Dr. Harrison did not mention the Shatt-el-Hai, which joins the Euphrates at Nasiriya, and then there is a channel which leads to Qurna through a marsh, and another channel at Gurmat 'Ali. I remember an occasion on which I once invaded the marsh country from Amara and made my way down a recognized channel, recognized by the local people as being the old Nahrawan Canal, and came out into the Shatt-el-Arab without ever touching the Tigris. We should use the name of Shatt-el-Arab for the whole channel up to the point to which the tides reach, which is roughly at Qurna at the present moment. The lecturer did rather pour scorn on the "highlands" in the neighbourhood of Basra, and it is certainly extremely difficult to recognize them as highlands. He explained how these creeks were excavated out of the silt from the Shatt-el-Arab up-country, as it were, and got to a point at which the tides cannot reach them. As these tides reach 70 miles inland to Qurna, which is presumably somewhat higher than these "highlands," it does explain why the dates do not reach as far inland as we would like them to reach. He also suggested that it would be nice to have another canal from the Euphrates to the Shatt-el-Arab in order to get more dates, and he suggested that this would throw the creeks out of business.

Dr. Harrison: No, no; I did not say that.

Mr. Philby: But one has to realize that those creeks serve two purposes: they are the channel through which the extensive palm groves of that area are fed, and they are also the sewers through which all the drainage of that country is carried away.

I was going to talk about the waters of the Shatt-el-Arab, which are excellent—I have often drunk from them—but one would not do that in the creeks because all the sewage goes into the creeks and is poured out by the river into the sea. I do not know how many gallons flow down the river every second, but it is such a strong power of water that it cleanses itself within a foot or so.

Dr. HARRISON: You heard the right man speaking last, one better qualified to have given this lecture. It is quite a problem why the Khor Musa should be deep water, but I think it has an explanation. The Karun and other rivers coming down from the Persian hills lose a lot of water through seepage, and that seepage has to go somewhere. The water which disappears up-country into the silt banks up and forms springs. Springs are not only to be found on land, they may also issue out in the sea, and at Khor Musa there are fresh-water springs bubbling out into the creeks. That water is apparently adequate to keep open the deep channels of Khor Musa. This is the only feasible tale which I have heard to account for the astonishing dead-end of deep water found in the inlet.

Mr. Philby's remarks are full of interest and I should like to join issue with him on quite a few points. It is extremely probable that the figures for these trees are his, but lecturers must have some peg on which to hang their remarks! The "highlands," about which I am accused of having been rather contemptuous, struck me as the most interesting fact which emerged in the preparation of this lecture. I could not understand the Shatt-el-Arab and its relation to the mountains behind at all, although I admit not having thought much about it until I was asked to lecture. It then astonished me that here was an inland sea about 5,000 square miles in area for which I had to account. I have endeavoured to do so to myself and to you. Perhaps one is tempted to be contemptuous of the "highlands" in view of the fact that it has been my fortune to spend some of my life at heights up to 17,000 feet.

Lord HAILEY: I am glad to have the opportunity of thanking Dr. Harrison for his lecture and also for the contributions made by the other speakers. I always think that oil must be romantic, although it has its commercial side; now I find it leads one into all manner of happy paths such as the romantic history of an exceedingly important river. This study has brought Dr. Harrison into one of the most interesting countries in the world, Mesopotamia, and I was glad to see some pictures of it again. If the kind of scenery which he showed us really does represent the Garden of Eden, we shall have to reform some of our ideas about its beauty.

How interesting it is to listen to these stories of rivers. They join and part again, break off into side rivers, create new rivers of their own. If one wanted to lend a little romance to those geography lessons which teased us so much when we were young, we could take the association of these great rivers for the purpose. There are great romances connected with the river Niger where it disappears into a vast mass of swamps so that the rain which falls early in the year at its source does not reach the sea until a year and a half afterwards! But I must return to my real task, which is to thank Dr. Harrison on behalf of us all.

THE DRUZES OF PALESTINE

By ELIAHU EPSTEIN

IN the Middle East mosaic of races and communities the Druzes form one of the most intriguing elements. They are probably one of the best-preserved Middle East stocks, as marriage outside their closed community is forbidden by their creed; their cast of face and stature mark them as distinct from the surrounding peoples. Druze history presents many interesting and unusual features.

The Druze people are estimated to number to-day about 150,000 souls, of which 60,000 are in the Jebel Druze, 55,000 in the Lebanon, and 11,000 in Palestine. There are small Druze communities in other countries, among them the U.S.A., which attracted some Druze immigration at the end of the last century. The mountains of Jebel Druze are the stronghold of Druze independence. The Druzes in the Lebanon, who live in more fixed surroundings, have been more subject to outside influences than those of Jebel Druze or Palestine. The post-war boundaries which divide Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine have not loosened the bonds between the various Druze communities, while, on the other hand, improvements in communications have even led to their intensification.

The Druzes of Palestine, to whom this article is mainly devoted, are kith and kin of those in Syria and the Lebanon, but their communal organization and evolution present certain differences which deserve special study.

Origin of the Druzes

Scientists, anthropologists and historians do not agree as to the racial origins of the Druzes. Some hold the view that the Druzes are a mixed race of Persian, ancient Syrian, and Arab descent.* The famous mediæval Jewish traveller, Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela,† in whose writings the first recorded mention of the Druzes occurs, believed them to be descendants of the Yatur (Ituræans)—one of the Ishmaelite tribes who at the time of the Second Temple inhabited South Lebanon, Beq'a, and Anti-Lebanon. The Druze tradition itself is confused and full of contradictions on this point. In recent years the theory of the purely Arab origin of the Druzes has found supporters amongst that part of the Druze intelligentsia in the Lebanon which has come under

* Ph. Hitti, *The Origins of Druze People and Religion* (New York, 1928), pp. 18-23.

† R. Benjamin of Tudela visited Palestine and Syria in 1167-69.

the influence of Pan-Arab ideas. But this view seems to have been inspired less by devotion to scientific accuracy than by the political desire to justify the place of the Druzes in the Pan-Arab movement. One of the most prominent exponents of this school of thought was the late writer and historian, Suleiman abu Izz-al-Din,* who maintained that the Druzes were the descendants of the Arab tribes of the Qahtan branch, hailing from the Yemen. He sought to prove his theory by philological studies into the Arabic spoken by the Druzes and by anthropological arguments. Incidentally, this Druze scholar made much use of the photographs of Yemenite types collected by the Jewish investigator of the Yemen, Hermann Burchardt, who was murdered during his last visit to that country in 1909.

The Druze Religion

The Druze religion is no less of a mystery than is their origin. The fundamentals of the creed and its ritual are kept secret not only from foreigners, but also from the majority of the community itself.

The name Druze is probably derived from Darazi (Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Darazi), the first prophet and apostle of the religion, which originated in Egypt in the days of Khalif al-Hakim,† whose divinity it proclaimed. Darazi, however, was not successful in spreading the new creed among the people of Egypt, and he fled in 1016 to the Beq'a in the Lebanon (Wadi al-Taym on the slopes of the Hermon), where he continued his mission. But more important for the crystallization and the spread of the new religion than al-Darazi himself was the Persian, Hamzah ibn Ali ibn Abmad, a felt-maker by trade, whom Khalif al-Hakim made his Vizier. Hamzah may be regarded as the true founder of the Druze faith, to which he gave definite form. He declared Darazi to be a heretic, with the strange result that the religion to which Darazi gave his name holds its first prophet in contempt. In the course of years Hamzah's teachings struck root in the valleys and hills of the Lebanon, among a population given for generations to an easy absorption of heretical deviations from established creeds.‡

The Druze religion consists, as far as is known, of a mixture of concepts and beliefs drawn from a variety of sources, ranging from Greek philosophy to the practices of various Islamic sects. The secrecy of the Druze religion and the hostility of their neighbours have led to the rise of innumerable slanderous rumours and insinuations about the

* Died in 1933.

† Of the Fatimite dynasty (996-1020 C.E.).

‡ Even to-day Syria and Lebanon can show some twenty-three religious sects and creeds.

Druzes, which must, however, be discounted. The Druzes call themselves *Muwahhidun* (Unitarians)—*i.e.*, believers in one and only one God.* But it is the fundamental tenet of their creed that the Deity has made Himself known to man in a number of human incarnations, of which the most important was in the person of the Khalif al-Hakim. The Druzes hold, according to some reports, that there have been in all some ten such incarnations; Christ is included among these incarnations, but this distinction is refused to Muhammad. The Druzes believe that at some future time, when the trials of the faithful will have reached their climax, God will reappear in the person of Hakim, who will conquer the world for the Druze religion and reunite the dispersed Druzes in their Syrian homeland.

Another fundamental of the Druze faith seems to be a belief in the transmigration of souls. They hold that on the death of one of their members a new birth reincarnating the departed soul replaces him so that the numbers of their population remain unchanged. The souls of the virtuous are perfected from one incarnation to the other, but the sinners may be degraded in their subsequent incarnations to dogs and camels.

The secrets of the Druze religion are known only to an inner circle of a few elect, women among them, known as *Uqqal* or initiated. The remainder of the community, known as *Juhhal*—the uninitiated—know only very little of their faith, and that only concerning some of its outward ceremonies. The Druzes are enjoined jealously to guard the mysteries of their religion from outsiders, and, in order the better to hide its secrets and preserve the community from persecution, they are allowed, like the Nusayriyyah (Ansariyyah),† to dissimulate and pretend that they accept the prevailing religion. This explains why the Druzes have for generations been calling themselves Moslems. During the first half of the nineteenth century, in the days of Ibrahim Pasha, many Druzes, in order to secure exemption from conscription, pretended to accept Christianity. Within the Druze community such cases of dissimulation are not regarded as placing a moral stigma on the individual.

The centuries of this " marrano " life of pretence and dissimulation, which involved the Druzes in much spiritual and material suffering, have, perhaps, been responsible for the growth among them of intense feelings of repressed fanaticism and hatred for their ruling neighbours, mainly, of course, the Moslems, to whose beliefs and customs they were forced to pay outward allegiance.

* The Wahhabis apply the same appellation to themselves.

† The Ansariyyah inhabit the Alawite region of Syria.

Druzes in Palestine

The Druze community in Palestine does not date back to any distant antiquity. Historians believe that the Druzes first came to Palestine in the first half of the seventeenth century, when Fakhr al-Din II., the Lebanese ruler of Druze extraction, extended his hold not only to other parts of Syria, but also to North Palestine. The Druze communities of al-Buqei'a, Beit Jann, Yirka, al-Mughar in Galilee, and those on Mount Carmel were probably founded during this period. The growth of the Druze population in Palestine was fed by the frequent Druze emigration movements from the Lebanon, connected with the bitter conflicts and wars between the Druzes and the Maronites, the by no means rare internecine strife among Druzes themselves, and tribal quarrels in which they took sides. Thus, for example, the prolonged war at the beginning of the eighteenth century between the Qaysites and Yemenites* resulted in large scale emigration of the Druzes from Lebanon, supporting the Yemenite side, to the Hauran. In the course of time the Hauran Mountains—the main centre of refuge for Druzes fleeing from the Lebanon—became known as Jebel Druze (or Mountain of the Druzes).† The Druze villages of the hills and plains of Galilee, which had been in existence since the times of Fakhr al-Din II., also attracted refugees.‡ Thus gradually a Druze population grew up in Palestine, where it became more or less concentrated in the region between Acre and Safed, in many parts of which Druzes came to form the majority of the inhabitants. The Druzes tended to segregate themselves in self-contained areas, as this provided them better security and more freedom to practise their secret religion and customs and usages differing from those of their Moslem and Christian neighbours.

The fact is to be noted that concurrently with the process of Druze emigration from Lebanon to Palestine and their internal migration within Palestine the cross-current of a Druze return movement made itself felt at different times. Whole villages in Palestine were sometimes deserted by their Druze inhabitants, who migrated to the Jebel

* The Qaysites were a tribal branch originating from North Arabia, and the Yemenites from South Arabia. The prolonged wars between the two branches in their territories of settlement in Lebanon were due, not only to ancient enmity, but also to local political and social factors (*vide* K. Basili, *Syria and Palestine*, Odessa, 1862).

† A particularly large wave of Druze immigration to Jebel Druze took place after the 1860 clash with the Maronites.

‡ It is believed that some of the Druze settlers came directly from the Aleppo district (*vide* Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement, 1889, p. 123).

Druze.* This movement reached particular importance during the period of the Egyptian rule in Palestine (1832-40). The ruthless treatment of the Druzes by the conquering Ibrahim Pasha impelled many of them to leave Palestine and flee to Jebel Druze to help defend its independence against the Egyptians.

But apart from such extraneous causes, the constant friction and clashes occurring between the Druzes and their Moslem neighbours provided a chronic reason for frequent Druze movements within Palestine, and sometimes for immigration to the Druze centres in Lebanon, and especially to Jebel Druze.† There is evidence of the existence of many Druze villages in Galilee which are no longer extant, and of the fate of whose inhabitants nothing is known.

Under the Turks the Druzes suffered much persecution on account of frequent risings in the freedom-loving Jebel Druze against the Damascus Governor, under whose jurisdiction the mountain was placed. The Turks often held the Palestine Druzes responsible for their rebellious kinsfolk in the Jebel Druze, and sought to take vengeance on them, especially when they could not inflict retribution on the rebels themselves. The Druze villages sometimes stood out, however, against the exactions of the unscrupulous agents of the Pashas, and not infrequently serious clashes broke out between the Turkish authorities and the Druze villages in North Palestine.

But even more than official oppression, the Druzes suffered from the attacks of marauding Bedouin tribes, the traditional enemies of the Druzes, and from the enmity of their hostile Moslem and Christian neighbours. Deep mutual hostility marked in particular the relation between the Druzes and the Matawalis inhabiting Jebel 'Amal and the slopes of the Hermon.

Status of the Druzes

Officially the Turkish authorities made no distinction between the various Moslem sects to which the Druzes were considered to belong.

* An instance of this kind is recorded of the Druze villages of Mount Carmel. Of the eight villages founded here during the first Druze influx (under Fakhr al-Din II.), only two remain to-day—Dalyat al-Carmel and 'Isfiya. The other six villages, deserted by their inhabitants at the time of Ibrahim Pasha a hundred years ago, fell into ruins.

† Thus, for example, in the last century all the Druze inhabitants of Dalyat al-Karmel were forced to flee from their village because of a blood feud which arose between them and a strong Bedouin tribe as the result of a wrongful accusation of murder. The Druzes, who were forced to seek shelter with their kinsmen in villages on the slopes of Hermon, were only allowed to return to Dalyat al-Karmel after it had been recognized that they had had no hand in the murder. (For a history of the Druze settlement on the Carmel *vide* Dr. L. Graf von Muelinen, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Karmels*, Leipzig, 1918.)

In point of fact, however, the Turkish attitude to the Druzes was influenced by the general Moslem view—shared by Sunni and Shi'a alike—which regarded the Druzes as heretics, no better in the eyes of orthodox Moslems than pagans, and worse even than the *Ahl al-Kitab* (Jews and Christians). This hatred between the Druzes and Moslems the Christian sects had always tried to exploit for their own ends. The Druzes, for their part, were not slow to take advantage of the periodic crises in the relations between the Moslems and Christians, in order to get into the good books of the Moslem majority and repay the Christians in kind.

The Druzes as a community enjoyed no special rights or standing under the Turkish régime and were not allowed to benefit from the *milet* system of qualified communal representation, which operated in favour of both Jews and Christians. They were made dependent on the general Moslem institutions such as the *Awqaf* (religious endowments) and the *Shari'a* religious courts. The anomaly of the Druze position led to endless friction and attempts at Moslem interference and domination in almost all phases of Druze life. This, however, did not prevent the Druzes from maintaining their independent internal organization and jealously preserving the secrets of their religion.

Only with the establishment of the new régime in Palestine after the Great War were the Druzes accorded the privilege of calling themselves openly a separate community, which was officially recognized by the Government. But even under the new conditions the Druzes continued to be placed under Moslem religious institutions (and thus under the Supreme Moslem Council) for many matters connected with education, religious endowments, and in particular personal legal affairs, such as testaments, guardianship, etc. In recent years, it may be noted, a movement arose in the Druze community which aimed at freeing it from its unnatural dependence on Moslem institutions. But as the objects of the movement seem to have been not only separation from the Moslem institutions, but also the establishment of a democratically elected Council to direct Druze affairs, it met with strong opposition from the Druze elders themselves. This movement, however, had not yet reached any very articulate stage when the outbreak of the disturbances in 1936 and the resulting terrorization of the Druze people diverted the attention of the community to more immediate needs.

Distribution of the Druze Population

Of the estimated Druze population in Palestine of about 11,000, some 10,000 are rural dwellers* inhabiting eighteen villages in the neighbourhood of Tiberias, Acre, Haifa, and Safad. The main Druze centre is in the Acre district (thirteen villages), while there are several Druze villages in the Haifa district (two villages), Tiberias district (two villages), and Safad district (one village).

The most important of the Druze villages are Dalyat al-Karmel in the Haifa district (1,154 Druzes†), Beit Jann in the Acre district (1,099 Druzes), Yirkā (1,138 Druzes). These three villages are almost purely Druze in population. Next in importance are the mixed villages of al-Mughar and Hazur in the Tiberias district (877 Druzes), 'Isfiya in the Haifa district (742 Druzes), al-Buqei'a in the Acre district (412 Druzes); in these villages the Druze proportion is 50 to 60 per cent. There are smaller predominantly Druze communities at Julis in the Acre district (586 Druzes) and Hurfeish, near Acre (474 Druzes). The above eight villages accounted for over 75 per cent. of the Druze rural population in Palestine.

Druze land holdings in Palestine are estimated at about 130,000 dunams.‡ Most of the land is owned by the peasants themselves, and there are only a few landlords among the Druzes, who work their land with tenants or hired labour. Few details are available as to the present state of Druze land ownership, but some data were furnished by the 1931 census. Among villages having more than 80 per cent. Druze population, the largest in area are Yirkā with 35,000 dunams (of which 20,750 dunams were officially registered as uncultivable—*i.e.*, under the official formula: "uncultivable with the fellah's present means and equipment"), Dalyat al-Karmel with 31,550 dunams (of which 17,000 uncultivable), Beit Jann with 45,650 dunams (of which 35,000 uncultivable), etc. The total cultivable area in villages containing a Druze population was estimated in 1931 at 140,720 dunams.

* Estimated in December, 1938. At the 1931 census the Druzes in Palestine numbered 9,148, of whom 8,407 were in the villages. The number of men and women in the Druze population is about equal, an important detail in a monogamous community.

Figures given are according to the 1931 census, but in most of the instances quoted little change has taken place. Thus, estimates for the end of 1938 indicate the total population of Dalyat al-Karmel at 1,318 (including no Druzes), as against 1,173 in 1931, Beit Jann 1,355, compared with 1,101 in 1931, etc. It may be noted that a rural Druze population of 496 was recorded in Shafa 'Amr (listed officially as a town).

‡ According to estimates of the Palestine Land Development Company, Ltd.

Economic Structure

The general character of the Druze population is predominantly that of an independent peasantry deriving their livelihood from their own labours; there are few landlords, hired workers, or tenants in the community. The only statistical source of information as to the economic structure of the Druze rural population is provided in the 1931 census. Data for the Druze community were not given separately, but were listed under "others"; as the Druzes form 95 per cent. of this category, we may be justified in accepting these figures as providing a close description of the structure of their community. The census figures indicated that 88 per cent. of Druze agriculturists were engaged in cereal farming (6,941 earners and dependents out of 7,928). Of these, 88 per cent. were peasants working the land themselves, only 1·4 per cent. were landowners working with tenants or hired labour, and 13·6 per cent. were hired labourers. Other agricultural pursuits, outside grain farming, occupied only a small percentage of the Druze population (8·4 per cent. in fruit and vegetable farming, and 3·6 per cent. in sheep and cattle raising). It is probable that since 1931 changes have taken place in many villages, leading to an increase in the proportion engaged in vegetable growing, owing to the remunerative markets which large-scale Jewish immigration had provided.

From the social point of view the Druze community forms one of the most harmonious rural communities in the country. Special reference may be made to a specific point distinguishing the Druze community from its Arab neighbours and exercising an important influence on their economic life. This is the highly developed practice of mutual help and the absence of usurious money-lending among the Druzes, which is prohibited by their religion. The Druzes are thus free from one of the main evils afflicting their Moslem neighbours, who greatly suffer from the ruthless exploitation by usurers from their own community.

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Personal Characteristics

While the Druze tiller of the soil does not differ from the Moslem or Christian fellah either in his agricultural practice or standards of living, observation reveals distinctive features both of external appearance, social habits, and communal organization. The dress of the Druze elders and their fine, aristocratic faces reflect their different origin.* The Druzes are renowned in the Middle East for their courtesy to strangers and their generosity to guests. They regard it as a sacred duty to help the weak and defend those who place themselves under their protection. The solidarity of their community and their highly developed feeling for mutual assistance have already been referred to.

The Druzes are endowed with marked natural intelligence and ability,† but they have fewer educational opportunities than the Moslem or Christian fellahin. Whereas the latter at least receive some instruction from the mosque preachers or the priests, the mass of the Druze peasantry is denied even religious teaching, as the mysteries of the Druze faith are reserved to the few elect. In recent years, however, there has been a growing tendency among the wealthier families, not only in the cities, but also in the villages, to provide a better education for their children.‡

Communal Organization

In its internal organization the Druze community in Palestine differs from that in the Lebanon and Jebel Druze because of difference in social and economic structure and historical evolution.

In the Druze Mountain, almost from its earliest occupation, a form of chieftain government arose which gradually led to the concentration of all power in the hands of one dynastic family—first the Hamdan family, and from 1865 and onwards the Atrash (plural, Tarshan)

* In her impressions of the Druzes, Gertrude Bell wrote: "They are all more or less beautiful. They are dark, straight-browed, straight-shouldered, with an alert and gentle air of intelligence which is extraordinarily attractive . . . cultivated, civilized human beings. . . . The women are very shy . . . the men treat them with great respect and affection. . . . The sheikhs' son and some other persons of importance came to see me: they were a group of the most beautiful people you would wish to see. Their average height was about 6 ft." (*Letters of Gertrude Bell*, pp. 80-87. One volume edition, 1930.)

† In some of the Druze villages people are found speaking foreign languages, in particular English and Spanish, the latter among returning emigrants from South America.

‡ Druzes graduating in high schools may continue their studies at the American University of Beirut.

family, who are still to-day at the helm of Druze affairs. The religious leaders in the Jebel Druze have been relegated by this dynastic family to a secondary position connected only with the cult.

In the Lebanon, where the Druzes achieved some prosperity and a considerable level of economic and social development, a number of wealthy and propertied families soon arose who came into sharp conflict over the leadership of the community. These conflicts eventually divided the community into two rival camps—supporters of the Yazbeks and those of the Janblats—and the struggles between the two sides fill the history of the Lebanese Druzes. But whilst struggling among themselves for supremacy the leading families had united in divesting the religious leaders of the community of temporal power, and succeeded in pushing them into the backwater of purely religious concerns.

Conditions were different among the poor and small Druze community in Palestine. The ignorant Druze peasants living in hostile surroundings had no one to look to for guidance but their religious leaders. Here there were no dynastic leaders or wealthy, influential families to challenge the traditional dominion of the Druze theocracy, and the original structure of the community was thus preserved almost intact.

Although family struggles were not absent in the Palestine community and sometimes led, indeed, to serious clashes, these could not alter the internal structure of the community, as the conflicts were limited generally to personal quarrels and were not based on any economic or political factors, which might have transformed the disputes into a fight for communal power. The unrivalled influence of the religious leaders has thus grown continuously, until to-day they wield such supreme power that nothing can be done within the community without their knowledge and approval.

The present head of the Druze community in Palestine is Sheikh Salman Tarif (the *Sheikh al-Uqqal*), who resides in Julis, for many generations the seat of the Druze religious leaders. Sheikh Salman's conduct of Druze affairs has always been characterized by the traditional Druze policy of cautious adjustment to the surrounding world as long as this did not involve loss of their independence.

Druze Attitude to Jews

Historical records provide many striking examples of Druze helpfulness and friendliness towards the Jews.* It is a fact worthy of note

* R. Benjamin of Tudela wrote in the journal of his journey that "they (the Druzes) love the Jews." A fact which may have contributed to the growth of

that the only village in which ancient Jewish agricultural communities persisted until our own time were the four Galilee villages with a Druze population—*i.e.*, al-Buqei'a (Peq'in), Shafa 'Amr, Kafr Yasif, and Beit Jann—while in none of the remaining 833 Arab villages was a Jewish community known to exist within the last 100 years.*

A notable instance of Druze help was provided in the 1840's, when the Jews of Tiberias and Safad were saved from Arab attackers only on the intercession of Lebanese Druze notables.

In the riots of 1929 the Druze villagers of al-Buqei'a took the Jews of their village under their protection. Even during the present disturbances the Jewish inhabitants of al-Buqei'a were defended by their Druze neighbours until intensified Arab terrorism finally forced this last remnant of native Jewish peasant communities to leave the isolated village which had been their home since remotest antiquity.

The policy of the Druze community with regard to Jewish-Moslem relations has always been as far as possible to preserve an attitude of neutrality.

Despite the extraordinary recent circumstances in Palestine, no links have been even temporarily created between the Druzes and the Arabs for a common struggle against the Jews or British. Incidentally it may be noted that an old tradition of friendship exists between the Druzes and the British which dates back to the Lebanese troubles of 1860. The underlying causes which impelled the Druzes of Jebel Druze to revolt in 1925 were absent in Palestine, and there was no local motive to encourage the Druzes in Palestine to support the Arab outbreaks. It is not intended to suggest that individual Druzes did not take part in the disorders,† but as a whole the Druze community and its leaders remained aloof and withheld any active support. The retribution inflicted by the terrorists on the Druze villages and the losses of life and property sustained by them were no mere accidents. The fortitude and independence maintained by the Druze community in the rude test to which it was subjected in the midst of a traditionally hostile Arab environment merits special appreciation.

these friendly feelings is that the tomb of Jethro ("Nebi Sha'ib") in Galilee in the vicinity of Kfar Hittin, an important place of pilgrimage for the Druzes not only from Palestine, is, according to old custom, also visited by Jewish pilgrims. This circumstance has been not a little appreciated by the Druzes, who take it as proof of the friendly bonds between the two communities.

* I. Ben-Zvi, *The Palestine Population*, p. 84 (in Hebrew).

† Not a single Druze was among those found guilty of murder or plunder or incitement during the 1929 riots.

Links between the Druzes

Strong ties bind the various branches of the Druze family in Lebanon, Jebel Druze, and Palestine. The comparative proximity of Palestine Druze communities in the north of Palestine (particularly in Acre district) to the Druze villages on the slopes of the Hermon was an important factor helping to tighten these relations. There were always strong links between the Palestine Druze villages in North Palestine and the two important religious Druze centres—Jedeideh and Ba'qlin in Lebanon, which are the seats of the religious leader (*Sheikh al-Uqqal*). Disputes between Palestine Druzes which could not be settled locally were often submitted for arbitration to the religious leaders inhabiting these centres in the Lebanon.

These relations were intensified greatly by the Druze rising of 1925, when the Palestine Druzes extended active assistance to their Jebel Druze kinsfolk. With the defeat of the rebellion many refugees from Jebel Druze found shelter for themselves and their families in the Druze villages of Palestine. To this time date many of the personal friendships and attachments between the Palestine Druzes and Jebel Druze leaders, some of whom spent a number of years of exile in Palestine and Transjordan. Both the Druze elders and the younger generation in Palestine see in Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, the head of the Druze revolt of 1925, the leader of the Druze people, which for generations has been no mere religious sect, but a distinct national entity with a strong individuality of its own. Of the Druze people as a whole it may be said that in their intense feeling of communal solidarity and mutual helpfulness in peace and trouble alike they are probably unrivalled in the Middle East. It is this, perhaps, that explains the successful resistance of the small Druze people living in an alien and hostile world to disintegration, assimilation, and even physical destruction.

REVIEWS

The Dutch East Indies. By Amry Vandenbosch. University of California Press. 1941. (Second Edition.)

W. Holland, the International Research Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, is quoted on the cover as stating that this second edition, revised and enlarged, of a work first published in 1933, "can rightfully claim to be unique in its field and will certainly remain for many years the definitive work in the English language."

In the interval between the two editions there appeared, however, J. S. Furnivall's *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy*,* which must be considered authoritative in the wide field where the two books overlap in scope. Whereas competent critics have not, I believe, been able to detect more than one or two slight inaccuracies in Furnivall's study, a number of mistakes in the work of Vandenbosch make it a less reliable guide for the general reader.

Those already well-informed, on the other hand, who will verify details elsewhere, may find it very profitable to consider Vandenbosch's interpretations of familiar facts and tendencies, based as they are on a comparative bibliography.

One of the chapters with particular interest for English readers is that on "Dutch Colonial Policy." During three-quarters of the period of the United East India Company (1602-1798), "the Government at Batavia had stood at the head not of a territory, but of a series of scattered establishments stretching from Japan through the archipelago and India proper to Cape Town,"† and the unpremeditated shift from a commercial to a territorial and political basis resulted from the discovery that the Company could not trade unless it also governed. Vandenbosch gives a very brief exposition of this stage, of the following period of direct Government control (1795-1811), and of the British interregnum, under Raffles (1811-16). It must be noted that, throughout, the author fails to stress sufficiently the importance of Raffles as the founder of what later came to be known as the "ethical" policy, oriented towards the welfare and happiness of the natives, whose culture he valued at its true worth.

This chapter goes on to show how the Netherlands Empire is largely an achievement of the last century; indeed, with respect to the outlying territories, especially, an achievement of the last 40 years, a period also characterizedo by an intensified "ethical" policy and native participation in government. The author clearly describes the sympathetic attitude towards Indonesian ambitions that was adopted by Governors-General A. W. F. Idenburg, Count J. P. van Limburg Stirum, and Jonkheer A. C. D. de Graeff; the inauguration of the Volksraad, the first representative legislative body; and the various currents in colonial policy. Most formulations envisage the continuance of Holland and the East Indies as autonomous parts of a common empire, and the author quotes from De Kat Angelino's well-known work‡ a summary of the means calculated to promote this end: a widening of the social horizon; the collaboration of the native intelligentsia, and the association of nationalism with constructive work; and, generally, differentiation, according to needs, within the framework of a structure made organic rather than mechanical.

* Cambridge University Press, 1939.

† Quoted by the author from C. van Vollenhoven, *Koloniaal Tijdschrift*, March, 1928, p. 117.

‡ *Staatkundig Beleid en Bestuurszorg in Nederlandsch-Indië*, The Hague, 1929-30. English edition (abridged), *Colonial Policy*, The Hague, 1931.

The chapter on "Law and the Judiciary" gives due weight to that recognition of indigenous groups and institutions, and of their right to develop along their own lines, which is the cardinal principle of Dutch colonial policy. Although the enforcement of a European legal system throughout the islands would have had the advantages of convenience, uniformity, and precision, the many difficulties have been surmounted and native customary law ensured an important place. The position may be contrasted with that in the Philippines, where "Indonesian customary law has no standing in the courts" (p. 177, f.n. 1). Tribute is paid by the author to Wilken, Liefrinck, and C. Snouck Hurgronje, founders of the scientific study of indigenous law, and to the leading scholars in this field since 1900, van Ossenbruggen and van Vollenhoven, who in his key position as Professor of Colonial Law at Leiden, was able to exert a profound influence on policy both in Holland and in the Indies.

Dealing next with "Education," Vandenbosch criticizes the fact that there are, as yet, not more than two million children in native schools. In the first place, however, several hundred thousand children in schools not subsidized by the State are here left out of account. In the second place, the quoted estimate by the Dutch-Native Education Commission in 1928, that illiteracy could only be wiped out in 167 years, is quite out of date, both because of the steady growth in the number of schools (pupils increased, for instance, by 6 per cent. between 1938 and 1939), and thanks to efforts towards adult education. Moreover, the fact that a mere 5 per cent. of the Central Government expenditure in 1939 was devoted to education means little, since, as in British India, provincial and, particularly, local governments bear a large proportion of the responsibility for the upkeep of native schools.

The absence of a Faculty for languages and literature in university education, regretted by the author, has already been remedied. The distinctive character of the educational organization lies in the scope given to the native languages in the lower grades, and the high standards maintained in the upper ones. Gifted pupils of native village schools may proceed, by means, first, of "continuation" schools, and then of "link" schools (which use the Dutch language), to secondary schools proper, and finally to the University College (Batavia), whose Faculties are fully comparable in standard to those in the universities of Holland itself. The striking development in this sphere since 1900 has been well summarized recently by J. Hardeman.*

Dealing with "Commercial Policy," Vandenbosch shows how the Indies have prospered under a liberal régime, and points out the dangers that would have lain in a restoration of the older colonial system of preferential tariffs, or in a customs union with Holland, as advocated by some. The warnings of the statesman Colijn, and his view that the administration of the Indies should be such as could serve as a model for "Mandatory Powers," prevailed. It is true that, when Holland's share of East Indian imports fell from 33 per cent. in 1909-13 to 12 per cent. in 1933, under the pressure of cheap Japanese goods, a quota and import licence system was resorted to as a remedy; but in the main a liberal commercial policy was maintained.

The author's treatment of "The National Awakening" is interesting and deserves attention. It is here necessary to point out, however, that the whole book suffers from an inadequate appreciation of the Indonesian cultural inheritance, which Vandenbosch characterizes as "not altogether insignificant," but "in no way comparable to that of India. Moreover," he adds, "India is a country with a great political past and a centuries-old historical consciousness" (p. 312). Yet in A.D. 13 the Javanese were already so advanced politically that they paid a salt tax to the King;† when the Hindus arrived, in the first centuries of our era, they found a highly cultured people; Javanese ships covered the oceans from North China to Africa over a

* "Educational System of the Netherlands East Indies," *Overseas Education*, Vol. XII, No. 4, July, 1941.

† Furnivall, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

thousand years ago, when they were the chief freight carriers in that area; and the native empires of Çrivijaya, Kediri, and Mojopait were very extensive. Crivijaya was the chief centre of Buddhist learning in the seventh and eighth centuries. Indeed, Javanese and southern Sumatrans have left their mark in Ceylon, on the coast of India itself, and in Further India. Javanese colonized Madagascar and were given a "free quarter" in the Indian university town of Nalanda. The author also neglects Javanese literature, philosophy, music (*gamelan*), drama, architecture and, above all, sculpture, which at its height was more Javanese than Hindu in character.

Other contrasts between the Dutch East Indies, on the one hand, and British India and the American Philippines on the other, are, however, well brought out by the author, as for instance with respect to the intensity of colonization. Thus, in proportion to the native population, there are nearly five times as many Europeans and Eurasians in the Dutch East Indies as in British India. The legal, political, and social assimilation of the Eurasians to the Europeans has meant that they have not associated themselves with the native cause, or become leaders of the nationalist movement, as has happened in the Philippines. "The Dutch in the East Indies have been peculiarly free from race prejudice, have intermarried freely with the natives, and have accepted the Eurasians in their society" (p. 312). Another special feature affecting the nationalist movement is the presence of 1,500,000 non-indigenous Asiatics (chiefly Chinese), a group of economic importance, which tends to react in a rather opportunist manner to East Indian political issues.

Various aspects of the nationalist movement are differentiated: the "pure" nationalists; religious, revolutionary, non-co-operative, and other groups; youth, women's, and trade union organizations. Also important are the groups, in European and other circles, formed partly as a reaction to the nationalist movement. The Dutch capitalists, whose investments total nearly two and a half milliard dollars, are very well organized. Vandenbosch somewhat exaggerates the pressure they can bring to bear on the Government, at home and in Batavia, but they certainly do not facilitate the official policy of judicious encouragement of the nationalist movement. Especially after the disorders of 1926-7, which had Communist inspiration, the reactionary tendencies among Europeans, and their inability to see the native renaissance in relation to a liberal, long-term colonial policy, caused many difficulties for the broad-minded Governor-General. Forced to suppress extremist excesses, he yet resolutely persevered in his sympathetic approach to the nationalist movement in general. Unfortunately, as Vandenbosch says: "His policy failed to win the nationalists, and it brought down upon him the wrath of a majority of the Europeans, who are in the East Indies in the interest of business and not of uplift" (p. 322).

The great progress nevertheless made in the last generation is best seen in the fact that, for 25 seats in the Volksraad held by Europeans, 30 are held by natives, and 5 by non-indigenous Asiatics (usually 4 seats by Chinese, and one by an Arab). At the same time the natives are found, with increasing frequency, in high official and other posts.

Under the heading of "World Politics," the author calls attention to the problems created by the numerous Chinese, whose immigration began centuries ago. By a law of 1910, all persons born in the Indies of parents resident there became Dutch subjects, and as a result most of the Chinese were brought under direct Government control. Various legal measures also removed the major grievances of the Chinese community. Problems still remain, however; large groups harbour strong Chinese nationalist sentiments, and there has always been a close cultural liaison with their country of origin.

As to the United States, Vandenbosch argues that she, like Japan, has "no interest in seeing Holland's position maintained in Western Europe," and therefore neither "has the same interest [as Great Britain] in maintaining her [Holland] as a

colonial power in the Far East. Only in so far as the United States is unwilling to see Japan's or Great Britain's power in Asia increased has she an interest in seeing the continuance of the Dutch colonial empire in the East" (p. 381). Recent trends encourage the hope that this is only a superficial reading of the situation, however, for if the rubber, tin, and other raw materials drawn by America from the Indies were owned by a power with a much less liberal commercial policy, it would not seem to be a matter of indifference.

The final chapter, on "The Dutch East Indies and Japan," shows Japanese already in the service of the Dutch East India Company in Java by 1612, and Dutch also well established as traders on the island of Deshima, in the harbour of Nagasaki, at an early period. During Japan's self-imposed seclusion from the outside world (1646-1854), Dutch traders alone were accepted, and Deshima became a diplomatic as well as a trading post, through which Western science and learning continued to filter. When finally the United States Government decided to break the Japanese seclusion, it requested the good offices of the Dutch Government in promoting its "amicable visit to the Japanese islands," and the request was granted. Dutch being the only European language known to the Japanese, oral and written communications were couched in that language; and Dutch scholars had produced almost the sole aids to learning Japanese which existed up to that time.

More recent relations between the two archipelagos have been complicated by the Japanese commercial invasion of the Indies, their shipping interests, intensive fishing, and desire to exploit oilfields, problems all overshadowed by the "southward" trend in Japanese foreign policy. Vandenbosch aptly mentions that Japan takes only 5 per cent. of the Indies' exports, and has small investments, compared with those of other foreign states. The Indies seem also unsuitable for Japan's surplus population. These factors would indicate that Japan's "real" interests here are small.

It remains to list certain inaccuracies of fact or emphasis, which should be corrected if a further edition of the present work appears.

There are about 200, not 20, different languages (see p. 203) in the Indies, over 100 being represented in school-books, religious tracts, or other printed matter. The different peoples are not "basically one in language and race" (p. 310), unless England, France, and Germany are considered in the same light. The cultural contrasts are, of course, incomparably greater in the Indies than in Western Europe.

Christian missions and their following are given too great weight, and space, compared to Hinduism and Mohammedanism, which are of far more importance in East Indian life. The statement that missionary schools are preferred by many non-Christians to the "neutral" Government schools (p. 48) is contrary to the reviewer's experience in many parts of Java. Vandenbosch writes that before "careful study of Moslemism was begun it was thought that the Moslemism of the Indies was 'a garment with holes,' through which Hinduism and the other religions were visible, but this is now known to be untrue" (p. 34). His revision, however, goes too far; the reviewer has administered areas where, among several hundred thousand nominal Mohammedans, there was not a single *haji*, and even the Prophet's name was unknown to the majority, while the Hindu god Batara Kala was familiar. On the other hand, the inhabitants of Borneo, Lombok, and Soembawa are not pagan, as the author says (p. 32), but chiefly Mohammedan. Again, the Bataks of Sumatra are not all Christians, but predominantly still pagan or Mohammedan.

Celebes does not lack extensive lowlands, nor is it sparsely populated, as alleged (p. 4); the neighbourhood of Macassar is mostly flat, and figures given elsewhere by the author (pp. 3, 5) show Celebes to be 20 per cent. more densely populated than Sumatra. In this respect Celebes also far exceeds Borneo.

Dutchmen cannot be prosecuted for breach of promise by native women, as the author asserts (p. 8), because such suits are not recognized by Dutch law, either in Holland or the Indies.

The Adviser on Native Affairs and his assistants are not "generally" selected from the staff of the Dutch Consulate at Jidda (see pp. 37, 374); of the six advisers appointed so far, four have never been Consuls at Jidda. Nor is the Dutch Consul (now Chargé d'Affaires) at Jidda chosen from Residents or Assistant Residents in the East Indian Civil Service. No Consul at Jidda has been an ex-Resident.

The seventh division of the Netherlands Colonial Office is not devoted to "Miscellaneous Affairs" (see p. 94), but to the Dutch West Indies. The Department of Naval Affairs has always been at Batavia, not at Bandoeng (see p. 107). The Moluccan Government (see p. 131) was merged, in 1938, into the "Government of Eastern Isles." There have always been two governorships in the territory of the four native States; the fact that, in 1933, one man held, exceptionally, both offices, must have misled the author (see p. 131). The Governor-General therefore deals with five, not four, Governors in Java (see p. 140). The Bureau of Chinese Affairs, described by Vandenbosch (p. 365), was merged into the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs in 1932.

The General Police of the East Indies is not composed "principally" of Menadonese and Ambonese (see p. 341), since the Javanese members are at least equally numerous; in Java itself, the members are almost exclusively Javanese, Sundanese, and Madurese. The Field Police number, not about 3,000, but about 10,000 men. The majority of the General Police are the so-called *Bestuurs Politie* (about 20,000 men), and do not live in barracks, as the author states. Only the section called Town Police do so.

Vandenbosch writes that in rural districts the total income is roughly estimated, and each village chief required to pay in a lump sum for taxes (p. 30). Such a practice would be quite illegal, and during 28 years' administrative experience in Java the reviewer never heard of a case of this kind.

The importance assigned to the General Secretariat (pp. 102-3) applies only to earlier conditions, when the measures proposed by the various Departments were examined and commented on by the Secretariat before presentation to the Governor-General, who might amend or reject the Departments' proposals on the Secretariat's advice. But since 1918 departmental budgets, and since 1926 all bills are laid by the Governor-General before the Volksraad, and as the Directors of the Departments must defend them there, the Secretariat's rôle has become mainly a formal one in this connection. Nor is a place automatically reserved in the Council of the Indies for each retiring General Secretary; vacancies normally occur, in any case, at irregular intervals.

The importance of the Council of the Indies is over-estimated by the author to a still greater extent (see p. 107). Its function is indeed to advise the Governor-General, but in practice he has more direct contact with the Directors of Departments than with any members of the Council, except the Vice-President. The Governor-General often refrains from following the Council's advice, if it conflicts with that of the relevant departmental chiefs.

Vandenbosch states that, because Indonesians are not yet found in high posts in the Department of the Interior, or elsewhere, native members of the Council are necessarily drawn from the Volksraad (p. 106). There is, in fact, no such connection between the two bodies, however. Of the four natives appointed up to the present, three had been Regents, and the fourth a Professor of Law. One was never a member of the Volksraad; one had previously been; and two were members at the time of their appointment, but this membership was obviously not their main qualification.

Finally, the author believes that one hindrance to decentralization in the Indies lies in the fact that Holland itself is small and highly centralized (p. 140). Dutch institutions have, however, for centuries been characterized by a greater degree of local autonomy than prevailed in most other European countries. Although the im-

portance of the provinces has diminished in favour of the centre since 1795, municipal government still plays a greater part in the citizen's life than does the central government.

A. MUHLENFELD.

Wanderer Between Two Worlds: An Autobiography. By Norman Bentwich. $8\frac{1}{2}'' \times 5\frac{3}{4}''$. Pp. vii+358. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd. 12s. 6d.

This book by Norman Bentwich is not only an autobiography but also a present-day history of the Jewish people. It is written by a Jew about Jews, and is an intimate and poignant account of their chequered story in these last years. It is written by one who knows his subject through and through, and hopes and suffers and agonizes with all the persistent clinging to an ideal of his race. Mr. Bentwich had been interested in the Jewish return to Palestine from his earliest childhood; as he expresses it, "Palestine was about us in the home."

He was educated at St. Paul's School under Frederick Walker, of whom he says: "No boy could be in his presence without realizing he was before a great man." From there he went on to Trinity College, Cambridge, and then read for the Bar, to which he was called in 1908. He comes of a very musical family, and he himself is no mean performer on the violin.

His first connection with the Middle East began in 1911, when, with a companion, he visited Palestine and the young Jewish colonies there. From that moment he decided to live and work in the East, and the following year he took up a post in Cairo as Inspector of Native Courts. The year 1915 found him in the Camel Transport Corps outside Cairo, and the rest of the war was spent between Cairo and Jerusalem.

After Allenby's victorious entry into Jerusalem in 1917 he joined the British administration of Palestine, and became Procurator-General and finally Attorney-General. He saw service under three High Commissioners, and gives a vivid picture of the difficulty under which the administration worked, trying to keep the balance between Arab and Jewish demands.

The Palestine problem, which between the years 1920 and 1928 looked more like being peacefully settled, was roused up once more by the European Jewish situation. From this time onwards, until the world war brought quiet to Palestine, there was no continuing internal peace, and riots, demonstrations, strikes and murder succeeded each other. During these times of trouble Mr. Bentwich's position as Attorney-General became, through no fault of his own, an increasing embarrassment to the Government. He was offered other posts but felt unable to take them, and finally left the administration.

Then followed a period of world-wide travel, which gave him a first-hand knowledge of the condition of the Jewish people not only in Europe but in America, South Africa and even as far afield as Australia.

I knew Mr. Bentwich during his sojourn in Palestine, where his unfailing good nature and wide interests gained him many friends among all sections of the very varied community. He quotes one of his Arab friends as saying about the Jewish problem in Palestine: "The only solution of the trouble is an Arab-Jewish friendship." This Mr. Bentwich did his best to promote.

The whole book is a heart-breaking story, with very little to alleviate the tragic account of a people who seem forced to tread an always thorny and stony path with no turning into green fields. But it ends on a note of hope. "Jews, Arabs and English have reached implicitly a 'détente' in the war. They should reach in the peace openly an 'entente.'" Surely this wish will find an echo in the heart of everyone who prays for the "Peace of Jerusalem."

N. B.

Gertrude Bell. By M. R. Ridley. Blackie. 206 pp. Map. Four illustrations. 3s. 6d.

On the few occasions when I have reviewed books, I have maintained during my reading a note of points, such as inaccuracies or omissions, which might have

bearing on what I wrote. Halfway through this Life of Gertrude Bell I tore up my list. The book does not profess to be a profound study of her life and character, and such being the case criticism of very minor inaccuracies would be rather carping.

Within the somewhat circumscribed limits the authoress has succeeded remarkably well in portraying the full and intense life of Gertrude Bell, and her wonderful courage and devotion to duty. If she fails to portray her full character it is only in a comparative sense and because that character was so completely and intimately portrayed by Gertrude Bell herself, in her own letters.

A life so complex in the multitude of its interests, and yet in each so direct in action and process of thought, is difficult to present in one picture. The mountaineer is normally so far apart from the archæologist, and both so distant from the diplomat, that not one volume, but three or four would be necessary for a full and complete interpretation.

Gertrude Bell's complete absorption in any task to which she had set her hand is well exemplified, and also the amazing fact that her acute and agile brain could tackle three or more tasks at one and the same time. Her work in assisting the control and direction of a new-born kingdom and a new-made King would have sufficed most men, but while doing it she still found time and energy to found and build up the Archæological Department and National Museum.

This book is not a serious study for the serious student, but as one to inspire the youthful, and possibly casual, reader to further investigation and emulation, it serves successfully a most useful purpose. J. M. W.

Modern Iran. By L. P. Elwell-Sutton. Pp. xii+234. Illustrations, maps and plans. Routledge. 1941. 12s. 6d.

The work under review has been published at a most opportune time. Its early chapters deal with the country, the classical age and the rise and decline of Islam. Chapter IV is entitled "Iran under the Shadow of the West," and after briefly describing the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French fight for supremacy in the torrid waters of the Persian Gulf, upon reaching the nineteenth century we come to the period of Anglo-Russian rivalry. Persia throughout played off one Power against the other, while the Shah, who considered the revenue of the country and loans by foreign Powers to belong to his Privy Purse, made little or no effort to establish law and order. To quote our author: "It is not surprising that foreign observers believed that . . . only full control by European Powers could prevent its collapse into chaos."

An important date was 1907, marking the end of the Anglo-Russian struggle for supremacy, but also marking the commercial division of Iran into a very large Russian zone in the north, a very small British zone in the south-east, and a relatively fertile neutral zone in the south-west. The Persians naturally disliked their country being divided up without their consent and felt certain that, so far as Russia was concerned, this treaty was a step in the direction of annexation.

The most important commercial event of this period was the discovery and development of a very rich oil-field, which was developed by a British company, now known as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Not only has this company paid a very handsome annual royalty to the Iranian Government, but the treatment of its employees, who are not only given houses, education and medical care but are specially trained to fill high posts, is most praiseworthy. Indeed, the new order in Iran has been largely supported by the engineers and mechanics trained at Abadan.

Upon the outbreak of the last world war "German . . . propaganda took familiar lines—attacks on Christianity, promises of independence and cash." However, the failure of the Niedermayer Mission and the capture of most of the German agents by the British struck them a heavy blow. However, Wassmuss, their most successful agent, was able to raise large forces of tribesmen, who attacked and invested the small British force at Shiraz, but were finally defeated.

We now come to the most interesting part of the work, which deals with the rise of Riza Khan, who was appointed by Brigadier-General (now Field-Marshal Lord) Ironside to command the Persian Cossacks. This remarkable man marched on Tehran, changed the Government, became Prime Minister, frightened the weakling

Shah out of Iran and, in 1926, was elected Shah and mounted the throne as Shah Riza, Pahlavi—a truly astounding career!

The first task of the new monarch ruthlessly carried out "was the re-establishment of law and order and the concentration of power in the hands of the Central Government." He had also strengthened the Cossack Brigade and added to it the British force of the South Persia Rifles. For two years he had had already to suppress revolts in North Persia, more especially in Mazanderan. The question of the powerful Kashgais, Bakhtiaris, Lurs and other nomadic tribes was settled by force and also by intrigues among their chiefs. The Shah insisted on their settling in villages and, generally speaking, they suffered in health and were unable to find grazing for their flocks. However, to a considerable extent law and order were re-established.

To quote our author once again: "Whereas Kemal Atatürk tried to make a complete break with the past, Riza Shah encouraged the natural tendency of his countrymen to look to and receive inspiration . . . from the ancient Iran of Cyrus and Darius." This is especially brought out in the style of architecture and also in the encouragement given to archæological research.

The nation was most anxious to end the system of capitulations, by which consular courts had jurisdiction, imposed by Russia in 1828. Just a century later, in 1928, the system was abolished, and a year later a new Penal Code, based on Italian law, was introduced. At first there were great difficulties owing to inexperience, but in time matters were improved, albeit it cannot be claimed that justice can readily be secured.

The author deals fully with economic foundations, with social and cultural progress, but of greater interest at present is the infiltration of Germany. Her trade was based on barter. She used to send 70,000 tons of iron, electrical and textile machinery, etc., valued at £3,000,000, in exchange for cotton, silver, gold, rice, caviare, skins and wheat. Actually when the Anglo-Russian force recently occupied the country great scarcity prevailed owing to the Shah having exported the wheat crop to Germany. Factories supplied with German machinery were not only constructed by Germans but were managed by them. Indeed, so far had this gone that the number of Germans was estimated at over two thousand. There was also the inevitable Brown House.

Again, Dr. Grobba, who had been German Minister in Iraq since 1932, and had gained influence in that country by lavish expenditure and intrigue, was obliged to leave when Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. He retired to Tehran but, to quote our author, "continued to maintain contact with the Arabs through the Italian and, more recently, Japanese Legations in Baghdad." Such were the difficulties that confronted the Anglo-Russian invasion of Iran.

To conclude, every subject of importance has been ably dealt with in this work, and I can only express the hope that its author is rendering valuable service to his country in connection with Iran, which he knows so well.

P. M. SYKES.

Ruz-gar i Nau. A quarterly illustrated magazine in Persian. No. 2, Autumn, 1941. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Ltd.; London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1s. net or 20 cents.

In the second number of this small quarterly magazine in the Persian language the Ministry of Information continues its laudable task of promoting a more civilized sort of relationship between this country and Persia. One misses the colour plates of the first number, but one is gratified to observe the increased quantity of British export firms who advertise in Persian.

Like the summer number, the contents of the autumn number are entirely didactic, a quality perhaps not unsuited to a country which is not yet disillusioned with modern Western education and its products. Yet even considered as a purely didactic magazine there seems to be a lack of keynote in its contents. Here are specimens: The first of a series of articles on English Orientalists commemorates Edward Granville Browne and is by the late Professor Ellis Minns. This is followed

by an article on Browne's services to Persia by Mr. Mujtaba Minovi. Dr. Arberry contributes "Eight Hundred Years Ago," celebrating the birth-anniversary of the Spanish-Arabic philosopher Ibnu'l-'Arabi, and there is an illustrated article on some Persian miniatures in the Chester Beatty collection. Then comes "India's War Effort, a Torrent Increasing Daily in Breadth," then the second chapter of an introductory history of England, which carries on the story from the death of Elizabeth to the reign of George I. Then "Leaves of Freedom," an article on the newspapers of many nations which are now published in England. Professor Dr. Josef Schacht discourses learnedly on Persian contributions to science and physics in ancient and mediæval times, while further articles review a hundred years of Western medicine and British progress in electricity.

Both choice and presentation seem to show a certain lack of inspiration. As a Persian magazine it has something in common with that legendary history of Chinese music, which the author wrote by the simple expedient of looking up the *Encyclopædia Britannica* under the headings "China" and "Music." Young Persia will doubtless be attracted by four pages of aircraft recognition photographs, but something better is required than nineteenth-century engravings of historic scenes of the boarding-house parlour type if we wish to convince this astute nation of our good intentions. Could not a little of this space be conceded to the Persian appetite for poetry and romantic stories? Moreover, the fine Persian sense of ridicule would welcome the better sort of war caricature.

G. R. R.

Turkey and Britain. 1s.

This illustrated monthly journal, produced by the British Industrial Publicity Overseas, Ltd., in the Turkish language, is a publication of the type in great demand in Turkey to-day. Its contents include articles on various aspects of life in this country during war-time, emphasis being given to commercial activities, supported by numerous advertisements of famous British firms. Cultural activities are represented by articles on the film industry and broadcasting.

In one issue Sir Osborne Mance discusses Anglo-Turkish commercial relations and the prospects of increasing Anglo-Turkish trade, and in another he gives his views on post-war trade. Mr. Harold Nicolson analyses the political structure of the British Empire, whilst Mr. Wentworth Day makes a most appropriate greeting to Turkish Youth, a subject whose importance has not been adequately appreciated in all quarters. It is good also to find an article on the United Kingdom motor industry by Mr. William Rootes, President of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, Ltd., for British cars are all too few and far between in Turkey, and, indeed, throughout the Near and Middle East generally. "Developments in Aeroplane Armament" are described by the editor of *Aircraft Engineering*, and other subjects dealt with include "Maternity and Child Welfare," "Calico Printing," "Silk Throwing Machinery made in Britain," "The British Police in War-time," and "British Railways in War-time." All these subjects are well chosen, and are likely to appeal to the public in Turkey at the present time.

The journal is extremely well produced and preserves the pre-war fine texture of paper. It contains numerous excellent photographs and is priced most reasonably at one shilling. It is in every way a worthy production to represent British interests in a most important neutral country, and it is encouraging to hear of such a venture as this publication being undertaken by a commercial firm. It should be a most valuable corollary to the official efforts to improve Anglo-Turkish trade being made through the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation.

H. M. Burton.

This Impertinence. By Peter Arnott. Jenkins. 12s. 6d.

Here we have a vivid narrative, enhanced by delightful illustrations, written by one who went to India as a Sapper subaltern in the good old days, when, with care, two horses could be kept on a pay of £13 a month. It tells of his life in India until the commencement of the last Great War.

After he has described a somewhat dreary childhood, Peter Arnott gives a graphic account of his voyage to India when, sharing an experience common to most of us, he found his first impressions of his fellow travellers to be most disappointing. Port Said, full though she may still be of touts and extortioners, would blush now at the accounts given of her in the end of the last century and the early years of this.

Arrived in India, Peter Arnott learnt to know the people living in the small towns and villages of the country where his work took him; he gave them of his best and earned their friendship. He shows us the horrors of famine and of hydrophobia, describes the thrills of big-game shooting and with it all, their attendant tragedies. He prays with the Muslim, bathes in a sacred pool with the Hindu, takes the part of magistrate in a wholly unofficial, but well-attended Court of Justice. Best of all is the description of a lumber jam on the Jhelum river.

With Europeans his contacts were unfortunate and his criticism of the snobbery found among them (and among their wives) is scathing. We hope that readers who do not know India will not consider his criticisms apply to the majority of British officials. In less good taste is his description of Viceroys and of the Vice-regal office.

Vivid though the narrative is, some of us would gladly have been spared certain gruesome details, for Peter Arnott must not only call a spade a spade but must draw attention to its existence. For most of us the book would have made better reading without these pages.

M. G. A.

Soviet Asia : Its Records and its Problems. By E. S. Bates. Pp. 191 and a map. Jonathan Cape. 8s. 6d.

Soviet Asia includes Siberia as well as the Federal Republics of Central Asia. It is debatable whether the area between the Black Sea and the Caspian should be treated as Asiatic or European, but even without it the Soviet territory in Asia covers a very large part of the earth's surface, is the home of very many different races, and includes every kind of natural feature from snow-capped mountains and scorching desert to tropical valleys and frozen tundra. In the small volume under review it was obviously impossible to give more than an impressionistic sketch of the land and its inhabitants. Mr. Bates attempts no more than to indicate a few of the most outstanding problems and achievements of the Soviet Government, and should any of his readers be inspired to seek further information he recommends them to read a number of books which he himself has found entertaining and informative. As he frankly confesses, he has never visited the Asiatic dominions of the Soviet State and his knowledge has been acquired entirely at second-hand.

The first chapter, "What it consists of," states that it "is a land in two parts: Siberia and the rest. The rest is that which lies between China and the Caspian Sea." Which is true enough so far as it goes, but over simplified; for even if the natural features of Siberia are more or less constant, Central Asia contains many different types of country between the steppes of Northern Kazakhstan and the Pamir Mountains. Neither is it feasible to lump the five Central Asian Federal Republics together in a single whole.

The history of Russia's occupation of Siberia is largely concerned with the trading ventures of the Stroganov family and the exploits of the Cossack explorer Yermak. But no mention is given of the Russian campaigns in Central Asia about the middle of the nineteenth century, which resulted in imposing the suzerainty of the Tsar over the Khanates of Bokhara and Khiva. In this chapter, too, the author makes a rather curious slip when, touching on the Tatar invasion, he writes that the Mongols settled down around the river Volga, and then goes on to say that the chief city of those parts, Kiev (!), was destroyed.

Describing conditions to-day, Mr. Bates confines himself to four districts—the basin of the Lena river, Tanna Tuva, Birobidjan and Tadjikstan—which seems rather an odd choice, for none of these regions are typical of the great mass of the country. The three last-named are situated on the periphery of Soviet territory,

while the Lena river flows through the least known and most sparsely populated part of Siberia.

The economic section deals with industry, trade and finance, but strangely enough gives very little information concerning agriculture. In discussing social questions, Mr. Bates seems to have studied the emancipation of women among the Muslim peoples of Central Asia and education to the exclusion of practically everything else. For example, he has nothing whatever to say about the collectivization of the peasants and the effect it had on their habits and outlook.

The author's intention is merely to whet readers' appetites for more comprehensive and authoritative information, and in this it will no doubt succeed. But it should not be regarded itself as a serious or reliable study of the conditions and recent developments in the Asiatic territory of the Soviet Union.

L. E. H.

Green Prison. Twenty Years in Thailand. By W. Leigh Williams. 8½″ x 6″. Pp. 252. Illustrations. London. Herbert Jenkins. 12s. 6d.

It was in the early 'eighties of last century that the teak forests of the Lao States, feudatory to Thailand, began to attract European notice, though the timber therefrom had been an article of the Chinese junk trade with Thailand long before. About then certain British merchants, profiting by the ignorance and greed of the Lao Chiefs, obtained concessions under which they dangerously exploited the forests until, in 1893, the Thai Government took charge from the Chiefs, established a Government Forest Department, and placed the Thai teak industry on a sound basis. Twenty-five years later five European firms, each with a Service of trained foresters, held leases over practically all the forests and, about 1920, the author of this book joined one of them as a junior Forest Assistant.

Kipling says somewhere that no man who has lived a year alone in the jungle is ever quite sane thereafter, which statement, while containing perhaps a grain of truth, would have been nearer the mark had 'normal' been substituted for 'sane.' The author of this gay little volume put in a good deal more than a year alone in the course of his work in North Thailand jungles but the only sign of abnormality about him appears in the observation, the industry and the skill that went to the making of his book; for Thailand teak men, with one or two rather bright exceptions, are not given to literary composition.

The *Green Prison* from which the book takes its title was in fact the adequately furnished double-fly tent of green Willesden canvas in which all Thailand teak men pass so much of their existence and, while Mr. Williams animadverts upon the dire effects on young men of solitary confinement therein and points his tale with one or two awful examples, evidence abounds throughout his book that for him at least such solitude had few terrors but that, while his zest for an occasional frolic at headquarters remained always unimpaired, he was never loth to abandon the fleshpots for the sylvan simplicity of his little green 'jug' in the woods.

'Alone' in this connection must be qualified by the fact that the teak man in camp is surrounded by a host of lumbermen, elephant keepers, bullock drivers and other native servants of his firm; with jungle villagers and an occasional rural official usually in the neighbourhood. Owing to linguistic difficulties such environment usually has little or no significance for the average teak man; but our author having, unlike the majority, 'swotted up the language' early in his career, found a mitigation of the rigours of his solitude in probing the minds and studying the easy-going philosophy of the countryfolk about him, the instructive and amusing results of which pursuit incidentally make one of the attractions of his book.

Mr. Williams wastes little space on introductory matter or in a lay-out of the origin, government, politics and so forth of Thailand and its people, but gets down at once to the purpose of his book: the relation of his own experiences in the faraway hinterland that was the field of his activities for so many years, leaving the reader to gather from the occasional glimpses that appear in his narrative the extent of the social and political development that has taken place in Thailand during recent years. The author's objects are to interest and amuse, and these he achieves with signal success. For his method he adopts the inconsequent sketch

rather than a chronological exactitude. The chapters present periods, not always consecutive, in the course of his development from the merry neophyte of the teak business into the not quite so jocund manager supporting heavy responsibilities; and each page has its vignette of scenery and incident or its portrait of some companion of exile. There are shootings of rapids in the wonderful gorges of North Thailand, there is tracking of elephants, sitting up for tigers, chasing of deer and gunning for all manner of game-birds. There are tall stories of witches and elves round the camp fire, and chopping of logic with Buddhist monks. There are wild revels with boon companions at headquarters and deep discussions, usually after drink taken, on ethics, religion and the absorbing subject of sex, in which senior men make profound observations and gravely offer advice for the guidance of juniors. And interwoven with all this runs the tale of the teak forest as the writer discourses of the various aspects of his highly specialized work: the drudgery of girdling, the excitement and sometimes danger of logging, the pleasures and pains of rafting and so forth. And elephants, wild and tame, roam at large all through the book.

The style is lucid and the composition practically faultless. The language is that forcible, straightforward English shot through with innumerable expressions borrowed from Burmese, Hindi, Malay and, more rarely, Thai that form the peculiar idiom of the Thailand teak man.

The book will find many readers, more especially since the sudden falling of the tragic curtain that has, for the moment, blacked out Thailand and all it contains from the English view.

W. A. GRAHAM.

The Earth is the Lord's. A novel by Taylor Caldwell. Pp. 400. Collins. 1941. 9s. 6d.

This historical novel describes in dramatic form the rise of Temujin, who was chief of a weak tribe of the Mongols, to the position of Genghis Khan or Supreme Lord, by which he is known to history.

He had many a struggle but undoubtedly possessed a strong personality and magnetism. To quote the author: "This vehement and tempestuous youth with the angry grey eyes and the violent profile had a mysterious and nameless power which none could oppose."

His foster-father was Toghrul Beg, the chief of the Karai, who was the Prester John of Marco Polo. Temujin visited him on the occasion of his beautiful daughter's wedding to the ruler of Bokhara, and, *mirabile dictu*, not only fell in love with her but was able to visit her at night.

Among the many figures who appear on the stage is Kurelen, his lame uncle, who gave him wise advice: "Let men beware when one of lust appeareth among them, but let all men arm themselves when a priest coveteth power." Kurelen especially disliked the *Shaman* Kokchu, whom, however, Temujin utilized to preach to his superstitious followers that he was destined by the spirits to greatness.

The final fight for power was with Toghrul Beg, who was lulled into a sense of security by Temujin's agents and was surprised. Needless to say, he was put to death with ignominy. To conclude, this work is perhaps on the lengthy side for British readers, but yet it is full of drama and exciting events. The writer certainly has the gift of story-telling, while the leading figures who appear on the stage are historical.

P. M. SYKES.

Genius of Friendship: T. E. Lawrence. By Henry Williamson. $10\frac{1}{4}'' \times 6\frac{3}{4}''$. Pp. 78. Faber and Faber. 12s. 6d.

This monograph, written in 1936, amplifies the same writer's contemporary note in *Lawrence, by His Friends*. As we know from *The Letters* (two of which are reproduced in this essay), a long letter from Lawrence to Mr. Edward Garnett about one of Mr. Williamson's books began the latter's contact with Lawrence. The correspondence

which followed was destined to be so intimately connected with Mr. Williamson's literary work that it is, perhaps, not surprising to find in the volume under review a large number of references to Mr. Williamson's own books. Subject to this limitation, of which the author confesses his awareness, the book paints an interesting, intelligible and candid picture, illustrating not only the exercise of Lawrence's critical faculty in literature but the powerful influence of his personality upon a mind sensitive and solitary as was his own but not robustly controlled.

Apparently Mr. Williamson met Lawrence twice only. On the first occasion, in 1929, Mr. Williamson felt that "for the first time in my life, I was becoming real and strong. . . . It was as though I had cast my slough on him and emerged a fine, cool, poised fellow. . . ." Then, five years later: "It was so clear at this meeting how he affirmed sensitive people to themselves; he absorbed one's shell or covering, and supplied the small inner personal light with oxygen, so that from a flickering glimmer it becomes for oneself a clear, bright flame." Mr. John Heygate, who had been present on this second occasion, said: "I notice how deliberately he voids himself, for the service of others, while remaining entirely himself."

That Lawrence, for his part, derived lasting enjoyment and satisfaction from certain of Mr. Williamson's books is proved by Mr. Williamson's quotations from his letters. There is occasional mention of other writers also. Of the work of Eldon Rutter (to whom Mr. Williamson refers as "a young American"!) Lawrence wrote: "Thank you for Rutter's books on Mecca and Medina. They are most modestly good: very human and fair and fresh. . . ." Whether in literature or in the Oriental field, such readiness to acknowledge merit in others is welcome. Of Lawrence's remarks on Mr. Williamson's work, one quoted by the author seems appropriate for reproduction here, because it is borne out by this book. "I begin to suspect you may be one of those rare authors who write best about people or things other than themselves." When Mr. Williamson's attention is concentrated on Lawrence his observations are always interesting.

E. D.

To be reviewed in April:

Khadim al Haramain al Sharefain. By Farik Elmizir al-Firaon.

OBITUARY

SIR WILLIAM WILLCOX, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G.

By the passing of Sir William Willcox the Society loses one of its most distinguished members and a very constant supporter of the Society and its Dinner Club.

By the general public Sir William will be remembered as an eminent member of the medical profession. Members of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, to which he was Chief Consulting Physician, will recall his invaluable services to that Force, among which may be mentioned the eradication of scurvy, which was very prevalent and which, thanks to his insistence on a revised diet for the troops, disappeared; a result which afforded him great satisfaction. The immense and progressive improvement in the health of the troops was largely due to his labour. Those who had the privilege of knowing him during the last war and subsequently will treasure the memory of a singularly unassuming and warm-hearted man. Indeed his modesty led some at first to fail to see that his personal shyness was accompanied by a strength of character and determination equal to his eminent position in his profession. When action was called for in coping with epidemics of cholera, typhus, typhoid and influenza, Willcox showed his mettle. For instance when visiting North Russia he found some 10,000 refugees from Baku in October, 1918, huddled together with all these diseases in virulent form. He at once took the lead in creating order out of chaos, working himself unsparingly and inspiring others. Perceiving that the influenza was of unusual type, he dashed back to Baghdad in time to initiate precautions which much mitigated the severity of the epidemic when it reached Mesopotamia on its westward course.

The war over, he returned to his busy life in London, but never too busy to see his friends, and many have reason to be grateful for the kindness amounting to generosity with which, even after the lapse of years, he would, in the most charming way, place his great knowledge and skill practically gratuitously at their disposal.

War has some compensation when it brings out the full virtue of a man as it did in the case of Sir William Willcox. Before 1914 he was just the genius who "hung Crippen" and other prisoners, thereafter he was widely regarded as a fine example of a big Englishman.

W. M. T.

CORRESPONDENCE

Sir,

May I comment briefly on "B. K. N. W.'s" letter on the subject of transliteration, or rather the system of transcription used in my book *Colloquial Persian*? I distinguish between transliteration and transcription, since the former is the representation of one alphabet in terms of another, whereas the latter is the use of symbols to indicate the sounds of a language; the difference is important, and it is the latter that must be used in depicting on paper the colloquial or *spoken* tongue. Your correspondent evidently agrees with this view, but casts doubt on the accuracy of my method and suggests that it is "cumbersome"—though on the latter point, indeed, he seems a little uncertain, since he describes it elsewhere as "simplified." I am not sure which are the other phonetic systems of which he speaks; there is, of course, the International Phonetic Alphabet, but that is hardly simple. St. Clair Tisdall's system, like several others, is a transliteration, and so is hardly comparable; nevertheless, he uses 24 plain letters, 11 accented and 6 combined, whereas I use 23, 4 and 5 respectively. In teaching beginners it is desirable to use as few unfamiliar letters and accents as possible; each should be of a kind that reminds the student at once of the group or range of sounds it is intended to represent. I doubt whether it would be possible to simplify the sound system of Persian any further than I have done without disproportionate loss of accuracy.

"B. K. N. W.," indeed, suggests that I have already achieved this; unfortunately, he gives only one example—the alleged confusion of *gh* and *q*. Presumably he means by these the two Arabic letters *ghain* and *qāf*; the latter only occurs in words of Arabic or Turkish origin (with rare exceptions), and the Iranian, I must insist, pronounces it almost exactly as his own *gh* (which is *not* the same as the Arabic sound).

I am sorry if this sound sticks in "B. K. N. W.'s" throat, but that, alas, is the penalty of learning any new language.

Perhaps you will allow me to refer to one other point raised by your correspondent; it has nothing to do with transliteration, but as it stands it is rather misleading. He speaks of the movement to exclude words of Arabic origin, and has apparently overlooked my specific reference to it on page 72 of *Colloquial Persian*. But even if it were a matter of importance to beginners (which is doubtful), I fear that your critic is exaggerating its effect on the Persian language. The *Farhangestān* has since 1936 introduced only some 2,000 new words, the bulk of which are scientific, medical and other technical terms not in common use; many of the remainder have not yet found popular acceptance, though I have given the most important in the exercises and vocabularies. There is as much likelihood of purging Persian completely of Arabic as there is of purging English of Latin.

Yours faithfully,

L. P. Elwell-Sutton.

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NOTICES

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Correction: Part 1, 1942, p. 32, end of first paragraph, *for* "when" *read* "if."

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GLIMPSES OF THE WESTERN DESERT, AND THE CAPTURE OF THE KUFRA OASIS BY THE FREE FRENCH*

By COLONEL E. G. HUME

SIR JOHN, Ladies and Gentlemen, I feel that I am being very presumptuous in speaking to you on the subjects of this lecture when my experience of them is so slight; however, I have been asked to tell you something of two short visits I paid to the Western Desert, and also something about the very gallant capture of Kufra by the Free French in February last, so I will do my best and I will try to give you a picture.

My first visit to the desert was to the Libyan frontier and the second to Tobruk. The first was to Sollum, Halfaya and Sidi Omar about August, 1940, when our troops were still holding these places, before, of course, the Italians pushed forward across the Egyptian frontier to the Sidi Bairani area. I had been working in an office at G.H.Q., Middle East, for some time, and part of my work being to make arrangements for the disposal of prisoners of war, I got permission to visit the Western Desert.

Having collected seven days' rations in Cairo and taking with me a valise with a mattress and several blankets, as the nights in the desert, especially towards morning, can be quite cold even when the days are really hot, I left Cairo early one morning in a Ford utility car with a British driver.

We had a quick run of some 150 miles along the smooth ribbon of tarmac which, passing the Pyramids, cuts across the monotonous yellow-brown desert to the sea-coast and there forks, right-handed to Alexandria and left-handed to the Western Desert.

Nearing the sea one comes, suddenly, over a rise and is amazed to see the expanse of unbelievably bright and glowing turquoise blue sea. All along this coast the sand is as white as chalk and runs out for some distance into the water. The reflection of the sun from this sand striking up through the water makes it a vivid luminous blue, as if there were lights below it shining through, then farther out it gradually merges into a darker shade.

We took the left-hand fork. The road here runs along the edge of the desert and skirts the sea at a distance generally of a few hundred yards, and in between is a narrow strip of fertile land at a lower level, which is divided from the white sand of the shore by a narrow line of rather high sand dunes.

In this narrow depression there are for miles either groves of date palms, or, more often, groves of fig trees, which are watered from wells of rather brackish water. In August the figs are ripe and along the road

* Christmas lecture, January 7, 1942, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., in the Chair.

we passed lorries loading up crates of figs for the Cairo and Alexandria markets.

In this neighbourhood a bird migration corridor strikes the coast, and in the winter migration from Europe millions of tired and exhausted birds alight and crowd under the shelter of the fig trees to rest. Unfortunately the local inhabitants catch thousands of them either for the larder or for sale as cage birds.

About lunch-time we reached the camp of an Indian brigade on the lines of communication. Seeing a hut marked "Officers' Mess" close to the road, I went in search of a drink, and was fortunate enough to find an old friend, the Brigadier, having lunch. At that time I was re-employed as a major, whereas the last time I had known him *he* was a major, a student at the Senior Officers' School, and I was his instructor. It was as if I had been nibbling the wrong side of the mushroom, like Alice.

That afternoon we reached Desert Force headquarters, situated close to the sea, and when I had transacted my business in the well-camouflaged and ventilated offices underground, I walked over the dunes to the sea and had a glorious swim. A fortune awaits anyone who, when peace comes, builds an hotel in that charming little bay enclosed by a spit of white sand running out into the sea. The colour of the sea in the warm evening sun and the whiteness of the sand outdid any cruising poster I have ever seen!

A daylight start next morning brought us by about eleven o'clock to Mersa Matruh, the railhead. In peace-time it must be a bright little town, with an hotel and a small harbour where sailing boats could be hired—but now it was deserted except for a small shop here and there whose stout-hearted owner had decided to see things through. The Italians were bombing regularly, as frequent heaps of rubble showed.

Here again I had business to do in the spacious underground offices and after that visited the prisoners of war cage, then off we started again. From here onwards the coastal plain is clearly bounded at a short distance inland by the "escarpment"—a cliff-like rise in the ground beyond which is the desert plain at a higher level. The further west one goes, generally speaking, the narrower becomes the coastal plain as the escarpment gradually closes in to the sea, until just beyond Sollum the low coastal plain ends and the sea washes the foot of the cliffs.

Speeding along the good tarmac road we passed a lot of transport, the lorry drivers usually bareheaded even at midday and burnt as red as berries. In spite of the hot sun it isn't necessary to wear a topi in the desert. At Sidi Bairani, a much-bombed hamlet by the sea, the tarmac ended and the worst road in Africa began. For fifty miles we bumped along on second gear, flinging up a bow-wave and clouds of powdery dust-like spray. There was no fixed track and each driver backed his luck and took a line for himself through this wide and deep sea of yellow powder. *Our* luck must have been definitely out! Completely yellow from head to foot we eventually reached the headquarters of the armoured division which at that time was responsible for the Libyan frontier area.

The Divisional Commander, another old friend, gave me tea, and then we climbed the dunes and had a splendid bathe; meanwhile, a message was sent to the brigade holding the front line near Sidi Omar, saying that I would go up there for the night.

From this point on the road was better, the soil being hard damp sand. Close on our left were the escarpment cliffs and on our right the dunes fronting the sea. Eventually the dunes ended, and the cliffs, curving away to the left, made a wide, open amphitheatre. The curving sandy shore joined in the distance the towering cliffs of the escarpment where it reached the sea, and in the middle lay the small town of Sollum,



beyond which a white track zigzagged up the face of the cliffs at the far end to Sollum Barracks on the crest.

Close at hand at our left was Halfaya Pass, christened of course by the troops Hell Fire. Here a very rough and very steep motorable track wound up a spur of the escarpment with sharp hairpin bends. Up this we ground on bottom gear. As we climbed, the view over Sollum to the curved white strip of sand enclosing the bright blue bay and the towering dark cliffs away beyond was magnificent in the evening light.

As we reached the top the sun was setting. A short run along a pebble-strewn track brought us to brigade headquarters, which con-

sisted of a well-camouflaged mess tent and a number of vehicles scattered widely round, each some 200 yards from the next, so as to give no worth-while target for bombers. The plain up here is more or less level with a hard, stony surface covered in some places with a sparse low scrub. Sometimes it is gently undulating, and there are often rocky outcrops on the somewhat higher ground, which is frequently strewn with small boulders. What tracks there are usually follow the lower, more level stretches. There are no marked features, the undulations of which I spoke being quite slight and at a distance almost imperceptible, so it is a hard country to find one's way about in, except by compass, and that needs much practice when travelling at speed.

I slept that night in my valise beside the car. It was cold towards morning and a heavy dew made pools in the folds of the waterproof cover, but the air seemed like champagne after Cairo. A rub over with a wet towel and a shave was all the washing possible—water had to be brought from a distance by lorry.

After an early breakfast, the commanding officer of a famous Rifle Regiment holding the Sidi Omar sector of the line most kindly drove me round to visit his forward posts. He navigated by compass and we made our objectives without difficulty. The spirit of the troops who had been for months out in the desert with many hardships was splendid—they looked very fit, too, burnt almost as brown as Indians; but sometimes they would get sores, and cuts and abrasions would be hard to heal, vegetables and fruit being hard to come by. It was amazing to see these men from England so at home in the desert, and to see how motor vehicles have extended the distances and scope of infantry action in open country such as this. In command of the widely scattered posts were sometimes very young officers full of the keenness and self-confidence that come of " having a show of your own to run "; and the men were smart, alert and contented-looking. The regimental tradition of a first-class regiment works wonders.

Sidi Omar, of which one hears so much, is on the Libyan frontier line and consists of no more than three or four ruined huts; but they stand at the junction of some desert tracks, and on the skyline—enough in that featureless and barren plain to make it a very Piccadilly Circus.

All along the frontier line from the sea for many miles inland stretches a line of big masonry pillars about 8 feet high and some 2,000 yards apart, painted white, and on the Libyan side " Libia " is marked in large black letters with a number below. Compass navigators who lose their way have only to drive westwards or eastwards as the case may be until they see a white pillar; the number on it shows them exactly where they are. Possibly Mussolini at some time had trouble with his compass hereabouts! Following roughly the same line was a derelict line of barbed wire put up at some time or other by the Italians in order to control the movement of camels across the frontier. This had mostly been crushed down by our tanks moving backwards and forwards across the frontier. Out ahead of this line a famous cavalry regiment had for months been complete masters of this no-man's-land up to Fort Capuzzo, in spite of the Italians' superior numbers.

Reluctantly next day I had to get back as far as possible along the road to Cairo, where each day's absence meant the piling up of files till my return.

TOBRUK

My second visit to the desert was to Tobruk, a little more than a year later. In the interim, of course, the Italian forward push into Egypt up to the Sidi Bairani area had taken place, from which they were driven eventually by General Wavell's brilliant campaign which drove them helter-skelter back beyond Benghazi with the loss of 170,000 prisoners; this being followed in April, 1941, by the German-Italian surprise counter-thrust which drove us back to the frontier line again, leaving Tobruk as an isolated defended area on the coast.

During this period I had been appointed Liaison Officer between G.H.Q. in Egypt and the Free French in Equatorial Africa. I had edged round the mushroom a bit!

Arriving back in Cairo from Brazzaville last August an opportunity presented itself of a short liaison mission to Tobruk (unconnected with the Free French). This was particularly fortunate, as my regiment was at that time in Tobruk, and it was some nine years since I had last seen them when I finished my command.

Embarking in a small warship from Egypt, we steamed all day in formation with other warships at high speed, zigzagging to avoid submarines, and with a vigilant lookout for hostile aircraft. The weather was gorgeous—a cloudless sky and a sea as blue as only the Eastern Mediterranean can be. A light breeze made it pleasantly cool on deck in spite of the hot sun as we raced along. The decks were crowded with troops going to Tobruk. Standing on the bridge, it was very impressive to watch the bow wave of the ship astern shooting up forecastle high as she caught our wake when zigzagging. A number of warships close together rushing through the water give an impression of smooth, swift and relentless determination it is hard to describe.

The captain was most kind and hospitable. Besides putting his cabin at my disposal (he, of course, never left the bridge), he let me spend as much time as I liked on the bridge, and of this I took full advantage. It was my first experience of a warship at sea in war conditions—a most inspiring experience.

Towards evening, when enemy attack from the air became more probable, we passed a British warship steaming eastwards, who told us some ships had been bombed in that neighbourhood the afternoon before. A little later two formations of aircraft appeared high above us; they were our own fighters, so *we* were being well cared for.

When darkness came, still we sped along completely blacked out. It was a wonderful starlight night with no moon. Looking ahead or astern, one could just make out the faintly deeper blackness of another ship.

After some hours the captain told me that we were getting very near Tobruk harbour. How one can find the narrow entrance to an inconspicuous harbour in the dark beats me! Presently I thought at times I

could see a tiny dim winking light; our speed slowed. We seemed to be alone now; the other dark shapes had disappeared. In a little a dark and low coast-line could just be distinguished quite close, and we slowed again until we were just moving—and so we crept into the harbour. Occasionally a dark shape would show indistinctly, close to right or left. These were wrecks, one being a ship on which I had once travelled from Karachi to Bombay. Presently the engines stopped and with a loud rattle our anchor chain ran out. Almost at once small dark shapes closed in on us and received their instructions from an officer on the bridge. These were lighters. Those with troops to be embarked were directed to one side and empty ones to take our troops on board to the other. Yet another was brought astern to take off the stores we carried. Almost immediately all three operations were in full swing together. To port disembarkation into the empty lighters was taking place. To starboard troops from the lighters were swarming up ladders on to the deck, and, astern, the stores were rapidly being unloaded. There was scarcely a sound as all this went on rapidly and smoothly in complete darkness. It was a triumph of efficient organization. I was directed to a launch and was soon deposited on a jetty with my valise. Here I had to wait until an embarkation officer was free to drive me to Divisional Headquarters. In the distance one could see occasional white or green Véry lights go up, and hear the rattle of machine-gun fire, followed by a glare of white light as the Italians switched on a searchlight somewhere on the perimeter—and sometimes there was the "boom" of guns and the "wump" of a bursting shell. Night in Tobruk was not so peaceful, it appeared, as the clear serenity of the sky with its swinging clusters of sparkling stars suggested.

Presently we drove off in a small Fiat car which had been captured from the Italians. It was pitch dark and no lights at all were allowed in Tobruk. Nevertheless, my driver seemed to have little difficulty in finding his way, driving at a fair pace too. I could see nothing! Eventually we stopped and he showed me into an empty dugout in the side of a slope. It was the mess of a part of Divisional Headquarters. Here, unrolling my valise, I slept until an orderly arrived early in the morning and got me a most welcome, though rather odd tasting, cup of tea and a quarter of a bucket of muddy water. The morning air at Tobruk was delightfully dry and exhilarating after the heavy, damp heat of Cairo. I had an excellent breakfast with the Australian Divisional Commander and his staff in a hut near by and then transacted my business at the offices of the Divisional Headquarters. Presently a breeze sprang up and the daily dust storm began. Dust and the shortage of water and vegetables were, it seemed, the main discomforts of Tobruk, but everyone seemed in the best of health and good spirits. They all felt, I think, that they were doing a really worth-while job. There was usually something to think about, too, as, apart from the continual sporadic shelling, which went on all the time, the perimeter was always in a state of alert, and nightly there were raids and counter-raids across the narrow no-man's-land.

A liaison officer drove me to the headquarters of my regiment, which

was holding a sector of the perimeter. Part of the way lay along the fine tarmac Tobruk-Derna road built by the Italians. The commanding officer had no idea that I was coming. He had been my adjutant ten years before, so it was a great meeting. We got straight into a truck and he drove me across a more or less level hard-surfaced plain covered with large stones, at quite thirty miles an hour, to a high bit of ground close to the perimeter from where we could get a splendid view of the whole sector, and he pointed out the positions of our posts and of the enemy's defences. Of these he had accurate knowledge by means of nightly listening patrols and occasional what were called "murder parties." A patrol in gym shoes and armed with bayonets would carry out a very carefully planned raid on some Italian post, usually getting right round it and rushing it from behind. Once in the post the Italians, it seemed, gave very little trouble and prisoners were brought back.

After some ten minutes the C.O. said: "We ought to get down about now, as the 'Itis' usually send over some stuff about twenty minutes after anyone shows up here," so we walked back a couple of hundred yards to the car, and sure enough, as we drove off, there was "wump, wump, wump" behind and tall pillars of dust shot up near where we had been standing. This delay seemed to be an invariable rule that could safely be taken advantage of.

During the next three days we visited all the forward posts along the regimental front, and I met many old friends among the Indian ranks. Most of the posts in this area, which had a fine natural tank-proof obstacle running just in front of it, were formed by improving natural features of the ground. Close below the surface in most places in this area was hard conglomerate rock, in which blasting was required in order to make a trench. Many observation posts were cleverly sited camouflaged sangars, built of stones, such as are used on the Indian frontier. There were one or two ex-Italian concrete dugouts in the forward area, but the C.O. would not let these be used: he had a very sound theory that it is bad for men to get "concrete-minded," a disease from which the Italians sometimes seem to suffer.

In this sector of the Tobruk perimeter, owing to the rocky ground, there was little dust—which was a great advantage. Walking about all day in the sun with a pleasant breeze blowing from the sea was most exhilarating, and gave one a splendid appetite.

We lunched one day at the mess of one of the squadrons close up to the forward positions. Here, just below the forward crest of a deep "wadi," was a low cave under a jutting slab of conglomerate rock. Bully beef, cooked with dried cabbage captured from the Italians, and tinned peaches, washed down with water from a well at the foot of the "wadi." A member of this mess was a most remarkable old gentleman of over seventy—a well-known and distinguished retired Admiral. He had been re-employed as a Commander in charge of naval matters. As his job was finished he had stayed behind and had attached himself to the regiment. He was a great favourite with all ranks. A sangar had been built for him, with a camouflaged canvas roof, near this mess, on a slope of the "wadi" overlooking the sea. "Admiralty House" it was called. A most inspiring

old gentleman he was, with a quiet voice and ways. He was never happy out of the front line and was always "looking for trouble."

Most mornings before daylight an air raid would take place on Tobruk Harbour. I used to get up and watch the fireworks display. A large parachute flare was dropped, which burned very brightly in the sky, and all around it tracer rounds from Breda guns, glowing red, shot up trying to knock it out—and above were the bright bursts of anti-aircraft shells. We had no aircraft at Tobruk, as the aerodrome was under enemy gunfire, so the German and Italian planes had the sky to themselves.

At the end of three days I had to return to Cairo and was ordered by Divisional Headquarters to report to Movement Control at the harbour that night. A truck from the regiment took me down.

After some time a large motor lighter came alongside the jetty and I embarked with some troops and we put off into the harbour and waited. Punctually at the time expected a large dark shape appeared and an anchor chain rattled noisily. We moved forward and were told to come alongside on the starboard side. Clambering on board up a ladder I found that, most fortunately, it was the same ship that had brought me four days before, so I was among friends.

Immediately the same routine of embarking and disembarking as on our arrival was started. I made my way up on to the bridge and got the Captain's permission to stay there. While watching some green Véry lights going up on the perimeter in the distance, I heard the noise of aircraft. Suddenly a large parachute flare was dropped immediately above us, which lighted up the harbour as bright as day. Tin hats were put on and work went on smoothly without a check. The Captain turned to me and said: "That makes one feel very naked, doesn't it?" Indeed it did! However, for some reason no attack was made, and after what seemed a long time the flare burnt out. As soon as all was ready up came the anchor and we crept slowly out of the harbour.

As soon as we were outside it was full steam ahead for an appointed rendezvous out at sea, where, in due course, we joined up with other warships waiting for us. The return passage to Egypt was as enjoyable and uneventful as before.

KUFRA

Now to turn to Kufra, which is, as you know, a large and important oasis more or less in the centre of the Libyan desert. It lies, *as the crow flies*, some 500 miles south of Tobruk, some 450 miles from the northern boundary of Chad, and some 650 miles from Wadai Halfa on the Nile on the boundary between Egypt and the Sudan. All these distances are *as the crow flies*; by the desert tracks the distances are very much longer.

So much for geography.

In February of last year you will remember General Wavell's brilliant campaign capturing the whole of Cyrenaica was brought to its close. During January British long-range desert patrols, accompanied by a detachment of the Free French, raided Murzuk, in which operation the gallant French officer Colonel Colonna Dornano lost his life.

Kufra at that time was held by the Italians, to whom the landing-ground there was most useful for their aircraft flying backwards and forwards to Abyssinia, where the, then, small garrison of the Sudan was busily engaged.

The Free French in French Equatorial Africa, the capital of which is Brazzaville on the Congo, had for a long time been spoiling for a fight with the Italians, and, though they were in process of sending a division to the Middle East, General de Gaulle offered to send a small mobile expedition to attempt the capture of Kufra—which was really in the British zone of action. This offer was gratefully accepted by General Wavell.

This operation necessitated a great deal of preliminary organization and preparation, and by February, Colonel (now General) Leclerc, the Free French commander in Chad, who was to undertake the operation, had everything in readiness.

The enormous difficulties of organizing this expedition must be remembered. Fort Lamy, the base, is itself an immense distance from any source of supply, and it was necessary with a very inadequate amount of mechanical transport to establish a forward base near the Chad frontier, some 1,100 kilometres from Fort Lamy, and also petrol dumps in the desert ahead of this. Lorries leaving Fort Lamy for these advanced dumps had, of course, to carry enough petrol to take themselves there and back again, and this on indifferent desert roads and tracks, so that the stores and petrol that could actually be dumped in the forward area represented only a small fraction of the carrying capacity of the lorries. However, by impressing every available vehicle, civil and military, the dumps were, in fact, prepared; and in February Colonel Leclerc crossed the frontier into Libya and about the middle of that month reached the neighbourhood of Kufra.

I was not present, but as British Liaison Officer from G.H.Q., Middle East, with the Free French in Equatorial Africa, my headquarters being at Brazzaville, I was in close touch with developments and frequently visited Fort Lamy before and after the operation. I got the eye-witness story from Captain Mercer Nairne of Spears Mission, who was present and who was representing me so far as Middle East interests were concerned, and also from Free French officers who took part.

By a surprise attack, Colonel Leclerc's force captured the Kufra aerodrome and destroyed some aircraft there, but the Italian garrison in the fort were on the alert and were holding some strongly dug-in and wired-in posts round the fort. They had a powerful radio station inside the fort which was in communication with the Italian forces in the north-west.

During the next few days Colonel Leclerc's lorry-borne force was twice attacked by the Italian Auto-Saharienne Company—a unit strongly armed and specially equipped for desert warfare with eight-wheel-driven vehicles, their arms including excellent heavy machine-guns firing tracer bullets. Seven aircraft co-operated with the Italians during these actions. However, by quick manœuvre and bold leadership Leclerc drove them off on the first occasion, and on the second rough-handled them to such pur-

pose that they fled for some 400 kilometres and never returned to the Kufra area.

Colonel Leclerc then settled down to the siege of El Tadj fort. By the skilful use of his mobility he deceived the garrison as to his strength, and night and day kept them on the alert, shelling them by day and pressing home bold night attacks on their outlying posts. He moved his one 75 mm. gun rapidly about and fired into the fort from different directions. This disconcerted the Italians, as they found it difficult to find cover and thought he had several guns. During this period Italian aircraft from distant aerodromes constantly came over and bombed the small French force.

This went on for several weeks. Supplies became very short as time went on. It must be remembered that Leclerc was surrounded on all sides by hundreds of miles of desert and that there was every probability that a strong force of Italians might arrive from the north-west. Colonel Leclerc was, however, determined to hang on, and he is the type of leader who inspires his men—they would do anything for him.

The French wounded presented a difficulty, especially the severely wounded. One day a very old single-engined Potez 29 ambulance plane managed to stagger up over the 2,000 kilometres of desert from Fort Lamy and landed on a rough landing-ground that had been prepared. This was a very fine navigational performance, as in these desert areas there are no landmarks whatever for hundreds of miles, and the slightest error means that you may pass out of sight of your objective; then you are lost, and when petrol runs out you have to come down in the desert and are probably never heard of again.

Well, the Italians inside the fort saw this machine in the far distance and in their anxiety of mind jumped to the conclusion that it must be a fighter, and if there was one there were probably more! So they sent a wireless message, which the French intercepted, reporting this. From that day on no Italian bombers appeared!

Eventually, just as Leclerc's supplies and men were almost exhausted, the Italian's morale broke. They put up the white flag.

At once Leclerc jumped into a touring car with one staff officer and drove up to the gate. He was admitted to the fort and peremptorily ordered the garrison to parade and stack their arms. Nearly 400 prisoners were taken, much equipment, and a large quantity of arms and ammunition.

This brilliant operation is surely as fine an example as one could find of tenacity and able, determined leadership. It shows also the high fighting value of the Free French troops in Chad; but, above all, it is of course *leadership* that counts.

The Free French continued to hold Kufra until they were relieved by our own troops after the capture of Abyssinia, a token Free French detachment remaining there as part of the garrison.

Since that time, over Fort El Tadj, the Union Jack and the French Tricolour fly side by side.

JAPAN'S PLANNED AGGRESSION

By THE RIGHT HON. SIR ROBERT CLIVE, P.C., G.C.M.G.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on March 4, 1942, the Right Hon. Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., in the Chair.

WHEN I called this talk "Japan's Planned Aggression," I intended to signify that Japan's entry into the war was one of the most calculated and deliberate acts of aggression recorded in history. Japan's aggression dates back to the sixteenth century, when a complete programme was drawn up for the conquest of Eastern Asia and South-Eastern Asia, even including India and as far west as Persia. But after the death of Hideyoshi in 1598 the whole of this great programme was put into cold storage and remained there during the long period of 250 years when Japan went into seclusion during the Tokugawa Shogunate.

You have no doubt heard of that very curious offence which has been translated "dangerous thoughts," for which anyone in Japan to-day is liable to arrest. The danger feared by the Shogun was that the Japanese who adopted Christianity might come to think that there was some authority higher than himself. In 1937, when I left Japan, "dangerous thoughts" meant what we should call liberal thoughts or any way of thinking that did not accord with the views of the military hierarchy. It is the army leaders who for years past have been planning Japan's policy of aggression.

Japan's aggression, as I see it, passed through three phases. The first was aggression for security, the second for security *cum* expansion, and the third for expansion. The wars against China in 1894 and against Russia in 1904 were fought mainly for security, though I do not deny that expansion was also part of the programme. Fear of Russia has always haunted the Japanese, and Japan was determined to get control of Korea from the point of view of her own security. Security combined with expansion was the reason for the war of 1931. It was not called a war. It was in that year that Japan seized Manchuria. Expansion was the first thought in that enterprise, but security against Russia was also part of the programme. The attack on China in 1937, which developed into the war that is still going on, and the attack on Pearl Harbour and Malaya in December of last year, which were the prelude to Japan's entry into the present war, were unquestionably for expansion and expansion only. No theory of security can be justified in those cases.

The Japanese have always had three main enemies in view. Those three enemies were the countries which were responsible for the opening up of Japan after her long period of seclusion about ninety years ago—namely, Russia, the United States, and Great Britain. Russia is the

country of which Japan has always been most suspicious and afraid. With the United States and Great Britain her relations were relatively easy during the first fifty years. There were sporadic outbursts of anti-foreign feeling, but these died down on the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902. But both in England and in the United States there prevailed generally amongst the English-speaking peoples the most appalling ignorance of Japanese mentality and ambitions. In fact, I suppose more nonsense has been written about Japan than about any other country in the world. What might almost be called the "cherry-blossom complex" continued far too long, and blinded many eyes to the fact that Japan not only was, but always had been, a ruthlessly aggressive nation.

Napier, the historian of the Peninsular War, said of this country that Great Britain was a warlike but not a military nation. That would be a very incorrect description of Japan, which, like Germany, is and always has been both military and warlike. Yet the world persisted in underestimating her military strength and her aggressive policy. Many American writers and journalists have during the last few years taken a very correct view of what Japan was really aiming at, but the other day I came across an American magazine, in which a writer who had been living in Japan for thirteen years stated that most of Japan's 6,000 planes were obsolete or obsolescent, and that competent military authorities were convinced that an air offensive operating from southern British, Dutch, and Philippine bases would annihilate on the ground the whole Japanese air force within a few weeks. It also stated that planes from two American aircraft carriers could cripple the entire Japanese railway system for months, that Japan had few fighter planes, and that Japanese industry could not produce them, lacking materials, tools, and labour!

There have been equally misleading calculations about the internal position of the country. A very well-written book, *Japan's Feet of Clay*, left on one the impression that Japan could never stand up against a really serious shock. Unfortunately, events have shown that the conclusions drawn were based rather on wishful thinking than on actual facts. Finally, there have always been, especially in this country, many well-intentioned people who, in spite of evidence to the contrary, refused to believe the worst of the Japanese, and not only defended them, but dubbed as anti-Japanese anyone who was sceptical of their peaceful intentions.

This "Japanese right or wrong" element included all sorts, even officials, who were convinced that by yielding to Japanese demands and not reacting to Japanese insults we could still retain Japan's goodwill. But my Soviet colleague in Tokyo always said: "When a Japanese hits you, hit him back harder." That was the Russian policy during those ten years of fighting along the Manchurian frontier, and on the whole it was not unsuccessful.

The British Government never adopted this point of view, because they always hoped that the Empire could be held by sweet reasonableness and not by force. A distinguished American Minister in China some thirty years ago, Mr. Rockhill, at a time when Japan had begun to put her own interpretation on the American doctrine of the open door, said that diplomacy, however astute and however beneficial it might be, if it

was not supported by force which not only commanded but demanded respect would avail very little. Frederick the Great put it more bluntly. Diplomacy without force, he said, was like an orchestra without musicians.

Those who misled themselves and the world in their estimate of the Japanese seem to me to have ignored the basic fact of the Japanese character, which during the two and a half centuries of Japan's isolation was moulded into a very definite pattern. During that period the Japanese became the most regimented, the most self-centred, and the most conceited people in the world, and there developed in their character that fanatical devotion and loyalty, first to the family, then to the feudal lord, and later to the Emperor. This attitude of mind was well summed up in an article I read the other day, which stated that filial piety and loyalty were considered to be the sole virtues; the loyalty was always to a superior, and any crime could be committed in the name of loyalty, whether it was the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour or the murder of a statesman. As you know, no fewer than five Prime Ministers were murdered in Japan between 1921 and 1936.

Tribalism is as good a description of the Japanese way of life as any other, for the tribe is the end-all of existence. The Japanese have no standard of international morality based on the Christian ethic. This was unknown to them, and, even if it had been known, it was quite incompatible with the belief instilled into every Japanese that he came of a superior race of divine origin. Since the last war this belief in the divine origin of Japan has been encouraged and developed in all the schools into the ideal of a Japanese mission on earth to spread her culture and civilization. More recently it has been masked under the cloak of the new order for Greater East Asia and the co-prosperity movement. But no equal partnership was ever intended. The countries included were simply to be dependencies under Japanese domination. We know how Japan has treated her colonies—Formosa and Korea and the Dependency of Manchuria. There is no pretence of any sort of freedom, no self-government now or promised for the future. The inhabitants are classed as Japanese subjects. They have merely to obey the orders of the Japanese officials sent to govern them.

It is rather instructive at this moment to look back at the reaction of President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 at the end of the Russo-Japanese War. The whole sympathy of America up to that date had been solidly pro-Japanese, but an American correspondent then reported that the Japanese had become intolerably overbearing and insolent. The President wrote down his own reflections as follows: "I wish I could be certain that Japan down at bottom did not lump Russians, English, Americans, Germans, all of us simply as white devils inferior to themselves, not only in what they regard as the essence of civilization, but in courage, to be politely treated only so long as would enable them to take advantage of our national jealousies and beat us all in turn." The President's reflections were not very far wrong.

The Chinese have a remarkable philosophy of life, but they never wanted to impose their own civilization on the world. The Japanese affect to-day to despise the Chinese for lacking those qualities of efficiency,

established order, and disciplined patriotism which are the foundation of the Japanese State. The Chinese have a saving sense of humour and are a most likeable race, while it is no exaggeration to say that the Japanese *outside* Japan have made themselves universally disliked. I am not referring to individual Japanese, but to Japanese in the mass. Contact with Europe and with America—contact, that is, with the white man—has really had but one object in view for the Japanese—namely, to learn his trade secrets, to copy his latest inventions, and to find out everything that could conduce to Japan's efficiency and material advantage.

The world must now come to realize that the Japanese are a most formidable race who have been remarkably successful in deceiving us. Sir Rutherford Alcock, the first British Minister to Japan, spoke of the incorrigible habit of the Japanese to disguise the truth in all matters great and small. I remember that after the autumn manœuvres in 1936 most of the foreign military attachés came away with the idea that Japanese military equipment was some years behind, and that the Japanese army was not up to European standards. It is now quite clear that the Japanese were deliberately deceiving the military attachés, and they were equally successful in deceiving the air attachés, who formed the impression that the Japanese air force, which started under British tutelage, was no less behindhand. We now know that since 1924, when the Americans passed the Exclusion Act, Japan has been building up her armies, and since 1931 has been deliberately preparing for war to drive the white man clean out of Eastern Asia. " Public Enemy No. 1 " has shifted from the Americans to the Russians, and from the Russians to the British, and again in the last year back to the Americans. Russia was the main objective of the army, and remained so until the signing of the Soviet-German Treaty in August, 1939. Twice the Soviet Government offered Japan a non-agression pact, and twice it was turned down; and in 1936 Japan signed with Germany the anti-Comintern Pact. I remember in 1934 old Admiral Saito, who was then Prime Minister (two years later he was brutally murdered), saying that Japan could never sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, for that would rob the army of their main incentive, which was one day to take Vladivostock and the whole of Eastern Siberia up to Lake Baikal.

Four things have profoundly affected Japan's outlook since the end of the last war: (1) The refusal of Britain and America to accept the Japanese claim to racial equality; (2) the scrapping of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; (3) the American Exclusion Act of 1924; and (4) the limitation of the Japanese fleet to 60 per cent. of the British or American navies.

The Japanese resented very much the fact that at the Peace Conference their claim to racial equality was never endorsed. They hoped to have some clause inserted in the preamble to the League of Nations Covenant to establish this claim to racial equality, and the British, largely under the influence of the Australians and the Canadians, objected to this as unnecessary. Although the Japanese proposal was passed by a vote of eleven to six, it was suggested that such a vote must be unanimous, and President Wilson, who was in the chair, agreed. Then came the scrapping of the alliance, which was looked upon as a blow to Japanese pride, and, com-

bined with the limitation of their fleet to 60 per cent. of the British or American fleet, was deeply resented in Japan. We have every reason to believe that the naval authorities, from the moment this document was signed at Washington, determined to adjust matters in their own way and re-establish the equality of their own fleet. Finally, in 1924, when the Americans passed the Exclusion Act, the Japanese took that as a definite blow and as signifying that the Americans looked upon the Japanese as an inferior race.

Those four things which happened so quickly in the years following the last war have certainly had an effect in shaping the extreme tempo of Japanese aggression during the last few years. With all this there came a growing realization of the fact that the Power which more than any other stood in the way of Japanese expansion was the British Empire, not only politically, but also economically. Although little was heard about Japanese designs in the years immediately following the Washington Conference, the famous Tanaka Memorial to the Emperor was a danger signal: "To conquer the world we must conquer China, and one day we shall have to fight the United States. To gain control of China we must crush the United States." The Japanese pronounced this document to be a fake, but it is far too prophetic to have been invented. Unfortunately, neither we nor the Americans took it seriously. When the army began to recover the prestige it had lost in the post-war campaign in Eastern Siberia, the military leaders set to work seriously to prepare for the coming struggle, and by 1931 were ready to strike. That autumn Manchuria was seized and occupied, which was the first requirement in General Tanaka's plan. Since then Japan has been in a constant state of war, the objectives being the control of China, the conquest of Eastern Siberia, the smashing of the British Empire in the Pacific, and the elimination of American influence from the Far East.

I will now endeavour briefly to outline the successive steps in this carefully planned policy of aggression since the beginning of the century. We start with the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, which began with a treacherous attack on the Russian fleet before war had been declared. The chief gains of the war were the elimination of the Russian threat to Japanese security, virtual control of Southern Manchuria, and a protectorate over Korea. Next came the twenty-one demands which were presented to China in 1915, when Japan's ally, Great Britain, was fighting for her very existence in Europe and unable to do more than protest, which under the terms of the alliance we had every right to do. Those demands, if accepted, would have given Japan control at that time of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria and the provinces of Shantung and Fukien. They did not, however, materialize immediately, because in 1917 China entered the war as one of the Allied and Associated Powers, and the demands obviously could not be pressed. Furthermore, the refusal of the American Senate to confirm the Japanese claim to Shantung, which the Peace Conference had originally endorsed at the bidding of Great Britain and France, forced Japan to wait. However, in 1931 the army leaders had laid their plans and Manchuria was seized and Inner Mongolia was brought under Japanese control. In 1932 or 1933 the Soviet Government got possession of and

published in Moscow a very interesting document which gave the whole Japanese army plan for attacking the Maritime Province and Eastern Siberia up to Lake Baikal. The Japanese denied the authenticity of this document, but very unconvincingly. In 1933 began the drive against the Netherlands East Indies, with the formation of the Great Asia Development Company, of which Prince Konoye, later Prime Minister of Japan, and Mr. Hirota, the Foreign Minister, were prominent members. Four or five thousand Japanese "fishermen" were from then on always round the coast of the Dutch Islands. Other Japanese obtained concessions for oil in places where there was no oil. Their idea was always to build up a fifth column, to spy out the land, and prepare for the day when they would eventually attack the Dutch Indies. By April, 1934, the year I went back to Japan, the army felt strong enough to throw down their challenge to the white man by the "Hands off China" declaration made by the Foreign Office spokesman. Although the Powers protested against this, the Japanese could only deny that the statement was official. Later in the year began the publication of a series of so-called army pamphlets praising Germany, reflecting on this country, and preparing Japan for war. Those pamphlets continued right up to 1940. I remember protesting against the first one that was issued in the autumn of 1934, but Mr. Hirota, the Foreign Minister, denied all knowledge of it. He said that it was purely an internal matter with the army. But the pamphlets continued. Their object was to induce in the Japanese public the idea of expansion at the expense of the white man, and that the white man was the inevitable and permanent enemy of the Japanese. In 1935 the Japanese finally seceded from the London Naval Treaty and claimed equality with us and the Americans. Since that date their naval construction has been a profound secret. The same year Commander Ishimaru published his book, *Japan must Fight Britain*. In the following year, 1936, the army intensified their aggressive action in North China by setting up a so-called autonomous government of Eastern Hopei, the object of which was to undermine the Chinese maritime Customs and to ruin British trade in North China. At the same time the British and American oil companies were being forced out of Manchuria. Low, the cartoonist, well represented the situation by a picture of the "open door" with a little Japanese sentry standing beside it, kicking all the white men through it.

In December, 1936, Japan signed with Germany the Anti-Comintern Pact, which laid the foundation of the alliance of Japan with the Axis, and there is no doubt that before this the Japanese had started to fortify the mandated islands east of the Philippines. During that year there took place what was called the Keelung incident, when British sailors in Formosa were beaten up. By this time it was hardly safe for an Englishman to travel in Japan off the beaten track, as he was liable to be arrested for espionage on the flimsiest pretext. A definite policy of hatred and contempt for white men had been launched. In 1937 the undeclared war on China began. When the British Ambassador in China was attacked and nearly killed, four weeks passed before the Japanese sent an unwilling expression of regret; although when the American ship *Panay* was bombed they lost no time in offering compensation. June, 1938, will be remem-

bered for the infamous treatment of British subjects in Tientsin, when the Japanese blockaded the British Concession. The blockade continued for nearly a year, and is one of the greatest outrages to which a British Government has ever had to submit in peace-time.

The signing of the Soviet-German Treaty in August, 1939, resulted in a certain relaxation of the anti-British propaganda, but only for a short time. After the collapse of France in 1940 the ten-year pact with the Axis was signed, and then came the invasion by the Japanese of Indo-China. In July, 1941, Japan signed with Indo-China a Treaty of Mutual Protection, and that was really the final danger signal before December 7, 1941, when, while negotiations were still going on in Washington, Japan made her treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour and Malaya before war had been declared.

No one can deny that Japan has for years past planned aggression with the utmost thoroughness and deliberation, though it may well be that if the French had not behaved with almost unparalleled treachery the Japanese might still to-day be non-belligerent and awaiting the moment to attack. Those who persist in thinking that a still more conciliatory policy on the part of H.M. Government would have resulted in keeping Japan out of the war may be reminded that a nation which yields to blackmail is on the down grade. Of course, we could have bought off Japan if we had sacrificed China and accepted all that Japan had done there, but such a policy would be unworthy of any British Government. Although Russia may still be the historic enemy with whom Japan will have to settle her account one day, it has been Japanese policy since 1936 to insult and ill-treat the British and injure their trade in the Far East. This policy has been directed more against the British than against the Americans, because British interests in the Far East were greater than those of any other country. It was only in the autumn of 1940, when it was clear that the two great democracies would hang together, that Japanese propaganda turned against the States.

It is difficult to see how we can ever live again side by side with Japan in that spirit of friendly tolerance natural to the British race. There is little tolerance among the Japanese, even if they have inherited from the Chinese a spirit of compromise. The antagonism between the Japanese and the white races is fundamental. I say the white races because Germany has never had any sympathy with the Japanese, or the Japanese with the Germans, beyond natural admiration for the other's military efficiency. We must have no illusions about the future. On the one hand we have the Japanese determined to dominate Eastern Asia. On the other hand we have the alliance between the British, the Americans, and the Dutch, who want only to maintain their trade and their interests in the East on the principle of "live and let live." The clash between the two is bound to be resounding. The Japanese new order is so opposed to all our ideals that there can be no compromise. Either they go under or we do. Either Far Eastern trade is to be opened to the world or it is to be the exclusive prerogative of the Japanese. That is the issue at stake, and we may be sure the Japanese will fight to the last on behalf of their new order.

A discussion followed, in which Lieut.-General Sir Douglas Brownrigg, Mr. Julian Piggott, Mr. Matters, and Mr. A. H. Byrt took part.

Lord HAILEY, in expressing the gratitude of the Society to the lecturer for an address which, he said, was of outstanding interest at the present moment, desired to thank, also, those speakers who had, at the invitation of the Chair, taken on themselves the not entirely welcome task of emphasizing views regarding the grounds underlying Japanese aggression different from those expressed by the lecturer himself. This referred in particular to the problem raised by the Japanese claim for expansion on the basis of over-population. There had at one time been a disposition in England to believe that Japan's statement of her increasing population was purposely exaggerated. Lord Northcliffe had, for instance, once supported that view. But the pressure of population on her soil was undoubtedly a fact, and the figures of increase were somewhat staggering. Nevertheless, the question remained how far a country whose population was pressing hard on the resources provided by its own soil was justified in attempting to raise its standard of living by seeking territorial acquisitions at the expense of other peoples. In this particular case the areas over which Japan was attempting to expand were also very heavily populated, and Sir Robert's address undoubtedly showed that she was seeking something quite different from an expanding space for emigration. The proper method of providing for her expanding population was one of the kind of problems we shall have to settle after the war.

There was another problem suggested by the lecture, and in view of recent circumstances seemed of outstanding importance. We and America will no doubt be able to restore the military situation created by Japanese aggression, but we shall have more difficulty in restoring the psychological situation in the East. We cannot hope to go back to countries overrun by the Japanese and to rule them on the former basis of prestige. The war has done too much to destroy this. There are only two courses. One is to put these countries under a considerable period of military rule or the like, forcible enough to restore the moral position we have lost. The second is to deliberately encourage among these peoples the sense of their own nationality and a pride in their own national existence which will make them view future aggression from Japan or elsewhere in the same light as the Chinese view it, and to resist it as the Chinese have done. That type of problem is one of the most acute issues that we shall have to face after the war, and it is one which requires to be approached with a new vision and with different conceptions from those which we have entertained in the past.

SOME LESSONS CHINA HAS LEARNED FROM THE WAR*

By DR. ZING-YANG KUO

In introducing the lecturer the CHAIRMAN said: Ladies and gentlemen, I have great pleasure in introducing to you Dr. Zing-Yang Kuo, who has come over to England at the invitation of the Universities of China Committee to give a course of lectures. The idea of this invitation which the University Committee extends is that eminent Chinese shall come to this country to expound the intellectual life and culture of China to us and that we shall send intellectual people to China for the same purpose. Dr. Kuo is one of the younger generation of scientists in China. He has a distinguished academic record, and has been speaking here for some time with great success in British universities and other institutions. I have heard some of his addresses, have heard reports of others and am sure you will have an admirable account of what is happening in China. He proposes to say something of the lessons that China has learned from her experiences during the last three or four years.

DR. ZING-YANG KUO: Sir John Pratt, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have to apologize for the title of my lecture, "The Present Position in China." What I intend to say to-day should be entitled "Some Lessons China has Learned from the War." Now war is a bad thing. War is a bad thing, as every one of us knows, but sometimes when war happens, in the end it accomplishes something valuable. I have spoken elsewhere of social and other changes which have taken place during the last four years as the result of this war, and to-day I am going to point out some of the lessons that we in China have learned in those four short years which, as a matter of fact, we should not otherwise have learned in less than a hundred years. One of the things we have learned is the lesson of self-reliance. Until the last twenty years or even before, in any case before the establishment of the present Government in 1927—which now is in Chungking—the Chinese foreign policy was to rely more or less on the help of friendly Powers to check the aggression by unfriendly Powers. When this war broke out, and especially during the second year of the war, the Chinese people began to realize that the Chinese themselves were the most important factor in checking this aggression. They must not rely on others. I think that this realization of the necessity of self-reliance is universal now in China and extends even to the ordinary person who used to be indifferent to political and international affairs. If you go to Chungking or to any province in the interior of China and ask a student what may happen in Washington in negotiations between the United States and Japan, if for example you suggest to the young student the pessimistic idea that something may happen which will not be favourable to China, you will get a characteristic response: "It makes no difference to us what happens outside China; we are going to carry through the war ourselves."

As a psychologist I was astonished to find this attitude prevailing

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among the Chinese population as the result of the war. This I consider a very important psychological factor not only for the future of China but for other nations to consider in relation to China. Now there is another important factor which has happened in China; it is this: we see that it is necessary for us to achieve real unity. This necessity for unity implies overcoming the old conception of life in China, especially in relation to the family; you all know that in the old days the family was the centre in the life of the individual, the real centre of interest. You found every member of a family very loyal, very faithful, very honest as long and as far as the family was concerned; but you would wonder why this very faithful, honest Chinese would sometimes, outside the family, do something which from the standpoint of modern life is not very desirable. There was one case which happened only about seven or eight years ago. I had personal experience of one young man who was very honest in everything up to the family standard so far as his behaviour was concerned, but this young man was caught and arrested for what Chinese slang calls "squeezing" five hundred dollars from the public funds. He was put on trial, and it was discovered that he considered it his duty to pay the debts of his big brother, who was a gambler and had lost five hundred dollars and could not pay the debts. It was a duty to save the honour of his family, so he stole from the public funds to pay the debts of his gambling brother. This is not, from a modern standpoint, desirable, but if you look at the situation objectively, and realize the change that has taken place since then—especially within the last four years—you will begin to realize that it was the different type of philosophy of life of those days which caused this action.

If you go to China now you will find that as a result of this war the interest in the family is gradually dying out, the people are beginning to become more interested in the affairs of the nation. From the standpoint of the standard of ethics now we might say this squeezing of five hundred dollars from the public funds is an immoral action, but probably from the standpoint of international relationship at present the same kind of action would not be considered immoral. In the future international ethics may improve. So I am speaking of Chinese ethics as they used to be, and I say there was a transitional stage where one might be honest in the family but could be justified if one was not honest outside the family. But herein lies the change, that it is now felt that the nation and not the family should be the centre of interest to every Chinese. This change has not gone far enough; I would like to see it advance so far that "honesty" should be accepted as "the best policy" by every nation in all international affairs. But it is already a great step from the old conception of the family as the centre of life. As to honesty in national life and the more recent sentiment against public dishonesty, I do not say there is no graft whatever going on; there is plenty of it still. But the surprising thing is that when I went to Chungking more than two years ago I discovered much less graft than I expected. The sentiment against graft was so strong, and the organization to check graft was so efficient, that it even tended to interfere with efficiency in carrying out the policies of certain departments, and the checking of accounts in each depart-

ment before they are passed is troublesome because there is so much red tape. Take, for instance, the appointment of the Treasurer of the National University. Neither the Chancellor of the University nor the Minister of Education has any say in this appointment; the appointment must be made direct by the Government Treasury Office. Once appointed, the Treasurer of the National University is in complete charge of all expenditure, and all expenditure must be in strict accordance with the estimates laid down by Government. If there is an item of £2,000 for books and £1,000 for apparatus, the University has no right to spend £2,001 on books and £1 less on apparatus, because the Treasury would not have approved it. It is not in the Budget. If the Chancellor spent only £995 on books, at the end of March, which is the end of the fiscal year, the University would have to return £5 to the Government, regardless of whether the University was in debt in other directions or not. Control has become so strict and inflexible that at a great many universities Chancellors are finding it difficult to meet their expenses, because they are not able to shift even a few pounds from one purpose to another, unless they get permission in an emergency from the Minister of Education and finally get the change approved by the Cabinet. The same thing is going on in every direction, but I am giving you this example to show you the sentiment against grafting and any kind of stealing in Government departments. The Government has devices to prevent it and has been rather successful in preventing it, but it has gone so far as to interfere with efficiency.

Another interesting thing that has happened in China is what I will call the spirit of co-operation. In China in the old days the individual was left alone outside the family. He had no religious restraint and no other restraint. As long as he did not commit a murder or steal he could do what he pleased, and he was left as an individual to deal with other individuals. Probably in those days there was no notion of co-operation, of team work. You found in the old days that the Chinese were individually intelligent, but when it came to a group, when it came to team work, there was a great deal of difficulty in getting the individual cooperating with his fellow-countrymen.

You may be interested to be told of the common games that China had invented. As a psychologist I have paid some attention to this. Ma-Jong was originally invented in China, and I found a great many games there were like Ma-Jong, requiring a great deal of individual intelligence to play—a rather complex and complicated process in the game—but a game where one individual would play against all the rest. There is no partnership in Chinese games, no partnership in the sense of a Western game; for example, bridge, where you have four persons but two teams. This is typical of Chinese individualism; he lived alone in any society and had to exert his intelligence as he best could. The result was that there was a lack of co-operation and a lack of the spirit of team work. But this again is gradually changing, and in a great many places, especially schools, you will find that there are teams. When travelling in the provinces, visiting high schools and universities last year, I was interested in this gradual growing-up of a mass psychology among the

students. A proposal would be made which the majority of students would accept, but so far was individualism repressed that even a sensible critic was called down by his fellow-students: "Here," said they, "we must follow the majority." I do not say this is universal in China, but the change is coming. "We must co-operate and work together in a unit," they say, and there is no time and no chance for us to let the individual act individually in high schools and universities. There is another rather interesting tendency in the school life of the students: as soon as a resolution is passed by the student party then any objector to the resolution is expected to forget his own objection and follow the others. It is a change which, so far as young students are concerned, may, I am afraid, go to the other extreme and result more or less in the repression of individualism; but so far it is, I think, one of the distinct accomplishments we have as the result of the war.

As I have said, in the past the centre of interest was in the family; people did not take public affairs very seriously, with the result that there was a great deal of inefficiency in the Government and in larger organizations. There are still plenty of these depressing items, but public sentiment is very much against this kind of thing. Disobedience to law and non-observance of regulations is beginning to be looked on as a detestable thing to the Chinese public. Probably you have heard of the tragedy where several hundred people died in the caves during an air raid, not through bombing, but because of suffocation: I mention this incident to show that in China when obedience to regulations is observed literally, people can go to the other extreme. A precautionary air-raid regulation in Chungking orders that as soon as the second and final air-raid alarm is sounded no one is allowed to be seen on the street without special permission from the authorities. In other words, everyone should be kept in the caves. During July the Japanese air force adopted a new tactic in bombing Chungking. They bombed continuously for twenty-two hours out of the twenty-four. So two or three thousand people were kept inside the cave for many hours. An ordinary Chinese soldier in the old days could use his own discretion, but now the guards are different, they obey the regulation to the letter; their orders are that no one should be allowed to come out of the cave so long as the "All Clear" has not been sounded. So during those long hours of air raids the ventilation in the cave deteriorated. People began to struggle, but the guards refused to let them come out because it was against the law. The result was a tragedy, in which several hundreds died. I do not think the Chinese want to be so observant of laws and regulations even to a point of suffocation, but the soldiers guarding the entrance to the cave realized that they must obey the law. Although expediency at the moment might save a few hundred lives, they refused to disobey and let people come out. This observance of laws and regulations is a healthy sign for China. although personally I feel sorry for the accident by which so many hundreds of lives were lost.

Again, as a corollary of the lack of a spirit of co-operation in the past, there was some kind of lack of appreciation of leadership in China. As an educator I used to experience this great difficulty with young Chinese in making them follow a leader. The conception of the individual had

gone to such an extreme that one found it rather difficult to accept any one person as one's leader. It was this intense individualism which was party responsible for the long period of civil war in China since 1912 until the present war broke out; but this is now changed, and the leadership of the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is indisputable. In fact, I was unable to find another such example of an undisputed leader in the whole course of Chinese history, for he is supported by the whole population. This is largely due to his ability, but also to the fact that the whole country feels it must have a single leader in the face of the present emergency. You may be interested to remember the so-called friction between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists which strengthened the realization on the part of the Chinese of the necessity of co-operation. The Chinese Communist party thought it was an opportunity for them to make propaganda against the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo. But the result was the opposite, for the whole Chinese public was solidly behind Chiang Kai-shek and through their act the Communists have made themselves unpopular.

Here, again, is another change which is rather interesting and healthy in view of the public sentiment against things which are not desirable from the standpoint of national unity and single leadership. As I have mentioned elsewhere, this war has brought China to a realization that Chinese culture is after all not so bad as we used to think some ten or twenty years ago. At that time a young student studying either in the United States or Europe, and returning to China—and then spending most of his time in Shanghai and other big commercial cities, and forgetting the actual situation in the interior—would condemn a great many things which belong to the old Chinese culture. But now we realize that these things we used to condemn as evil are the very things that have helped China greatly in her resistance to Japanese aggression. It is mainly due to the virtues of old Chinese culture that the Chinese have been able to carry on the war for such a long time. It is due to these factors that they are so determined to fight on for another four or five years if need be. We are now planning to rebuild our culture. We feel that from now on we must not learn everything from the West. Of course we have to learn a great deal from the West, but we are going to learn selectively. We are going to preserve those good things of old China which we were so apt to condemn in the past, and preserve them in such a way that they can be mixed with the best things we have to learn from the West and produce a new type of culture in the future. So there is a rediscovery of China's own soul as a result of the war.

Another thing more or less on the material side is the alarming discovery of the physical weakness of the Chinese race. As the result of malnutrition, hardship and lack of hygienic care, when the call-up for service was made the physical examination of applicants for training revealed diseases and defects many of which are almost unknown in a country like Great Britain. The result is that the whole nation from the nursery school teacher up to the Generalissimo himself has become determined that a gigantic effort must be made, and as soon as possible, to improve the health of the nation. Some of us who are interested in this

programme of national health go so far as to say that if we can solve the problem of health in China our national reconstruction will have gone half-way. I mention this statement simply to show how much interest we feel and how much effort we are now going to make to improve the health of the nation. We have come to a full realization of the necessity of improving the health of the nation.

Monsieur GENISSIEUX: When Dr. Kuo said China was beginning to realize the good things of her ancient civilization, I think he was too modest. He implied that China could take a lot of things from Western civilization and he belittled the ancient Chinese culture. I should put it the other way. I should say, let China remain true to the spirit of her centuries-old civilization and world outlook, and take perhaps a little scientific technique from the West. China is rich enough to give to the West more than she can take from the West.

Brigadier-General Sir PERCY SYKES: May I ask one question? When I was in Chinese Turkestan some years ago the army was looked down on, and they had an old proverb, "You don't make nails out of good iron and don't make soldiers out of good men." I hope that is altered now.

The LECTURER: I am afraid that has changed almost too rapidly; there might be some danger in the future in the other direction. If you go to Chungking you will find the man in the street will take off his hat to a wounded soldier. In the old days young girls from a good family would not look at a soldier, but you will find university girls now nursing wounded soldiers in hospital. The position of a soldier is respected now. Everywhere you find the same thing. Children play at soldiers. As a scientist, a man interested in the future of internationalism and international peace, I feel this change is at present a necessity but I hope it will not go too far. How far it will go in China will depend very much on the future of international relations in the Far East. If Japan comes out with her army, navy and air force intact and ready to attack China at any time, even though some compromise and terms may have been arranged, I am sure China will say: "Go ahead now. We are going to queue up our own forces for defence so as to prevent Japan coming back another time." The whole situation is a serious one and depends on how Japan comes out of the war. If she comes out totally disarmed and defeated this tendency or respect for the soldier may be checked. The contempt for the soldier was the tradition of centuries and could be brought back easily if the thing has not gone too far and does not last long enough.

Mr. FRANCIS MORGAN: I think the doctor has already answered the point that had been rather in my mind. I had felt that in the past the great characteristic, or one of the great characteristics perhaps, of the Chinese has been their horror of war and their love of peace. I have been wondering whether in years to come, when this war is over, China may desire to become a great and powerful World Power, and perhaps no longer be an influence on the side of peace? I had felt that China might in the future be one of the greatest factors there could be for peace in the world.

The LECTURER: I think that the whole thing depends on the future peace settlement, especially with reference to the Far East. But China probably, in spite of the changes during the last few years, will be more ready than a great many other nations to go back to her old tradition of peace, and will do her best to contribute her share for bringing peace after the war. I should say that as soon as Hitlerism is destroyed Japanese militarism will be destroyed also. I am speaking for the mind of the whole of the intellectual people of China when I say that in that case China is ready to lay down her arms and go back to her old tradition of peace-loving.

The CHAIRMAN: My own view of the question that has been raised is that when thinking of China it is well to think in long distances of time. It is a happy trait of ours here that we have no sense of history. We always think that if anything happened more than five years ago it does not matter. Other people do not have that mentality; some brood about the past, which is not a good thing. The Chinese do not brood about the past, but they have a long, continuous past to think about, and it is difficult for us for that reason to understand the minds of the Chinese. For instance, a very interesting contribution was made to-day when Mr. Francis Morgan said that China was going to play a greater part in the world than in the past. I think that is true if you are speaking of the last two or three hundred years. But if you think of China's three or four thousand years it is a different picture. Up to the end of the eighteenth century China was a world civilization. The Chinese people have achieved something which no other people have ever accomplished. They have gathered into one vast political body more than 300,000,000 people, but it was a world civilization rather than a nation-state. There was no rival nation to stimulate feelings of nationalism or patriotism, and that is what accounts for the characteristic to which Dr. Kuo referred—loyalty to the family rather than to the State. These conditions changed at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and for the last 150 years China has been faced with an extraordinarily difficult problem, for she has had to try and uproot the traditions of some thousands of years in order to transform her world civilization into a world power. In that task she has received much help from the scientific knowledge of the West. We have worked out the art of living in a world of rival states for centuries. Perhaps, too, in the setting-up of a central government, which China never had before, she can learn from the West, but if any social and political structure is to grow up in China it must grow out of Chinese soil and have Chinese roots. If it is something borrowed from abroad it will wither away. I was in China when the nationalist movement started about 1910 or 1911, and I have seen the mistakes that the Chinese nationalists made at the beginning, when they were making futile gropings after democracy and parliamentary institutions from the West. They thought by borrowing and transplanting these to Chinese soil they would solve their own problems, but it did not happen. The Chinese have a proverb, "A rose across the river Hwai turns into a bramble." Something that you transplant will not take root in an alien soil. What the Chinese are doing now with a considerable measure of

success is transforming their own institutions in the Chinese way and using Western science and learning to strengthen the structure thus built up.

General Sir DOUGLAS BROWNRIGG: As to borrowing from the West, the lecturer rather frightened me when he said the Chinese had borrowed from the West one of our undesirable characteristics—that is, our form of Treasury control. I thought the vision of the Chancellor, compelled to spend on the purchase of books money which he needed for something else, and unable to transfer it without a Cabinet decision, was terribly like us here. I would like, if I might, to remind the lecturer, and perhaps through him the Chinese Government, that Treasury control came to us in a rather peculiar way. Particularly in the army we cannot transfer money from one vote to another, but that is because Charles the Second was apt to spend on his ladies the money voted for his fleet. Possibly that temptation does not arise in China now, and the different votes of money might be allowed to be more fluid without any great danger.

The LECTURER: I have had experience of the difficulty, my own hands being tied by the regulations. I may say incidentally that this scheme has partly come from Great Britain as the result of British advisers to the Chinese Government; as the result of this advice the system has been adopted with modifications. I think for the present it is necessary as a means to check the old custom of graft, but I am fully aware of the danger you mention and hope to find Confucius's golden mean checking graft but at the same time not reducing efficiency in administration.

The CHAIRMAN: You may be interested to hear a story about Treasury control which might be of use to Dr. Kuo. I think it is a common complaint of civil servants, soldiers, sailors and airmen that the Treasury interfere with efficiency. It is not peculiar to this country, and I am inclined to think Treasury control essential in China. I was discussing this point with a friend of mine, a German consul in China; it was before the Great War, and we were discussing how the Treasury damped down all enthusiasm. He said: "It is just as bad in our country. A German general in East Africa was great on economy combined with efficiency. He was conducting a campaign and had to use for transport a large number of donkeys. There was a great mortality. When a donkey died he had it skinned, sold the skin and entered it in his accounts. He expected to be patted on the back. But instead he got back a query on his accounts from Berlin, 'We notice in your account you have credited four marks for each donkey's hide that you have sold; a donkey's hide in Berlin fetches six marks. Will you kindly explain the discrepancy?' He replied, 'The only explanation I can offer is that there must be bigger donkeys in Berlin than here.'" If no one has any more to say I will bring the proceedings to a close. I will say how very grateful we are to Dr. Kuo for this illuminating talk. We hope that when he gets back to China he will find the situation very much improved, and that his own troubles and those of his country will be at an end. He goes back with our very best wishes and thanks for his lecture.



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THAILAND AND THE JAPANESE INVASION

By A. F. THAVENOT

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on January 14, 1942.

The lecturer was introduced by the Right. Hon. Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., who said they liked to feel in this Society that they specialized in matters of topical interest, and this was certainly the case on the present occasion. He often felt a presentiment of evil when countries began to change their name. We were quite contented with "Siam," and indeed we were quite contented with "Mesopotamia" and had no fault to find with "Persia." But as soon as the names were altered to "Thailand," "Iraq," and "Iran," trouble began. How wise was Mr. Churchill to insist on reminding them of their old relationship with us by calling them by their original names! And what a pleasure it was to be able to speak of Russia again, instead of "U.S.S.R."

Mr. Thavenot had undisputed qualifications for lecturing on this subject; he had been in Thailand for over thirty years.

LORD HAILEY has referred to the change of name from Siam to Thailand. That change of name was made two and a half years ago, but, in fact, in talking with Siamese, one always said "Thai," which means "free." When the name was changed some of us thought the change was made deliberately in English as an indication of the fact that Siam had always been independent and desired to utter a warning, having regard to the growing Japanese menace. We thought—most of us who were there at the time—that it was an indication that the Siamese were still determined to resist this Japanese menace as far as possible. Most of the Siamese in talking English still call themselves "Siamese"; in fact, the Prime Minister, immediately after the change was made, spoke of "Siam" in a public speech and hastily corrected himself.

I originally went to Thailand in 1909, when foreign relations between Siam and Europe were really relations with Great Britain and France. Other countries had at that time no political interests, though the Germans were capturing trade and shipping.

The relations with England had always been extraordinarily good. I do not think we have had any serious dispute, and in 1909 we made a new treaty which did away with the extra-territorial status of British subjects in Siam. We were the first European nation to place its European subjects under the jurisdiction of the Siamese courts. We also made concessions about Custom duties. There was a further treaty in 1925, and ten years later negotiations ended in a treaty which gave Siam complete fiscal and juristic jurisdiction over all British subjects.

In 1907 the French had gone half-way. They had allowed their native protégés to come under the jurisdiction of the Siamese courts, but they still stuck to their French citizens, who remained under the jurisdiction of the French consular courts. All the other nations, including Japan, had always had consular courts, and a foreign national could not be prosecuted or sued except in those courts. These consular courts caused difficulties not only to the Siamese but to us, for when the original treaty of

1857 was made there were very few British subjects in Siam, and all of them were congregated more or less around Bangkok; but by 1909 thousands of Indians were scattered all over the country, many of them extremely turbulent, and it was a great burden not only to the British Legation but to the Siamese that they could not be prosecuted or sued without recourse to a consular court.

In return for the relinquishment of extra-territoriality, Siam ceded four provinces in Malaya—Kedah and Perlis on the west of the peninsula and Trengganu and Kelantan on the east. The Japanese are now insisting, for propaganda purposes, that we took them from Siam. That is not the case. They had never been administered by the Siamese, and the Siamese took very little interest in them. I was there when the treaty went through, and never heard of any Siamese resenting it in any way. They got what they wanted, that is, their jurisdiction over British subjects in Siam proper and a loan, which eventually came to five and a quarter million, for building the southern railway. They got that from the Federated Malay States. During all that time relations were very friendly indeed.

Relations with France were never so good. The Siamese had never forgiven the French aggression in 1893, when the French, without much warning, invaded and took a large slice of Cambodia, which had been Siamese, and inflicted very humiliating terms. The Siamese never forgot it, and seized their opportunity when France fell in 1940. The French in Siam, curiously enough, never seemed to realize that this grudge existed, and they were, I think, extremely surprised when the incursion into Indo-China came about.

But to go back to the relations with England. Most of the Siamese who came to Europe were educated in England, and to-day I have no hesitation in saying that 80 per cent. of the class that counts are undoubtedly anti-Japanese and the vast majority of them are pro-British. By the "class that counts" I mean the official class, for Siam is divided into peasants and officials, and the peasants have no political views. This new and surprising alliance with Japan is not supported by public opinion—such public opinion as there is.

In 1909 and until the beginning of the last war Japanese influence practically did not exist. There was a Japanese Legation and a consul or two. There was the usual Japanese photographer in almost every village. He took about six photographs a year. The Japanese Foreign Office knew how he lived. Undoubtedly these Japanese photographers were spies. Apart from that, the Japanese had very little trade. There were, I think, fifty—certainly not more than a hundred—Japanese in the whole of Bangkok. Before the war of 1914, or even earlier, in 1910, when Rama VI came to the throne, things began to change. Nationalism sprang up, and there was undoubtedly a slight antagonism—though not very apparent—to foreigners generally.

Japan did not suffer from this xenophobia, for the Siamese have always been rather inclined to prefer the devil they do not know to the devil they do, and when Siam came into the war in 1917—it joined us as an ally—Japan's opportunity came with regard to trade. Supplies

from Europe were very short, and Japan immediately began to seize the principal trade—cotton piece goods; but there was still not much political liaison. The real moment for Japan came with the revolution. King Rama VI died in 1925 and was succeeded by King Prajadhipok, and things began to change very much. The economic depression caused considerable poverty, and eventually official salaries were very much cut. As I have said, practically the whole of the thinking population is official and a revolutionary spirit began to spread.

Moreover, European education was beginning to tell. There were large numbers of quite patriotic young Siamese who felt that they ought to have some say in government. No revolution need have taken place had the Government acted quickly. The King was already having a constitution prepared, to my certain knowledge, and the opportunity to inaugurate the change should have been taken in April, 1932, when the 150th anniversary of the accession of the Chakkri dynasty and the founding of Bangkok were celebrated.

The police had already warned the Government that revolution was brewing, but nothing was done, and in June, 1932, this bloodless revolution came. In order to get popular support for it a great wave of nationalism was started. It was largely artificial, but there was, of course, a consequent xenophobia, and once more Japan was the devil they did not know, while England and France could be represented as those they did know. Any animosity against foreigners was therefore turned against England and France.

Japan then started an intensive propaganda. There were continual "goodwill" missions. A large number of Japanese merchants set up in business, though the amount of trade they did was negligible, and the Legation staff was greatly increased. We all saw that this intensive propaganda was going to have some effect, and eventually we knew that certain vernacular newspapers were definitely in Japanese pay, while certain members of the State Council were strongly suspected by both Siamese and Europeans. They were not very important people, but there they were.

Another thing was that owing to the value of the yen being so low the rate of exchange was favourable to Siam, and it paid the Government to send students to Japan to enter the universities or to be trained for the army instead of sending them to Europe; while they were in Japan they were subjected to continuous propaganda.

The final opportunity for Japan came with the Indo-China incident in 1940. France collapsed in June, and Siam began to make demands for rectification of the frontier. That frontier was the one established as a result of the French aggression in 1893, when Siam lost 400,000 square kilometres of territory. The French had promised the Siamese a rectification over and over again, and after the signing of the last treaty in 1937 Boundary Commissions were to be appointed. Nothing came of it. The French procrastinated, and after their collapse the Siamese saw their opportunity and were not loth to take it, especially as the Prime Minister was a military man and depended largely on the support of the army. Moreover, a good deal had been spent in Japan and in Italy on

armaments, and something had to be done to show a return for the money. Although it is fairly safe to say that the Japanese did not stir up the incident, they used it to the full when it came. As you know, the Siamese went into Indo-China and the French were not in a position to put up any defence, so that the Siamese were able to claim an almost bloodless victory. They did in fact take some prisoners; these were from the Foreign Legion—I saw some of them in Bangkok—and practically all of them were German or Italian! The Siamese also had a glorious naval victory. The flagship had a shell through her magazine, three torpedo boats were sunk, and the one French cruiser engaged did not have a scratch on it.

Japan had previously entered the north of Indo-China, and said immediately that she was going to mediate. I believe I am correct in saying that the United States would have been willing to mediate, and Siam would have been quite willing to accept that mediation, but the Japanese made it quite clear that they meant to mediate and would not allow anyone else to do so.

As a result of that mediation Siam got very little—only some 70,000 square kilometres of territory was returned to them. Originally they had not asked for that, but the demands grew as the incident went on. For this 70,000 square kilometres they had to pay a large sum of money, and the Prime Minister recently admitted that what they did get back was not self-supporting, and that fresh taxes would have to be imposed.

The Japanese increased their pressure, and as late as February, 1941—just before I left—the situation became so acute that the British Legation sent out a confidential warning that wives and children should leave. Therefore any who have been caught there have only themselves to blame. They were told quite clearly that if the Japanese came in Singapore could render no help at all, the railway would be cut, the Gulf would be full of Japanese warships, and there would be no hope of escape.

With regard to the Siamese Government, after the revolution of 1932 a Government which was predominantly a civil one was set up, headed by one of the judges who had had nothing to do with the revolution. He was called in to act as Prime Minister and Minister of Finance because he was one of the few people in the country whom everyone could trust. Everyone knew him to be honest, and he had a remarkably good reputation. However, his term of office lasted only a year—from June, 1932, to June, 1933. Then a military clique, headed or assisted by the present Prime Minister, Luang Pibul Songgram, who is an army man, seized the civil members of the Cabinet and re-formed the Government with a military man as Premier. Since then the country has been controlled by a military clique, and it was not long before the second Prime Minister was replaced by Luang Pibul.

With regard to the army, there was undoubtedly a small but influential party which was pro-Japanese. They were pro-Japanese because they believed that the Axis was bound to win the war. Several of them had been trained in Germany and in Japan, they had had that idea inculcated into them and they were thinking, of course, of what would be

best for themselves afterwards. But the majority of the people were definitely anti-Japanese. The Siamese have no intimate relations, and never have had any, with the Japanese. No Siamese can think of any Japanese friend he ever had, whereas the Siamese are very much allied with the Chinese, with whom there has been much inter-marriage. The Chinese used to arrive in Bangkok as rice-mill coolies or rickshaw coolies, and in two generations one might find one of them in the Cabinet. They married Siamese women and the children grew up as Siamese. There is scarcely a prominent Siamese official to-day, including the Prime Minister, who has not Chinese blood in him. I know several Siamese who talk of their Chinese grandfathers.

At the same time, the economic importance of the Chinese had its dangers. They had the whole retail trade and most of the wholesale trade in their hands, just as they have in Malaya. The Siamese, like the Malayan and the Burman, does not take kindly to trade. Moreover, with the Chinese revolution Chinese women began to come into the country, and their children were growing up as Chinese, with the result that there was some danger of having a nation growing up inside a nation. A certain amount of anti-Chinese feeling was also gathering, and has been much encouraged during the last two or three years by the Japanese. There were continual arrests of prominent Chinese, inspired by the Japanese Legation, and many deportations. One curious thing was that two years ago the police suddenly raided all the haunts of the Chinese "bad hats" and potential gun-men, and we know that this action was inspired by the Japanese because they were frightened of them; they went to the police and said, "We cannot have these toughs hanging about, they might attack us." The whole crowd of them, some 5,000, were deported.

Besides the Prime Minister, a very important person in the Government to-day is a German half-caste. He, again, was raised up by the first Prime Minister. Comparatively recently he went to Germany, and although he was then of no importance, in the usual German way he was received by Hitler and a great fuss was made of him. When he came back he started a sort of youth movement in Siam, and he is now a very prominent person and is naturally pro-Japanese. On the other hand, there were the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who were definitely anti-Japanese and, if anything, pro-British. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was definitely pro-British. He has now been sent as Ambassador to Tokyo. He could not very well be put in gaol, but Tokyo is a long way off, and there he has gone. The Minister of Finance has been dismissed, and we have no news of the Minister of Justice. But there is an alternative Government, so to speak, that is definitely anti-Japanese.

We thought—and since I came home last May I have committed myself in speech and writing to that effect—that Siam would resist if the Japanese attacked. I was not the only person to make prophecies with regard to events in the Far East which have been falsified. A very eminent authority on Far Eastern affairs stated publicly on the morning of December 6 that Japan would not fight, and on December 7 Japan

made her attack on Pearl Harbour. You may also remember that when Mr. Churchill returned from America, in his first broadcast speech, he said definitely, talking of the Japanese menace, "Siam will fight, and she will not fight alone."

One can only guess more or less at what has happened. The Japanese, having come in, told this Prime Minister, Luang Bipul Songgram, who has the makings of a Quisling, that if he did not sign "on the dotted line" they would call in one of his many enemies to take his place, and he, as a Siamese here in London told me, decided to cling to office in the belief that Japan *may* win, but that at the worst, if Japan loses, the Allies can be trusted not to do anything too harsh. That is what we have been suffering from in the Far East for the last twenty years—the wretched policy of appeasement.

People say that Siam might have done a great deal in resisting the Japanese advance. Actually the Siamese had about 40,000 troops all told, and any idea of a real resistance to the Japanese army is out of the question. It is unfortunate that the Governor of the Straits Settlements should have stated that Malaya had been imperilled by the lack of resistance of the Siamese army. It is rather undignified to suppose that that can have been the case. The Japanese obviously came in from the east and also landed in the south. A certain amount of nonsense has been written about the south. One has heard of secret aerodromes—of a secret aerodrome in the jungle in Singora. Actually there is not enough jungle at Singora to hide a tom cat. There may have been some secret aerodrome somewhere else in the district, but there is not much jungle there anywhere, and I cannot believe that with a British Consul in Singora and the way in which all things get known in the East any secret aerodrome could have been located there. Moreover, the various air mails have been flying over there for years and could not have missed such a thing.

It is quite ridiculous to suggest that anything the Siamese could have done would have stopped the Japanese attack on Malaya. What the Siamese here feel—and I am quite certain the vast majority of the Siamese in Siam feel—is that they have been betrayed by their Prime Minister. They have lost face. They had maintained that they would defend their country to the last moment, and I have no doubt that there is secretly a very great feeling against the action of the Government. The Siamese Minister in Washington immediately said that he refused to take orders from a Government under Japanese domination, and he is trying to form a free Thai movement in America—I do not know with what success.

Perhaps I ought to say something about the geographical position. The Isthmus of Kra is only twenty miles across. From Singora there is a railway across the peninsula—a single track, like all the others—and a good road, but troops could not be deployed there in large numbers as it is really a defile. They have undoubtedly brought such tanks as they have got by rail, for it would not be possible at this time of year to land tanks on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula. This is the time of the north-east monsoon, when a state of gale may go on for weeks at a time. It used to be known as the closed season. It is perfectly obvious that

tanks must have been landed in Bangkok by rail or else brought across country from Indo-China, which, of course, would have been a long business.

One has heard a certain amount about Japanese operations in the north. I am quite certain that no mass attack on Burma could be made by land from the north. The country is almost impossible for troops. From Chieng-mai to the Burma frontier the country is covered with jungle and is mountainous and the track is extremely difficult. The Salween River, which is more or less the frontier, is unbridged, and it would be almost impossible to take a modern army that way. There is only one real aerodrome in Siam, fifteen miles from Bangkok, where the air mails used to land. The other places are nothing but landing-grounds, though they can be developed by the Japanese of course, and from Chieng-mai it is only 250 miles to Lashio, the head of the railway for the Burma Road, so that there is a definite menace to the Burma Road by air. The papers talked of an attack on the aerodrome of Bangkok, but they happened to mention the name of the aerodrome, which is not in Bangkok but up in the north-west.

Another thing which you may have seen in the newspapers is that there was a raid on the dock area of Bangkok. Actually there is no such thing as a dock in Bangkok; there are wharves, but to talk of docks is quite ridiculous. It is true that they are building a harbour, but that has only just started. It is necessary to take what appears in the newspapers with considerable scepticism.

I have been asked whether British policy in Thailand is that Thailand has been more sinned against than sinning. I am perfectly incompetent to say what the policy of His Majesty's Government is. I personally think that is exactly what has happened, that the country is not pro-Japanese, but that it is entirely in the hands of this military clique and has no choice in the matter. They are no more sinning than, say, Holland or any other occupied country. They are, in fact, an occupied country themselves. It is quite impossible, I should imagine, for the Government to announce a policy, for up to the present date no direct communication has been obtained with the British Minister in Bangkok. He appears to be entirely cut off, so that very little is known as to what actually happened. It seems certain that the Siamese did put up about five hours' resistance, and after that they "called it a day." I imagine the Government will have to await detailed information before they know what action they can take.

But it is wrong to blame the Siamese people, who hate the Japanese, but cannot help themselves. What Japan has gained is economic rather than military. There are no great naval bases in Siam, and Japan has got what she wants for her navy in Camranh Bay in Indo-China. There is nothing in Siam to help except an inland sea half-way down the peninsula which might shelter submarines.

Another thing to be borne in mind is that the Siamese are already beginning to discover the effects of Japanese occupation. There has been a banking panic. The Japanese at once seized the banks that were British, and they did more than that. Not long ago Siam with great

pomp and circumstance opened a State bank, but the Japanese have now turned the Siamese out of the State bank on the ground that they do not know anything about banking, which is quite true. Japan has also announced that Siamese currency is in future linked with the yen. As you could buy yen for " the half of nothing " in Bangkok, the yen having no exchange value to speak of, the Siamese will not be pleased at being linked with the yen. All that they can buy must come from Japan. I do not think, therefore, that the occupation is at all likely to be popular.

With regard to the possibility of a movement against the Japanese in Thailand—a free Thai movement—I think the chances are very small. The Siamese are not a very warlike nation, and, as one of them here said to me, nobody in Bangkok would do anything of the sort because they are far too soft. That was said by a Siamese. But there might be a chance of bands headed by notorious robbers and bandits—the country has plenty of them—doing a certain amount of destruction, though not very much can be counted on in that way.

I think that probably the Siamese themselves will sit down now and wait to be rescued. I do not believe any active attack on the Japanese is possible. What the Japanese propose to do in the way of reconciling them to the occupation I do not know, but the country, of course, is largely under-populated and is a poor country. There is no oil, though there is tin and also rubber in the peninsula. Apart from that, the whole country is practically devoted to rice, and the Japanese made great play with the fact that they were buying rice very largely recently. That, however, was only due to the fact that the crops in Korea and Japan failed a few years ago, and Japan was buying rice wherever she could. The best customer of Siam was the British Empire, and the trade balance has always been favourable to Siam. With Japan in normal times the trade with Siam consists in Siam taking about 2 million sterling worth of Japanese cheap goods, whereas Japan took only about £200,000 worth of Siamese exports, so that the trade balance was definitely adverse.

After my mistake as to Siamese resistance to Japan I do not know that I am very anxious to prophesy as to what is to happen in the future.

Admiral The Earl of CORK AND ORRERY: What is the attitude of the royal family of Siam? Is there any royal circle in Siam which might influence the situation?

The LECTURER: After the revolution in 1932 most of the important royalties were invited to leave the country. The king eventually came to England and abdicated; he died quite recently. There are only minor princes left. King Chulalonkorn had 100 sons, only three of whom are alive to-day; one of them is an exile in Java and one a political prisoner in Bangkok. I do not think there is any possibility of any movement by the royal family. Also there is no royalist party worth speaking about. At the same time, I think it is safe to say that the royal family is pro-British to a man.

A MEMBER: I once had the privilege of educating a Siamese at Sandhurst, and when he left us as a cadet he told us he was going to command the Siamese army.

The LECTURER: There have been a great many Siamese both at Sandhurst and Woolwich, but in recent years many have gone to Germany and some to Denmark.

Sir WILLIAM HORNELL: I was never in Siam, but I know Malaya fairly well. What the lecturer has told us is most interesting, though it does not throw much light on what the Government are going to do to meet the present Malayan situation. I should like to say how terribly we who have lived in the Far East feel recent events there. I was Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hong Kong, which I left in 1937. On Boxing Day I had a letter from the Registrar of the University. It was written last October. In this letter the Registrar told me that there was a record number of students, many of them from the Malay States, that the University had a splendid new building and was really going ahead. That letter arrived the day after Hong Kong had been captured by the Japanese. So far as Malay is concerned it is really the end of an epoch. I do not suppose our possessions will be recovered for many years, because, if the Japanese are driven out of any place under pressure they will not leave much behind them. But what we mourn is not so much our material loss as the great loss of our imperial prestige.

Sir RICHARD WINSTEDT: My own general impression was that Buddhism, malaria and venality are not material from which fighters are made, and one never expected the Siamese army, even at the best, to stand up for more than a fortnight to three weeks.

Some ludicrous statements have got into the newspapers about Siam, but they are not a bit more ludicrous than those about Malaya. One statement was that "miles of rubber plantations" were in flames. Well, they must have got a new form of fire to do that. There are 350 million rubber trees in Malaya, and I should think it would be very difficult to burn ten of them, considering that the climate is like that of the palm-house at Kew and the rubber is full of sap.

What struck me about the lecture was the extreme lucidity of it, the perfect manner of its delivery, and the recent and intimate details it gave of the present position. We all had a vague idea of what Siam was like, but this glimpse of its internal politics and the various cross-currents has been extremely interesting.

A vote of thanks was accorded by acclamation.

IRAN AND THE MODERN WORLD

By L. P. ELWELL-SUTTON

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on February 4, 1942, Baroness Ravensdale in the Chair.

THE news of the signing of the treaty between Great Britain, Russia and Iran last Thursday has brought to an end an episode in the history of Iran and of our relations with that country which has been in some respects rather painful, but in other ways full of hope and promise for the future. I want to-day to try to see, so far as one can at this distance, how the Iranian people are reacting to this new situation and how they are likely to develop in the future.

I think one can look at a country in two different ways—one can look at it from a detached point of view, or one can take a more dynamic interest in it and try to see how one can help it to take its place in the world. Whatever ideas we may have about the future world, it has to be made up of countries as they are, of peoples as they are; we cannot try to impose some preconceived scheme on it; we must try to influence the development of various peoples along the lines we think are the right ones.

Recent events are an illustration of the dangers of the strategical position of Iran in the world which seems to have got her into trouble throughout her history. She is a bridge or a wedge between the East and West according to circumstances. Our policy has been rather to regard her as a wedge or a buffer state to protect India against, formerly, Russia, and, more recently, Germany. The Germans have looked at her rather as a bridge, their idea being to try to pierce through the Caucasus or Syria or Turkey, and cross Iran into India. That seems to be the plan that they had in mind, and last year it became obvious as they pressed towards the south-east of Europe that Iran was the weak link in the barrier across southern Asia which would prevent them from penetrating into the Indian Ocean. The fact that there were rather a large number of Germans in Iran made it clear that that was the idea they had in mind and that they would try to take advantage of this position if they reached the Caucasus. Our demand for the expulsion of these Germans during July was more than just getting rid of a few unpleasant agents; we wanted to bring Iran into line with our own strategical ideas and ultimately our own ideas about the war and about the future of the world.

Iran, on the one hand, was desperately anxious to stay neutral and to keep out of the war; they felt that what they had done in their country was something they wanted to carry on themselves and they dreaded the intervention of the Western Powers in their affairs. On the other hand, they felt that Germany was much stronger and was going to win, and it would not be a good idea to be on the wrong side in the final settlement. Probably they did not expect the Allies to act in quite such a drastic way as they did. The Allied troops entered Iran in August and met with very

little opposition, the Government was taken over by Foroughi and the only other change in the Cabinet was the interchange of the Ministers of Home and Foreign Affairs.

Foroughi declared on August 28 that the policy of Iran was to maintain peaceful relations with the rest of the world, and to follow this policy they had decided to cease resistance. At first sight it might seem that this was a satisfactory solution to the troubles which had arisen, but that did not take into account the psychological effect on the Iranian people of this development. The Shah had built up his power on a policy of maintaining strict neutrality, and of building up an army which was supposed to be strong enough to preserve that neutrality and Iran's territorial integrity. Now that it became clear that that policy had failed, the morale of the Iranian people to some extent broke down. There were reports of general disorder throughout the country, there was a serious food shortage, there was indiscipline in the army and civil service and martial law was declared in Teheran; the Premier made an appeal for calmness, but it was fairly clear that the position of the Shah in particular had been seriously undermined and that the central authority had to some extent been disrupted.

In the Majlis—the Iranian Parliament—the whole correspondence with the Allies was read in full (and afterwards published in the Press), but the attitude of the deputies seemed to have been one rather of dazed bewilderment and probably the same attitude was true of the Iranian people generally. The Germans in Iran took advantage of this situation and put all kinds of obstacles in the way of leaving the country. It became obvious that the Shah was to some extent responsible for this and that in any case, as he was no longer the strong hand in the country, his position had been thoroughly undermined and he would have to go. Within a week or two of that he abdicated and left the country on September 28. That was the end of what might be called the "first round."

The chief thing that troubled the people of Tehran at that time was the threat of Allied troops, especially the Russian troops, entering the city. A few did, but after negotiation with the Government they were persuaded to stop just short of the suburbs, and the Government was assured that they had no intention of interfering in internal affairs. The new young Shah promised in a statement in the Majlis that there should be greater co-operation in future with the Government, Shah and Majlis. There was a general demand for more co-operation, a greater share in the government, on the part of the people's representatives. The Shah also promised that the Government would prepare a programme for social, economic and financial reform.

The first problem was to form a Government which was able to do this. One unfortunate result of the dictatorship was that no young new politicians had been trained; the existing Government consisted largely of statesmen like Foroughi, who had been one of Iran's leading statesmen for twenty years. He was in office before Reza Shah came to the throne, and later led the Iranian delegation to the League of Nations. He was a literary man rather than a statesman, and probably the ideas of himself

and of his colleagues were based rather on the conception of the 1907 democracy, which is a little out of date in the conditions of the modern world. In any case, most of the ministers had served under the old Shah and for that reason did not command general confidence. Therefore on September 21 a new Cabinet was formed, four of the original members were dropped, six retained, and two new ministries were formed, which made six new ministers. There was a further reshuffle in December, after the twelfth Majlis had been dissolved and the new one had been assembled. One or two more of the old ministers were dropped, but there were still five of the ministers who served under Reza Shah in the Cabinet, including the War Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Justice. The problem is, will Iran be able to produce new statesmen to take the place of the older men?

The young men have been educated under rather totalitarian ideas. On the other hand, there are others who have been trained in Europe, and they are probably anxious to take a greater part in the government of their country than they have been able to do so far. The Shah is a young man and seems to have a good understanding of what the people in his country want. Another unfortunate thing is that the elections were in progress when the events of August began, and the new Majlis is very much the same as the previous one and contains many nominees of the old régime; at the same time, there seems to be a tendency among the deputies to revert to the old party system, and also there is a reactionary movement against social and educational reform.

The Government produced its new programme of ten points. The first was "good relations with neighbours," which meant primarily Britain and Russia. Second, legal system to be revised to ensure personal security; third, military and police force to be reorganized; fourth, taxation to be reduced, cost of living reduced, pay of civil servants to be increased; fifth, more attention to be paid to agriculture, particularly irrigation, and the growing and consumption of opium is to be restricted. Sixth, industries which were very largely run by the state under the Shah are to be transferred to private hands and special care is to be taken of the welfare of industrial workers. Seventh, roads and railways are to be improved within the capacity of the country. That, of course, we are doing ourselves now, so that burden is taken off their hands. Eighth, people are to have a greater share in local administration; ninth, educational establishments are to be improved and extended; and tenth, special care is to be taken of public health, which has been placed under a ministry.

The first point is the key to all the rest—good relations with Great Britain and Russia. Obviously whatever is done, although we have promised not to interfere in the internal affairs of the country, they must be adjusted to our ideas, they are bound to be.

An early question which was raised was the question of an alliance between Great Britain, Russia and Iran. When the Government was first approached they apparently favoured it, because Mr. Churchill, speaking in the House on September 30, seemed to think it would be signed in the very near future. However, there was a good deal of talk

and it was not until December 15, when the Government had obtained a vote of confidence in the Majlis, that they allowed it to be mentioned in the Iranian Press. The debate in the Majlis lasted over a month, but the treaty was finally passed by a vote of 80—5. The total strength of the Majlis is 136, so that there were quite a number who did not feel particularly happy about it.

As far as one can tell, popular feeling seems to have been against the treaty. The reasons for this were various. I suppose the people were still afraid of the Germans and thought they were likely to win and did not want to be allied to the people they thought were going to lose. The military action we had to take left rather a nasty taste. Many people, of course, welcomed the removal of the old Shah because they thought everything was going to be nice; then they discovered there were a lot of evils, administration collapsed, the cost of living rose, there was banditry, and they felt probably less ready to put up with those things under a foreign administration, or under foreign control, than under a national Government. There was also the fear that the alliance with the Allies might bring them more directly into the war. They did not realize that it was impossible for any nation to be neutral under conditions as they are. Particularly among the middle and lower classes there was this deep hankering after neutrality and they could not see the advantages of the alliance. They probably felt that this alliance was more likely to benefit us than to benefit them, which must be true to some extent.

We agree to safeguard Iran against economic privations as far as we can, but the fact that there is a war on and we are using their transport communications for war material must affect the economic conditions in an adverse manner. The general situation has a resemblance to the 1919-20 period, when there was a rather similar disorganization owing to the collapse of the central Government and there was a feeling that we were trying to take advantage of the situation. The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 was very unpopular and was never ratified. We offered to reorganize the army and police, something which was very necessary then and is very necessary now, but national pride makes the Iranians feel that they would rather do these things themselves.

The two points that the Prime Minister Foroughi felt it necessary to emphasize in his various speeches on the subject was that there was no threat to Iranian independence and that the Iranian army was only to be used to maintain internal order. That was perhaps a two-edged argument; it meant that Iran will not be involved in the actual fighting, but some might have felt that it was a slight to their national pride not to be allowed to defend themselves.

The first step that the Government had to take in internal affairs was the reorganization of the police force. Under the old Shah it certainly seemed that the various elements of disorder had been held in check, but probably they were not entirely suppressed. There were, of course, isolated incidents all through his reign, and as soon as his strong hand was removed the tribes in the south and north-west took advantage of the situation. There were various disruptive factors present—the army was disorganized; after the armistice they dispersed to their homes, sold their

arms to the tribesmen, their pay got into arrears and the Government was not strong enough of itself to carry out reorganization. Now they have been rounding up many of these conscripts; they are trying to reorganize the gendarmerie and get a better class of man into it, the pay of the army and the police has been raised and with assistance from the British Government there will no doubt be a great improvement. The central authority is naturally rather weak in the occupied areas, where the inhabitants tend to turn to the occupying forces rather than to the local Iranian authorities. There is always the danger of separatist tendencies among the minorities—the Arabs, Kurds, Armenians and Turks. There have been signs among them of a return to their old traditional dress and language, and one hopes that it will not go any further.

The food situation seemed to be bad for some time; there was a certain amount of food imported from India, but distribution remained the difficulty; crops had been poor for some years, and owing to the monopoly system and the fixing of prices which were not sufficient to pay the farmer there was some hoarding of produce. There was a serious rise in the cost of living, which went up something like 100 per cent., and that, with all the other troubles, was attributed to the Allies. It was unfortunate that the Government had to increase the price of bread by 100 per cent. only a fortnight after Reza Shah had reduced it. This must have created rather an unfortunate effect. Then there was a demand for constitutional reform, which was rather vague. Iran has a constitution and, on the whole, it is quite satisfactory. There was no reference to constitutional reform in the Government programme and there has been no modification of it. There was some discussion on various specific problems. One of the things which agitated people for some time was the question of the old Shah's property; one of the first acts of the new Shah was to turn over all the property that his father had acquired to the Government and at the same time to make a great many gifts to charitable, educational and other bodies. The great discussion then was whether these properties should be retained by the state or whether some attempt should be made to return them to their original owners. Finally, it was decided to nationalize most of them and to use them for charitable purposes.

The release of political prisoners occupied a good deal of time. A general amnesty was declared on September 18, but there was much criticism of the delay in putting it into effect. Three weeks later the Prime Minister announced that 450 had been released, 450 had had their sentences reduced and there were over 140 still to be investigated.

One of the things discussed was the repeal of the Awqaf Law (passed early in 1941) enabling the Government to sell religious endowments. That had been very unpopular, especially with the reactionary elements, and the law was now repealed. There was also a demand for the punishment of various police officials who had acted in an oppressive manner under Reza Shah's régime.

In a more general way certain reforms were proposed. It was felt that the judges and magistrates had been too much under the control of the Ministry of Justice and they should be given more freedom. Local government was to be strengthened. One practical step that was taken

was the abolition of the permits for internal travel, which were rather a tiresome feature of the old régime, and the internal postal censorship was also abolished. Salaries of the civil servants were increased in the same way as those of the army and the police, and the Military Service Act was modified more particularly with regard to students and men with dependents.

In economic affairs the monopoly system is to be gradually abolished. This system put into force a monopoly on the sale and purchase of certain commodities such as tea, sugar, automobiles and so on. It was felt in the course of discussion that it had certain useful features; for instance, it had enabled the sugar beet industry to be built up, which could not have been done by private enterprise. So far they have abolished the rice monopoly and the import-export monopoly on tea, sugar and automobile parts.

The old, rather cumbersome exchange regulations have gone. Their object was to keep the value of the *rial* at 80 to the £ and to ensure that the foreign exchange should be in the hands of the Government. Now the *rial* has gone to 140 to the £, which is certainly a little nearer to what it was outside Iran, but is not particularly beneficial to Iranian trade. Foreign exchange can now be sold and purchased freely.

The oil royalties were formerly put into a special fund, but they are now to be included in the general budget. This fund was used for building the railways, for military purposes and also for the training of students abroad. Now there will not be that special fund; presumably the need for expenditure in those directions is not so acute. Some attempt is to be made to readjust taxation so that it falls more equally on each class, and there is to be less expenditure on roads and railways.

Agriculture is to be encouraged. The trouble with the monopoly system was that while it helped to keep the cost of living down it did not give the farmer sufficient return for his labour; there was the usual conflict between wages and prices which there is in every industrial or semi-industrial country. The old policy was to keep the cost of living down, regardless of the farmer; now the policy is to ensure that the farmer obtains proper prices and let the cost of living follow, the idea being to encourage the increase of acreage under crops, the neglect of which, it was felt, was to some extent responsible for the shortage of bread. Partly, however, it was due to lack of irrigation; this had had some attention in Reza Shah's régime, but is to receive more now.

A minor point of interest is the restriction of opium, and an attempt is to be made to find some new crop which can take its place. This measure met with quite a lot of opposition in the Majlis because it was felt that the country would lose valuable markets abroad. It was also claimed that restriction in consumption had been tried under Reza Shah and that it had not succeeded.

All building of roads and railways was for a time suspended, and an investigation is to be carried out into industrial organization. The general tendency is to slow down on industry in order to build up agriculture.

It was fully recognized that all these reforms were advantageous, but they were dependent on being carried on as well as being started. The

need was seen for the education and training of the youth of Iran to build up the future, and educational development has been the special interest of the new régime.

To-day, February 4, is a particularly appropriate day to dwell on this, as it is the seventh anniversary of the foundation of Teheran University and it is celebrated annually as an education festival. Teheran University was the climax of tremendous progress made by Reza Shah in the sphere of education. One set of figures will demonstrate this progress: in 1922 there were only 612 schools in the country; in 1940 there were over 8,000, and over 150,000 adults were attending night classes, about half of whom were over twenty-five and drawn from many different social classes.

The schools were well equipped and reasonably well run, but there were certain problems which had arisen. There was too much attention paid to physical training and scouting in the primary and secondary schools and in the higher classes to military training, and it was felt that these activities took up so much of the student's time that he could not pay sufficient attention to his studies. Both were dropped from the school curricula at the end of September. At the same time the young Shah, who is an athlete, is very anxious to encourage physical fitness and sport, and it was a very important feature of the old régime in improving the health of the nation.

There were complaints about the high fees, cost of uniforms and equipment, cost of subscriptions, and these have been either abolished or reduced, and arrangements are being made to give assistance to needy students. The Minister of Education, speaking to primary teachers on September 29, complained that there was great lack of discipline, particularly in the primary schools, and he emphasized the fundamental importance of primary education and suggested that the relationship between teacher and child should be on a new basis, more consistent with the democratic ideas of the new régime.

Another complaint was that spiritual interests had been neglected, and this is another matter to which attention is to be given. I understand there is an American Mission in the country now which is investigating the reorganization of the educational system, and it has that aspect particularly in view.

Other small points are the low pay of the teachers; salaries are to be raised and better pensions provided; the Shah himself gave a contribution of 10 million *rials* for that purpose. There is to be greater freedom of decision for heads of schools and departments and more local responsibility. Teachers are to be trained in more modern methods of education, and adult education is to go on as it did before.

Another cultural matter of interest concerns the Iranian Academy, which was founded in 1936 with the primary purpose of reforming the language by abolishing European and Arabic words which did not harmonize and replacing them by words of purely Persian origin. Actually not so much had been done as might have been supposed, a great many of its activities were purely scientific and technical, but greater attention is now to be given to the publication of books, poetry, folk songs, and general guidance given in cultural matters.

The press law is to be reformed. The 1907 constitution established the complete freedom of the Press, but various restrictions were imposed subsequently; for instance, the censorship and also the law which stipulated certain qualifications for editors, who had to have a good education, knowledge of languages and financial soundness. The Press is now supposed to be free, but a special commission has been set up to bring the 1907 constitution up to date. There must be some measure of control at present, because recently a newspaper was suppressed for publishing a letter from the Vichy chargé d'affaires. One noticeable feature is the appearance of far more original matter. In the old days nearly all the articles in the Press were translated from the European papers; there might be one Iranian article of a non-controversial nature in each paper, but now the articles are much more controversial and there are correspondence columns, which seem to indicate that people are interested in public affairs but know very little about them.

One also gathers that from a broadcast by the Premier in October, in which he emphasized all these subjects, said that freedom brought responsibilities with it and dwelt on the need for observance of laws, suggesting that the neglect of the constitution in the past had been due to the people's failure to understand what it meant. The Shah has emphasized that people do not understand what democracy means or what democratic methods are. I do not think it would be fair to attribute that entirely to Reza Shah's policy. A study of Iranian history rather suggests that democracy is not inherent in the Iranian character, that the Iranian tradition is not conducive to democratic institutions. What Reza Shah did in the way of education and instilling a sense of responsibility in the people was a great contribution towards making them more ready to accept democratic institutions. I think it is true to say that most nations during the course of their cultural development need some kind of authority and discipline as a foundation for the introduction of individual freedom. The Shah, broadcasting on his birthday on October 25, evidently felt that the first need for the Iranian people was a strengthening of the idea of national unity on a spiritual basis as a preliminary to greater national progress.

The fact that the Iranian people have rather pro-Fascist leanings at present is no reason why they should not develop into a democratic state, although the change should not be too sudden. It may be felt that it was a pity that Reza Shah's work was cut off, and that if he had been allowed to complete it, as Atatürk completed his, the position might have been better. But the damage has been done; it could not be avoided; and it is up to us to try to remedy it.

We tend to look at Iran as the road to Russia and we do not concern ourselves with her internal affairs; we should not do so directly, of course; but we have an interest in seeing that Iran goes along the right lines, and if we go about it in the right way we can have a good influence. Feelings are strong against us at present and we must develop some rather more practical measures of friendship. At present there is not much; we can say we are defending Iran from the dangers of Nazi occupation, although this will not arouse much enthusiasm until they are convinced

of the dangers of Nazism. But there are certain things we can do. We are benefiting Iran a great deal in the expansion of railways, roads and ports, and we could arrange to carry on on those lines after the war, even when it is no longer necessary for us to do it for our own benefit; we are much more technically advanced than Iran and would be in a position to help them a great deal in improving their irrigation system or providing them with electrical power or an electrical grid system; it would be a practical step towards cementing relations between the two countries. We must make it quite clear that the policy of development will be controlled by the Iranian Government and not by us. The purpose, I imagine, would be to enable Iran to take her place amongst her neighbours as a modern and efficient state.

There seem to be two ideas about the way in which the world can be organized: one is the method favoured by Germany that there should be one economically strong nation surrounded by subordinates, whose primary purpose is to provide the strong central nation with raw materials, and those subordinates should not be industrialized but remain agricultural nations; and the other, the alternative, is that each nation should be in itself strong enough to stand on its own feet. That seems to me the more hopeful way. It is not the place here to talk about the possible layout of the post-war world, but it will tend to go into social and cultural groups rather than in economic and political federations. Iran and its adjacent countries have common interests, as was evidenced by the Saadabad Pact in 1937.

The Shah has referred to his desire for an even more solid Moslem *bloc* and has hinted that Turkey was the right nation to take the lead. Whatever we may feel, we must agree that the greatest hope for the future lies in every community and every individual being as free as possible to develop and fulfil their own desires and aspirations.

The discussion, in which Sir Percy Sykes, Sir Harry Lindsay, Sir Lionel Haworth, Miss Namazi and Mr. F. Hale took part, dwelt on the difficulties of adjustment, the progress made by Iran, and closed with an appreciation of the lecture and of so excellent a Chairman in the Baroness Ravensdale. It is regretted that it is not possible to give it in full.



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A GREAT NORTH ROAD

By LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR KERR FRASER-TYTLER,
K.B.E., C.M.G., M.C.

THERE are many great roads in history; the great Silk Route of China which carried the caravans from Pekin to Constantinople, the Grank Trunk Road from Calcutta to Peshawar, even on a smaller scale the Great North Road from London to Edinburgh, are roads which since the beginning of history have been famous for the trade they have carried, for the armies which have traversed them, and for the men who have travelled over them on their lawful and unlawful occasions. But the road I write of is not yet famous for these things; it is a new road, hardly ten years old, and it has not yet taken its place in history. Few people know of it, and traffic on it is as yet of no great volume. And yet it may even now claim the title of "great," partly because it is an enduring memorial to the genius of the man who caused it to be made, and partly because it is the first road to join directly two great river systems, so that to-day a traveller in a powerful car, who does not fear a roughish journey, may see the sun rise over the Indus at Attock Bridge on a Monday morning, and without hurrying watch it set over the brown waters of the Oxus on Saturday evening.

But in referring to a new road I am not, of course, including the first part of the route from the Indus to the Oxus. From Attock the traveller is still on the Grand Trunk Road, running smoothly up the Kabul River and across the rich plain which it waters till he reaches the great cantonment of Peshawar. On again westwards past Jamrud and through the Khyber Pass he is still on a well-worn road till he drops down the long hill to Torkham and the Afghan border. From Torkham to Kabul the road runs north to the Kabul River and then due west for 150 miles to Kabul city, and this is still not a new road, though it has been motorable for only about five-and-twenty years. But it is old in history and runs past many landmarks full of unhappy memories of things best forgotten. It is at Kabul that my "Great North Road" properly begins, but before describing it I must digress for a space to consider the lie of the land and the causes which led to the road's construction.

The Kingdom of Afghanistan is about the same size as Germany, including Austria, or rather larger, and is bisected from east to west by a great mountain range, generally known as the Hindu Kush, though this name actually applies only to the eastern portion. This range is an offshoot of the Pamirs, and, starting with the peak of Tirich Mir (26,000 feet) in the east on the Chitral border, gradually diminishes in height till opposite Kabul, and nearly one hundred miles from it, the main ridge is some 15,000 feet in height, and the range is about 150 miles in breadth, completely separating the Indus and Oxus River systems. Up till ten years ago there were no means of communication between the capital of

Afghanistan and its rich northern provinces, save by the circuitous route by Kandahar and Herat, or over the top of the passes which were always difficult and for many months in the year impassable.

In summer communication by the mountain routes was open. A thousand years ago Chinese pilgrims, seeking the birthplace of the Buddha, followed, among other roads, the Great Silk Route westward from Pekin, traversed the Gobi, and, descending from the Pamirs, crossed the Oxus, and so came to the great city of Balkh. Thence they turned southwards, following one of the routes across the Hindu Kush. Of these, possibly the most frequented was that by Haibak and the Bamian (or Surkhab) River, which they mounted till at Doaba, the place of the two waters, further progress up the main stream was barred by the endless gorges down which the river plunges for fifty miles from its source in the high valleys. So they turned aside up the western of the two waters, the Kamerd, crossed the Ak Robat Pass, and came into the beautiful valley of Bamian, where, no doubt, they rested awhile under the shadow of the great Buddhas. Thence the pilgrim road descended the Bamian stream till the gorges once more blocked its path, and it turned again southwards up the Kalu water and over the Haji Gak Pass into the upper Helmand Valley. Crossing the Helmand, it faced one more pass, the Unai, before descending on to the upper waters of the Kabul River and so down this lovely valley to Kabul city.

This was the main road from Northern Afghanistan to the Kabul Valley, and a pretty formidable route it was. The Chinese pilgrim Huen-Tsang, who crossed it in the seventh century A.D., describes the pelting hail and snowstorms, the winding, crooked passes, and the mud stretching for miles. It crossed three major passes and traversed parts of three main river systems. In summer it was agreeable enough with its great uplands, beautiful streams, and wonderful clear views. But even in summer the wind blew cold and strong on the Ak Robat Pass, and in the winter the road was impassable for many months.

There were, of course, other routes—the difficult Salang and Khawak Passes were both open in summer—but the route by Bamian appears to have been the main connection between Central Asia and the plains of Northern India. How otherwise is it possible to account for the city of Ghulghula with its flourishing Buddhist colony, set in the little Bamian Valley, which could provide but few of the necessities of life, save that its inhabitants depended for their wealth and substance, not on the scant produce of the soil they tilled, but on the fact that their city stood on the main trade route, half-way between the rich lands of the Indus and Oxus Valleys? Bamian survived as a Buddhist colony until the Arab invasion at the beginning of the eighth century A.D. It continued to exist, if not to flourish, till Genghis Khan, passing down to India in 1220 A.D., completed the destruction of the city, mutilated the great statues, and annihilated the Mohamedan garrison of the great red fortress of Zohak, a few miles down the valley. The city crumbled to ruins, the monasteries were deserted, and nothing was left of their former splendour save the great Buddhas standing in their rocky niches. And so they remained through the centuries, remote and silent, until rescued from oblivion by the work of the French

archæological mission which, under the leadership of the late Monsieur J. Hackin, has done much in the last twenty years to uncover some of the ancient history of Afghanistan. A small hotel was built on the south escarpment of the Bamian Valley, and travellers to Kabul now visit the site and marvel at the skill and patience of those old monks who carved the mighty statues in the honour of their Master. Even now there broods over the little valley a silence and a sanctity which seem to retain something of the spirit of holiness which perhaps once filled it, something of the peace of those great hills and upland valleys, the peace " man has not made and cannot mar," which has always attracted the Seekers after Knowledge.

But while the city vanished the route remained. It is mentioned by Baber, though it appears that in his advance on Kabul he crossed the main ridge by a more direct, if more difficult, pass further to the east. It is referred to by Masson, who traversed it in 1832, as the " high road " from Kabul to the north. It was up this route that in 1842 the British prisoners were taken to Bamian, and it was still being used as a main route as late as 1906.

When, however, the Afghan Kingdom was gradually consolidated under the Amirs Abdur Rahman and Habibullah, and the advent of the motor vehicle made swifter and easier travel desirable, it became increasingly necessary to open up road communication which would carry fast-moving traffic and be passable for as much of the year as possible. Abdur Rahman connected Kabul and Kandahar by a good fair-weather road; Habibullah made the Peshawar-Kabul road fit for motor traffic; it was left to Amanullah, who ascended the throne of Afghanistan in 1919, to essay the far more difficult feat of carrying a road through or over the Hindu Kush.

History will probably record of this unlucky monarch that, although his mind held the germ of many a valuable project, his attempts to carry out his ideas were rashly conceived and indifferently executed. The construction of a road to the north was a good idea, and it began well. Amanullah abandoned, and rightly, the old pilgrim route, thereby avoiding the crossing of the Helmand River and the difficult Unai and Haji Gak Passes. Instead he utilized the already existing road northwards by Charikar, and then turning westwards up the Ghorband Valley, which runs parallel to the main ridge of the Hindu Kush, followed its stream for seventy miles to its source in the Shibar Pass. Now, the curious thing about the Shibar is that, although it is a minor pass, being only 9,500 feet in height, and rarely snowbound for long, and although it is not part of the main ridge of the Hindu Kush, being set, in fact, at right angles to it, it yet forms the watershed of the Indus and Oxus River basins. A traveller standing on the summit of the Shibar and facing westwards has on his right hand the great ridge of the Hindu Kush, continuing away to the west, and on his left a great upland country leading away to the snowy peaks of the Koh-i-Baba range. In front of him is a valley, down which pours a little mountain stream. The road following this stream descends steeply till some twenty miles further west it joins the Bamian River at the place where the latter, flowing dark and swift, cuts through the main

ridge on the right and disappears into one of the most stupendous gorges it has been my fortune to behold, on its journey northwards to the Oxus. But Amanullah's road did not follow the river downwards and northwards. He turned aside, as many had done before him, from the apparently impossible task of penetrating this fearsome rockbound way, and took his road up the river till it joined the pilgrim route where it debouches from the Kalu Valley by the old fortress of Zohak. And then he took it on and drove it right up the Bamian Valley to the summit of the Ak Robat Pass beyond, and there he left it. I never discovered why he did not continue it down the north side of the pass and on to the plains of Turkestan. It would not have been very difficult to do so, and it would have, at any rate, provided a summer passage for traffic passing between Kabul and the north. It may have been lack of money, or it may have been the fierce gradient of the Ak Robat itself, which would have defeated most laden lorries. At any rate, he did leave it, a monument to his own impetuous folly, and it gradually disintegrated until now he who seeks to climb to the summit of the pass must do so on his own feet.

Amanullah's next attempt to solve this most difficult problem was in 1926 or 1927, when he invited the Russians to make him a road to the north. Russian engineers surveyed the ridge of the Hindu Kush for 200 miles from the Ak Robat to the Anjuman Passes, and decided on the Salang Pass as the most suitable route. It is strange that they should have missed the significance of the Bamian River as a possible route, and stranger still that they should have chosen what is probably the most difficult of all routes over the main ridge. The Salang River is a swift and turbulent stream which flows out on to the Koh-i-Daman Valley some miles north of the Ghorband. The Salang Valley is narrow and strewn with boulders, and the pass itself is steep and snowbound for half the year. The route, in fact, has nothing to commend it save its shortness. However, work was started and the road had nearly reached the foot of the pass when the revolution of 1927-8 swept away Amanullah and his Russian engineers, and the river swept away the road and its twenty bridges. And so up to 1929 the problem was still unsolved.

In the autumn of 1929 Nadir Shah ascended the throne of Afghanistan. He brought with him to his difficult task not only a ripe experience of men and matters, derived from much service in Afghanistan and a prolonged sojourn abroad, but also an intimate acquaintance with his people and his country. He realized with the prescience of a born administrator that if he was ever to weld together in one coherent body the scattered peoples of Afghanistan he must open up communications throughout the country, for only by so doing could he hope to control and govern men grown disaffected and lawless by years of misrule and the convulsions of revolution. Many and varied were the roads he planned and made, and the most important, as well as the most difficult, of these was the north road. But Nadir Shah knew his country and understood the problem. He knew that the comparatively easy Shibar Pass was the only obstacle between North and South Afghanistan, provided that, after crossing it, the road turned down and not up the Bamian River. He knew, or at any rate believed, that it was possible to drive a road down

through the great gorges of the Bamian River until it finally emerged on the plains of Turkestan. It is easy now, after one has motored the length of King Nadir's road, to say that the task was not, in fact, formidable, that the gradients are nowhere excessive, and that no great engineering problem presented itself. This is possibly true, but it must be remembered that when the project was conceived and planned the country was unsurveyed, no accurate map of the area existed, and no single person had ever travelled the hundred miles of river from Bulola to Doshi. No one, in fact, had ever attempted this solution to the problem, and King Nadir's predecessor, with the advice and skill of foreign experts at his disposal, had preferred, as we have seen, the alternatives of the Ak Robat and Salang Passes. But Nadir Shah had what his predecessor lacked—a far-sighted vision coupled with a large degree of practical common sense. He sought information about his project from men who knew the country intimately, from shepherds whose flocks roamed over the surrounding hillsides, from hunters who followed the ibex to their drinking-places in the gorges, from local chiefs and headmen. All reports showed that the task was difficult but not impossible. Bridging would be required in many places where the cliff face made further progress impossible on one bank or the other, quantities of gunpowder would be needed to blast a way through the rocks and boulders which had hitherto closed the valley to even the most sure-footed of caravans, but, given sound organization and a determination to succeed, the road would go through.

And so in 1931 the work was started. His Excellency Mirza Muhammad Khan, at that time Minister of Commerce, who with his intimate knowledge of the interior of the country had been the King's chief supporter in his project, was charged with its execution. In the autumn of 1932 I motored down from a camp near Bamian to where the road was just entering its most difficult phase. There were a thousand men working on it, blasting, cutting, digging their way down the narrow, twisting defile with the river rushing below them. I spoke to the engineer in charge.

"Where are you going?" I asked.

"To Turkestan," he replied.

"When do you expect to get there?"

"*Khuda midanand* (God knows)," he said. "We are just going on until we do."

And so they did. Down through the first great gorge, where there is room for nothing save the river and the road, and the cliffs rise a thousand feet sheer on either side; on past Ghandak with its little trout stream flowing into an opening in the valley; on again to where the valley closes in again, and for twenty miles there is nothing save cliffs and shale slopes and the roar of the river, and the road threading its way among mighty boulders. Down past Doaba, where the valley opens and the road to the Ak Robat takes off. There is a good hotel now at Doaba, where the mail lorry halts on its long journey from Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul, and where the traveller may find rest and refreshment and a magnificent view of the great red cliffs across the valley. On again past Ishpushta, where there are coal workings on the steep slopes of a little side valley, and so down to

where, a few miles beyond, the valley widens and the road winds down the long bare slopes to Tala, and the beautiful Payendeh water, now a royal preserve, joins the main river. On goes the road, down and down the river, past Doshi, where the Andarrab stream flows in from its source in the Khawak Pass and so to Dahana Ghori and Haibak and the great plains of Turkestan rolling away by Mazar-i-Sharif to the Oxus. Such is King Nadir's road.

But no description of mine can do justice to its ever-changing beauty and interest. The valley down which it runs is known as the Dara-i-Shikari (Vale of the Hunter), and its name is well justified. Time and again in the early morning light the traveller turning some sudden corner will come on a covey of chikor, the big hill partridge, feeding on the river-bank or crossing the road after their morning drink, or in the evening will see the ibex moving silently down to the river from their rocky pastures above. The valley is full of game, and the river is full of fish, though the best sport, at any rate with fly, is to be found in the side streams, in the Kula which on a day of mist and rain might well be a Scottish burn, or in the beautiful Andarrab, where the big trout lie in the pools below Khinjan. No one who has wandered in these valleys can ever forget their grandeur, their remoteness, and, above all, their colouring, when, as the shadows lengthen in the evening and the smoke rises from the hamlets in the green pastures by the river, the great bare rocks above turn golden and red, indigo and orange and purple in the rays of the setting sun.

Apart from the scenery and the sport, a very welcome feature of travel in Afghanistan, which strikes one afresh on each occasion, is the fellowship of the road. Caravans have now largely given way to lorries on the north road, but there are always people moving on it, on horseback or on foot, and rarely does one meet with anything but a cheerful greeting and a kindly word. I remember once encountering near the summit of the Shibar Pass a horseman coming down from the north, a well-to-do man with a servant at his stirrup. He stopped and greeted us, and after the usual salutations asked if we were Russians.

"No," we replied, "we're not Russians; we're British."

"Ah," he said thoughtfully, "I never heard of them. You're not Germans by any chance?"

"No," we repeated, "we're British. You've heard of the British in India, haven't you?"

"Oh yes," he replied vaguely, "I think I have. Well, have a plum; they come from Haibak; they're the best in the world." And he produced a couple of rather squashed plums from his pocket. We dutifully ate them and praised their sweetness, which was undeniable.

"I must be getting on," he said. "Next time you come this way you must visit me and have a pilau. My house is in the valley down below. *Khuda hafiz* (God protect you)!" And on he went, swinging down the hill with the easy amble of his Badakshani pony. Delightful people! One will never forget their pleasant, courteous manners, hospitality, and readiness to help if help were asked for.

King Nadir lived to see the road opened in the autumn of 1933, a few

months before his most untimely death, but he did not live to see it become the great highway down which now rumbles lorry after lorry carrying cotton from Kunduz, sugar from the new factory at Baghlan, bale upon bale of the famous Afghan lambskin from the fertile plains round Andkhui, coal from Ishpushta, and all the produce of the rich Oxus Valley. Northern Afghanistan is still undeveloped, as we call development, but the potentialities of wealth are there and the work is in hand. It is the road which has made this possible. Up it goes machinery for further development, for textile mills and hydro-electric plant, and down it come the main exports of Afghanistan. The work of improving it never ceases. When it was first opened there were many places where two-way traffic was impossible, and meeting lorries had to back and fill. Each year the more difficult corners are rounded off, narrow stretches are widened, and iron girder bridges replace structures of stone and wood. It will never be an easy road; the best engineering in the world could never make a by-pass of a route which crosses such country, but it is a great road for the service it performs in the economic and political life of the country. And for those who had the honour of knowing King Nadir Shah it remains, above all, a fitting and abiding memorial to the man who in his short reign did more for the future of his country than any ruler who preceded him.

GURKHA GHOSTS

By W. M. SPAIGHT

IN general the ghosts of Nepal are similar to those of the Indian plains and are almost identical with those of the adjoining British Indian hill districts. Ghost legends vary from place to place and it is rare to find two Gurkhas who will agree on all details. The following notes refer particularly to the Western Nepal recruiting area.

Ghosts are normally only seen at night; they tend to frequent cross-roads, where they gather to play. No ghost casts a shadow. Each ghost has it own particular locality, which it never leaves. A man who sees a ghost is never the same afterwards and frequently becomes an idiot. The term used for ghosts in general is *bhut*, but in a particular sense *bhut* means the ghost of a human being who has died a violent death and whose remains have not been given a proper funeral. The ordinary *bhut* is the ghost of a Kshatriya, Vaisya or Sudra. The ghost of a Brahman is called a *Brahm*; a *Brahm* is said to throw stones at humans. There are, of course, Mussulman ghosts. Mussulman ghosts are not met in the hills of Western Nepal, from where the majority of Gurkha soldiers of our army are recruited, because there are no Mussulmans there. In parts of India, and most particularly on the North-West Frontier, Mussulman ghosts are common.

These Mussulman ghosts are considered most dangerous to Gurkhas. When Gurkha regiments move to the Frontier some men take with them pieces of dried pig flesh, generally the gristle of the snout, or pig's teeth to keep away Mussulman ghosts. These Mussulman *bhuts* tend to live in the vicinity of Mussulman graveyards. It is very dangerous to go near these graveyards at night or to ease nature near them during daylight. If a Mussulman ghost attacks a man the man's heart swells in his chest and stops beating so that he cannot breathe. The cure for this is to damp a piece of pig's flesh in water and to rub it on his chest. When one has to go near a Mussulman graveyard it is a wise thing to say the word "Pig," or to ask another man in a loud voice to "Bring the piece of pig's flesh"; this will scare away any Mussulman ghost. The Gurkhas, of course, use the Gurkhali word "Sungur," meaning domestic pig, but it is considered that even a Pathan ghost understands the significance of the word.

There is a most intelligent Jemadar in the writer's regiment who was, according to his own statement, when stationed in Landikotal, in the Khyber Pass some twelve years ago, attacked by a Mussulman ghost. He could not breathe and was in great pain, but pig's flesh rubbed on his chest gave him immediate relief and a complete cure within five minutes. An interesting point is that this Jemadar is a Gurung, and Gurungs, while they eat wild pig, will not eat domestic pig, though it is not an unclean animal to them as it is to Mussulmans and to high-caste Hindus.

The other tribe enlisted into the Western Nepal Gurkha regiments—the Magar—will eat domestic pig and, in their own homes, rear them for that purpose.

The ordinary *bhut* is tall, thin, naked and black. It normally lives in a tree. *Bhuts* prefer dirty to clean places; this is one of the reasons for cleaning houses frequently, by plastering with cow dung. *Bhuts* are said to eat rice and fish and to be fond of human women. The spirit of a man who dies without issue may become a *bhut*; this is called a *tola* or *autar*, but it does not appear to have any special characteristics, except that it is always alone and not in company with other ghosts.

A *pisach* is also the spirit of a man who died a violent death, but frequently it is the spirit of a criminal. It is more unpleasant than the ordinary *bhut*. A *pisach* normally lives in a graveyard or cremation ground, and it is said to eat human flesh. The speech of all *bhuts* is called *Pisach-bat*, and this is said to have a distinct nasal twang. The Indian *bhut* "Masan," who lives in graveyards and is connected with small-pox, is known by some Gurkhas. The female counterpart of the *Pisach* is the *Pisachini*; another similar female ghost is the *Dakini*, though "Dakini" may be used to describe a witch, whose evil eye is said to be harmful to the livers of little children.

A *Pret* is the spirit of a crippled or deformed person. It cannot touch the ground, so lives in trees or roofs. Villagers put out food and water for it, frequently in Pipal trees. It does not appear to be harmful to man. Some Gurkhas say that *bhut, pisach,* and *pret* are different names for the same ghost, but the majority agree that there are three different species.

A ghost that walks at night with its severed head held under its arm is called a *Murkatto*. It does not appear to have any other unusual characteristics.

The ghost of a woman who dies in childbirth is called a *Duncani*. The *Duncani* is lighter coloured in front than behind; some say that the back is blackened, raw flesh. The *Duncani* always has her feet turned backwards. She tends to lure men, particularly young men, away. The *Duncani* is similar in all respects to the *Churel* of the Indian plains. The *Churel*, while it is known of, does not appear in the Nepal hills.

Another ghost of the plains, the *Guruwa*, an evil spirit which changes from human to tiger shape at will, is known of by many Gurkhas but is not met with in their homes. It is said to be common in the Terai, which all Gurkhas cross when coming down to India. It is presumed that the scarcity of tiger in the high hills accounts for the absence of the *Guruwa* in Nepal.

A true ghost of the hills, which appears to be unknown in the plains, is the *Airi* or *Eri*, sometimes called the *Shikari Jhankri*. This is a ghost shaped like a man who hunts men to death with a pack of large dogs; each dog has a bell round its neck. It is said that the *Airi* only hunts at night, normally lone men. No one has seen it and lived to tell the tale, as anyone who sees it dies of fright. The *Airi* is armed with a bow and arrows. When a violent gust of wind is heard or felt at night this is said to be caused by the passage of one of the *Airi's* arrows. According to

Crooke in his *Religion and Folklore of Northern India*, the *Airi* is accompanied by fairies, who have their feet turned backwards, and two litter bearers. Whoever hears the bark of the hounds suffers some calamity. The *Airi* spits a lot and his saliva is venomous and causes wounds. Whoever is caught by the *Airi* either dies of fright, is burnt up by the eyes of the *Airi*, is torn to pieces by the hounds or has his liver eaten by the fairies. If, however, a man manages to avoid all these things he may be shown hidden treasure by the *Airi*. Crooke also states that the *Airi* is connected with the god Shiva and that he has temples erected in his honour. The writer has been unable to confirm whether these particulars also apply to Nepal or not. Another hill ghost mentioned by Crooke, about which the writer has been unable to collect any information, is the *Acheri*. The *Acheri*, according to Crooke, are found in the lower Himalaya and are ghosts of little children. They live in the high hills and descend at night to play. They dislike things coloured red. It is fatal to meet them. If a girl child falls sick it is said that the *Acheri* have cast their shadow on it.

A Gurkha ghost is the *nidini*, which is apparently not met in India and is not mentioned by Crooke. The *nidini* is a very tall ghost who roams in search of meat food at night. It does not set out to hunt man, but if it meets one by chance it will chase him. Generally flocks are their prey. It sometimes eats one sheep or goat and then strikes the rest of the flock down with disease. Sometimes no meat is actually eaten, the *nidini* contenting himself with killing the animals.

Another Gurkha ghost, not mentioned by Crooke, is the *kichkini*. The *kichkini* is a mischievous imp and appears to be similar to the Irish leprechaun. It milks cows dry, turns milk sour, breaks down fences for animals to escape and plays other annoying but harmless tricks. Its tracks, seen in the morning, are like those of a small child. Its body is said to be covered with fine fur. It lives in caves or holes high up in the mountains and comes down at night to play its tricks.

In order to avoid hurt by ghosts many villagers put out food and drink for them. Most children are protected by amulets and charms, which are sometimes worn for life. Iron, turmeric and garlic are frequently used in these amulets. People who have to travel at night prefer to do so in company. In order to keep ghosts away conversation should be continuous. It is said that no ghost can stand the sound of the human voice. If one has to travel alone one should shout, sing or talk to one's self all the time. In the big cities of the Nepal valley indecent figures on the outside of temples and big buildings are used to scare away ghosts and to avert the evil eye.

It is hard to discern the dividing line between pure ghost-law and sorcery. *Jhankris* and *bhoksas*, with their female counterparts *jhankrinis* and *bhoksinis*, can cast spells which can be most unpleasant, but they can also recite *mantras*, which can remove the evil of other spells or spirits. There is a widespread and genuine belief in the evil eye, which is frequently connected with a wasting away of the liver.

In the hills of Western Nepal the removal of spells is normally done by a *jhankri*. The *jhankri* generally lives in an inaccessible spot, preferably

a forest, and only learns his trade after a long apprenticeship. As well as the manufacture of amulets and the recitation of mantras, the *jhankri* cures many ills by "Phukni" or blowing with the mouth. The word comes from *phuknu,* meaning to blow. The writer does not pretend to understand how or why, but a man learned in the art of *phukni* can cure a sprain or a hurt in a limb by just blowing on it. On occasion a man who has done some training as a *jhankri* is enlisted into one of the Gurkha regiments of the Indian army; a full-fledged *jhankri* is never enlisted, as he would be too old and could always be detected by his long hair and other signs. It is not a good thing to have a *jhankri* in a regiment as all the men are frightened of incurring his ill-will. A man of almost any caste can become a *jhankri*, but after becoming a *jhankri* he is considered to have left his caste and his progeny are not accepted into it. Men of the Gurung tribe, if they wish to go in for this sort of thing, generally go over the border into Tibet and study at a monastery; after they have become lamas they are capable of casting spells, reciting *mantras* and curing minor ills. In the Nepal valley and in the larger towns of Nepal the casting and the curing of spells is done by a *Gowaju,* who is always a man of the Newar race.

The average Gurkha has not got a very wide knowledge of the types and characteristics of the various ghosts, but he has a very real belief in their existence. He believes in their continual presence, and any unusual occurrence or misfortune is normally blamed either on a *bhut* or an unknown sorcerer. An example of this is the following account of an occurrence which took place in the writer's regiment some years ago. One evening at roll-call it was discovered that one of the recruits was missing. The recruit in question had only arrived from Nepal about two weeks before. He had been seen on the parade ground, dressed for games, at about 4 p.m. It was known that he could not speak Hindustani and it was believed that he had no money. A thorough search was carried out by the regiment and the police were asked to assist, but no trace of the boy could be found. Almost exactly forty-eight hours after his disappearance the recruit turned up on the parade ground. He was out of breath and had, apparently, lost the power of speech. He was given food and sent to bed. The next day he was able to speak and told the following story.

There had been some spare time before games started, so he went for a short walk down the path which he had been told led to the rifle range. As he walked along he repeated to himself the words of command that he had been taught that day; these were "Right turn" and "Left turn." He had only gone a little way when a *bhut* suddenly came up and caught hold of him from behind. He did not see the *bhut*, as it was behind him, and it lifted him up by his clothing; it must have been a *bhut* because nothing else could have done such a thing. The *bhut* carried him into the air and down the hillside, clear of the ground, but between rather than over the trees; they passed the rifle range and he was taken below that into a small cave. The *bhut* threw him on the floor of the cave and went away. An old woman in the cave advised him to run away at once, because she said that the *bhut* would certainly eat him on

its return. She was a Garhwali woman and very old; he could not say what language she spoke, but he could not understand Hindustani though he understood her. She told him that he was very lucky to get this chance to escape; so he got to his feet and ran all the way back to the parade ground. He was so frightened that he could not speak when he got there. The recruit refused to believe that he had been absent for two days and was quite certain that he had only been away from the parade ground for half an hour.

The amazing thing about the whole affair was that all the Gurkha ranks of the regiment, from the Subahdar Major downwards, accepted the story without question and agreed that there was no doubt about it; a *bhut* had certainly taken the recruit away and that he was lucky to have escaped. The British company commander, however, tended to be sceptical and had thorough enquiries made. The recruit could lead people to the area where he had been taken but could not find the cave. All nearby villages affirmed that they had never seen the boy. The recruit, in the fullness of time, was attested as a soldier and served on in the regiment for several years. He was a rather stupid man, of average ability, who was never considered fit for promotion.

Individuals who believe that a spell, or the evil eye, has been cast on them sometimes suffer from paralysis, either complete or partial, of a limb. The writer knows of cases of this nature which doctors have proved, with the patient under chloroform, to be due to nervous hysteria, but it has proved impossible to cure them. No doubt the "Phukne" ritual of the *jhankri* is the best treatment in such cases. Similar cases occur in the Nepalese army, in which the sufferer considers that he is being punished by the gods for failure to carry out some obligatory religious rite. It must be remembered, however, that the rank and file of the Nepalese army is of higher caste than is the case in our Gurkha regiments. Most Nepalese units are composed of over 70 per cent. Chettries, with some Brahmans; they are therefore more assiduous in performing the necessary religious ceremonies.

Finally, there was one most regrettable case in the writer's regiment some years ago, when the battalion football team was beaten in an important match by an inferior team, because the whole team believed that the opposing side, whose ball was being used, had arranged for a spell to be cast on the football.

OPENING OF A TURKISH "HALKEVI" (PEOPLE'S HOUSE) IN LONDON

BY MAJOR H. M. BURTON

ON February 19, 1942, a Turkish "Halkevi," or "People's House," was opened at No. 14, Fitzhardinge Street, W., by the Turkish Ambassador, Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, in the presence of a large and distinguished gathering, which included the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

This is a venture which will be warmly welcomed alike by Turkish nationals resident in this country and by all British Turcophiles. It is, indeed, a step towards cementing Anglo-Turkish cultural relations which many would have wished to see taken long ago, in the "piping days of peace." That it was possible to acquire, decorate and equip such a fine building amid the turmoil and desolation of war is a great tribute to the Organizing Committee, presided over by His Excellency the Turkish Ambassador, whose members include: Bay Suphi Ziya Özbekkan, Commercial Counsellor to the Turkish Embassy; Bay Nebil Akçer, Turkish Consul-General in London; Sir Malcolm Robertson, Chairman of the British Council; and Brigadier-General Sir Wyndham Deedes. It is, however, principally due to the initiative and great interest in Turkey of Sir Wyndham Deedes that this scheme has been successfully launched. One felt a deep sense of disappointment that the late Lord Lloyd did not live to see the fulfilment of this project, in which he was keenly interested, both as Chairman of the British Council, and President of the Royal Central Asian Society.

The opening ceremony on February 19 was attended by a large gathering of Turks and friends of Turkey, including representatives of Empire Governments, which filled the entire building. It was pleasant, indeed, to realize that so many Turks are living in our country even during the present troubled times. The "Halkevi" was formally declared open by His Excellency Dr. Rüştü Aras, making his last public appearance as Turkish Ambassador in London. His departure from this country shortly afterwards is keenly regretted by the many friends he has made during his all too brief stay of three years, and we shall all hope that he may continue his distinguished career in the service of his country for many years to come. His Excellency's opening address in English revealed the remarkable progress he has made in the language, in spite of the many heavy calls on his time in such an eminent position.

Mr. Eden referred to the functions of the "Halkevleri" and the objects of this cultural movement, which he aptly described as Turkey's most vital contribution to the civilization of this century. He also voiced the appreciation which will be widely felt by the public here at the fact that London had been chosen as the site for the first "Halkevi" to be established outside Turkey. Mr. Eden, who has himself visited Turkey during the present war, appropriately stressed the atmosphere of vigour and vitality which the foreign visitor to modern Turkey cannot fail to perceive.

Bay S. Z. Özbekkan, who speaks impeccable English, read a message from Dr. Tüzel, Secretary-General of the Turkish People's Party, which controls all "People's Houses" throughout Turkey, wishing success to the new venture.

Sir Malcolm Robertson, Chairman of the British Council, spoke of the Council's mission in spreading a knowledge of British culture in other countries, without, however, attempting to impose that culture on other people. It is encouraging and significant that the British Council has taken a prominent part in the establishment of this Turkish cultural centre in London, thereby demonstrating their belief that the exchange of cultural ideas must be conducted on a reciprocal basis. This point will be appreciated by no country more than Turkey.

To any English-speaking student of Turkish the address delivered by Brigadier-General Sir Wyndham Deedes in that language must have been, as it was to me, a

sheer delight, as well as a remarkable achievement. Sir Wyndham provides a brilliant refutation to the fallacious belief—prevalent, be it noted, far more in this country than abroad—that the English are poor linguists. One could wish, however, that our diplomatic representatives abroad might be selected more frequently from the ranks of those possessing a really good knowledge of the language of the country to which they are accredited; such knowledge being usually a *sine qua non* to a keen all-round insight to the various problems of the country concerned, as well as to the psychology and outlook of the people. In this connection it is worth mentioning that the new Turkish Ambassador to London, M. Rauf Orbay, is an excellent English scholar, having been educated in this country.

The Committee are specially to be congratulated on the collection and arrangement of the various exhibits. In view of the great difficulties of transport under present circumstances it was inevitable that the range of exhibits should be limited to material available in this country, but the excellent series of photographs displayed on the walls and stands were alone adequate testimony to the great strides made in the commercial, industrial, social and economic development of modern Turkey. Amongst the exhibits I noticed a particularly interesting Turkish map of Istanbul and the Bosphorus, dated early fifteenth century, before the capture of the city by Muhammad the Conqueror. There was also a fine model of the iron and steel works erected at Karabuk by Messrs. Brassert and Co.

Membership of the "Halkevi" in London is restricted to persons of Turkish nationality. But the Committee explains that in order to build up a body of English people interested in the People's House and Turkish affairs a list of British honorary members is being compiled. Applications for inclusion in this list should be addressed to the Secretary of the "Halkevi" (M. Faruk Akçer), 14, Fitzhardinge Street, W. 1, to whom all other communications about the "Halkevi" should be sent. Copies of the Constitution of the "Halkevi" in London will shortly be available on application to the Secretary.

(*To be continued*)

REVIEWS

Wavell in the Middle East. By Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. $8\frac{3}{4}'' \times 6''$. Pp. 236. Illustrations. Hutchinson. 12s. 6d.

The British public, when studying the many campaigns of this war, perforce depends on the accounts given by correspondents who, often at considerable risk and under trying conditions, give vivid accounts of what they have seen, but cannot penetrate behind the scenes. We therefore owe a debt of gratitude to Major-General Rowan-Robinson, a noted student of military strategy, for summarizing each campaign and criticizing the movements on each side.

He first devotes two chapters to the military situation at the outbreak of the war and refers to the tragic results of the early collapse of France. "Seldom, if ever, in our history," he writes, "has there been so sudden and, to all appearances, so catastrophic a transformation."

To commence our survey in Africa, the first enemy success in the war was the capture of British Somaliland by a powerful Italian column, which included tanks. The small British force put up a good fight and successfully evacuated the country, but not without some loss of prestige at Aden and elsewhere.

In view of the many criticisms lavished on the Government, alike in Parliament and in the Press, it is well worth while recalling that, to quote our author, "it was in the midst of the desperate battle over Britain that the Government took the daring step of despatching an 'immense convoy' through the Mediterranean with reinforcements and war material." Not a vessel was lost, and Egypt and the vital Suez Canal were probably saved by this bold action.

The account given of General Wavell's dramatic victory over Marshal Graziani is admirable. Each phase is succinctly described, and special praise is rightly bestowed on the intimate co-operation of the three fighting forces. The first three battles led to the capture of Sidi Barrani and of Tobruk, together with 100,000 Italian soldiers and immense quantities of war material. In the second phase we read of a flying column of tanks which, after a forced march of thirty-six hours in a violent dust storm, threw itself across the powerful enemy column which was seeking to escape to Tripoli. For a while the situation was perilous, but the British main body soon arrived on the scene and attacked and, finally, the entire Italian force was taken, together with Derna, Benghazi, and Sollum. The British losses were well under 2,000 as against 150,000 Italian prisoners.

Before quitting Libya the author pays a well-earned tribute to Major Bagnold, whose exploration of the unknown heart of the Libyan Desert won him the Gold Medal of the Royal Geographical Society. He was obviously the ideal leader of the "Long-range Desert Group," whose raids on practically every oasis within a radius of 1,200 miles won constant success. Valuable information was also acquired and the *moral* of the enemy in these outlying posts was undermined.

About one-half of this work is given to Libya, and we next have a concise account of the campaigns in Italian East Africa, Eritrea, Somalia, and Abyssinia, together constituting a huge area. Indeed, Abyssinia alone, which we are reminded we should term Ethiopia, measures 900 miles, from north to south, by 750 miles. For a considerable period after the entry of Italy into the war, the British forces in the Sudan were extremely weak. The Italians had, indeed, expelled the small garrison from Kassala, but fortunately made no attempt to capture Khartum, which they could probably have effected.

When Bardia had fallen, Wavell decided to despatch a force, which was mainly composed of Indian troops trained in mountain warfare, to invade Eritrea under Major-General Platt. The story is told that, on January 18, an Arab messenger brought a letter from the Mayor of Kassala reporting that the Italian garrison was evacuating the town. On receiving the information British troops not only reoccupied Kassala but followed hot on the heels of the retreating enemy. Upon approaching

the mountain fortress of Keren, the invaders were held up by the appalling difficulties of the terrain. Finally, however, partly owing to the capture of aerodromes by flank attackers from the north, Keren was finally captured at the end of March. This important success was followed by the fall of Asmara, the capital, and finally Massawa, the chief seaport, in early April. Platt then marched on Ethiopia, but was held up by the strong position of Amba Alagi.

The scene now shifts to the conquest of Somalia. The Kenya frontier marches with Ethiopia and farther south with Somalia for close upon 1,000 miles, the boundary throughout running through a desert area of considerable width, with no made roads. On the Ethiopian frontier there were no suitable objectives, whereas Somalia had its flourishing capital Mogadishu and other towns. Accordingly, Lieut-General Cunningham decided to invade this southern area. The campaign which followed was mainly a war against harsh desert conditions, although the Juba River would have constituted a formidable obstacle if defended by a determined enemy. In the event, the British invasion constituted a veritable *Blitzkrieg*, and, as the author put it, "Somalia was no mean prize."

It was, moreover, destined also to be a stepping-stone to Ethiopia. The attack on this vast mountainous country was made from almost every direction by relatively small British columns. Nor must we forget those gallant British officers who, incurring the greatest risks, had joined the Ethiopian Patriots, as they were called, and had taught them the rudiments of guerrilla warfare, of which they were lamentably ignorant; they also provided them with arms and ammunition.

To resume our narrative, Cunningham reached Harar, the chief city of South Ethiopia and the home of the royal family. He next seized Diré Dawa, the chief station on the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway. Finally, on April 5, he boldly advanced on Addis Ababa, which he captured, the powerful Italian force having previously vacated the capital. Had the Italians been in fighting mood his position would have been a dangerous one. Platt, however, was not to capture Amba Alagi, with the Duke of Aosta and a garrison 1,900 strong until May 20. This victory proved that the end of the campaign was in sight, although one Italian force held out for some weeks longer.

In the space at my disposal I cannot deal with the succinct accounts given of operations in Greece, Crete, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and I will, in conclusion, refer the reader to the advice given by the author to the effect that lack of preparation "has been paid for in wasteful bloodshed and in defeat that verged on disaster," and again that "we must trust not to co-operation but to co-ordination." These are wise words which will, I hope, be read and digested not only by the general English-speaking public but also by our legislators. Numerous illustrations vividly illustrate the text and there is more than one useful map.

P. M. SYKES.

The Tribal Problem. By Fariq al Mazhar al Fir'un. Published at Baghdad, 1941.

This work is a full-dress essay on Arab tribal customs in general by an educated scion of the well-known and redoubtable Fatla tribe of the Middle Euphrates. He represents the Diwaniya division in the 'Iraqi Parliament and, as the titular head of his own tribe, he is well qualified to tell us about the social and economic organization and habits of the 'Iraqi tribes in general. His own tribe claims descent from the famous Arabian stock of Qahtan, and it may be remarked in passing that tribal life in 'Iraq and in other provinces contiguous to the Arabian desert is fundamentally based on the customs and traditions of the great Arabian tribes which go back in an unbroken line to the most ancient times. Pharaoh, Jacob and Abraham are names which jostle each other in the author's pedigree; and a perusal of the various paragraphs in which he deals with the multifarious aspects of tribal life will show the reader that it is based on the old code of chivalry, which in the middle ages reached as far as Europe and left an indelible mark on our own manners and customs.

The author does not tell us how or when his own tribe, the Fatla, got its name. It must have come to the Euphrates valley in the distant past and, like most of the tribes of this area, it adopted the Shia' form of Islam. The whole of its history has been

enacted, at any rate since the middle of the seventh century A.D., almost under the shadow of the two great Shia' shrines of Najaf and Karbala. For this reason it is not surprising that the keynote of the Fatla tribe is a combination of racial patriotism and religious fanaticism. *Dieu et mon droit* might well be the motto of such a tribe. In the service of God and honour the author's fellow-tribesmen would shrink from nothing, as the Turks knew before our time and as we have learned since theirs—often to our cost. The author and his family have played a notable part in the history of 'Iraq.

In fact for me the most interesting part of this book is not the work of the author himself but a foreword by Saiyid Nuri Shams al-Din, in which we are told something of the author's activities and of the circumstances in which his life has so far been lived. He is only 42 now, having been born at al-Dar in the Diwaniya division in 1899 or 1900 A.D. His grandfather was at that time the Shaikh of the tribe. As a child he must often have heard in his family circle of the first stirrings of the spirit of Arab nationalism that marked the early years of the present century. It was in this spirit that, after the death of his grandfather, he was brought up by his uncle Mubdir who had adopted him, although his father was still alive. Just before the outbreak of the Great War, however, the author's family got into trouble with the Turkish authorities on account of their nationalist activities; and at the age of 14 young Fariq had the mortification of seeing his father, his uncle and other male members of the family consigned to prison. He himself proceeded to Baghdad to continue his education and, while there, frequented a nationalist club of which his uncle was a prominent member. He returned home, however, when his uncle and father were released from prison soon after the entry of Turkey into the war. It was as a young man that in 1920 Fariq took an active part in the 'Iraq rebellion, his tribe being one of the most prominent in all the fighting that took place against British troops at Abu Sukhair, Hilla, Hindiya and other places. Fariq, as the son of the tribal Shaikh, was always in the thick of the battle. And, when the rebellion petered out, he was again prominent as a critic of the provisional Government and of its ineffectual efforts to achieve the independence promised to 'Iraq by the British. When King Faisal came to the throne, however, he was satisfied and seems for some years to have remained a loyal follower of the king. He does not, however, appear to have taken a very active part in public affairs outside his tribal area during these years; and it was not till 1935, when Yasin Pasha al Hashimi had become Prime Minister and dissolved Parliament, that he entered it as the result of the General Election. The end of the following year witnessed the Bakir Sidqi *coup d'état*, the murder of Ja'far Pasha and the flight of Yasin al Hashimi, Nuri Pasha and others. The author of this book and other supporters of the legitimate Government maintained a courageous opposition to the revolutionary régime, and were thrown into prison for their pains. His experiences during this period of imprisonment have been recorded in a book called *The Reflections of an Innocent Convict*, which is to be published in due course. The fall of the revolutionary Government of Hikmat Sulaiman after the assassination of General Bakir Sidqi resulted in the release of the prisoners by Jamil al Midfa'i, who became Prime Minister; and Fariq was elected Member of Parliament, for the second time, in the General Election following the resignation of Jamil and the assumption of the Premiership by Nuri Pasha, who had meanwhile returned to 'Iraq.

It will be seen from the above that the author of this book has experienced strenuous days, and it is very satisfactory to know that he has a number of other books either ready for publication or under preparation, including one on the 'Iraq rebellion of 1920, which should be of considerable interest. The present work is apparently his first publication, and he is to be congratulated on the trouble he has taken to give the world so comprehensive a picture of the background of Arab tribal life.

H. StJ. B. Philby.

On the Distribution of Turk Tribes in Afghanistan. An attempt at a preliminary classification by Gunnar Jarring, Lund Universitets Arsskrift. N. F. Avd. I. Bd. 35. N. 4. Pp. 104. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup. 1939. Price Kr. 3.50.

Owing to the great difficulty of obtaining any books printed on the Continent this

book has only recently been received. This is unfortunate, for this modest brochure deserves to be studied by all who are interested in Afghanistan. There is much research embodied in its pages, and although there may be sometimes more intelligent conjecture than solid fact, the result is of a real value.

The existence of these Turki tribes is one of the many problems afflicting the Kabul Government, as few other countries possess within their boundaries such a heterogeneous and turbulent population as does Afghanistan. Amongst the difficulties of the author is the lack of modern books of reference, which appears from his often mentioning books published many years ago, especially the works of Bellew, Elphinstone, Ferrier, and others, classics which have never been superseded, although sometimes a century old. The copious bibliography which the author has included shows how very scanty are the recent books on Afghanistan, and proves how greatly political jealousies have prevented travellers, in this century, from moving about in Afghanistan, although it is sometimes hard to understand the reasons for this obstruction.

Mr. Jarring has an excellent note on the bibliography of his subject, and remarks that even the few recent books in Russian throw little light on his theme. He relies considerably on an Afghan writer, Burhan-ud-Din, who travelled in North-east Afghanistan, the home of the Turki tribes, and published an account in Persian of his researches, which were subsequently translated into Russian. It would be well if it were now produced in English; any work dealing with Badakhshan is of great value, as the whole of that part of Afghanistan is one of the least-known parts of Asia, except perhaps for the Russian territory immediately adjoining it to the north. Pages 14-34 of Mr. Jarring's work are a short gazetteer of Qattaghan and Badakhshan, and he actually visited many of the places—*e.g.*, Qunduz, in November, 1935—and queries in consequence Burhan-ud-Din's statement that Qirghizes lived there (p. 17). It is a pity there is only a brief reference to Faizabad, the capital of Badakhshan, which is well worth a full description. The author declines to guess the number of Turkmans in Afghanistan, and, as the estimate varies between 80,000 and 900,000, his reticence is wise. Pages 52-64 deal with the Uzbeks, and elaborate lists are given, but in this case (and indeed in all such enumeration) real accuracy is impossible. Many Turkish tribes are nomadic, recent events have caused an upheaval in the population, and much emigration has taken place. The author says (p. 62) that there are no traces of Uzbeks in Mazar-i-Sherif, yet Ferrier reports thousands.

Pages 65 and 66 refer to the Qipchaks, and this once great tribe still speak Turki, wherein they differ from the Chaghatai (pp. 67-68), who speak Persian, though one would imagine that with such a name they would cling to their original tongue. There is mention of Qazaqs, Qirghizes, and Qaraqualpaqs, and also a lost tribe, the Qarluqs.

Amongst the Mongols of Afghanistan the author places the Hazaras, and mentions that they are known as Berberi, a name often heard on the North-West Frontier of India. As, however, these people do not speak Turki the author does not discuss them.

In all lists of tribes, the question arises of the real differences between them. In many cases there are, in fact, none whatever, and consequently to classify them as separate tribes is a mistake. From the data in this work it is impossible to judge how distinct one tribe is from the other, and how far the elaborate divisions and subdivisions mean anything. Very often the various names are no more than mere family labels, and an over-elaboration gives a false picture of the real state of a tribe. When customs and languages are the same and endogamy exists, the tribes are all one family, and a long catalogue of names implies differences which are not there.

The author has studied his subject, and has devoted much care to this brief account of the racial divisions of the Turks of Afghanistan. He has obviously amassed valuable material and possesses also the ability to produce an excellent work on Afghanistan; and it is to be hoped that he will use this and his other theses as the foundations of a book which should be published in England and have a good map. There is a rough sketch map in the present brochure, alas! quite unworthy of it. The spelling of proper names in this review is that used by the author.

Le Cas Moorcroft. Un problème de l'Exploration tibetaine. Par Robert Fazy. Tirage a part du T'oung Pao. Vol. XXXV. Livr. 1-3. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Pp. 155-184 n.d.

This brochure deals with the question whether William Moorcroft ever visited Lhasa. According to Abbé Huc, the French Lazarist, Moorcroft went to Lhasa in 1826, spent twelve years there as a Kashmiri, and was assassinated on his return journey to Ladakh. The version given by the Abbé in his famous work on his travels in Tibet, published in Paris in 1850, is that Moorcroft posed as a Muhammadan, made maps of the country, and acted as an agent. When the Abbé reached Europe he heard the official account of Moorcroft's death at Andkhui (spelling of author) on August 27, 1825, and his burial at Balkh. Abbé Huc is the sole authority for the story of Moorcroft's visit to Lhasa. The evidence that he never went there is overwhelming. It is purely negative evidence, for the good reason that it struck no one who wrote about Moorcroft that he ever went to Lhasa.

There seems to be no mystery about his death. If he had gone to Tibet he would, as a capable traveller, have certainly not lived twelve years in Lhasa without sending some reports to the authorities in India and preserving a record of his stay. There is a considerable volume of evidence for his death, as well as that of his companion, Trebeck. Monsieur Fazy himself believes that Moorcroft did not visit Lhasa. It is therefore unfortunate that so shrewd a man as the Abbé Huc should have given so long and so picturesque an account of Moorcroft at Lhasa. The legend certainly lengthened the Englishman's life, and in those days it was well known that Britain maintained secret agents in the remotest places of the earth, so why should not a fair Kashmiri be the famous Moorcroft in disguise?

Khaki and Gown. An Autobiography. By Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood of Anzac and Totness, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., C.I.E., D.S.O. Foreword by the Right Hon. Winston Churchill, C.H., P.C. $6\frac{3}{4}'' \times 6$. Pp. 456. Illustrations, 5 maps. Ward Lock. 1941. 18s.

This autobiography is a very human document which will recall many pleasant memories, particularly to soldiers of the older generation. Throughout its pages Lord Birdwood's sympathy and great personal interest in his fellow-soldiers stand out vividly, and these qualities account fully for the affection in which "Birdie" has always been held by those who served under him, whether British, Anzac, or Indian.

Blessed with a strong constitution which demanded exercise in large quantities, the author was an outstandingly energetic man, and his energy appears to have continued undiminished throughout his service. We see him as a Corps and Army Commander in Gallipoli and France spending much of his time daily in going round the front-line trenches acquiring a detailed knowledge of all the ground held by his troops. In more pleasant and peaceful circumstances he found an outlet in climbs and expeditions among the Indian frontier hills or in the Himalayan ranges behind Simla. Having put in fifteen years' service in the country before getting his first leave home, he is certainly a splendid advertisement for India as a health resort. So long a spell in the East would make the present-day officer quail—and with good reason—but Birdwood was evidently none the worse for the experience, and it gave him exceptional opportunities for acquiring a knowledge of the language and of village life in the districts from which the men in his regiment were mainly recruited.

We read how he went out to India in 1885 with the XII Lancers, but the following year transferred to the XI Bengal Lancers, with whom the rest of his regimental service was passed. Those were pleasant days in the "Sillidar" Cavalry, where life was not too strenuous but offered plenty of agreeable work and sport to keep officers and men fit and efficient.

The South African War broke into this halcyon period, and it was there that Birdwood made his first contact with Australian and New Zealand troops and began his long and close association with Lord Kitchener, as one of his Staff, which continued until 'K.' finished his term in India as Commander-in-Chief nine years later. The chapters dealing with this period are perhaps the most interesting part of the

book, and the intimate glimpses which we get of Kitchener both in his official and private life are very illuminating. 'K.,' generally considered so unforthcoming, is seen in a very human and, at times, mellow light, with only occasional flashes of sterner mood.

Lord Kitchener's tenure of command in India was a busy period of Army reform. The lessons of South Africa were applied, and with Kitchener's organizing ability much was done to prepare the army in India for the part it was to play in the Great War.

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that with all the work at headquarters Lord Kitchener—and later Lord Birdwood, when C.-in-C.—were able to do an amount of touring which present-day Commanders-in-Chief may well envy. Lord Kitchener visited the most inaccessible parts of the frontier, much of the travelling being on horseback or on foot, and, even when roads for wheeled traffic existed, it must be remembered that this was in the pre-motor-car era.

Before the end of 1914 Birdwood was ordered to Egypt, and there he assumed command of the Australian and New Zealand contingents, a command which he retained for the next three and a half years in Gallipoli and France. Of all the years spent on active service, this is the period upon which the Field-Marshal probably looks back with the greatest pride and satisfaction of achievement and association; feelings he will have been able to renew in the warmth of his welcome when visiting Australia and New Zealand in recent years. Renewed and confirmed, too, by his reception in Turkey when, representing the King, he was able to do honour to the memory of his former opponent at the funeral of Mustapha Kemal.

His active command ended with his tenure of the Commander-in-Chiefship in India—a fitting and happy culmination of his distinguished service in the Indian Army. It was now that the Gown took the place of Khaki, an uncommon and agreeable experience for a soldier. Master of Peterhouse, he found full scope for his activities and interests as guide, philosopher, and friend of the rising generation.

The autobiography is the story of a full and remarkably varied life, and in its concluding chapters we see the Field-Marshal as Captain of Deal Castle and Colonel of several regiments maintaining his interests and many connections with the service. We can hope that this may continue for many years to come, and perhaps he may yet add a postscript to *Khaki and Gown*, to which Mr. Winston Churchill has written the Foreword.

S. F. M.

Dupleix. By G. Jouveau-Dubreuil, Professeur au Collège Colonial à Pondichéry. *Imprimerie de la Mission, Pondichéry. 1941.*

This work is not a serious contribution towards our knowledge of Royal France's "Grand Colonial," for, though it gives many interesting sidelights upon Dupleix's difficulties and methods, culled from recent research, it does not add greatly to our knowledge of the man. Its publication marks the second centenary of the recognition of Dupleix's status as a Mogul Nawab, and a large portion of M. Jouveau-Dubreuil's book is given to a discussion of his hero's dual status and of what was implied by what is described as "Nababisme." That Dupleix was first and foremost a great Frenchman is indisputable, and the average Englishman's view of him that he was the victim of jealousy and neglect, and that his king failed to see the significance of all that he was doing for France so far away, is, and must remain, generally correct. His intrigues and his duplicity were certainly in the fashion of things Indian, and no doubt accorded with the devious ways of European *haute politique* in the grand manner of Louis XV. On the other hand, Godeheu's words in respect of Dupleix (quoted by the author at page 252) might have been written to-day: "La négociation ne sert qu'à donner du temps pour la réussite de la trahison." Dupleix was of his time. He was not in advance of it, but he had a greater vision than his king; and as for the methods and selfishness of the times, was La Bourdonnais' desertion of Dupleix in 1746 very different in degree from the conduct of Lord George Sackville at Minden?

There can be little doubt that Dupleix's desire to combine his Mogul "Nababisme"—or, as we should say, "Nawabi," but the fine distinctions of meanings of the two words should not be overlooked—with his standing as a Frenchman had for its

object the prestige and advantage which such a connection appeared to lend to diplomatic negotiation and position, and perhaps the most tangible result of this policy can only have become evident with the passage of years. The Englishman in India has generally maintained his own standard of conduct and living, and this has meant in the long run an avoidance of that moral and spiritual decadence which lost for the Portuguese, for example, the ascendancy which their prestige as the heralds of a new order originally gave to them. There can be little doubt that a French domination in India based on Dupleix's ideas would scarcely have endured as a civilizing medium, possibly not even beyond his lifetime. Moreover, men of his calibre were rare, and very justified was his cry in 1753, on hearing of the reverse at Trichinopoli: "Je n'ai pas un homme de tête pour conduire la moindre opération."

M. Jouveau-Dubreuil has arranged his work into three parts, which he heads respectively "Le Nabab Dupleix," "Le Système de M. Dupleix," and "A la Conquête de l'Inde." This indicates clearly the author's intentions, but the method of presentation is somewhat confusing. There are frequent quotations from the diary of Ananda Rangapoullé, Dupleix's Dewan as Nawab of the Carnatic, as well as from many authorities with whose works the reader is better acquainted: yet there is no index, and this is a serious defect. The quotations are indicated in the body of the work. Yet there is no bibliography accompanying it which would make it more easily readable. These defects of form are material in an undertaking of this nature and they reduce its value for the general reader no less than for the scholar. The reader feels that he would gain a better insight into the writer's intentions were he able to refer to Ananda Rangapoullé's diary in particular. With one statement by the author this reviewer must here join issue. This is at page 202, where he writes: "Qu'un Européen puisse devenir Prince dans l'Empire Mogol, c'est l'Idée de Génie. . . . Après Dupleix tous les chefs Européens, Bussy, Godeheu, Saunders, de Leyrit, Clive, etc., ont été obligés de continuer le 'système' de M. Dupleix . . . la mission des Européens dans l'Inde était changée. . . . Ce n'est pas la force des choses qui a entrainé la conquête de l'Inde par les Européens; c'est la force d'un Caractère. Les Européens n'ont conquis ni la Perse, ni la Chine, ni l'Égypte, ni le Japon. Pourquoi donc l'Inde seule a-t-elle été conquise? Parce qu'il y a eu Dupleix." It may be inferred from this passage that the author is not so well acquainted with the history of English relations with India as he is with those of his hero, nor apparently has he studied the chaos of Indian affairs which followed the decadence and misrule to which the Mogul decline naturally led.

HAROLD WILBERFORCE-BELL.

Manual of Indian Forest Utilization. By H. Trotter, I.F.S. Utilization Officer, Forest Research Institute, Dehra Dun. 419 pp. 9 diagrams and 18 plates. Humphrey Milford. Oxford University Press. 1940. price 30s.

British India, including Burma, comprises about 60 per cent. of the Indian Empire, the remainder being under the governments of the Indian States. The total area of the British Indian forests is larger than the British Isles, and they form one of the most valuable assets in the British Asiatic possessions. Extending as they do through every kind of soil and climate, they include almost every known type of vegetation; their wealth and variety are amazing, and some indication of this is given by the author's statement in the early part of this Manual that 2,500 species of woods are known to occur in this area!

Systematic forestry was introduced into British India and Burma about eighty years ago, and, since that time, it is no exaggeration to say that the expansion and progress of forestry in these regions constitute one of the finest achievements of British rule in Asia. Indian forestry has set the highest standard of forestry in Asia and also in the British Empire. This is perhaps all the more remarkable when we compare the meagre and often spasmodic efforts made in other parts of the Empire and even in the United Kingdom itself. The basis of this success is to be found in the far-sighted and progressive policy sanctioned by the Provincial Governments, which were ready to put back each year into the business a substantial part of the

revenue as a long-term investment to ensure both direct and indirect improvements. The outcome of this policy has been a steadily increasing output accompanied by a corresponding increasing revenue. The general aims have been to conserve and to realize these great resources for the benefit of the country as a whole, and not for any particular classes and interests. It may be added that there are also very valuable forest areas in the Indian States of which a good proportion are under systematic forest management.

In addition to the direct works in the forest an urgent need for scientific research work of all kinds became apparent. Accordingly the Forest Research Institute was founded at Dehra Dun, U.P., many years ago. Since its foundation its scope has been progressively enlarged, and it now occupies a site covering about two square miles. It is supplied with every kind of modern equipment, and its scientific output over many years shows that it is the finest establishment of its kind in Asia, and certainly one of the best in the whole world.

At the Institute every aspect of scientific forestry—both pure and applied—is studied, and it is safe to say that by far the most important branch of research carried on there nowadays is that of utilization. Forest products are divided into two classes, major products, which include timber and fuel, and minor products, which include all the rest. The possibilities of this branch of research are almost boundless. To quote an example as applied to woods only—the author divides Chapter VII. (Part I.) into 73 different sub-headings, each describing different uses for wood. The difficulties often lie in the selection of the right woods amongst the many kinds available, as he remarks. If the prospects for Indian timbers are very bright the outlook for the minor products is perhaps even more remarkable. The last half of this book is devoted to this subject, and a mere perusal of the chapter headings given in Parts III. and IV. will supply some indication of the possibilities involved. Many striking features are brought to light, as, for instance, the fact that India virtually holds a monopoly of the world's production of shellac. Again, investigations carried out during the last twenty-five years at the Institute have proved that bamboo can be used for the manufacture of a large variety of papers; India has a sustained supply of two million tons of bamboo annually, and bamboo is already a staple raw material for the Indian paper-making industry. The difficulties in obtaining unadulterated supplies of some of these minor products, because of the intervention of so many middlemen, are discussed, as well as the question of departmental exploitation as against private enterprise.

Speaking generally, it may be said that the utilization of Indian forest products of all sorts is bound to receive a strong impulse in the near future, for two reasons. Firstly, the situation created by the war is bound to produce a greatly increased demand for many kinds of forest products. Secondly, any future changes in the political status of India are sure to lead to great expansion in Indian industry.

The need for the establishment of technical forest education in India was met by the foundation of the Forest College at Dehra Dun, U.P., more than half a century ago for the training of Indian Ranger students. At a later date other similar colleges were started in the Madras Presidency and in Burma. In these establishments one of the chief needs for the efficient instruction of students is the publication of suitable textbooks. As the author states in the Preface, "This Manual is intended primarily as a textbook for Indian students, and does not aim at being a comprehensive or complete Manual of Indian forest utilization." The original Manual by the late Professor Troup was first published in 1907, and a revised edition was issued in 1912. "At that time," to quote again from the Preface, "such subjects as Kiln Seasoning, Timber Testing, Wood Technology and Wood Preservation were almost unknown in India, whereas in the present day they are among the most important branches of modern timber utilization," so it is clear that the publication of a new, enlarged, and up-to-date Manual has been long overdue. The nature of the contents of this Manual has already been sufficiently indicated, and it only remains to add that the work is written in clear and simple language; furthermore, the explanations and examples given are always of a practical nature. The Manual should be very suitable to the purpose for which it is intended. It may be also of practical value to forest officials and others working in various parts of the British Empire, especially in the tropics.

The illustrations consist of 9 diagrams and 18 plates. On the whole they are adequate, but they are certainly not lavish. The instructional value of good illustrations and diagrams to Ranger students is considerable. It is certainly desirable that certain processes which a Forest Ranger may have to organize and supervise practically during his service, such as the burning of charcoal and the working of portable sawmills, should be illustrated in greater detail than is provided in this book. Obviously there are other manufacturing processes of a specialized and technical nature about which Ranger students need only possess some general knowledge.

D. B-B.

Poems of Cloister and Jungle. A Buddhist Anthology by Mrs. Rhys Davids, D.Litt., M.A., President of the Pali Text Society. "Wisdom of the East" Series. John Murray. 3s. 6d.

The profound study and wide reading of this distinguished Pali scholar has recaptured for us the spirit that prevailed in the early days after Gautama Buddha's teaching had echoed through the foothills of Nepal.

Poems of Cloister and Jungle gave me the impression of having been written for those well acquainted with Buddhism. I therefore asked Mr. A. van Muhlenfeld to collaborate with me.

Many of the verses, from some centuries before Christ, are not only of great poetic beauty but of great historical interest, because they give us an idea of the views existing in the early centuries of Buddhism.

The author tells how the monks and nuns who wrote these poems were not all cenobites, but in many cases left the world to lead the "alone life," seeking the carefree existence of the mountains or the "man of the jungle."

"Well rid, well rid, oh excellently rid,
Am I from these three crooked tasks and tools,
Rid of my reaping with your sickles, rid
Of trudging after ploughs, and rid's my back
Of bending over wretched little spades."

"Though I be suffering and weak, and all
My youthful spring be gone, yet have I come,
Leaning upon my staff, and clomb aloft
The mountain peak. My cloak thrown off,
My little bowl o'erturned. And o'er my spirit sweeps
The breath of Liberty! By me is won
The Threefold Lore! The Buddhas bidding's done!"

To leave the world and devote oneself to the religious life was nothing new to the Hindu, but until now it had been a practice of the aged. After the time of Buddha, middle-aged, young and even boys were encouraged to enter the monasteries, where they found a well-ordered, worry-free existence.

A new ideal was awakening.

"There is that groweth never old! O how
Canst thou be satisfied with sense-desires
That age so soon? Are not all things reborn
Where'er they be, gripped by disease and death?
This that doth ne'er grow old, that dieth not,
This never ageing, never dying Path—
No sorrow cometh there, no enemies,
Nor is there any crowd; none faint, none fail,
No fear cometh, nor aught that doth torment—
To this, the Path of Amata have gone
Full many. And to-day e'en now 'tis to be won,
But only by a life that's utterly
Surrendered to devotion. Labour not
And ye shall not attain!"

Though in the main there was not equality between monk and nun (the latter being looked upon as pupil of the former) there were exceptional cases; Mrs. Rhys Davids quotes the words of Vadha's mother, which make it clear that the nun-mother maintained her maternal influence over her monk-son.

What strikes one in so many of the verses is the spirit of happiness:

> "Abundantly this almsman doth rejoice
> Over things by the Awake made known.
> For he doth fare along the ways of peace,
> The bliss of quiet as to this and that."

It is interesting to read of the important rôle played in Buddhism by *Jhana*, the Pali term for abstraction, achieved by gazing fixedly at an external object until the body becomes numb and the inner world of thought is set free; in other words, "a withdrawal from what earth sense brings, alert for some voice or vision from the Spirit World." The author is very sure that Buddhist *Jhana* implied the seeking for psychic intercourse.

By many and varied quotations from these early poets of Northern India, Mrs. Rhys Davids illustrates the appreciation of nature that prevailed among them: "I'll seat me on the mountain top while the wind blows cool and fragrant on my brow," etc. (p. 41). "Wherever I see the crane his bright clear wings outstretched in fear to flee the black storm cloud," etc. (p. 39).

In these poems hostile aborigines never find mention; only one of the nuns seems conscious of the dangers in the forest from wild elephant or snake.

In the terrible times we are going through it is a rare refreshment to read the ***Poems of Cloister and Jungle.***

We agree with the editors that a "deeper knowledge of the great ideals and lofty philosophy of oriental thought may help to a revival of that true spirit of charity, which neither despises nor fears the nations of another creed and colour." And to this end Mrs. Rhys Davids' book has a valuable contribution to make.

HILDA SELIGMAN.

The Book of Mencius. (Abridged.) By Lionel Giles. "Wisdom of the East" Series. Pp. 128. $6\frac{3}{4}'' \times 5''$. John Murray. 1942. 3s. 6d.

The publishers rightly claim that this book has interest and instruction for a far wider public than the small circle of people acquainted with Chinese ethics.

This charming little volume of 128 pages has been translated by a true expert from very difficult Chinese, and the English equivalent may be relied upon as the nearest possible to the original writings of some 2,400 years ago. The exact shades of meaning of many Chinese characters can only be approached in English, and two such characters are "Jen" and "I," around which the teachings of Mencius were centred. The nearest English words, "benevolence" and "righteousness," are apt in these days to imply a degree of smugness which is absent from the Chinese conception. This difficulty partly arises from differences in national mentalities, just as the Germans have no true equivalent for "gentleman."

The work is an abridged version embodying over half of the seven books of Mencius, the Chinese scholar and moral teacher born in 372 B.C., or 107 years after the death of Confucius, from whom most Chinese, including Mencius, have inherited their religion.

Critical readers may find the teachings tend to be archaic. In the last two decades the "Young Chinese" have tended to reject Confucian teaching. This fact has caused alarm to many Chinese who feel that "Young China," in its greed for Western learning and fashions, has left in many Chinese minds a moral vacuum.

But let not readers fear being wearied by this book, which contains some beautiful passages, as true to-day as when they were written.

Two adjoining paragraphs on page 76 show how near Chinese doctrine can be to our own and also how widely different can be our views from theirs.

(*a*) "The great man is one who has never lost the heart of a child."

(*b*) "Not the support of one's parents when alive but rather the performance of their obsequies after death, is to be accounted the great test of filial piety."

Mr. Giles, in an illuminating introduction, describes the life and nature of Mencius, who was a stern idealist, with deep sympathy for the poor and needy as well as a strong dislike for war, which was during his life widespread between the various kingdom of ancient China. Especially in these two respects Mencius is of interest to-day. The value of sound propaganda in the Far East is now greater than ever before, and here is an authoritative work which should have a high value for our authorities in exposing the evils of aggression. One typical example occurs on page 72: "Therefore I say that those who make fighting their trade should suffer the severest punishment; those who band the feudal lords together for aggression should come next; and last, those who force the people to till uncultivated land for the ruler's benefit."

Chinese mentality, often regarded as mysterious and incomprehensible, is actually a natural one; the difference between their methods of thought and ours arising from development over thousands of years on independent lines. The fact that there is so much agreement between the two civilizations is really quite as remarkable as existing differences.

With a need for one nation to understand better than it has done hitherto the mentality of other peoples, any true light thrown on the abysmal ignorance of most English people in regard to China should be especially welcome at a time when the thoughts of many are with the problems of world reconstruction after the war. This book does much to explain the peculiarities of the Chinese ways of thinking in an entertaining and natural way. For example, the niceties of Chinese etiquette on page 89 and of Chinese chivalry on page 122 are set forth as Mencius wrote.

The weaknesses as well as the good points of Oriental nature will be apparent to the reader. Thus, in ancient China, where learned men migrated from one kingdom to another in the capacity of advisers to the rulers, Mencius found favour with the King of Ch'i. But, the king insisting on the respect due to his rank and Mencius insisting on his independence, the two reluctantly drifted apart, an example of Chinese pride which is commonly known as "face." The importance of "face" has been a source of weakness rather than strength in the Orient, and leads in many cases to outbursts which sounder judgment would discourage. This has been illustrated by the rash attempts of the Japanese military element to gain "face" by aggression first in China and now in the Far East as a whole. In this respect, as in many others, these very ancient writings are quite up to date and decidedly instructive.

While Mencius was mainly a religious and moral instructor, his work is full of references to social improvements which have a modern ring, and there are passages referring to agriculture, canal construction, astronomy, strategy, trading conditions, and other matters of so wide a nature that this great classic of the Orient should meet with approval from all who are interested in applying ancient wisdom to modern problems and who realize that East and West have much in common as regards human nature.

Thanks are due to Mr. Giles for this compilation. The writings are not in any special order as we find in Western literature. As reference to any particular subject would be difficult with the book in its present form, the only improvement that one can suggest is that an index be provided for later editions which one hopes may follow. Author and publisher may retort by quoting page 75 of the book: "What trouble is he laying up for himself who discourses on others' faults."

R. B. Denny.

The Crescent in the Land of the Rising Sun. By M. A. Aziz. $9\frac{3}{4}'' \times 6''$. Pp. 156. Blades East and Blades. Agents: Luzac. 21s.

Mian Abdul Aziz, a recent President of the All-India Muslim League, was travelling in Japan in 1935 when the first Mosque in that country was nearing completion in the City of Kobe. He was asked to preside at its opening ceremony, and gave a series of addresses which are included in this book. The Japanese Government, if it did not assist in the erection of the Mosque, certainly approved of it. This approval may be surmised to have been connected with the interest in Muslim affairs (not men-

tioned in this book), which had been manifested in 1934. Japanese activity in this direction included the publication of a monthly review in the Turki language, and the printing and distribution to Muslims in Japan of a new edition of the Qur'an. An observer of the experience and acuteness of Mian Abdul Aziz, however, had no difficulty in seeing that there was little scope for any Islamic movement in Japan, and that very limited recognition was allowed by the Government. There were fewer than 600 Muslims in Japan, the majority of them refugees from the Russian territories in Asia. Even this small number was divided by personal jealousies and quarrels. The Indian Muslim merchants, few in number, were desperately afraid lest their trade should be affected by any attempt to make Japanese converts. The local Muslim magnates, our author tells us, were only expected to carry on propaganda for the Japanese Government. There were only three or four Japanese Muslims, and proselytization was not encouraged. Moreover, the Government recognized Islam, not as an "actual" but as an "analogous" religion, thus creating what the author naturally calls a spurious distinction. No exemption from local taxation was allowed for the Mosque, though it was remitted on the religious property of the three recognized churches. The difference between this treatment and the freedom from taxation enjoyed by Mosques, as well as the absence of embargo on religious propaganda, in Great Britain may be observed. Disappointing as the Islamic situation in Japan must have been to Mian Abdul Aziz, his prolonged stay in the country gave him the material and knowledge to write some chapters on social and political conditions in the country, which form the most valuable portion of the book. He recognizes the intensity of national feeling and the strong sense of patriotism, even if he overestimates the influence of Bushido, which he translates as the "noblesse oblige of chivalry." Recent events have proved that this conception is largely intended for foreign consumption. While recognizing, however, the points which are the basis of Japanese strength, he paints also the darker side of the picture. Japan is, he shows, a Police State, run by a military oligarchy. Assassination is a political weapon, which is regarded with indifference and amusement by the mass of the people. Corruption is widespread, particularly in the Diet. It is interesting to note the horror with which a member of another Asiatic nation regards the servile status of women in Japan. He does not believe that Japan can ever be the leader of the Asiatic peoples unless she changes her outlook in spiritual matters. The observations of a writer so acute and well informed can be read with interest and profit at the present time, particularly by his countrymen in India.

P. R. C.

British Mountaineers. F. S. Smythe. With 8 pages in colour and 24 illustrations in black and white. *Pp.* 46. *1942.*

The author of this is too well known to need an introduction to lovers of mountains, and in this short sketch he has written an agreeable account of the beauty and glory of mountains, and how they began to be appreciated and then loved. It is no small credit to the British that they were the first to learn the charm and the majesty of the great hills and to feel that strange compulsion of the great peaks which so strongly drew men to them. Despite their remoteness and their silence, many of the Anglo-Saxon race, as all chronicles of mountaineering show, almost worship mountains. And yet those forced to live among the mountains usually detest them and envy the easier life of the dwellers in the plains. In this they follow the feelings of the Romans, who spoke of the mountains with disgust.

Mr. Smythe shows us how love of mountains and of mountaineering—two very different emotions—has grown up and how their study and exploration have developed. The short account reads well, and one wishes there were more.

The few pages on the Himalayas gives concisely a good idea of what climbing at great heights means. The last chapter in the book describes a personal adventure of the author's in Switzerland. If the dangers of climbing in the Alps are so great, it can be realized how they are increased in the stupendous Himalayas.

The book has eight delightful reproductions in colour of old aquatints.

Who's Who for 1942. $9\frac{3}{4}'' \times 6''$. Pp. 3,451. Messrs. Blackie. £3 10s.

Praise is superfluous and criticism is not necessary of a book so widely used as *Who's Who.* The 1942 edition contains about a thousand new names with the usual short biographical notes; a thousand eminent men have died in the same period, so the size is much as it was. The book is quite up to the pre-war standard, well printed and well bound, and Messrs. Blackie are to be congratulated that in a year such as this, when printers, proof readers and binders are confronted with such great difficulties, they have been able to bring it out in its usual form. *Who's Who* is necessary in every office, and becomes increasingly useful.

Three books of the greatest interest will be reviewed in the next number of the Journal: Mr. Humphrey Bowman's most delightful *Middle East Window*, giving an account of his own work since the last war, a book which should do much to help readers to realize the immense amount of constructive educational work which has been done during the last twenty years in Iraq and Palestine; Mr. Albert Hyamson's *Palestine: A Policy,* and Mr. L. E. Hubbard's *Soviet Labour and Industry.*

OBITUARY

COLONEL PERCIVAL GEORGE ELGOOD, C.M.G.

For long a member of the Royal Central Asian Society and an occasional contributor to the Journal, the death at his home at Villa Beata, Heliopolis, Egypt, on Saturday, December 20, 1941, of Colonel Percival George Elgood, C.M.G., brings to a close a period of comradeship-in-arms and true friendship—the latter extending over nearly half a century.

Born on July 30, 1863, Percival Elgood was educated at Marlborough and Sandhurst, where he won the sword of honour and passed out first. He was commissioned in the Devonshire Regiment in 1883, and in an interesting record of his early interview with the late Lord Roberts, the gallant Field-Marshal impressed upon Elgood, in the following words, that the essentials of a successful Staff Officer were " manners "—" manners, manners, and don't forget it."

No advice was ever more implicitly followed, and I can truthfully say that during the many years Elgood served on my Staff when Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, his manners were as perfect as was his staff work, even when occupying the difficult post of Financial Secretary and when it fell to his lot to have to veto expenditure represented as urgently necessary by a keen head of a department.

Later on, Elgood held important posts in the Ministries of Finance and Interior of the Egyptian Government, but the Great War of 1914-18 recalled him to the British Army in Egypt, when he gained four mentions in despatches, receiving the C.M.G., Officier le Grand 'Honneur, Coronia d'Italia, White Eagle of Servia and Saviour of Greece, besides the third class of the Orders of Osmania, Medjidia and Nile.

Amongst the various posts he held with distinction during the war was that of Controller-General of Food Supplies of the Egyptian Government and Inspector-General on the Suez Canal. In these capacities and in the many difficult questions which arose during my period of High Commissionership (1916-19) in connection with Canal affairs, his tact and intimate and accurate knowledge were of the greatest value to me.

I may mention here that during this period of the war, his beloved wife Bonté (sister of the late Sir Maurice Sheldon Amos, Judicial Adviser to the Egyptian Government) rendered excellent service in connection with the medical supervision of the many camps of Armenian refugees dotted along the banks of the Suez Canal. Mrs. Elgood, herself a distinguished member of the medical profession, has done much for the welfare of the women and children of the poorer classes in Egypt.

On his retirement from military and administrative work, Elgood continued to live on in his land of adoption, where he devoted himself largely to literary work. His published works give an idea of what he might have achieved had he been able to devote himself solely to authorship. His *Egypt and the Army*, published in 1924, shows his intimate knowledge and reasoned criticism of the conditions and circumstances which brought the Egyptian Army into being from 1882 onwards, and resulted in the creation of a reliable fighting force when trained and disciplined by carefully selected British officers.

The Transit of Egypt, published in 1928, taken in conjunction with his book on the Army, dealt more directly with political events, and these two works contain by far the most useful account of Egypt during the last Great War; they are essential to a proper understanding of the events of 1919 and what led up to them and to Egypt's evolution to fully independent status.

Napoleon's unsuccessful attempt to conquer Egypt and march eastwards, entitled *Bonaparte's Adventure in Egypt* (1931), coupled with his article on Egypt published in 1935 in Arrowsmith's Modern State series, and other articles in the Dictionary of National Biography, all provide fascinating studies of events intimately concerned with the history of Anglo-Egyptian past, present, and future developments.

His *Ptolemies of Egypt* (1938) is a profound study of ancient Egypt and was easily

his favourite book; this, his beloved Horace and his Marlborough Schoolbook, he had beside him to his last hours, but it was pain and grief to him that he was unable to sit up to his desk and continue his book on *The Ten Last Dynasties.*

In his last affectionate letter to me, written in October, 1941, he said: ". . . I have become an invalid in body, if not in mind, and I cannot move without difficulty . . . but I must bear my affliction as best I can. . . . H.R.H. Prince Mohammed Ali is most kind in coming to see me; he is a stout friend to our interests. . . . I often think of our golf matches at Dunbar, but I am afraid I shall never play the noble game again. Good-bye, my dear General. The older I grow the more I seem to live in the past—intelligible enough, as the future holds nothing for men of my age (approaching 79)."

Throughout his life Elgood was happy in the help and loving understanding of that very remarkable woman, his wife Bonté, who, as an Egyptian correspondent so aptly puts it, occupied the position in feminine circles that Elgood did in masculine. In her letter to me, four weeks after his death, she says: "Percival suddenly slipped away from this world—he said, 'Tempus abire est' (my task is over); he kept courageously on foot till two weeks before he died, then fell into unconsciousness. I am staying quietly here where ties and duties bind me and where Percival's spirit lingers with me. . . ."

The following extract from an article in *The African World* sympathetically describes the home life of the Elgoods at Villa Beata, Heliopolis: "During the winter season it was always a meeting-place for important visitors to Egypt, and they could be sure of making contact there with many of the most interesting local personalities, whether British or foreign, and the Elgoods were charming hosts. There were no more popular members of the British Colony, and Elgood Bey, as he was generally known, enjoyed to an especial degree the liking and confidence of his many Egyptian friends who . . . saw in him a true English gentleman whose sympathy for all just causes was ever ready and whose advice would ever be carefully considered, moderate, and sound." I can faithfully subscribe to every word of this last tribute to my dear old friend and comrade—"right faithful true he was in deed and word."

REGINALD WINGATE.

ALEXANDER LAUZUN PENDOCK TUCKER, C.I.E.

Alexander Lauzun Pendock Tucker, C.I.E., an old and valued member of the Society, who died recently, was a son of Henry Pendock St.George Tucker of the Bombay Civil Service. He was born in 1861, and was educated at Winchester and Balliol College, Oxford; he married in 1908 Eva Beatrice, younger daughter of Thomas Egerton Tatton, of Wythenshawe Hall, Cheshire; he entered the I.C.S. in 1882, was Political Agent Haraoti and Tonk 1895, Commissioner Ajmer-Merwara 1899-1904, Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan 1905-07, Revenue and Judicial Commissioner North-West Frontier Provinces 1908-12, Agent to the Governor-General in Central India 1912-13.

The following appreciation of him is contributed by B. E. M. G.:

"The recent passing of Alec Tucker has meant for me the loss of a most loyal and interesting friend. I first met him at Indore in 1890 when he was First Assistant to Mr. Henvey, the then A.G.G. in Central India, for whom he had a great admiration. As Junior Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General I was brought into close contact with Tucker, and I can well remember being at once immensely impressed by the celerity and deep sense of responsibility with which he worked. He was most kind and helpful to me in my work, and from then to the end of his life never ceased to take an interest in my career.

"He had a very nice sense of humour and was a most regular and sympathetic correspondent, and I am confident that all who really got to know him never failed to recognize how truly sincere he was. Perhaps the most valuable and attractive feature of his public service was the fearless sincerity with which he expressed his views, regardless of whether they were likely to win the approval of his superiors. His abilities were, I am sure, much above the average and many were, I think, surprised that they did not win a fuller recognition.

"Tucker's later years were marked by long and most painful illness, borne with great courage and amazing cheerfulness.

"As to Tucker's literary activities, I should mention that in 1921 the S.P.C.K. published his brief Life of Sir Robert Sandeman in the Empire Builders Series. It is, I think, generally agreed that this admirably written Life supplied a valuable postscript to the Life written by Sir Robert's contemporary, Dr. T. H. Thornton (Foreign Secretary to the Government of India), which was published in 1895.

"A Life of Warren Hastings also occupied Tucker's leisure after his retirement, but, to his great disappointment, he did not succeed in getting this published."

B. E. M. G.

THE DOWAGER VISCOUNTESS ALLENBY

The death of Lady Allenby, who was an Honorary Life Member of the Society, recalls a gracious woman who was an adequate helpmate and complement to her great soldier husband. In the brief space allotted to me, it is impossible to do more than register a sense of the loss we have sustained.

P. M. SYKES.

MR. PAUL KNABENSHUE

The loss of Mr. Paul Knabenshue is so great that it seems irreparable; most delightful of diplomats, his forethought and courage during the dark days of last year in Iraq when his house served as a sanctuary to over 150 British subjects and others will always be remembered with deep and lasting gratitude. Mr. Knabenshue's diplomatic career began in 1905 in the town of Belfast, where he was appointed Vice-Consul in 1906. Perhaps the strong party feelings and religious differences he learned to know in the capital of Northern Ireland helped him to a better understanding of the feuds of the Near and Middle East. In 1911 he went to the American Consulate in Cairo and from then on served continually in Arab countries. It was fortunate that he was the American Minister in Baghdad at the outbreak of Raschid Ali's rebellion and could immediately offer his house as sanctuary. A bank manager wrote:

"The most outstanding feature of our new situation was the truly marvellous way in which the Americans—from the Minister downwards—treated us all. From first to last their hospitality and kindness were beyond all praise. The Secretaries gave up their houses and slept on the floor with the rest of us, whilst the Minister threw the whole of the main building open to the multitude, even to making his own private bathroom a communal one—with right of way through his bedroom. His own office, indeed, was not sacred. He and his staff declined all privileges and shared the food of the refugees. It was a true example of democracy!"

He was a magnificent Ally.

CORRESPONDENCE

SIR,

On February 19, 1942, a Turkish "Halkevi," or People's House, was opened in London. This will be warmly welcomed by all Turcophiles, especially as it is the first of these modern Turkish cultural centres to be established outside Turkey. The primary purpose of the London "Halkevi" is described by the Committee as "to give a picture not only of a People's House, but also of modern Turkey to English people." This most laudable and worthy object is long overdue, and it is to be hoped that large numbers of English people will be able to visit No. 14, Fitzhardinge Street and learn something about the amazing achievements of modern Turkey.

I feel it is, therefore, particularly unfortunate at a time when such a welcome attempt to enlighten public opinion in this country on the progress of Republican Turkey has just been launched that a film should be on view at a popular London cinema portraying the life of the Turks as it has never existed outside the vivid imagination of film producers, or at best the fanciful writings of Pierre Loti. As thousands of people will witness this film, for every individual who enters the portals of the "Halkevi" or ever meets a Turk, the illusions of Pierre Loti's highly coloured pictures of the old-fashioned Turkish life will be fostered and kept alive in this country. . . . No doubt film producers would retort that the popular conception of Turkish life has more appeal to the public from a box-office point of view. I would suggest, however, that the history of Turkey since the last war, and particularly the spectacular career of the builder of modern Turkey, the late Kamal Atatürk, provides material for one of the most thrilling film stories ever written, and could give an accurate picture of present-day Turkey. The plain unvarnished truth is sometimes stranger, more interesting, and certainly more instructive than fiction.

H. M. BURTON.

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NOTICES

Mr. E. M. Gull, who for ten years has filled the post of Honorary Secretary, Far Eastern Section, has found it necessary to retire, as he is overwhelmed with work for the Government. Few men have so clear a knowledge of the realities and personalities in China and of British interests in the Far East. It is with real regret that the Council accepted his resignation. The Society owes him much for the many years in which he has put his knowledge at their disposal.

Colonel S. F. Newcombe has accepted the post of Honorary Secretary, but Mr. Gull's place still waits to be filled.

The Council has had to consider the best means of retrenchment in the face of rising costs, and with regret has decided that for the war years the Journal should be brought out every four months instead of every quarter. This has the advantage of saving paper, but has obvious disadvantages in a Society where the greater number of members are serving abroad. It will be possible to print a large number of the lectures.

The thanks of the Council are due to Miss Evelyn Samuel and to Colonel W. B. Lane for gifts to the Library.

Contributors only are responsible for their statements and opinions expressed in this Journal and also for their transliteration of place names.

Members who are not receiving lecture cards and Journals are asked to send a postcard to the Secretary.

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ANNIVERSARY LECTURE

AFGHANISTAN: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION

By LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR KERR FRASER-TYTLER, K.B.E., C.M.G., M.C.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on July 1, 1942, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

I PROPOSE to give you to-night a brief description of Afghanistan, of the country, the people and the Government. I hope that this description may perhaps serve you as a background should events in the future bring this part of Central Asia into prominence. I will begin with the country.

The boundaries of Afghanistan enclose an area of about 260,000 square miles, or approximately the area of Germany plus Austria, and contain a population of some 10 million people. The cultivated area has been estimated at from 30,000 to 40,000 square miles, though this is little more than a guess, and the revenue may be about 4 million pounds a year, though this, in the absence of any published budget, must be looked on as a very rough estimate.

The main feature of the country is the great mountain range of the Hindu Kush, which traverses it from the peak of Tirich Mir on the Chitral border till it ends in the Paropomisus Mountains, which run north-westward towards the Russian frontier near Kushk. This range, the main ridge of which opposite Kabul is about 15,000 feet high, consists of a tangled mass of mountains with deep, narrow valleys and many subsidiary spurs. It is about 150 miles broad and completely separates Northern and Southern Afghanistan. Little of it has been surveyed, and much of it is unexplored and unknown. The north-eastern slopes form the southern watershed of the Oxus basin, and from them run down such rivers as the Khushab, the Kochha and many subsidiary streams to join the Oxus across the plains of Turkestan. From the north-western and western side the Hari Rud and Murghab rivers flow northwards to lose themselves in the Merv and other oases of Turkestan. On the southern slope the watershed is again divided, the eastern portion forming part of the Indus basin, the main rivers being the Kabul, Logar, Panshir and Kunar. The south-western portion of the Hindu Kush forms the watershed of the Helmand river, which eventually loses itself in the great swamps of Iranian Seistan.

So intricate and involved are these watersheds that it is worth while to explore them a little so as to unravel, if possible, the tangle which,

according to some geologists, the practical application of the "toast on treacle" theory has made of the configuration of the country. Starting from Kabul on a summer morning, a sixty-mile drive due west up the Kabul river valley takes the traveller past Sar-i-Chashma, where the sacred fish swarm in a beautiful little pool by the river, and on to where by the Unai Pass the Kabul river takes its source. A steep gradient over the pass brings him into the Helmand river valley, where the upper Helmand flows small and clear from its source on the slopes of the Paghman range, an offshoot of the Hindu Kush, to the east. The road drops down to near the river, and, changing from car to pony, the traveller crosses the Helmand and starts on the long eighteen-mile climb out of the Helmand Valley on to the eastern ridge of the Koh-i-Baba range. Here on the Haji Gak Pass he crosses from the Helmand to the Oxus watershed and drops steeply down to the little Kalu river. It would be possible to cross these two passes in one day, though I have never done this myself. But it is perhaps remarkable that even in two days one can pass from one great watershed through another and into a third. The general result is to make it clear how tangled is this mass of valley and ridge in Central Afghanistan, and how this area, some seventy to eighty miles north-west of Kabul, is, as it were, the central massif of the country and the source of three of its main rivers.

The road we have been following is one of the old routes through Afghanistan, and another easy march brings one down to the junction of the Kalu and Bamian rivers, where the great red fort of Zohak stands on a towering cliff overlooking the two valleys. Much of it still remains in a state which is probably not very different from that in which it was left by Genghiz Khan when he sacked the fortress on his way to India in 1220 A.D. Here one joins a motor road again, and after a short ten-miles journey up the main river arrives at Bamian, famous for its Buddhist remains and the great statues cut in the rock on the north side of the valley. Above this rock wall are the remains of many caves and grottoes, cut by the Buddhist monks in the soft stone. It was in one of these, a beautifully carved chamber which, perhaps, had been once used as a meeting-place, that M. Hackin came upon that curious couplet scrawled in pencil on the wall:

> "If any fool this high Samouch explore,
> Know that Charles Masson has been here before."

This very odd verse has always struck me as being characteristic of the man who wrote it.

From Bamian this west road goes on up the valley for a few miles and then branches off up a side ravine and so out on to a great rolling upland country of shallow, muddy valleys and low hills, gradually rising to the Nil Pass, which for many months in the year is blocked to traffic by snow. From this pass the road drops down steeply until far below appear the lakes of the Band-i-Amir, formed by possibly the most remarkable limestone dams in the world. There are three or four of these lakes, filling up a narrow valley. They have been created by deposits of limestone which

have gradually made dams some 20 to 30 feet high, over which the water overflowing from the lakes cascades in many little waterfalls. The contrast between the great brown hills, the vivid blue of the lakes and the yellow limestone is most striking.

I do not propose to take you further along this remarkable road. Some miles to the west it joins up with the road from Kabul by the Unai Pass, and together they continue down the valley of the Hari Rud to Herat. This is, of course, the direct way from Kabul to the West, and if it were possible to construct a feasible road over this country it would have many advantages over the long circuitous road by Kandahar. But the difficulties of the Hari Rud alignment are tremendous. It crosses three or four passes of 10,000 feet and over, and it is liable to be blocked by snow for many months of the year. For the present, at any rate, the only feasible



way is round by Kandahar and the Helmand, and that, too, is not always open.

The great difficulty about all roads in Afghanistan, and particularly those radiating from Kabul, is that they are liable to be blocked by snow for several weeks in the year. Kabul stands at a height of about 6,000 feet in a broad open valley, and all exits from it are at present over passes. The road to the north, which I have described in a recent issue of the Society's Journal, crosses the Shibar Pass; the west road crosses the Argandeh Kotal just outside Kabul and then rises again to the Unai Pass; the road to Kandahar crosses some very high ground for scores of miles before reaching Ghazni, and is rarely open for long in winter. The south road up the Logar and on to the Indian border in Khost and Waziristan must face the Altimur Pass of 11,000 feet before dropping

down to Gardez and the lower lands of Katawaz beyond. Only in the case of the road eastward to Jalalabad and Peshawar does there seem any possibility of the problem being solved, for it is eastward that the Kabul river runs through the great Tangi Gharu gorge some ten miles from Kabul. Six miles down this gorge the whole river is concentrated in a channel so narrow that a man could jump it, and from this channel the river pours over a waterfall known as the Mahi Pir, or Fishes' Leap, some 60 feet down into a boiling pool below. Above is sheer precipice, with a narrow footway past the fall. The problem of circumventing this precipice and the gorges beyond it has baffled Afghan and foreign engineers for many years. Ten years ago the road to Peshawar still followed the old alignment, through the sinister Khurd Kabul Pass, the way taken by the doomed British Army of 1842. Then another and shorter route was found round the north side of the Lataband Pass, but this, too, proved unsatisfactory. And now work is well in hand to drive a road through the Tangi Gharu gorge and so down the Kabul river direct to Jalalabad. When I left Kabul it was hoped that another two years would see this road completed and a way opened to Peshawar which would not only be free from serious snow-blocks but would also shorten the journey by two or three hours. Apart from this road there are only three main roads crossing the Afghan border—*i.e.*, roads fit for wheeled traffic—and one principal ferry.

In addition to the internal roads I have mentioned, I need only refer to the Spin Baldak-Kandahar-Kushk road, the road from Herat over the Paropomisus Mountains to Mazar-i-Sharif, the road north-east from Pul-i-Khumri to Faizabad, and the road from Jalalabad up the Kunar valley to the Chitral border. There are also, of course, many fair-weather tracks fit for motor traffic, but these are the main thoroughfares, which, though rough and difficult, are always open except in winter or after heavy floods, and on which lorries and other traffic can move in perfect safety by day or night. The principal towns linked by these roads are Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif, with several others, such as Jalalabad, Ghazni, Maimana, of lesser importance.

You now have a general idea of the country, with its great mountain range as the salient feature, its many rivers flowing down three main watersheds, and its roads connecting the larger towns. Cultivation is confined in the south mainly to the valleys and watercourses, in the north irrigation from the Oxus and other rivers is extending the cotton- and beet-growing lands, but by far the larger area is still pastoral. The main occupation of the large majority of the population is to follow the grazing till in the height of summer one meets their flocks right up on the high pastures near the passes of the Hindu Kush or round the grassy valleys which lie at the source of its many rivers. Seasonal grazing is to be found throughout Afghanistan except in the desert country south and west of Kandahar and in some of the more inaccessible parts of the Hindu Kush.

I must now try to tell you something of the Afghan people. In considering them as a whole one should be careful to guard against a tendency to liken them too closely to other Asiatic peoples, and particularly

to Indians. Afghanistan is composed of many different races, as I shall show, but these have a very distinct nationality of their own, and the greater part of the country is much more akin to Central Asia than it is to India. I think it is possible that the failure of the Government of India in its dealings with the Afghans in the nineteenth century was due to its inability to understand or take account of these differences. One is sometimes tempted to wonder whether this failure has even now been altogether remedied.

In describing the Afghan peoples it is convenient to divide the country into three parts—Afghan Turkestan, the Hindu Kush area, and Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. This is only a rough and not entirely precise division, but it will serve its purpose. In the first of these areas, Afghan Turkestan, you will find in the west a people of Iranian origin; further east, Uzbegs, Kazaks and Tajiks are the principal inhabitants, stretching away into Badakshan till right up in Wakhan there are the Kirghiz, allied to the people across the border in Chinese Turkestan. In the central area the western portion contains the great tribe of the Hazaras of Hazarajat, who stretch from near Herat almost to Kabul. North of Kabul are the people of the Koh-i-Daman, mainly Tajiks and Pathans and then a varied assortment of small tribes in the valleys to the north and north-east of Kabul until one reaches the borders of Nuristan, north of Jalalabad, where live the people once known as Kaffirs till the Amir Abdul Rahman subdued them and converted them to Islam. The third layer—that is, the people living south of the Hindu Kush—are wholly Pushtu speaking. It would take too long to enumerate all the various tribes, but if one considers as a rough dividing line the road leading south from Kabul, to the north and east are the tribes of the Eastern Province and Khost, comprising about half of the Mohmand clan, and then smaller tribes such as the Shinwaris, Jajis, Mangals and so on. To the south and west are the great Ghilzai clan, of whom the principal section is the Suleiman Khel. South of these round Kandahar are the Durranis, from a section of which comes the present ruling house of Afghanistan.

Of the Uzbeg and other tribes in the north I must confess I know very little. The British Minister in Kabul is a busy man, and it is curious how often some crisis on the frontier will coincide with his most carefully prepared plans for a holiday. And so I have seen little of Northern Afghanistan. But the country is rich and the people, on the whole, are prosperous. It is from the area round Andkhui that comes the best of the famous lambskins which form so important a part of the export trade of the country. Further east there are now large areas under cotton and sugar beet, but the majority of the people are still pastoral, with many herds of sheep and cattle and a fine breed of small horses. Of the middle section, the Hazaras are of Mongol origin and are believed to be descended from some garrison of a thousand (*hazar*) left behind by Genghiz Khan. They are Shiahs, and have in days gone by often been at loggerheads with their neighbours, but they have now settled down and live a quiet life, for the most part in their remote valleys and hills. They also serve in the army, and make excellent and willing servants. The people of Nuristan

are a mysterious race of unknown origin, fair-haired and grey-eyed, with many traits which would appear to link them rather with the West than the East. I believe, however, that the theory of their descent from a part of Alexander's army has been discredited, and that it is now thought that they are a remnant of some Aryan race which was driven up into the hills by their Pathan successors.

The main characteristics of the true Afghans are a sturdy independence, a dislike of outside interference, a narrow fanatical outlook and a quick temper. They are an inaccessible people, living their own lives in their remote valleys, and governed by their own tribal laws and customs. They are fine fighters, hospitable and within their own code friendly and honourable in their dealings, and possessed of a saving sense of humour. But they are difficult people to deal with or to understand. Of them, perhaps the most interesting as well as the most formidable is the great Ghilzai clan, who live, so far as they can be said to live anywhere, in the wide plains of Katawaz, stretching away from Ghazni to the Waziristan border and south to Kandahar. In winter the Ghilzais move with their families and their black tents, their flocks and their herds of camels down through the passes into India, there to graze their beasts and to trade until the first sign of the approaching hot weather sends them streaming back to Katawaz and so as the summer progresses up into the southern foothills of the main range. Here they meet and sometimes fall out with the Hazaras as they lead their flocks up to the summer pastures. Some of them penetrate as far as the Dasht-i-Nawar, that extraordinary hidden basin in the hills north-west of Ghazni, a remote and fascinating place some thirty miles long by ten broad, with a great lake in the middle of it and no entrance save over a pass 10,500 feet high. For eight months in the year the Dasht lies silent, deserted and snowbound. In May the snow clears off the pass and the Ghilzais bring in their flocks to graze for three months on the rich pastures, till at the first signs of autumn they turn their faces once more to the south.

Perhaps the best time to see as a whole the diverse races which make up the Afghan nation is at the Jashen-i-Istiqlal (Festival of Independence) in August, when all Kabul is in holiday mood, offices are shut, and the people and visitors are out to enjoy themselves to the full during a week of festivities. The proceedings open with a parade of the Kabul garrison, at which the salute is taken by the King, after a short impressive ceremony when the whole parade turns to salute the tomb of the late King Nadir Shah, which stands on the slopes of Siah Sang overlooking the city.

For the next six days there are parades, sports and competitions of all types. Here can be seen some excellent hockey, at which the Afghans are very proficient, followed, perhaps, by teams from the north on their wiry little horses, playing their remarkable and often exciting game of buzkashi, a kind of rugby football on horseback, played with a goatskin for ball. Here, too, can be seen the Pathan tribal dancing with much stamping and shaking of long black hair, and in curious contrast the ceremonial dance of the Nuristanis, which they accompany with a high bird's whistle. I have seen also the Nuristanis engage in an archery contest, and in contrast

an excellent display of clay-pigeon shooting, at which many of the Afghan nobles are very proficient. There are many other things to do and see, including a visit to an exhibition of local industries, but the most interesting is to wander among the crowd and watch the many diverse types—the people from the north in their long boots and quilted coats of many colours; the Ghilzais resplendent in their velvet waistcoats, richly embroidered, full-skirted shirts and baggy trousers; the Hazaras with their flat, hairless Mongol faces; an occasional Hindu or Sikh with distinctive headdress; soldiers in khaki and airmen in dark blue; officials in Western dress with the attractive black or grey astrakhan hat—all the elements of this country of many races mingled in a care-free holiday-making crowd.

You will realize, however, that a country composed of so many diverse races and tribes must at times contain many elements of disruption, and I propose to turn now to tell you something of the Government which controls them, and which has successfully guided their destinies for the past twelve and a half years.

King Nadir Shah ascended the throne of Afghanistan in the autumn of 1929, after defeating the brigand usurper Bacha-i-Saqao, who had ruled in Kabul for the previous nine months. The new King and his four brothers, who are collaterals of the former ruling family, brought with them to their task two great assets—their personal popularity in the country and the political instinct of born administrators. They needed both of these, for in the autumn of 1929 they were faced with every conceivable difficulty. There were many people who still maintained their allegiance to the ex-King, and even the brigand had his followers in the Koh-i-Daman. The eastern, southern and Kandahar provinces were lawless and disaffected, the northern provinces were out of control, the Herat province was practically independent. The King had no army and an empty treasury, his palaces had been looted and his resources appeared non-existent. Contrast this with conditions when I left Kabul just twelve years later. The country was then quiet, peaceful and loyal to the central Government, an efficient police with a backing of an army of some 70,000 to 80,000 men kept order, movement throughout the country was unrestricted by day or night, and although there were grumblers there was no disaffection. But grumbling is the birthright of all free people, and in a country which has not yet attained to the full blessings of democracy it is one of the few ways in which His Majesty's Opposition can air their opinions. There was, however, no real opposition to Government or to its measures, and the people seemed generally to recognize that their rulers were making genuine and unsparing efforts to guard their welfare and to ensure their progress. How was this transformation accomplished? I think the answer is that King Nadir Shah and his brothers were patriots and realists. They put before everything the welfare of their country as a whole, and they governed with common sense and with a true instinct of what they could do and what they could not do. They had no time or use for political theories; they were confronted by stark facts and problems of immense difficulty which had to be faced and solved as they arose. Their knowledge of human nature and their natural gift of leadership carried them through, and, though they were frequently opportunist, their rule

was never haphazard. But their task was anything but easy, and though they never lost courage they must frequently have been near despair. In fact, when they looked back over those early days the King and his brothers might well have echoed the words which Sir Alfred Lyall puts into the mouth of the Amir Abdur Rahman:

> "Fair are the vales well watered,
> The vines on the uplands swell,
> You might think I was reigning in Heaven,
> I know I am ruling Hell!"

Their first task was to bring the country under control, to raise an army to maintain order and, while raising it, to restore order. First, the Eastern and Kandahar provinces were pacified, and while this was in progress a revolt occurred in the Koh-i-Daman area, just north of Kabul. This was soon dealt with, and by the autumn of 1930 southern Afghanistan was sufficiently peaceful and the army sufficiently organized to permit of an expedition over the Hindu Kush to restore order in the Northern provinces. This expedition, led by the King's brother, H.R.H. Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan, the War Minister, returned successful in the summer of 1931. In 1932 the King took measures to bring the outlying province of Herat once more under the full control of Kabul.

While all this was going on plans were being made for the spread of education and the development of communications, and the great problem of economic stability and progress was tackled. In 1933, when political stability seemed almost assured, King Nadir Shah was struck down by an assassin's hand in the garden of the Dilkusha Palace. For a year further progress was stayed, and the Government and people waited to see the outcome of this paralysing disaster. It speaks well for the influence which in four short years the King had been able to establish over his people that this assassination was followed by no disturbance, that King Zahir Shah succeeded to his father's throne with the willing assent of his uncles, his Cabinet and his people, and that by the autumn of 1934 the wheels of progress were once more moving forward.

Since then much has been done, though progress must of necessity be slow in a country which is still in early stages of development and which is handicapped by so many difficulties, both financial and physical.

The Government is in the hands of the Prime Minister, H.R.H. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim Khan, and of a Cabinet who are directly responsible, on the one hand, to the King and, on the other, to the National Assembly of elected representatives, which meets on occasions of importance. Under this system, in which autocracy is gradually being replaced by a more democratic form of government, the country has remained remarkably peaceful. There has been some small trouble on different parts of the frontier, in Mohmand country and among the Suleiman Khel, but the Afghan Government have tackled the frontier problem with patience and a realistic conception of the fundamental requirements of the situation. In the frontier areas, as elsewhere in the country, education is spreading, and, though Kabul does not yet boast of a university, every year sees the opening

of fresh primary and secondary schools in many different areas. A medical faculty has been established under Turkish supervision, and a beginning has been made in the teaching of arts and sciences.

On the economic side the Government under the direction of King Nadir Shah faced up to the problem with characteristic straightforwardness and realism. Their first object was to balance their budget and to pay their way. They reviewed their assets and the possibility of developing the country's potential wealth, and lived, rather precariously perhaps, on the former while seeking with foreign assistance to develop the latter, and to make the country as self-supporting as possible in certain essentials.

Their principal exports are the valuable lambskins from Andkhui, wool mainly from South and East Afghanistan, hides and skins, and, last but by no means least, fruit from the areas round Kabul and Kandahar, for which there is always a ready market in India. Of these the lambskin trade is the most valuable, but the market is fluctuating. It depends very largely on the American purchaser and on whether the American business man feels equal to buying his wife a new astrakhan coat every year or not. In search of a more stable product the Afghan Government has sought to develop cotton-growing in Northern Afghanistan round Khanabad, and to cultivate sugar beet near Baghlan, a little further south. Both these products were developing satisfactorily up to 1941, though it will take some time before either of them reaches the point of freeing the Afghan Government from the necessity of importing both sugar and textile goods. Another valuable product is coal, of which there are considerable quantities in the north of the Hindu Kush. There are also signs of oil.

One is inclined to regret that more attention was not paid at the outset to the development, in this great pastoral country, of agriculture and animal husbandry, but generally speaking the economic planning of Afghanistan was proceeding satisfactorily up to 1939. The war has, however, inevitably interfered with progress. Partly for political and partly for economic reasons the Afghan Government had in 1935 and 1936 entered into business relations with Germany, and their economic plan was being worked largely, though not entirely, on credits supplied by that Government. German engineers and other experts were engaged to carry out irrigation projects, to construct roads and to install textile and hydro-electric machinery. At the beginning of the war the Afghan Government, whose external policy had been based on a determination to cultivate the best possible relations with all foreign countries, endeavoured to maintain their pre-war economic policy, but the effect of the war was gradually to cut them off in an increasing degree from their European markets and other sources of supply. The dislocation of trade was considerable, and when I left Kabul in August last it seemed doubtful whether the Government would be able to complete their projects, at any rate till after the war.

I should like to say a few words about the Afghan attitude to the war. As you know, the Afghan Government proclaimed neutrality at the outset, and they maintained this attitude up to the time that I left the country

in August, 1941. Their position was not always easy; German propaganda was rife, and a good deal of pro-German sentiment existed as the result of the close economic connection of the previous years. But this did not affect the policy of the Government, and, if one looks for deeds rather than words, one can find them in the drastic action taken by the Afghan Government against two Germans who in July 1941 tried to get across the border to join the Faqir of Ipi, and in the fact that during the war years from 1939 to 1941 the internal and frontier situation has never been more peaceful.

I should like to finish this lecture by saying something of our personal impressions after many years spent in Afghanistan. We were fortunate in having a delightful site for our Legation and in having a most comfortable house to live in and a garden where most English flowers would flourish. We were fortunate, too, in our climate. For six weeks or so in summer the Kabul climate is uncomfortably hot, but in spring and autumn the weather is delightful, and the winter, though at times intensely cold, is very bracing.

We enjoyed most of all our spring and autumn expeditions, either by car to fish in the streams beyond the Hindu Kush, or on ponies across one of the great passes. On these expeditions one saw Afghanistan at its best, and could enjoy to the full its magnificent scenery, beautiful rivers and most interesting flowers. It was also on these occasions that one met with the Afghan peasants and wayfarers at large and discovered what delightful kindly people they were. It might be an Uzbeg, ambling along on his wiry pony, or a small caravan bringing down salt from the mines near Khanabad, or a few Pathans with their camels, or a Ghilzai encampment on the move. Whoever they were they seemed cheerful people who passed with a kindly greeting or stopped to enquire who we were and whether they could do anything for us. They gave one the impression of free men in a free country, who took no account of rank or position, but talked as equals and as hosts in a land where a traveller is a man to be welcomed and assisted, and a stranger is a guest to be treated with kindness and hospitality. And this is not only my own impression, but it is the tale told by nearly every traveller who passed through the country on his or her way to stay with us in Kabul. The Afghans do not care about foreigners if they suspect that they are seeking to tamper with their independence or to exploit their country. But towards those who are not doing so, and are prepared to take them as they find them and to meet them on an equal footing of friendliness and courtesy, no people in the world could reciprocate more readily.

Of our many friends in Kabul itself one can most truthfully say the same. On the social side we had many contacts and many friendly contests, till our annual hockey and tennis matches became a feature of the Jashen festival.

Of my official contacts it would not be suitable to say much. But I will say one thing. When I look back on my many years of official life in Kabul and on the men with whom I dealt, I am reminded of the words spoken by Charles II. when he was entering into negotiations with the Dutch prior to his restoration, because these words seem to apply so aptly

to the rulers of Afghanistan. He said: "God send that I may deal with men of passion, who grow angry when they are contradicted, and yet are moved by reasons to which they cannot find an answer."

One could wish for no better fate than to be associated with men of whom these words might justly be spoken.

H.E. THE AFGHAN MINISTER spoke his appreciation of the lecture and the excellent slides, and was followed by Lord HAILEY.

The meeting ended with a vote of thanks to the lecturer.

SIR AUREL STEIN, K.C.I.E.

THE members of the Royal Central Asian Society need no introduction to one of their Honorary Vice-Presidents, Sir Aurel Stein, and this short account is intended to offer him the warm congratulations of the Society on his eightieth birthday, which is on November 26, 1942.

There is likewise no need to recapitulate the many learned books and articles which Sir Aurel has produced, and this is rather a brief appreciation of an illustrious and distinguished traveller, the greatest explorer and archæologist of our time and also a scientist of a high order.

It was a happy fate that directed Sir Aurel's steps to India, where he was given the opportunity to develop and exercise his taste and talent for research. Even more fortunate, perhaps, was his choice of the field of his explorations, Central Asia, which repaid him so richly for all his labour and which has since become a forbidden area to the traveller.

The long list of books, the many maps and the great mass of precious material, such as statues, pictures, manuscripts and "antiques" of every kind witness to his industry and success. Many of these would have never been found, or would have been destroyed by vandalism or by riot, if they had not been rescued by him.

I have known Sir Aurel for nearly twenty years, and have met him, not only in India and England, but also in Chinese Turkestan, the scene of his most fruitful operations. There he is well known, and it is hardly possible to call on a Chinese official without being shown a photograph of "Seteno Darin." This was always produced with pride and affection, for Sir Aurel has a warm and lasting admiration for the Chinese race and to this day has many friends amongst the people of China. To the non-Chinese races of Turkestan he is always known as "Miscal Sahib." A miscal is a unit of the rather intricate currency of Central Asia, and was found more convenient to reckon in than the muddling taels, tangas, darchin and so forth. There has surely been no archæologist or explorer who has done so much solid work and has, at the same time, provoked so little opposition or suspicion. Travellers in strange places, and antiquarians particularly, are seldom a docile breed, as whoever wanders outside the beaten track of the tourist requires great tact, with immense patience, determination and good humour, to achieve any results. That Sir Aurel had these qualities, his books and his exhibits in museums prove. In his books, too, are many references to the help that he received, and the courtesy and kindness that he showed are evident.

Sir Aurel, moreover, possesses in a singular degree that priceless and only too rare quality of the archæologist and explorer—accuracy. If he says a thing is so, it is so. His classification of objects found, his geographical discoveries, his description of places are always as correct as is humanly possible, and consequently his deductions and his arguments are likewise. I have often thought that he was mistaken in some site, feature or local characteristic, but later I have found that he was not. That is

remarkable, for in the vast amorphous arena of the Tarim Basin, with its monotony, changelessness and decay, it is not easy to preserve an alertness of mind and an originality of outlook, especially after a long and tiring day in the bitter cold or the stifling heat.

Except for archæology and exploration, Sir Aurel has no hobbies or interests whatever. He is absorbed in his work, and it is work that calls for no small physical exertion and endurance. Family ties and bodily health are disregarded. He was not a young man when he lost all his toes through frostbite when crossing the Karakoram, and when over fifty years of age he had a serious accident on his way to Kashgar.

At the present time he is in Kashmir, or rather his headquarters and library are there, but he prosecutes his studies with the same zest and his journeys are as fertile and as original in result as ever. If his wanderings are nearer India, it is due to the war and not to his physical inability. In 1940 he toured in Kashmir, which meant riding or walking, and in December of that year he started on examining some ancient sites in the Indian desert. Before the present war, and during the early part of it, he was in Persia.

This brief appreciation does not, and indeed cannot, describe even shortly the immense volume of solid, accurate research which this eminent explorer has accomplished. From 1888 there has been a steady output of valuable work—no mere collation, no sociolistic book-making, but the results of long, wearisome, comfortless labour, cut off for months at a time from all European society. His geographical work in Chinese Turkestan and adjoining regions is of the highest order; his mapping of the Kuen Lun range, and his journey through it, are feats of the highest merit. I realized this when I tried, and failed, to join his track after I had crossed the Aksai Chin. Again, his exploration in the Pamirs and in the Taklamakan desert are outstanding.

I recently urged Sir Aurel to write his autobiography, but he refused, pleading that his life was in his books. That may be so, yet there is little of himself in his modest works. For his personality is his own. No man can wander fruitfully throughout Asia for nearly fifty years without having a character and a make-up that are worth knowing. He is devoted to his dog, and has a succession of white, smooth-haired fox terriers, or, if one is not to be had, an Airedale. All are called Dash. He uses with great skill an old-fashioned, very serviceable but clumsy half-plate stand camera. His menage is frugal, as I know only too well, for I once had a cook who had been with him for some time, and the explorer's menu was far too ascetic for me. He is indifferent to the simplest comfort and his capacity for work is terrifying.

This is but an inadequate tribute to a great explorer. If he is little known in this age of advertisement and spectacular discovery, that is neither his fault nor his misfortune. His work is as lasting as it is outstanding. The sober narrative of his books shows the man as he is—thorough, diligent, determined and creative. As an explorer in the field of archæology and geography he is far beyond his contemporaries. *Ad multos annos.*

R. S.

ANNUAL MEETING

The Annual Meeting was held on July 1, 1942, in the Royal Empire Society's Assembly Hall, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., in the Chair.

The Chairman called on Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes to give the Honorary Secretary's report for the past year.

Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E.: This Annual Meeting, held in the middle of a titanic struggle between the freedom-loving States and the powers that are aiming at universal slavery under the Nazis, proves the continued vitality of the Royal Central Asian Society. There have been lectures, many of extraordinary interest. At the same time, members are, as ever, invited to suggest suitable subjects and lecturers. We are, perhaps, especially grateful to Commandant Schaeffer, Colonel Guy Symonds, Mr. Thavenot and Mr. Elwell-Sutton, whose papers may justly be described as possessing historical importance, and our grateful thanks are due also to Sir Ronald Storrs, Sir Thomas Hohler, K.C.M.G., C.B., Mrs. Hilda Seligman, the Rt. Hon. Earl Winterton, M.P., Major H. M. Burton, Mr. W. M. Kirkpatrick, the Hon. Sir Archibald Cochrane, the Rev. G. J. Rogers, Mr. Zing-Yang Kuo, Dr. J. V. Harrison, Colonel E. G. Hume, Mr. W. Leigh Williams, the Rev. C. K. Hughes, Mr. Edward J. Thompson, the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Clive, Mrs. Joan M. C. Jullien, the Countess Czarkowska, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Douglas Brownrigg, Mr. J. S. Furnivall, Dr. J. H. Hutton, Dora Gordine (the Hon. Mrs. Richard Hare), and Dr. Elizabeth Hill for their most interesting lectures. Also to Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler, Wing-Commander Embling, and Mr. Peter Hume for their informal talks.

Once again we tender our grateful thanks to the able reviewers, whose work maintains our high literary standard.

Among our new members of distinction we would mention H.R.H. Prince Peter of Greece, who displays deep interest in our activities. Thanks mainly to some energetic members, our list of elections is not unsatisfactory, but we want still more to maintain our position.

The losses through death have been most serious. They include H.H. the Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan, who was one of the earliest members of the Society; the veteran writer, Mr. J. A. Spender; Mrs. Florence Ayscough (Mrs. McNair), expert in Chinese literature and art. A special tribute is due to Mr. Paul Knabenshue, the American Minister to Iraq, who gave sanctuary to the members of the British Colony during the rebellion. The Council deeply regret also the loss of the Dowager Viscountess Allenby, Mr. George Antonius, C.M.G., Mrs. W. R. D. Beckett, O.B.E., Colonel R. A. E. Benn, C.I.E., Rev. A. K. Boyland (in a motor accident), K. A. H. Casson (killed in action), C. R. Corbett, Sir Dadiba M. Dalal, C.I.E., P. W. G. Douglas, Colonel P. G. Elgood, C.M.G., Wing-Commander S. R. Groom (missing, believed killed), E. M. B. Ingram, C.M.G. (killed by enemy action), Lieut.-Colonel R. L. Kennion, C.I.E., A. J. Martin (in China), Arthur Merton (in a motor accident), Mrs. Sandford Storey, and A. L. P. Tucker, C.I.E.

Finally, we would extend our deepest sympathy to the families of members who have fallen or who are in enemy hands.

The HONORARY TREASURER, Major EDWARD AINGER, said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—When I spoke to you about the accounts of the Society last year I told you that we were unlikely to have a balance to our credit on our Income and Expenditure Account. I am afraid that my views have turned out to be only too accurate, as on December 31 last year we had an excess of expenditure over income of just over £50. There has been a drop in the year under review of over £100 in the income received from subscriptions, and I fear this source of income may be further decreased this year. As I told you last year would be the case, our position as regards investment has now become sound. We have over £600 invested (taking the value of investments at cost), and against this our true liabilities account of £300, and Mrs. Tweedie's legacy, which is shown as a liability, is a sum against which, if necessary, we could draw for current expenses, as is also the Entrance Fee Account, which amounted at the date of the audit to £233.

In these circumstances it would have been possible for us to continue the present rate of expenditure and to meet our loss of income from Capital Account, but this is a course which commends itself neither to me as Treasurer nor to the Council as a whole. At the last meeting of the Council, when I informed them of the financial position, it was decided that the Society's Journal should be issued only three times a year instead of four, and we hope that this action will enable us to achieve a balance between our income and expenditure in the future, though it may be necessary to ask the bank for facilities for a small overdraft towards the end of this year. This is a position which should not recur in future years. Besides easing the Society's financial position, the course proposed should also assist the war effort in that we shall be using less paper than would otherwise be the case.

It would also be helpful to our revenue if an increasing number of members were to sign the covenant. We have taken steps to appeal to all members to do so if they are willing, and have sent out a letter to them to this effect, and the appeal will have the further support of a letter which our Chairman is sending out after this meeting, telling about the new arrangements for the Journal and the reasons which have compelled us to take this course.

The accounts, as appended, were adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—The membership of the Society shows a reasonably steady increase in these difficult times; but we must not relax our efforts to attain our ideal of a membership of 2,000. We hope that the members will help in this respect.

In the interests of economy it has been decided to issue the Journal three times a year instead of four. It is a satisfaction to learn that the subject-matter of the Journal continues to give satisfaction, and we hope not only to maintain, but to increase, its high standard.

We are most grateful to the Royal Asiatic Society and to the Royal

Empire Society for placing these halls at our disposal for lectures. The various subjects of these lectures have ranged widely. It is our great desire to provide lectures which appeal to members. We will therefore be grateful to any member who will suggest a subject, accompanied, if possible, by the name of the proposed lecturer.

The Council desire to express their grateful thanks to Sir Percy Sykes for his unselfish and untiring work in the interests of the Society. And last, but not least, to Miss Kennedy, who for so long has been the prop and stay of the Society, and who has given it such valuable and devoted service.

The following elections for Honorary Officers and the 1942-43 *Council were then made:*

Brig.-General Sir Percy Sykes proposed, and it was unanimously agreed, that General Sir John Shea should be asked to take the Chairmanship of Council for the following session. General Sir John Shea accepted, and the following nominations were put to the meeting for election: That as Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of Cork and Orrery, Major-General H. Rowan Robinson and Colonel S. F. Newcombe retire in accordance with Rule 16, Sir Charles Innes, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Sir Nigel Davidson, C.B.E., and Colonel F. M. Bailey, C.I.E., be elected as Vice-Presidents. And in accordance with Rule 25 the three senior members of Council retire, Mr. Humphrey Bowman, C.B.E., Mr. A. Kenneth Williams and Colonel R. C. F. Schomberg, D.S.O., be elected to the vacancies.*

Sir Angus Gillan of the British Council, and Colonel S. F. Newcombe had been co-opted to the Council.

These names were put to the meeting and were therewith elected.

The CHAIRMAN continued: Since our last Annual Meeting there have been many, and some unexpected, changes in the countries in which the Society is interested. China, now an ally, maintaining her heroic and undaunted struggle against the invader, will no longer be the China of the past. She has earned a seat at the peace table, which will entitle her to her place beside the Great Powers. Extra-territorial rights will no longer exist, and future international relationships will be on a basis of equality.

Malaya and Burma are now temporarily in the hands of the conquerors. They must be won back again before a fresh start of development can be made. India is not usually dealt with by us, by agreement with the East India Association, except in exceptional circumstances. But we can express the hope that the sharing of a common danger and the visit of Sir Stafford Cripps may herald a better understanding of the aims and desires of the British Government.

Afghanistan has pursued her course of strict and honourable neutrality. But it is interesting to note that, with the exception of the two Legations, all Germans and Italians have been obliged to leave the country. The Japanese Legation also remained.

* General S. B. Pope, C.B., has retired since the Annual Meeting as he is unable to attend any Council meetings. Major D. Talbot-Rice has been appointed to the vacancy.

The Arabs have readily followed the controlling influence of King Ibn Saud in spite of persistent hostile propaganda.

Palestine is more concerned for the moment by the threat from without rather than by internal dissension. But it is a matter of considerable regret that the question between the Arab and the Jew has not yet been finally settled.

Turkey, anxious only to maintain what is her own in spite of threats and her difficult position, remains our staunch ally.

The U.S.S.R. has been the subject of some very interesting lectures. Dr. Elizabeth Hill told us of the remarkable development of Siberia and how the trend of Russian development is increasingly towards the East. It would seem that for many, many years after this war the U.S.S.R. must be occupied solely with this development. But to-day it is a new U.S.S.R. to us—our friend in an alliance based on mutual interest. Let us hope, let us believe that the alliance, which is to continue for a defined period after the war, may develop into a mutual understanding which will continue, to the lasting benefit of both great empires.

There is in this Society a wealth of experience and knowledge gained by members who have served in the various countries in which we take interest. It is the function of this Society to collate this knowledge in our lectures and discussions, and in the articles in our Journal to place it at the disposal of the authorities, and to inform public opinion.

The late Lord Allenby, in one of his presidential addresses, said: "We must not wait on events. We must anticipate them." It is essential to look well ahead, for many and complex are the problems which must be solved in the future.

Lastly, let us look at the country west of the Canal. Not, it is true, within our orbit, but so closely linked that it is difficult to separate. We have had two interesting lectures on this area in the past year, and towards a portion of it all our thoughts turn to-day. He would be rash indeed who would venture to prognosticate, since so little is known of the resources, position and condition of the rival armies. But history has taught us three things. The tide of battle so often turns in a sudden and unexpected fashion. No battle is ever lost until the will to win it has been lost. Most of all, we should place complete trust and confidence in the best of all fighting men—the British soldier.

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 8, CLARGES STREET, W. 1.

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1941.

Expenditure.

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
To *Office Expenses:*						
Salaries and National Insurance	436	17	3			
Rent	230	0	0			
Telephone	12	4	7			
Stationery and printing	12	15	9			
Postage	83	3	7			
Office cleaning	46	14	2			
Audit fee	5	5	0			
Insurance (including War Risk Insurance) ...	48	17	6			
Bank charges	5	19	6			
Lighting and heating	45	1	4			
Sundries	52	7	1			
Repairs	1	9	0			
				980	14	9
,, *Journal:*						
Printing	482	3	9			
Postage	56	14	8			
Reporting	25	4	0			
				564	2	5
,, *Lectures:*						
Lecture fees and expenses	9	5	6			
Lecture halls and expenses	36	0	2			
Lantern	7	17	6			
Slides	15	15	0			
Printing	30	18	0			
				99	16	2
,, *Library*				19	8	1
,, *Legal and Professional Expenses*				21	0	0
,, *Annual Reception*				13	19	8
				£1,699	1	1

Income.

	£	s.	d.
By *Subscriptions received*	1,451	15	1
,, *Journal Subscriptions and Sales*	49	9	2
,, *Interest Received* (less tax)	11	9	7
,, *Deposit Interest*	10	11	0
,, *Income Tax Refund*	90	0	0
,, *Dinner Club* (Contributions to expenses)	25	0	0
,, *Sundry Receipts*	2	0	0
,, *Balance* (being Excess of Expenditure over Income for the year)	58	16	3
	£1,699	1	1

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 8, CLARGES STREET, W. 1.

BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 31, 1941.

LIABILITIES.

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Creditors				129	13	10
Capital Funds:						
Life Subscription Fund	180	5	0			
Entrance Fee Account	233	0	0			
Legacy Account	100	0	0			
Lawrence of Arabia Medal Fund	117	11	0			
				630	16	0
Income and Expenditure Account:						
Balance, January 1, 1941	124	1	0			
Less: Deficit for year to date	58	16	3			
				65	4	9
				£825	14	7

ASSETS.

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Cash:						
At Bank on Current Account	68	13	6			
On Deposit: Post Office Savings Bank ...	10	17	1			
Petty Cash in Hand	19	5	9			
				98	16	4
Sundry Debtors and payments in advance ...				14	2	3
Investments (at cost):						
£100 3½ per cent. War Loan	100	0	0			
£434 11s. 3d. 2½ per cent. Consolidated Stock	337	6	3			
£173 9s. 6d. 3½ per cent. Conversion Loan ...	175	9	9			
				612	16	0
Society Premises Account:						
Balance as per last Account				100	0	0
				£825	14	7

PERSIA FUND.

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Accumulated Fund:						
Balance, January 1, 1941	357	18	7			
Add: Investment Interest	8	15	11			
Deposit Interest	0	17	11			
				367	12	5
Sundry Creditors				6	16	0
				£374	8	5

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Investment:						
£467 8s. 3d. 3½ per cent. Conversion Loan at cost				331	17	3
Cash:						
On deposit with Halifax Building Society ...				42	11	2
				£374	8	5

AUDITORS' REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

We have examined the above balance sheet, and have obtained all the information and explanations that we have required. In our opinion such balance sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the Society's affairs, according to the best of our information and explanations given us and as shown by the books of the Society.

16, KING STREET,
CHEAPSIDE, E.C. 2.
June 29, 1942.

WILLIAMS, DYSON, JONES & CO.
(Chartered Accountants).

FRENCH ARCHÆOLOGICAL EXCAVATIONS IN SYRIA BETWEEN THE TWO WARS

By COMMANDANT C. F. A. SCHAEFFER

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on June 10, 1942, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, We welcome to-day Commandant Schaeffer of the Free French, our very good friend. The excavations at Ras Shamra, in which he took so prominent a part, have been the source of a great wealth of material of various kinds, and more particularly the tri-lingual tablets, the discovery of which is of the greatest importance and helped us in our study of Near Eastern philology. The various material which was discovered comprised also Egyptian and Minoan finds, and threw a very considerable light on the very extensive trading operations of the ancient world and also their cultural interchange.

We thought very often in the past that the Bible history of the time of Abraham was so far away, but the curtain which has been unrolled by Commandant Schaeffer and his fellow-archæologists has brought quite close to us the history of one of the most interesting countries in the whole world.

To-day is one of remarkable coincidence, because the last time that we had the honour and the pleasure of welcoming the Free French to our Society was the occasion on which the Free French forces in Libya had so greatly distinguished themselves by the capture of the Kufra Oasis. To-day is even more historical because it coincides with the occasion on which the news has come that the Free French, defending the post of Hakeim in Libya, have for the sixth time repulsed the attacks of Rommel and his tanks. (Applause.) It shows that those soldierly virtues of courage, endurance, professional skill, and what we call in the Scout world "stickability," are as prominent in the Frenchmen of to-day as they were in their forbears.

I have great pleasure in introducing to you Commandant Schaeffer.

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—Some weeks ago, when I was invited by Sir John Shea to speak to you of the French excavations in Syria, I hesitated for a moment to accept this honour. In the midst of this gigantic struggle it seemed strange to me to return in thought to the archæological research which was my preoccupation and my passion in time of peace.

Then I accepted, for the kind invitation of the Royal Central Asian Society offered me an opportunity to remind you of an aspect of the scientific activity of my country, France, to-day overwhelmed, frequently suspect, and of which it is good to speak with affection and confidence.

I accepted also for the reason that it is possible for me to recall here the scientific work of a friend who, having rallied to the Free French cause, was called upon to sacrifice his life for it. To be able to include a summary of the late Commander Joseph Hackin's work, I enlarged the subject of this lecture, originally confined to my own excavations at Ras Shamra in Northern Syria. So I shall make a short survey of some of the principal excavations in the Near and Middle East undertaken by French expeditions in the interval between the two wars—that is to say, in the interval between 1919 and 1939.

I should like to add immediately that these researches were not undertaken at the caprice of accidental discoveries of ancient sites. On the

contrary, they correspond to a preconceived plan deriving from that strong, imperative desire in the French character—the desire constantly to expand the limits of human knowledge. For knowledge is the basis of progress; it is the primary condition for the betterment of human existence. Never at any moment of its national life has France abandoned the desire to know more and to know better. The constancy of this desire is manifest in all the domains of French science, in that of pure thought, as in that of experimental science. We may take for example to-day, and as the subject of this lecture, French archæological activity.

When Bonaparte undertook his expedition to Egypt, his army was accompanied by a group of learned men—engineers, historians, archæologists and geographers. While military operations were in full swing they set themselves to study the possibilities of controlling the course of the Nile, thus fulfilling the dream of the ancient Egyptians to transform the destructive floods into fertilizing streams. At the same time they drew up the first maps of that mighty valley, measured and put on record its incomparable monuments. They also taught the natives to respect these witnesses of their glorious history and to preserve them for generations to come. Thus, in the very midst of war, Egyptology was born.

What Bonaparte and his Committee of learned men accomplished in Egypt, France was again to accomplish when, in 1860, she disembarked her troops on the Syrian coast in order to uphold the Christian Arabs. While the expeditionary forces advanced towards the interior, a scientific mission under the direction of Ernest Renan set about excavating the ancient sites on the coast.

Returning with the army to France, they brought back, with other archæological and epigraphical documents, the first Phœnician inscriptions. They permitted the founding of a new department of the human sciences, Semitology. At the same time they directed into more fruitful ways the critical study of the Old Testament.

About twenty years ago, in 1919, when the victorious Allies had entrusted the Mandate of Syria to France, my country, though bled white on the battlefields, and in spite of its financial exhaustion, did not hesitate immediately to resume its scientific work in the East. The task which France undertook as mandatory power, of welding into a nation various populations divided by religious antagonisms and impoverished by a deficient economy, was to necessitate her presence in Syria for twenty years. Consequently my country this time set herself a more ambitious scientific programme. She organized several simultaneous expeditions, which she despatched throughout that vast country and beyond its boundaries.

On the map are indicated the principal prehistoric and early historical sites in which France, from 1920 onwards, had initiated excavations, or on which, as at Susa, research has been resumed with increased activity. I should like to take you now on a rapid visit to some of these sites, following the geographical order, from east to west.

In Afghanistan, where the prestige of her archæologists had won for France the exclusive privilege of excavation, Joseph Hackin, Director of the Guimet Museum, had been given the responsibility of exploring various ancient towns. It was the site at Begram which eventually retained

his attention. Situated about forty miles north of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and sixty miles from the Indian frontier, Begram was the principal town of a province in the Kushan Empire.

This empire, during the first centuries of our era, formed a link between the Western world, at that time under the domination of the Roman Empire, and the East—India and China. It was at Begram, the ancient Kapisi, that the products of Roman trade mingled with the wealth brought from the Indus valley and the Far East. There Hellenic and Roman art met the art of India and China. What an opportunity for the students of comparative art! What possibilities of solving the complicated problems



of chronology, or of retracing the commercial currents and ethnical movements of the first centuries of our era!

(Here the lecturer showed a slide of a little plaster plaque found by Hackin at Begram, depicting a young man, hero or god, in the best traditions of Hellenic art; also another plaque, where the realism of the portrait recalled the art of the Roman medallists. At Begram, far from the centres of the antique world, the figures of divinities sometimes revealed a curious syncretism, combining the most diverse of divine attributes. Thus a statue of Hercules, characterized by his club, showed him wearing the *modius*, the head-dress peculiar to Serapis, god of the dead. Another slide, showing a seated warrior with a Gaulish moustache, was

one of the finest bronzes found at Begram. The appearance in the Hellenistic world of these European conquerors shocked and amazed the Ancients. The sculptors of that time, notably in Asia Minor, depicted with predilection these well-proportioned barbarians, who eventually—that is to say, after some 1,500 years—turned out to be the French of to-day. Among the products of Asiatic art represented at Begram, the most beautiful found by Hackin were small ivory plaques, samples of which were shown on the screen. Their style recalled the sculptures of certain Buddhist sanctuaries in India.)

The few objects I have very rapidly shown you are only samples, chosen more or less at random, of the mass of finds due to the research of Hackin. We must wait for the publication of his manuscripts in order to appreciate the full importance of his last discoveries at Begram. Hackin, alas! is no longer among us. With Madame Hackin he was lost at sea when the ship which was taking him back to the East on a mission for Free France was torpedoed. It will be the privilege of the French scientific institutions, on which Hackin's mission depended—the Academy of Inscriptions and the Museum of the Louvre—to publish, after the war, the last volume dealing with the excavations at Begram. The manuscripts and documents brought back from Afghanistan by Hackin, at present in this country, will one day be returned to France, for whom this deeply learned and disinterested man has nobly given his life.

I can only say a few words here of the excavations undertaken at Sialk and Susa in Persia by the Museum of the Louvre since 1934. At Susa, once the capital of Darius, it was, above all, the most ancient strata that held the attention of the French excavators, who worked under the direction of M. de Mecquenem. There they found some remarkable painted ceramics. Dating from the fourth millenary, these ceramics are characteristic of a civilization which flourished in the lower valley of the Euphrates and on the edges of the Persian plateau.

As the excavations at Sialk undertaken by Dr. Contenau and M. Guirshman have shown, the civilization of the plateau adopted the art which had developed in the valley. If one compares the mass of objects discovered at Sialk and those of Susa with a series of finds made on other sites—those formerly explored by de Morgan and more recently by Sir Leonard Woolley and Mr. Mallowan in the Euphrates and Khabur valleys—the comparison makes it possible to study the evolution of those first groups of civilized men in the Near East. The rhythm of their growth and the causes of their decline are, on the whole, determined or influenced by the constant attraction exercised on the peoples of the plateau by the fertile valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris. A constant trickle of humanity infiltrated into these valleys, becoming a devastating flood in time of invasion or war.

As in our days, the major cause of human conflict then was the opposition between the natural conservatism of those in possession and the envy of the less fortunate. One has only to compare the spirit of the famous code of Hammourabi, found at Susa and dating from the nineteenth century before our era, now among the treasures of the Louvre, with the very recent Atlantic Charter, to observe that the removal of excessive inequali-

ties constitutes the primary attempt to create a really New Order in a peaceful world.

At Tell Harire, on the banks of the middle Euphrates, another French mission, sponsored by the Louvre Museum and led by André Parrot, discovered the capital of the ancient kingdom of Mari. Certain cuneiform texts of the third millenary, notably the famous Prisme of Oxford, had testified to the existence of this kingdom, but its situation was not known. It was revealed by the accidental find of a statue by some Bedouins, and saved from destruction by a French officer of the desert corps.

In the course of several seasons of excavations beginning in 1933 the expedition brought to light from under the desert sand a sanctuary going back to the period of Sumer, and a palace of the time of Hammourabi. In the sanctuary consecrated to Ishtar, goddess of fertility, several votive statues, of which certain are practically intact, were discovered. They reveal the powerful but somewhat massive style of Sumerian art; they date from the twenty-ninth and twenty-eighth centuries B.C.

The temple of Ishtar and its statues were destroyed by the kings of Akad, and the city seems to have been abandoned for some centuries. Towards 1900 B.C. the accession in Babylon of a powerful Semitic dynasty brought back to the country a strong political structure and material prosperity. At Mari a huge palace was constructed, testimony to the opulence of the local prince. Its plan shows more than two hundred rooms and courts. Cleared from the sand, the brick walls still stand almost ten feet high.

Proprietor of vast domains, the king of Mari had entertained in his palace a school for scribes, where young men, wishing to enter administration, could learn the art of writing the complicated cuneiform script. The brick benches on which the pupils sat are still there—as well as the little basins which contained the clay required to form the tablets which, to the dictation of the master, were covered with cuneiform signs in use at that epoch. Besides the bailiffs, who recorded the transactions in the granaries and stores of the palace, another class of scribes was entrusted with the correspondence of the king.

Towards 1800 B.C. Mari was utterly destroyed. The sand invaded that once brilliant city. Now its fallen and broken statues remain as silent witnesses of the vanity of all glory and all power.

It remains to me to speak of the excavations at Byblos and at Ras Shamra: the former, a little to the north of Beyrouth, undertaken by Professor Montet, of Strasbourg University, succeeded by M. Dunand; the latter, in the extreme north of Syria, undertaken by myself.

Byblos was one of the most ancient towns in Syria, from which, in the third millenary before our era, the famous cedar-wood was exported to Egypt. Having continued to be inhabited up to our time, the ancient city of Byblos has suffered by the construction of Roman monuments and later of modern houses. But beneath the Roman remains the levels contemporary with the Egyptian epoch have been reached. Many sculptures have been restored, including a bust of the Pharaoh Osorkon I. of the tenth century B.C. On a lower level the diggings, helped by the collapse of some cliffs, brought to light several funeral galleries. One of the caves con-

tained the tomb of an unnamed king of Byblos, a contemporary of the Pharaoh Amenemhet III. Among the funeral offerings were Egyptian jewels of gold, and several objects of obsidian studded with gold, which bear hieroglyphic inscriptions recording that they were sent as a gift from the Pharaoh to the king of Byblos around 1800 B.C.

The second cave was obstructed by an enormous stone sarcophagus, which is engraved with a funeral scene in honour of the deceased king. The tomb was that of Ahiram, a contemporary of Rameses II., thus of the thirteenth century B.C. He is seen seated on his throne, a little table before him laden with fruit and other gifts, while a servant is engaged in chasing away the inevitable flies. The interest of the discovery lies in the inscription engraved on the lid of the sarcophagus. It is in Phœnician script, revealing the oldest alphabetic writing known till that date—that is to say, up to the discoveries of Ras Shamra.

Carried out under the auspices of the Academy of Inscriptions, the Museum of the Louvre and the French National Centre of Scientific Research, the excavations of Ras Shamra were begun in 1929. They continued during twelve campaigns until 1939, being then interrupted by the approaching war. Their purpose was the exploration of the capital of Canaanite Syria. Known in ancient times as Ugarit, this Bronze Age city is often mentioned in Egyptian, Babylonian and Hittite records of the second millenary B.C. The kingdom of Ugarit extended from the northern coast of Syria to the edge of the desert. But if its territory was relatively small, Ugarit, owing to its geographical position, soon became one of the important cities of the ancient East.

The town occupied a key position at the point of contact between the influences of Egypt, Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. Situated exactly opposite the extreme point of the island of Cyprus, Ugarit also controlled the then vital Cypriot copper trade. In the course of excavations undertaken in the island during 1934 and 1935, I was able, near Famagousta, to locate and partially investigate the Cypriot harbour town from which copper, in the form of ore, was shipped to Ras Shamra-Ugarit. In addition to the advantages due to its geographical position, Ugarit possessed the best natural harbour in Northern Syria. Thus Ugarit could not fail to attract the attention of the Cretans, who, as you know, then controlled the sea trade of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Egypt of the Middle Empire, in its turn, intervened at Ugarit. Among the many Egyptian sculptures of the Middle Empire discovered at Ras Shamra, representing gifts to the kings of Ugarit, there was a statuette of a priest, and a charming female torso with the breasts and navel once adorned with gold. Another monument which throws light on the relations between the kingdom of Ugarit and Egypt at the beginning of the second millenary is the statuette of the Egyptian ambassador, Senousrit Ankh, and his wife, Sataman. The statuette is mutilated, but from the inscription which has remained we learn that the ambassador, formerly a member of the High Court of Justice, had received from the Pharaoh rewards in gold and great distinctions. The inscription discreetly alludes—almost in a Foreign Office style—to certain advantages granted to Egypt by the local king.

In the sixteenth century B.C., when the energetic Pharaohs of the New Kingdom decided to subdue the dissident Syrian countries by military intervention, Ugarit, the main port, became the base of operations in the north.

This port to-day is a lovely bay called Minet-el-Beida by the Arabs, where we excavated the harbour town of Ugarit with its warehouses and shops. One of the latter belonged to a wine merchant and contained eighty jars still in place, just as the merchant of Ugarit had stored them in his cellar some thirty-four centuries ago.

A flourishing industry at Ugarit was the fabrication of cosmetics and perfumed oils. They were destined for exportation, especially to Egypt. This explains why the jars in which they were sold flatter Egyptian taste. In the shop which contained these vases we also found several ivory boxes in the shape of water-birds or of circular form. They had contained red- and blue-coloured cosmetics, traces of which remained.

Another highly perfected art of Ugarit was ivory carving. The precious material did not need to be imported, for in the middle of the fifteenth century B.C. herds of wild elephant still roamed the Syrian steppes. The most beautiful ivory object found at Ras Shamra-Ugarit was a relief depicting the goddess of fertility, flanked by two goats. In spite of the strong Ægean influence shown in the costume of the goddess, the relief was certainly carved at Ugarit; the opulence of the goddess betrays oriental taste.

We found at Ugarit a great number of huge funeral caves. The richness of the furniture and the imposing architecture had at first led us to believe that they were royal tombs. In reality they were the family burial caves built by the rich merchants of Ugarit in the basements of their own houses, according to an old Mesopotamian tradition.

The above-mentioned discoveries all come from the harbour town. Our excavations on the nearby *tel*, or artificial mound, of Ras Shamra increased our finds. All the aspects of life at Ugarit in the second millenary are illustrated by them. At the centre of the city lay the great sanctuaries of Ugarit, one dedicated to the god Dagon, the other to Baal, his son. The most popular of the many divinities of Ugarit, Baal is a god of the atmosphere and the mountains, a combative god. He is represented, according to Ugaritian iconography, helmeted and armed, holding his lance with the point on the earth and the shaft ending in a stylized shrub. For Baal, it was believed, also commanded the clouds, and the rain on which these Syrian lands depend for their crops.

Near the temple of Baal we found the residence of the high priest of Ugarit, who also preserved the archives of the temple and directed a school. Here the young priests studied the religious literature and the mythology of the period, written in cuneiform on big tablets of clay. The discovery of this library of cuneiform texts, mostly written in an alphabetic script, unknown till then, revealed to us the Canaanite religious traditions, which were believed to be irretrievably lost. Their importance for exegetical study is considerable; indeed, it was these Canaanite traditions that largely inspired the biblical authors of the Old Testament.

After ten campaigns of excavation, in 1938 two important discoveries

were yet to be made at Ras Shamra—namely, the discovery of the palace and that of the diplomatic archives, which in a centre politically so important as Ugarit promised a rich harvest of historical information. Such were the objectives of my last campaign, of which it now remains to me to say a few words.

I attacked the eastern side of the huge *tel* with a total of 250 men, divided into two squads. At a depth of about a metre, to our great joy, the walls of buildings began to appear. The quality of the masonry, and, above all, the astonishing perfection of the hydraulic installations with which the buildings were furnished, permitted us to hope that we had discovered the official quarters of the capital. We found a drain for carrying off waste water from a nearby bathroom. The drain ran through the wall and emptied itself into the main sewer dug out under the street. To avoid the choking of the system, the openings of all the drains were covered with sheets of perforated lead. According to a text found in one of the rooms, the first building brought to light was the residence of a high official of the court, named Gilbeen, the Queen's Chamberlain.

Immediately beside the residence of Gilbeen we uncovered the royal stables, with a huge central hall. On the paving of the hall we found remains of harness and bronze bits. There were also the cribs, raised along the wall, and near by, let into the paving, a trough for watering the horses. As a matter of fact, the breeding of horses and their training for hunting or for war was one of the most flourishing occupations at Ugarit, the monopoly of which was reserved to the king.

We found a portrait of the king himself, standing in a chariot drawn by two of his stallions in pursuit of wild oxen, as engraved on a golden *patera* twelve inches in diameter. This is one of the best pieces of goldwork of the ancient East to be found at Ras Shamra, and is now in the museum of the Louvre. The rendering is most artistic and full of life. The king, followed by a hunting dog, is pointing his arrow at a gazelle, which gracefully leaps away in front of him. A powerful bull is protecting the retreat of a cow followed by her calf, while another bull takes the offensive and charges the royal chariot from behind. The central motive shows four ibex, their horns serving to form the umbilicus. They follow each other closely, so as to contribute to the impression of rotary motion which the artist aimed at conveying to the spectator.

Continuing our search to the south of the royal stables, we brought to light the residence of the military governor of Ugarit. According to a cuneiform letter found in the building, he was a son of the king of Beyrouth. In another room we had the joy of finding the beautiful battle-axe of that prince. Its bronze socket is encrusted with gold thread and decorated with a boar in high relief. The blade is of iron. Found in a layer contemporary with the fifteenth century B.C., it is, in fact, one of the oldest iron weapons at present known, being nearly a hundred years older than the beautiful iron dagger found in the tomb of Tut Ankh Ahmen.

The residence of the governor of Ugarit contained also the military arsenal. A unique document was discovered here. It is a large tablet, its hundred and thirty lines in cuneiform still covered with chalk, but, after cleaning, perfectly decipherable. The document is a register of part of the

armed forces of Ugarit, and lists the names of the officers and men. Beside each name is recorded the kind of weapon with which they have been provided; generally slings or bows.

In a wing of the arsenal we found a quantity of arrow-heads, and bronze plaques which were sewn on to the shirts to protect the soldiers. Compared with the highly perfected arms invented in our age, these weapons seem strangely inoffensive, but handled with skill they were no less deadly and effective. This is illustrated by a skeleton found in the tomb of a soldier of Ugarit. His spine had been pierced by a bronze arrow. The missile pierced the neck at the level of the collar-bone, passed through the lungs, and finally lodged itself between the fourth and fifth vertebræ, causing certain and probably instantaneous death.

The residence of the military governor was buttressed on the south by a defence work of exceptional proportions. It consists of a slope covered with a heavy carapace of stones and square watch-towers. Screened by the tower, a gate pierced the slope and led by a vaulted corridor to the interior of the fortress. This fortified work was destined to protect the palace, of which we were to find the walls at the very end of our excavations.

The palace proper remains to be unearthed. But the first entry which we have brought to light indicates by its dimensions and its columns, standing on foundations of massive bronze, that the building must have been superb.

But still more than the discovery of the palace, the find which filled us with joy was that of the royal archives. Discovered at Ras Shamra before the last campaign, a stele confirmed to us the existence of diplomatic archives at Ugarit. This stele represented the king of Ugarit and some allied monarch in the act of exchanging a vow above a table, on which are placed two sets of documents, which are obviously copies of a treaty or some other diplomatic instrument. Well, we did at last find these archives. They were lodged in several rooms in a subsidiary building of the palace. Sixty documents or so were unearthed in the course of a few days. Written in Babylonian or in cuneiform alphabet, these tablets form part of the economic documents of the kingdom of Ugarit. They consist mostly of registers of taxes and lists of towns with their contributions to the royal army. We also found specimens of royal letters, some of it touchingly intimate, and finally correspondence with foreign kings.

The deciphering and the historic exploitation of these documents has not yet begun. And then other texts, probably the greatest part of the archives of Ugarit, are still buried in the great mound of Ras Shamra.

It was hard to stop in the middle of these discoveries and to return to war-threatened Europe. But when, what a great man of this country calls " our job " has been completed, and when France and Europe are again liberated, then we hope to be able to return to Ras Shamra to continue our excavation of the palace of Ugarit and to make new discoveries. (Applause.)

Sir Frederic Kenyon: I hope everybody realizes the really very great importance of this work at Ras Shamra. It is not merely that it is one of

the sites in Northern Syria which has helped to clear up the history of a very blank part of the map. We knew something of the history of Palestine and Syria from Egypt on the one side and Babylonia on the other, and not so very long ago, within my own memory, the existence and greatness of the Hittite Empire in the northern part of Asia Minor was established. But there was a large space left in Northern Syria, and it is only comparatively lately that we have begun to realize its importance for clearing up the history of what we now call the Middle East.

There are several sites which have contributed to that, but none so greatly as that of Ras Shamra. Part of its importance, a great part of it, is due to the fact that Commandant Schaeffer had the very great good fortune, near the beginning of his work, to find a library. There are other sites on which archives have been found, such as that which he found towards the end of his exploration, but there are very few libraries—that is, collections of literature as distinct from official and business documents—yet discovered, and in the library at Ugarit Commander Schaeffer has discovered a library far older than the celebrated libraries which Layard found at Nineveh, and containing the literature of the Canaanites at a time of extreme importance for us, just about the period when the Hebrews were entering Palestine to the south. That literature includes hymns and legends of the gods, and gives us a very clear picture of the religion of the Canaanites at the time of the arrival of the Hebrews in Palestine.

We find there the supreme god El, whose name is the same as the El or Elohim of Genesis, and Baal as the principal deity of the people. That Baal is the Baal whom we know in the Old Testament, but we have hitherto known him only from the point of view of the Hebrew prophets and historians, to whom the religion of Baal was the accursed thing which had to be denounced on all occasions. Now we see it from the point of view of his own people and his own worshippers, and while we find that the religion of the Canaanites was a polytheistic one, with some features which we regard as not dignified, not particularly religious, we find also features of a dignity and an elevation portrayed in it of which we have had no knowledge before.

Some people have said that we have in these tablets a representation of the actual religion of the Israelites themselves in the early centuries of their history. I do not myself see that there is any evidence of that at all. What it is is the religion of the people among whom the Hebrews came and settled, and by which they were influenced—if you like, corrupted. But it gives us a great deal of the background and the setting of the Old Testament story, which has previously been unknown to us. I do not want to take up time, but I have dwelt upon this particular feature because Commandant Schaeffer had not time to do more than allude to it quite briefly. But it is one of the things which make his discovery a really epoch-making discovery in the history of those lands, comparable to the finds of Layard and others at Nineveh, or of Schliemann at Troy, or of Evans in Crete.

I am glad to be the first to be able to offer our thanks to Commandant Schaeffer for the very clear description he has given to us of them, and to

express the hope that it will not be very long before he is able to go back and continue these very fruitful researches.

Monsieur BONNEAU spoke in French of the work done by Commander Joseph Hackin in his researches, and of the loss which the scientific world had sustained by his death. Commander Hackin's life and work formed a subject too vast to be described in the few minutes at his disposal, but he gave a brief description of his daily work with the people of that region.

The CHAIRMAN: We have followed with very profound and deep interest the course where the culture of France has led her, as the lecturer said, to know more and to know better. We feel with him that the discoveries that have been made will surely always be placed to the credit of that great country. We have deplored with him the untimely death of that great archæologist, Joseph Hackin. We have followed very closely and with deep interest all his own personal experiences at Ras Shamra, and we owe a great debt to Sir Frederic for having explained to us so clearly and so well the very great importance of Commandant Schaeffer's discoveries, which he was too modest to stress himself.

May I say, sir, that we are most deeply indebted to you for your most interesting and instructive lecture. (Applause.) May I say, too, that if ever you have the time at your disposal to come and talk to us again, you will be welcomed, not only as a great archæologist, but as our own friend.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TROPICAL FAR EAST

By J. S. FURNIVALL

A meeting of the Society was held on May 6, 1942, the Right Hon. Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., in the Chair.

In introducing the speaker, the CHAIRMAN said: I would like to welcome on your behalf Mr. Furnivall, who after some twenty years' service in Burma has retired and given himself largely to the study of economic questions in the Far East. I have had the pleasure of reviewing his book on the Netherlands East Indies. A knowledge of development in the Dutch colonies is of fundamental importance to all students of colonial affairs. Mr. Furnivall's work deserves the most careful study; the reader will obtain from it a much clearer impression of the modern situation and modern economics of the Dutch Netherlands East Indies than from any other source I know.

YOU have kindly asked me to talk to you this afternoon about the Tropical Far East—the region extending from Burma through Thailand (Siam) and French Indo-China to the Philippines, and from Formosa in the north to Netherlands India in the south. That is a wide survey. In Netherlands India alone there are over 200 peoples speaking different tongues, and in Burma nearly 150; altogether there must be well over a thousand peoples, and if I am to deal with all of them I can allow no more than about two seconds to each. Obviously the task would be impossible if there were not something common to all these countries, and it is only because they have, in my opinion, a fundamental similarity that I have ventured on so wide a theme. That common link, I would suggest, may be found in the political and economic structure of their society; in other words, in their political economy. The term "political economy" is out of fashion; nowadays one talks of economics. But it is so far out of fashion that we can perhaps use it in a new sense, or rather in the original sense. I quite agree that certain economic principles are independent of social and political forms, yet, when dealing with the wealth of certain nations rather than with general principles, it would seem well to insist that their political economy is what concerns us, and I know no other term so apt.

The theme is wide, and I would like therefore to define somewhat closely the general purpose of this paper. First, I wish to establish that, common to all these countries of the Tropical Far East, there is a distinctive form of society with a characteristic political and economic constitution—a characteristic political economy; then, to trace the evolution and essential properties of this economy; and, finally, and very briefly, to examine its bearing on some urgent problems. But I must deal with the whole theme very briefly. It provides material for a course of lectures rather than a single lecture. I can attempt no more than a bare anatomy; I hope you will clothe it with substance and be kind enough to piece out my imperfections with your thoughts.

Social Constitution

The outstanding feature of the social constitution of the Tropical Far East is that everywhere Western Powers have come to exercise dominion over Eastern peoples, or, at least, as in Thailand, a large measure of economic control. I propose to examine first the native element, then the Western element, and then the effect of contact between East and West.

(*a*) *The Native Element.*—Over the whole region there is a similarity of tropical climate; the common racial stock is Indonesian, overlaid with Mongol elements; and rice and fish are the staple foods. Under native rule the basis of the social order was the family, supporting itself by domestic agriculture, and living in a small hamlet where most of the people were akin; the land was a family affair, and the women played a larger part in family affairs than in either India or China. Above the hamlet social relations were personal, based on the matrilineal or patrilineal stem rather than on the village; the political organization was genealogical rather than geographical, tribal rather than territorial.

From the beginning of the Christian era this common pattern of social life was enriched, except in the remoter tracts, by strands of culture from the ancient civilizations of India and China, and everywhere it followed a similar course of evolution. In general, the main lines of political development seem to have been due to the influence of Indian colonists, who for many centuries were founding settlements all along the coast from Burma to Annam and also in the archipelago. In all the more advanced societies there evolved a dual political organization, comprising distinct central and local elements. The central administrative system was purely official, radiating out from the person of the ruler. This was linked up with the people through a local organization in which an hereditary official was at once a servant of the central government and a chieftain among his own people. That was the typical system of administration everywhere, and it lasted up to, and for some time after, the introduction of Western rule.

Despite, however, the strong Indian influence, not on political organization only but on religion and general culture, there are certain features of Indian life that everywhere were obstinately rejected. Everywhere the women have great freedom; in Java, where three centuries of Islam have succeeded a thousand years or more of Hinduism, the women are freer in some ways than in Buddhist Burma. Everywhere the people rejected the central institution of Hinduism—caste; even in Bali, which is Hindu to the present day, the caste system is merely nominal. And everywhere the people held to their own traditions of land tenure; even where Indian influence worked so strongly as in Java it is still possible to recognize the general characters of Indonesian land tenure, and the main features of Indonesian tenures are exactly described in the technical terms of land tenure in Burma. The social organization was not, as in India, built on caste and land, but on personal relations, often—though inaccurately—termed quasi-feudal. It would be easy to site many other features common to the whole region in letters, architecture, sculpture, music, drama, but we may pass over these more superficial characters; the status of women,

land tenure, and class relations go to the root of social life, and the resemblance in these matters argues sufficiently a fundamental similarity.

One matter deserves close attention: the preference for personal relations rather than caste as the basis of social organization. This had grave consequences. In India, caste has to some extent protected the Hindu social system against the solvent influence of Western individualism; in the Tropical Far East, society has no such protection. Again, with a social organization based on personal relations, differences of race or religion tended to give society a plural character, reflected in its political constitution. Everywhere social and political relations were personal, not legal, and authority was personal, based on will and not on law. King and people had privileges and duties, resting on custom and sanctioned by religion; but no one had any legal rights and there were no legal restrictions on obligations; both person and property, land and people, were equally at the disposal of the ruler. The whole social organization rested on religion, personal custom, and duties. That, in brief, was the general character of the Tropical Far East on its first contact with the West in the morning of the modern world.

(*b*) *The Western Element.*—It is, I suppose, superfluous to argue that the Western Powers which have come to exercise dominion in the Tropical Far East likewise had a fundamental unity. I do not suggest that Portuguese and Spaniard, Dutch, English, French, and American are all alike. All had their distinctive national character which was an invisible export on every ship from Europe. Saigon, Batavia, Rangoon, though all Western towns in Eastern lands, are as different as French, Dutch, and English. Similarly, each ruling Power has stamped its own imprint on its system of administration in the tropics. But the West has—or had—much in common in a civilization derived from Greece and Rome under the vitalizing force of Christianity. On its first contact with the East, the rebirth of reason had newly liberated fresh sources of material power by the rationalization of economic life; from that time onwards there has been a growing tendency to base economic relations on reason, impersonal law, and rights. This much the West has had in common, despite national diversity.

(*c*) *The Effect of Contact.*—Wherever a Western Power has gained dominion in the Tropical Far East, or even, as in Thailand, has gained a large measure of economic control without actual political sovereignty, contact has been established between these two contrary principles of social life: between the Eastern system, resting on religion, personal custom, and duties, and the Western system, resting on reason, impersonal law, and rights. Contact has been established with different objects and in different ways, but everywhere with very similar results.

The mode of contact has been determined by the Western Powers, mainly with reference to their economic advantage. But the conception of economic advantage has changed with time and circumstances. Two alternative lines of policy were open: one was to build on the Eastern principle of authority or will, the other was to substitute the Western principle of law. The Dutch, in the days of the Company and later under the Culture System, aimed at tribute chiefly in the form of export

crops. They could obtain these only by help of the native chieftains, and this required a system of indirect rule based on the Eastern principle of personal authority. The British, after the Industrial Revolution, aimed at trade, at selling British manufactures. They could sell them only if the cultivators had money to spend on British goods; it was to their interest, therefore, to substitute paid service for compulsion, to leave the cultivator free to grow what paid him best, and to encourage the use of money both in commerce and taxation. The native chieftains were no longer required as agents of compulsion, and the exercise of their authority on Eastern lines prejudiced the new Western system of economic freedom and the rule of law; they were not only useless but a hindrance, and, during the nineteenth century, direct rule came to be accepted as the normal type of colonial government. But, towards the end of the century, economic relations between East and West took a new turn; the West acquired a new interest in the production of tropical commodities—in rubber, oil, tin, and so on—and indirect rule once again came into favour under the style of the dual mandate.

Yet, in spite of this diversity of aims and of administrative systems, everywhere the result was pretty much the same. Everywhere the organic structure of Eastern society has been drained of vital force and, in place of it, there has been set up the complex economic and administrative machinery of the modern West. And everywhere this double process of disintegration and reconstruction has stamped the Tropical Far East with its most striking feature: a medley of various peoples—European, Chinese, Indian, and Native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, a mixture; for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways of life. As individuals they meet together; but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. Under native rule the social organization had a plural character; under Western rule it has been transformed into what may be termed a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side but separately within the same political unit. Everywhere in the Tropical Far East—under Spanish, Dutch, British, French, or American rule; among Filipinos, Annamese, Javanese, Malays, or Burmans; whether the objective of the ruling power has been tribute, trade, or production; under direct rule as under indirect—the outstanding and obvious result of contact between East and West has been the evolution of a plural society.

Evolution of the Plural Society

It should, I think, throw light on the nature of the plural society if we examine the circumstances of its evolution. It is important, in the first place, to notice that it has evolved and not been planned; only in a very small degree is it a product of design, but it has come about by the play of quasi-natural forces.

When Europeans took over the government in the Tropical Far East, whether they aimed at tribute or trade, they wanted to increase production; and Western intervention created a demand for certain forms of economic activity in which foreigners—Europeans, Chinese, Indians—

had advantages over the natives. Naturally, one may say, foreigners, attracted by the prospect of good money, came in to meet the demand. Let us look at one or two examples of the working of this process in Burma. Burma was conquered with troops from India, and, when the troops first occupied the country, there was a demand for roads and buildings. The engineers came with the troops from Madras; they did not know Burmese, and the Burmans did not know what was wanted. It was much less trouble to employ Indian contractors and coolies than to learn Burmese and train Burmans; also the Indian, with a lower standard of living, was cheaper in actual money than the Burman. Later, it was found still cheaper to import Indian convicts instead of coolies. There was only one urban occupation in which Burmans could compete with Indians; almost every Burman was literate, and it was much less trouble to teach Burmans how to print than to teach Indians Burmese, so that, up to the present day, much of the printing trade is in Burmese hands. Otherwise, in urban occupations, the Indian had an advantage over the Burman; on the other hand, the Burman had the advantage in cultivation. Thus, by the ordinary working of the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest, the Burman was pushed out into the rice land and the jungle, while the towns, in more direct contact with the modern world, were crowded with a medley of foreigners.

The course of events was similar throughout the Tropical Far East, and everywhere there is a division of labour along racial lines. The typical native is a cultivator or a clerk; the Chinaman or Indian is an artisan or else, as money-lender, broker, or retailer, acts as middleman between the native and the European capitalist. Even within the major groups there are subsections with particular functions. Wherever Indians are numerous, one class will be engaged in money-lending, another in coffee shops, another in tailoring, one or more distinct classes in the police, and even among the coolies some classes specialize on earthwork, others as coolies in the mills. That is not merely an expansion of Indian caste tradition, for among the Chinese one finds a similar correlation between class and function. It has come about merely through the economic process of the survival of the cheapest. That is at work always, everywhere, and in many respects there is nothing unusual in the conditions of the Tropical Far East. At different times America, Africa, Australia have been flooded with immigrants, and among these immigrants there has been a tendency towards a racial differentiation of function. But elsewhere immigration has been brought under control; where it was of such a character, or on such a scale, that the immigrants could not by appropriate measures be absorbed into the general community it has been restricted or stopped. Thus it is no sufficient explanation of the plural society in the Tropical Far East to say that it has come into existence by the working of economic forces; we must examine why these forces were not controlled. The course of social evolution will, I think, suggest an answer.

Native rule was, on the whole, the kind of government that the people liked, and did what they wanted in a way they understood. It was neither very strong nor very stable, but it stood on its own feet, deriving

its authority from its subjects, and was an organic expression of native social life that lived in virtue of its inherent vitality. But it did not do what Europeans wanted, and, to get what they wanted, they had to take over the government. In the first instance, they tried to get what they wanted through native chieftains who would comply with their requirements. Outwardly there seemed little change; but, in fact, the whole native political organization was subverted; the chieftains no longer stood on their own feet deriving their authority from below, but hung down from above, deriving their authority from their European overlords. That in itself drained the vitality of native social life. But the process did not stop there. It was not sufficient for Europeans to get what they wanted; they wanted to get it in their own way, and only in their own way could they get all they wanted. Often the units of native rule were illogical, inconvenient. It is absurd, for example, to have one county the size of Yorkshire and another the size of Rutland. Efficiency, common sense, still more, economy, demanded uniformity, and the territorial limits of traditional organic communities were readjusted to suit administrative convenience. Moreover, the system of governing through native chieftains had its disadvantages; and, either alongside, or in place of, the hereditary chieftains, a new administrative system was built up on Western lines. Thus, by degrees, but more or less completely, the whole edifice of native society collapsed, leaving no organic unit higher than the village. That was the first, or political, stage in the disintegration of society: the country was broken up into villages. Above the village there was a vast Western superstructure of administrative and economic machinery, continually growing more elaborate. It gave, on the whole, the kind of government that Europeans liked, and did what they wanted in a way they understood. But it did not do what the natives wanted or work in a way they understood; it had no roots in the soil of native life.

This process of political disintegration, the break-up of the organic social structure into isolated villages, led further to a process of social dissolution, the break-up of the village into individuals. This also was due in part to quasi-rational principles of administration. At very much the same time, and for very similar reasons, the Dutch in Java and the British in Burma were readjusting village boundaries to promote administrative efficiency. In both countries efficiency declined and the policy was reversed, but the attempt to put Humpty Dumpty together again had very little success. It is easy to cut down a tree; time and nature are required for it to grow. But that is only one example of the manner in which the village was converted from an organic unit of society into an instrument of foreign rule; sometimes merely for administrative convenience in the collection of revenue or the suppression of crime, sometimes with the best intentions of enhancing welfare, but with no less deplorable results.

But at the same time that the village was being tinkered with from outside, corporate life within the village was being sapped by the victory of individual demand over social demand. Perhaps I should explain what I mean by the term "social demand." One might perhaps define it as the economic aspect of social will. Take, for example, sanitation.

If any town or village in England wants better sanitation, it can spend more on conservancy, either by putting a farthing on the rates or by spending less on roads or street lighting. There is a collective demand that the economist can measure with his supply and demand curves and schedules. Between collective and individual demand there is a conflict, and at periodical elections people can decide whether they would rather have better conservancy or more money in their pocket. Collective demand is only one form of social demand. In the East, social demand often reserves a patch of jungle close to the village as a public convenience; it would cost less to cut fuel there rather than further off, but social demand, enforced by village custom, forbids; or one might say rather that the idea of cutting fuel there does not occur to anyone.

Not so very long ago these primitive arrangements sufficed, or were suffered, in Rangoon. But timber was scarce, fuel was costly, in a mixed population there was no barrier of public opinion, and it occurred to someone that a valuable source of fuel was being left unworked; individual demand prevailed over social demand and the scrub jungle began to disappear. Some Europeans thought they had suffered long enough and agitated for modern sanitation. After long consideration of various costly schemes, the Commissioner passed orders that no one should cut fuel near the town. But law is no substitute for social demand. The orders were ineffective, and before long improved conservancy arrangements had to be introduced. But because a social demand for them has not been fostered they are costly and unsatisfactory.

Let me take one more instance of the failure of social demand. So far as I know, there is no law against the use of rickshaws in England. It is not necessary. Rickshaws might be cheaper than taxis, but we would rather walk than use them. The individual demand for cheap conveyances is overborne by the social demand for human decency. When I first went out to the East there were no rickshaws in Burma or in Java. Now there are hundreds of them in Rangoon, drawn by Madrasi coolies. A rickshaw is a flimsy thing, but, apparently, it lives longer than a rickshaw coolie. The life of a rickshaw coolie is put at four to five years—unless it is cut short when he jerks like a snipe in front of an approaching motor-car. He is, in fact, a nuisance to car owners, and many Europeans in Rangoon, partly on humanitarian grounds, would gladly see rickshaws abolished. But they are owned by Chinamen, used by Burmans, and drawn by Indians. Even in the old days, when Government could tread on people's toes with fewer apologies, any proposal to abolish rickshaws would have raised a hubbub in the press. Now such a proposal is quite impracticable. All classes alike have an economic interest in the retention of rickshaws, but there is no common standard of social decency, no social demand that can be mobilized against them. One could not get rid of rickshaws from Rangoon. Yet there are none in Java. The Dutch, partly on political grounds—they wanted no more Chinamen—partly on humanitarian grounds—they disliked this method of reducing the surplus Javanese population—refused to admit the rickshaw. And one result is now one can travel all over Batavia in excellent native-driven taxis, even more cheaply than one can travel by rickshaw in Rangoon.

These are merely isolated instances of a process that has been acting everywhere and always, and I would like to discuss it in more general terms. In all human affairs, so far at least as they are rational, we can trace the working of one process—the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest. Ordinarily, everyone would pay twopence rather than threepence for the same thing; that is a matter of universal common sense, irrespective of race or creed. There may, in particular circumstances, be reasons to the contrary; people may willingly pay more for home products or for goods free of sweated labour. But such arguments rest on national or moral grounds and are valid only for people of the same nation or with the same moral standards; the economic process works without regard to such considerations. Within limits it is a powerful instrument of progress; but it tends to eliminate from human intercourse all values that are not purely material, and even in material affairs it responds only to immediate advantage. It seemed cheaper to employ Indian coolies and convicts on road-making in Burma, but twenty years later the Commissioner had to report that " there are no roads, canals, tanks, or other works in the interior," and even after a hundred years conditions in that part of the country were very much the same. It seemed cheaper to employ Indians (and, again, convicts) in the printing of English in Burma, but printing has remained so costly and unsatisfactory that even to-day much of the English printing and some of the Burmese printing is done in India. The cutting of fuel near Rangoon and the introduction of rickshaws exemplify the working of the economic process without regard to public health or human life, and in both cases the final result was unsatisfactory even on economic criteria. The economic process, unless controlled, leads finally not to progress but to degeneration.

In actual life the working of the economic process is controlled in one of two ways. One is by the operation of the economic motive, the desire for individual material advantage. But this, usually, is anti-social. Within recent years there have been many illustrations of control exercised in the interests of individuals. The justification alleged for the successive restrictions imposed on rubber, sugar, tin, and tea was that, if the industries were left uncontrolled, they would be ruined by "cut-throat competition." Such restrictions may conceivably be in the general interest, but they are not conceived in the general interest; their object, formally and directly, is to keep up prices in the interests of producers. Moreover, the economic motive, as such, disregards non-economic values, and is therefore in the long run an agent of degeneration. Powerful interests have been concerned to protect existing stocks of rubber, tin, oil, and sugar from the competition of additional supplies, but there have been no such interests at work to protect native society against the "cut-throat competition" of foreign immigrants, or to maintain moral standards against attrition by economic forces.

The other check on the economic process is social will, insisting that man does not live by bread alone. This restrains economic forces by appealing to some principle of social welfare transcending the domain of economics. Formerly in the Tropical Far East, when rule was based on

personal relations, the social will, taking effect through custom sanctioned by religion, provided adequately according to local standards for the general well-being; it reserved, for example, the patch of jungle that we have mentioned. But in protecting society against harmful change it tended to prevent *all* change, and became a barrier against economic progress. That is largely why these countries were unable to resist Western Powers, representing a social order based on more secure foundations, and able therefore to allow greater scope to reason in the direction of affairs. Western society could run the risk of individualism. But even in Western society economic forces are still controlled by social will.

This may be embodied in the form of law, or, as a collective demand, can be measured in the form of rates and taxes. But it also acts, as in the East, subconsciously, more often and more strongly than we are apt to recognize. It might, for instance, pay to start a rickshaw service in London, but, among other things, the social demand for decent life forbids; no one would even think of doing so, any more than formerly the oriental villager thought of encroaching on common land. But in the East, social demand has been unable to prevail against individual demand, and there has been no effective barrier against the working of the economic process. Everywhere economic forces, working through individual demand, tend to create a mixture of races; ordinarily these forces are kept under control by social demand. But in the Tropical Far East the social organization has broken down, individual demand has prevailed over social demand, economic forces have had free play, and the result is the plural society. Let us attempt, then, to analyse the distinctive characters, political and economic, of such a society.

Political Aspect.—Looking at the political aspect of a plural society, we find three characteristic features: taking the society as a whole, it comprises separate racial groups; taking each section as a whole, it is an aggregate of individuals rather than a corporate unit; and looking at each individual we see that his social life is incomplete. Let me briefly develop these three points. The social life of everyone is incomplete. The European, for example, looks at social problems in the East, political and economic, from the standpoint of a capitalist and employer of labour and not from the standpoint of a citizen. At the other extreme, the native, so far as political and economic problems impinge upon his consciousness, looks on them from the standpoint of the peasant. Under native rule the people lived within a narrow world, but they had the freedom of their world, and their cultural horizon was co-extensive with its limits; Western rule brought them into economic contact with a wider world, but closed down their horizon to the limits of their immediate interests as cultivators; in a wider world their life was narrower than before.

Again, each section or group is not a social unit but an aggregate of individuals. To Europeans this may be most obvious in the European section: people are continually on the move; there are no children in the home; the club and not the home is the centre of social life; and everyone looks forward, more or less eagerly, to returning "home." They work in the East but do not live there. In the other foreign groups conditions are very similar; among Indians, for example, caste loses its validity, and

census officers in Burma have found it impossible to compile useful returns of caste. And in all accounts of native society we read of the breakdown of corporate village life. In Indo-China, it has been said, there is nothing but the Government and twenty-three million individuals. The same is true, in greater or less degree, of all these countries.

Looking at the society as a whole, as a collocation of separate communities, the closest analogy is with a confederation of allied states, united by treaty or within the limits of a formal constitution, merely for certain common ends, but otherwise, in matters outside the terms of union, each living its own life. Yet there are notable points of difference. In a confederation the component elements are segregated each within its own territorial limits; there is contact between the states but not between individual members of different states; the union is voluntary and the terms of union are definite and limited; finally, if the yoke of union should become intolerable, a remedy is open in secession. But in a plural society the sections are not segregated; the members of the different sections are intermingled and meet as individuals; the union is not voluntary but imposed by the ruling power and the working of economic circumstances; and the union cannot be dissolved without the whole society relapsing into anarchy.

Like a confederation, a plural society is a business partnership rather than a family concern, and the social will common to all groups and holding them together is restricted to their common interests. It might seem that the common interest should be strong; for a dissolution of the partnership means the bankruptcy of all the partners. But it is strong only in so far as this common interest is recognized. The only example known to me of a stable plural society is Hindu society in India. Here, as in the Tropical Far East, separate groups or classes have come to exercise distinct economic functions. But in India, caste has a religious sanction in the Hindu religion; in the Tropical Far East, there is no immediate prospect of Europeans, Chinese, and others being turned into Hindus. There are castes without the cement of a religious sanction; few recognize that in fact they have common material interests, but most see that on many points their material interests are opposed, and on these points economic forces are always tending to create friction.

Economic Aspect.—Let us turn, then, to consider the plural society in its economic aspect; rather, perhaps one should say, in its economic aspects. For in economic affairs everything has two aspects, according as it is seen from the standpoint of the consumer or the standpoint of the producer.

The economic constitution naturally reflects the political constitution, and the defect of social will finds expression in the weakness of social demand. Social demand, like social will, is partial. The European demands cheap labour and cheap produce without regard to the welfare of the community as a whole; the native demands well-paid jobs without reference to efficiency. Neither can envisage social problems as a whole. Again, within each section individual demand prevails over social demand. And, thirdly, taking the society as a whole, there is no common standard of welfare, and therefore no social demand for general welfare.

If, on the other hand, we look at the plural society from the standpoint of production, we find that here also it has a distinctive character. Everywhere the working of economic forces makes for tension between groups with contrary economic interests: between town and country, industry and agriculture, capital and labour. But in the Tropical Far East this tension is aggravated by a corresponding cleavage along racial lines. Thus, not only are the relations between the sections confined to the economic sphere, but, even within that sphere, there is no common standard of conduct other than the standards that are prescribed by law. The European has his own standard of decency of what, even in business, "is not done"; so also has the Chinaman, the Indian, and the native. They all have their own ideas as to what is right and proper; but on most points they have different ideas. Yet they are all subject to the working of the economic process, and all, in greater or less degree, respond to the economic motive. Thus, in the plural society of the Tropical Far East the economic motive is the highest factor common to all groups, and tends to prevail in its crudest form. This is emphasized by Dr. Boeke, Professor of Tropical Economy in Leiden. In the East, he says, "there is materialism, rationalism, individualism, and a concentration on economic ends far more complete and absolute than in homogeneous Western lands; a total absorption in the exchange and market; a capitalist structure with the business concern as subject, far more typical of capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called 'capitalist' countries, which have grown slowly out of the past and are still bound to it by a hundred roots." He was speaking with especial reference to the European group, but his remarks are true of all sections, so far as they come into contact, directly or indirectly, with the economic forces newly liberated under Western rule. In the first half of the last century economists praised the Economic Man; during the latter half they explained that he did not exist. Unfortunately, they were mistaken. He was cast out of Europe, but found refuge in the East; now, I fear, we see him returning, with seven devils worse than himself.

This emphasis on the material aspect of life in the Tropical Far East has political reactions. For it is strongest in those sections that are most closely associated with capitalist interests. The native, on the other hand, is especially identified with labour. Hence the common tendency of capitalists to regard labour merely as an instrument of production encourages them to regard the native merely as an instrument of production. Native labour is ignorant and unorganized, economic forces are paramount, and the power which ordinarily accrues to capital through the working of economic forces is enhanced. Capital is far stronger in the Tropical Far East than in the West. And because the maintenance of capitalist control is, or seems to be and—this is important—is believed to be the peculiar interest of the ruling power, no remedy is possible except by dissociating political and capitalist control.

Here then, I suggest, are the essential features of the political economy of the Tropical Far East. There is a plural society in which, on the one hand, economic forces are more active than in Europe; and, on the other hand, demand is more feeble. Under native rule the social organization

was weak and unstable; the machinery of Western rule is stronger and—to outward view—more stable; but the organization of the community for social life has been transformed, more or less completely, into an economic system, organized like a factory for production. As Professor Boeke says, " there is a capitalist structure, with the business concern as subject." So long as the structure holds together it is stronger than the old social organization. But it can be held together only by external forces; without external support it must collapse and the whole system crumble into dust.

So far as this analysis is valid, it has, I venture to suggest, important consequences; it implies that in the Tropical Far East political and economic problems are quite different, different in kind, from those to which we are accustomed in the West. Here, in Europe, we can take social will for granted, and the central problem of applied political science is how best to ascertain and give effect to it; but in the Tropical Far East political science starts at an earlier stage, and the central problem is to organize a common social will. In the West we can take demand for granted, and the central problem of applied economic science is how best to organize supply; but in the Tropical Far East the central problem is to organize demand.

Current Problems.—These considerations may seem remote, academic, theoretical. Let me try very briefly to apply them to some problems due for solution, and long overdue. We may assume, perhaps, that the object of modern colonial policy is to make these countries of the Tropical Far East capable of independence; various formulas are used to describe—or disguise—the object, but all will be found on analysis to mean the same thing. It seems to be taken for granted that there are recognized stages on the path to independence: representative government, partly responsible government, and wholly responsible government. But this attractive programme shirks the difficulty inherent in the nature of a plural society. What is the representative government to represent—the people or foreign capital? And who constitutes the people? Are we to take into account only the natives, or should we include the foreign elements—European, Indian, and Chinese? On any system that involves the counting of heads the natives will usually have a majority of votes. But how far *can* interests in mines, plantations, commerce be entrusted to a majority representing people who know nothing of industry, commerce, and the modern world? And how far *will* such interests consent to such a plan? An orderly progress towards independence through recognized stages assumes a common social will; in a plural society with no common social will these " recognized stages " will mark only a disorderly progress towards anarchy. The plan has no relation to the facts.

Turn now to the economic problems. Everyone agrees that economic progress is desirable, that it needs technicians, and that native technicians will be cheapest. So the usual policy is to *supply* technicians—cautiously, expensively, and with great care not to create a surplus in excess of the demand. You will never do anything in that way. Create or organize a *demand* for technicians, and lads—and lasses—will tumble over one another to be trained. India is often cited as a horrible example of the

divorce between education and practical affairs. But it supplied the best instance that I know of successful vocational education. Nearly a hundred years ago the foundations of the modern educational system were laid down in the great Despatch of 1854. Among its recommendations was one for vocational instruction to remedy the lack of lawyers. Well, no one in India complains now of a lack of lawyers; not because we created a supply, but because we encouraged trade and therefore multiplied law courts, which created a demand for lawyers.

Or look at the other aspect of economic life, at welfare. It is generally assumed that instruction is an instrument of welfare. Yet, so long as Western education was merely an instrument of welfare, it spread very slowly in the East; teachers had to go out into the by-ways and hedges to get pupils. But as soon as it was realized that Western education might be profitable, there arose a demand for schools and teachers. And this demand created a supply. Or compare Java and Burma in respect of primary instruction. In Java the people do not want to have their children taught to read and the village schools can be filled only by "gentle pressure"; in Burma the people, already under native rule, as Buddhists, wanted their children to be taught, and in response to the demand there was a network of monastic schools over the whole country.

Here, then, is what I feel about many projects of Utopia in the Tropical Far East and elsewhere: that they have no relation to the facts. We do not arrive at the right answers because we do not ask the right questions. We are playing the old game of cross-questions and crooked answers. The examination candidate who does not answer the questions put to him is ploughed, however brilliantly he may write on things that the examiner does not want to know. We are now facing a practical examination in political economy, and unless we read the questions rightly we shall fail.

These, as I see it, are the questions: How can we organize a common social will? And how can we organize demand? There is a Burmese proverb, "The cattle herd can ask questions that the Buddha alone can answer." Prudence would confine me to the rôle of cattle herd, but I will be rash enough to make a few suggestions, venturing only to plead that even foolish suggestions have their use as leading by a process of exclusion to wise ones.

The plural society, I say, has the nature of a confederation. Let us aim first at turning it into a closer union, into a federal society, by multiplying and strengthening the links between the several groups. Take just one example. In Java the Government fostered a commercial textile industry among the natives. Thus, during the depression, the flood of Japanese imports threatened not only Dutch but native manufacturers; both had a common interest in protecting the local market. That is only one instance of what might be attempted towards building a federal society. Again, the depression, and subsequently the present war, did much in Netherlands India towards turning capitalists into nationalists. And the history of rubber suggests what might be done towards turning nationalists into capitalists. Along some such lines it might not be impossible to create a common social will embracing all the sections in a federal society, leading finally perhaps to a unified society.

The second problem is how to organize demand. Take, for example, the demand for technicians. Require all Western enterprises to take out licences, renewable only on condition of satisfactory progress in replacing management, staff and employees with men of local origin. For the more difficult task of organizing a demand for welfare we might get useful hints from Dutch practice and experience in the use of a civil service as social engineers and welfare officers.

All aspects of all these problems, however, require far greater knowledge than we now possess. We do not even know what we want to know. We need, then, some machinery by which all countries of the Tropical Far East could pool their knowledge and experience. This need might be met in part by constituting a local branch of a newly reconstituted League of Nations, in which all these countries, and the various interests and groups in all these countries, would be represented.

And the constitution of such a body should go far towards fostering goodwill, and would serve also as a guarantee of good faith. It might, I think, help to solve the problem of dissociating political and capitalist control.

Here, then, are just a few suggestions. I put them forward with great diffidence because what we need, next to goodwill, is knowledge; and that we can obtain only gradually and by general co-operation. I make them with even greater diffidence than when I was asked to deliver this address only a few weeks ago. Since then things have changed—it might seem disastrously. But what looks like a disaster *may* be an opportunity. I have long felt that, at least for British dependencies in the Tropical Far East, nothing would serve but a fresh start in a new direction. Up to, roughly, 1900 it was perhaps sufficient justification of British rule that it extended the domain of law and order. But from about that date, and largely through the spread of law and order, new problems have arisen calling for new solutions, new formulas, a new attitude, a fresh start. We tried to go further along the old road; but it was a blind alley or, if leading anywhere, only to anarchy. And there seemed no prospect, no possibility of a fresh start. Now there *must* be a fresh start. We may hope to take our part in it. It is in that hope that I venture to offer these remarks for your consideration, and I must thank you for the privilege of putting them before you.

Dr. van Mook: I introduce this discussion with great diffidence because I think Mr. Furnivall comprised so much in his lecture that it is difficult to find a point on which to ask a question or commence a discussion. There is one point, however, on which I should like to have his opinion. In his travels in the Far East he has been to the Netherlands East Indies, and he will know that among the great difficulties of creating something like—I will not say a homogeneous society, but a collective society—a non-plural society, one is that it is very dangerous to deliberately break up native institutions and native society, and deliberately put something else in its place. We have always tried with more or less success, and more or less consistency, to keep the native village alive. There has been much tinkering with the village, but I do not think there has

been so much that it is largely destroyed. On the contrary, in large parts of the Netherlands East Indies the native village is a living institution, so much so that when the principalities in Central Java did away with the native villages, they were re-instituted with official boundaries. Within two years the villages showed signs of life and very healthy life. The difficulty has always been in trying to find a common denominator for the groups in the plural society so that we can give them a better chance of living in it and not being eliminated in the process.

Has the speaker met the same problem in Burma and has any specific solution been found for it?

Mr. FURNIVALL, in reply, said: The point raised by Dr. van Mook is very important, and one thing which struck me in the Netherlands East Indies was that they had tried to keep the village together. I do not know whether we can pride ourselves on that in Burma; conditions, of course, were different. I suggest that on that point I might be called a little more optimistic than several of the Javanese, and more particularly the European officials whom I met in Java. They commenced from about 1900 to try to build up village welfare, and I think Dr. van Mook will agree that there was an attempt to turn the Javanese village into a Dutch village. They gave them all sorts of books and registers to keep, and when I was in Java there was rather a reaction against this attempt to Westernize the village, and the impression I gathered was that they seemed to think it rather a failure. What struck me was that it had taken root in several ways. There were five or six different lines on which the problem could be tackled. Thanks very largely to the influence of the Permanent Native Official in one place one would find an aspect of the scheme striking root; in others another aspect would be evident, and it seemed to me that not only had more been attempted than in Burma, but it had had even greater success than the officials were disposed to claim themselves.

Mr. GOAD: If you wish to bring in any new form of co-operation between these various elements, will you not almost inevitably fall into Western political methods and constitutions? If you do that, how are you going to guard a society in which, as you say, the old native tradition has been so largely eliminated against the exploitation of the native professional politician? The native professional politician, taking the place of the European exploiter, would probably exploit the people much more cruelly than the European ever did. The whole system with us relies upon the fact that there is a strong social sense in the people, a traditional conscience which imposes a limit outside which no one can step. But it has been one's experience in Europe and many other places that the break-up of the old societies has implied a sort of shoddy imitation of European democracy, as developed in the west of Europe in particular, and the result has been, first of all, great corruption and exploitation on the part of the politicians, who take up politics for professional purposes, followed almost inevitably by political dictatorships, which is exactly the force which we are fighting to-day. How are these evils to be avoided?

Mr. FURNIVALL: I am not quite sure that I have the gist of the question. How are we to avoid a political dictatorship?

Mr. GOAD: How shall we avoid falling into the hands of the pro-

fessional politicians who will drag political organization into the economic and social aspects of life in these villages? and if that is done in larger units all the corruption and methods which unfortunately have followed so disastrously in such a large portion of the world will follow in these villages. Once the politicians are united, the party leaders will gradually coalesce into a party dictatorship, and finally a personal political dictatorship such as we have at present to struggle against (in Europe).

Mr. FURNIVALL: As far as one can foresee there are only two remedies: one a ruler on the old native lines, and the other a ruler on modern lines.

Mr. GOAD: I prefer the old native lines which have been tried.

In thanking Mr. Furnivall for a very interesting address, Lord HAILEY deplored the fact that so many of us approached the study of Eastern problems, and, indeed, often had to take part in the government of Eastern peoples, with so inadequate a background from the educational point of view. We approached them through an education in classical or European languages and history and politics, and such knowledge of economy as we possessed was largely that which related to European conditions. Yet, as the Lecturer had amply shown, there was a vital difference between the economies of European countries and those which had a "plural" economy, which was in itself largely based on social circumstances. There was, again, a wide difference between peoples living in industrialized conditions and those of which a considerable proportion was leading a subsistence existence. It would have been a great advantage to us if we had more education on sociological subjects, and if we had at an earlier date possessed a School of Tropical Economy—a matter in which we were still unfortunately deficient.

The most interesting part of the address referred to the stages by which a "plural" economy could be converted into one of a single type. That was the fundamental and most important problem in dealing, not only with Eastern, but with African peoples. He himself (Lord Hailey) wondered how far it would be possible, in the long run, to maintain the social institutions which determined the present form of Eastern economies. Much would, no doubt, remain of a cultural nature, but the economic forces directed from Europe were of enormous strength. In Africa we are attempting to build up the future on the basis of traditional social institutions, and that was all to the good. But he himself felt that this could only be an intermediate process, and it was possible that in the end we might see a very wide absorption of Eastern and African social economy into the type of that now prevailing in Europe. That was, at all events, an arguable proposition.

CHINA AS AN ALLY

By LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS BROWNRIGG, K.C.B., D.S.O.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on April 22, 1942, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Sir Douglas Brownrigg needs no introduction here. He is one of our keenest and most valued supporters. He nearly always helps us with the discussions, and his contributions are distinguished by being brief and very much to the point. Those of you who have had the good fortune to read his charming book *Unexpected*, which was published a short time ago, will join me, I know, in most pleasurable anticipation of what he is going to tell us this afternoon.

I WOULD like to divide my lecture into three parts: the first I will call an *apologia* for talking at all. The *apologia* will include how I learnt the little I know of China. The second part will be a very brief historical survey of our relations with China since our first contact with that great country. The third part will be a few reflections—I cannot call them more—on the value of China as an ally to-day.

First of all, my *apologia*. I think it is only fair to you, and it is certainly only fair to me, to tell you how I have acquired what little knowledge I have. I joined the Army in 1905 and my first station was Singapore. That brought me in contact, as a very young officer, with what we might call Chinese of the domestic type. They were extraordinarily good, but I learnt little, although I sowed the seeds of learning. I was there two years, and never heard or thought much about China until January, 1927. It was a Monday, and I had just been ill, and was feeling that I was almost going to enjoy having a little rest when a telephone message came from the War Office saying I was to proceed to China on Wednesday. I did not do so, because my temperature refused to go down, but I went on the Saturday, at four days' notice, and spent four years in China.

My job was chief of the Administrative Staff to General Sir John Duncan, Commander of the Shanghai Defence Force. Generals came and went, but I stayed on. I saw three of them out. During those four years I travelled to places where our troops were stationed—Peking, Hankow, Wei-hei-Wei and Nanking.

Naturally, in the course of such travels I stumbled upon Chinese of various grades of society, and also upon our own nationals. In particular, I would mention Sir Reginald Johnston, the Commissioner of Wei-hei-Wei. He had previously been the tutor to the young Emperor and was the greatest sinologue of our time. From meeting all grades of Chinese and mixing with people of the type of Sir Reginald Johnston, I could not fail to be interested in the country and its people. Apart from the places to which I travelled on duty, I naturally had some leave now and then, and I took all the leave I could get (roughly a month a year) *in the*

country. In the course of my journeys on leave my wife and I went to Peking four times, to Japan twice, to Manchuria and Korea, and we also had a short and intensely interesting trip to French Indo-China, where we visited the ruins of Ankhor.

During those four years I acquired a certain amount of knowledge first hand. Being interested, I tried to improve my knowledge by reading all I could about the country I was in while I was in it, and I continued to read about that country after I had left. That is my *apologia* for having had the effrontery to select this subject when your Chairman asked me to give a lecture on " a country in the Far East other than India."

Before I go on to the short historical survey, I want to give a word of warning. It is always terribly dangerous to generalize about anything, but it is particularly dangerous to generalize about the Chinese. In a short lecture, however, I must do so to a certain extent. I talk about *the* Chinese. Well, really one might just as well talk about " *the* Europeans." The burly peasant of Shantung bears very little more resemblance to that sub-tropical product, the Chinese of Canton, than does a Norwegian to a Spaniard. Incidentally, the peasant of Shantung could not understand one word spoken by an inhabitant of Hongkong. I proved that for myself when I bought a polo pony in Tientsin and arranged for the animal to be sent to Hongkong, a matter of 1,500 miles by sea. The woman from whom I bought him had sent down a groom with him, because she wanted to make quite sure he arrived safely. When the groom arrived in Hongkong I could not find one soul who could make him understand a word *and they were all Chinese*. He did, however, bring a note with him, which said, " If you give bearer $10 he will find his way back." I gave it, and, so far as I know, he did.

There are two things about the Chinese where, by and large, generalization is true. One is that the peasants have a complete disregard of death. When you have lived under the constant threat of death by famine or flood, you do not fear it so much when it comes in other forms. That applies particularly to the countryman. The generalization which I think is fair about the more educated Chinese, which are the townsmen, is that they have an amused tolerance for us and all our ways—a tolerance which was born (not so very long ago) out of contempt. Do not think I am implying that the Chinese of to-day are contemptuous of us and of our help. That is not so. But, as an extract I shall read to you from a book in a few minutes will show, in the days of George III. the contempt of the Chinese for all barbarians was complete. In the course of time—China herself having been through a period of humiliation—that contempt has changed to amused tolerance.

I think, before we consider the value of the China of to-day, you might allow me to sketch as quickly as I can the history of our early relations—almost a string of dates. China has a recorded history going back 2,500 years before Christ—a recorded, not a legendary, history. It was not until 1,500 years after Christ that the Western world first made contact with China. When the Portuguese merchants in the year 1511 first landed at Canton, China was the proud possessor of four thousand years of history.

The next date of note is 1634. After the Portuguese had made contact at Canton with the Chinese traders we British came—the Dutch and the Spanish following not long afterwards. It took about a hundred years before the East India Company, in whose hands the trading lay, was given a Charter, and that Charter was dated 1634. I do not say that was the date of the first contact of the British with China, but that is the date of the East India Company's first Charter for trading.

Trade increased, but was entirely limited to Canton. Traders were not allowed to go inland, and, as trade increased, our country took more interest in the East India Company, until we come to our next milestone, the year 1793, when George III. was on the throne of England and the Emperor Chi'en Lung reigned in China. Relations between our traders and the Chinese were very unsatisfactory. We could not get any further into the country, and every obstacle was put in the way of our trade. A mission under Lord Macartney was therefore sent out by George III. to the Emperor Chi'en Lung.

The main idea was to get trade extended from Canton to Peking. The Emperor Chi'en Lung received the mission, which, however, got no change out of the visit. I have here a book called *Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking*, by Backhouse and Bland. The English is so delightful and the description so admirable that I shall take the liberty of reading to you the mandate which the Emperor Chi'en Lung sent back to George III. by Lord Macartney on the conclusion of his mission in 1793:

> "You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization, you have dispatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial. Your Envoy has crossed the seas and paid his respects at my Court on the anniversary of my birthday. To show your devotion, you have also sent offerings of your country's produce.
>
> "I have perused your memorial: the earnest terms in which it is couched reveal a respectful humility on your part which is highly praiseworthy. In consideration of the fact that your Ambassador and his deputy have come a long way with your memorial and tribute, I have shown them high favour and have allowed them to be introduced into my presence. To manifest my indulgence, I have entertained them at a banquet and made them numerous gifts. I have also caused presents to be forwarded to the Naval Commander and six hundred of his officers and men, although they did not come to Peking, so that they too may share in my all-embracing kindness.
>
> "As to your entreaty to send one of your nationals to be accredited to my Celestial Court and to be in control of your country's trade with China, this request is contrary to all usage of my dynasty and cannot possibly be entertained. It is true that Europeans, in the service of the dynasty, have been permitted to live at Peking, but they are compelled to adopt Chinese dress, they are strictly confined to their own precincts and are never permitted to return home. You are presumably familiar with our dynastic regulations. Your pro-

posed Envoy to my Court could not be placed in a position similar to that of European officials in Peking who are forbidden to leave China, nor could he, on the other hand, be allowed liberty of movement and the privilege of corresponding with his own country; so that you would gain nothing by his residence in our midst."

It ends:

> "If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy might become, nothing would be gained thereby.
>
> "Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the State: strange and costly objects do not interest me. If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to dispatch them from afar. Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated into every country under Heaven, and Kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures."

I read that extract because, although after 1793 China went through a period of humiliation out of which she has now safely emerged, I do want you to realise, as a mental background, that the Chinese have not really very much appreciated being treated by us with a sort of tolerance and being looked upon as very efficient domestic servants.

Lord Macartney having failed to achieve his object of getting Peking open to trade, our country had another shot at it twenty years later when Lord Amherst headed another mission in 1813. By this time Chi'en Lung had died, and his son, Chia Ching, was on the throne. He was far less amiable and far less tolerant than his father—anyhow, in his relations with the mission we sent out, because Lord Amherst was not even received by the Emperor on account of his refusal to crawl into his presence on hands and knees and kowtow to him. So our mission of 1813 failed also.

The next contact was in the Opium War, when the Chinese pitched into the harbour some chests of opium. The Opium War of 1840 was the first time we went to war against China. We won, of course, and in 1842 the Treaty of Nanking was signed, which gave us the right to trade in other parts of China. At the same time the island of Hongkong, at the mouth of the Canton River, was ceded to Great Britain. So you see that Hongkong remained in the Empire exactly a hundred years, and, pray God, will soon be back again. Apart from the trade which was opened at the various ports, and the cession of Hongkong, even more im-

portant was the grant of extra-territorial rights to all foreigners in China. "Extra-territorial rights" meant to say that our nationals were not subject to the courts of the country, but could only be tried before their own consular courts.

Going rather out of chronological order, it is interesting to know that in 1902 Great Britain and America offered to give up their territorial rights if the Chinese courts were reformed.

We go on now to 1860, when we fought another war against China, in which the French joined with us. For the first time Peking was entered by foreign troops, and Tientsin, another port eighty miles up the river, was opened to trade.

In 1895 came China's third war, with Japan this time, as a result of which she lost Korea. In 1900 there was the Boxer Rebellion, which spread all over China, but chiefly racked the north, as a result of which the Legations of the countries which had extra-territorial rights were besieged in Peking. The Japanese for the first time come into the picture, providing a contingent with the force helping to relieve the Legations. It was from that date that that myth *bushido* was born. The Japanese got a good press, but there was little truth in the *bushido* myth. As a result of that participation with other nations in relieving the Legations, Japan, fifty years after everybody else, got extra-territorial rights also.

This was the beginning of the break-up of the Manchu dynasty, which finally fell in 1912, and the Manchu emperor was taken charge of by the Japanese. When I say taken charge of, he fled for refuge to the Japanese Concession in Tientsin. My wife and I actually attended a very strange party there in 1927, when the Emperor was celebrating his wife's twenty-first birthday. Some time after that this same man, who had been kept in cold storage by the Japanese, was made Emperor of Manchukuo.

From 1911, when the Manchu dynasty fell, all China was a seething whirlpool; rival lords in every direction. But there had been an unwritten law, as the Chinese fought up and down China, that Shanghai was always out of bounds. It therefore became the bolt-hole for discredited soldiers and frightened politicians; but by 1926 a new spirit had been born in Canton. The Southern Nationalist Army, commanded by General Chiang Kai-shek, who had as his adviser a Russian named Borodin, advanced from Canton six hundred miles up to Hankow, and we gave up our concession. I imagine Borodin whispered temptation into Chiang Kai-shek's ear and said, "Why not go down the river five hundred miles and take Shanghai?" I do not know, but I suggest that is what occurred. Chiang Kai-shek listened to these blandishments, but by the time he reached Shanghai there were sixteen thousand British troops there—the Shanghai Defence Force—and also the landing parties from Italian, French and Dutch ships. In other words, the great leader Chiang Kai-shek received his first loss of face, and, if my reading of history is anything like accurate, from that moment was born respect for the British Empire, which at such short notice could send out so large a force so long a distance.

In 1932 Japan seized Manchukuo. She thus started the habit of aggression, and in 1937, two years before the war started in Europe,

Japan and China were at war. So remember, whereas we are in our third year of war, China has been fighting continuously for five years.

I have sketched (probably far too quickly) our various impacts with China from the arrival of the Portuguese in 1511 until Japan made war on China in 1937. Having sketched that outline, let me come in a few words to what I may call the meat of my talk. What is the value of present-day China as an ally to the rest of the United Nations? I think it is fair to say that the value of any ally can be discussed under six headings.

1. Potential man-power.
2. Character of its people.
3. Quality of its leadership.
4. Geographical position.
5. Degree of self-support in regard to military requirements.
6. Readiness for war (which is really a summary of the other five headings).

We will take each in turn.

1. *Potential man-power.* This can be dismissed in a very few words. The estimated population of China is 500,000,000. A large part of China is admittedly under Japanese occupation, and you may reasonably say that a large part of that population is in occupied territory and thus not available for recruiting or for industry. That is true, but still the total population is 500,000,000, and I think I can illustrate what that figure means—for people who may not be very good at figures. If the whole population of the world was drawn up in four ranks, one complete rank would consist solely of Chinese. That is China's potential man-power, and it is interesting in passing to note that for every Japanese in the world there are six Chinese.

So much for man-power. In this respect China is the greatest ally in the world.

2. *Character of its people.* What of the character of the people? Masses are no good unless they are masses of the right stuff. Generally we look to history to give us a guide as to a nation's character and as to a nation's probable reaction to modern circumstances. The curious thing about China is that history in this respect is hardly any guide at all. Since the Manchu dynasty fell, thirty years ago, it is almost true to say that the character of the people has changed more than it had in the previous thirty centuries. The fall of the Manchu dynasty and all the movements initiated by Sun-Yat-Sen made a complete change. The people went abroad and got what we call education. They brought back the seeds of democracy and the seeds of government as practised in other countries, not always to the advantage of China, but sometimes very much to her advantage.

Up till the fall of the Manchu dynasty, the character of the Chinese people hung on two pegs—reverence of ancestors and love of family. Two very honourable things in themselves, but not things which are calculated to make a country progress much in the modern world. As a result of

the change in the last thirty years, I think it is perfectly true to say now that a national consciousness (that is, pride of forming part of a nation instead of pride of forming part of a family) has been born, and love of country has taken its place alongside reverence for ancestors. Remember, also, that the last five years of war and the calculated and deliberate Japanese brutalities have speeded up this process of change as nothing else could possibly have done.

Therefore, I think we can say that history tells us nothing, but the last five years tell us a lot—*i.e.*, the Chinese people have the character and the ability required to make good fighting men. There is no question of it. The scholar has turned soldier and has made a very good soldier, and has been spurred to do so by seeing all he holds dear attacked deliberately and brutally by the Japanese.

3. *Leadership.* I think we can say that leadership in China to-day is spelt by the word Chiang Kai-shek, who, I venture to suggest, will probably go down to history as the outstanding figure of our age. He has accomplished more in China during his brief reign than any of his predecessors did in a far longer time. He has united a nation one and a half times the size of the United States, with very poor communications. What is more, during those five years' guerilla warfare the Chinese have produced very fine junior leaders. In the past emperors were reverenced for their culture, not for their conquests. Chiang Kai-shek is looked up to by his countrymen and by us as a great fighting leader.

4. *Geographical position.* I only ask you to look at the map. There is China. Here is Japan. Except for the maritime province of Siberia, China is the obvious corridor to get at Japan. All the ports of China which may be in Japanese hands to-day are still ports; and there, when the command eventually passes, as it must, are the ports of China ready waiting to take in the vessels and the ships of war of the United Nations.

But do not let me be too optimistic. Communications are bad. There are only 8,000 miles of railway in the whole of China. I think I am right in saying that in the U.S.A. the actual mileage of single-track railway is one-quarter of a million miles. China, one and a half times as large, has 8,000. The length of single-track railway in England is 50,000 miles, which shows you the poverty of China's communications.

5. *Self-support.* Here is where we have the heel of Achilles. The output of Chinese factories was never very great; it has become all the less by reason of the factories themselves being uplifted from the coast and carried bodily inland, where they are now once more in production. This is an epic in itself. Undoubtedly that is the weakest point in China as an ally—her inability to produce for herself the munitions of war required for modern fighting.

6. *Readiness for war* is a summary of all these five heads: In man-power China is the greatest ally in the world; the character of her people is all we can desire; she is led by perhaps the outstanding figure of the age; geographically she points at the heart of Japan; in self-sufficiency she is very poor. Is she ready for war? Yes, ready for a *defensive* war, ready to continue the war of attrition which she has fought so magnificently for five years; but not a country capable of using that man-

power, that character, that leadership immediately to advance and drive the Japanese out or to help others do so. Her armies are believed to be something like three hundred divisions, but only those helping us in Burma can be said to be armed with modern materials, such as tanks and so on.

So we see that we have a country of inexhaustible man-power, which requires the modern munitions of war to harness that man-power to the chariot of the United Nations; in other words, China's value as an ally depends rather more on the workmen and workwomen in the factories of the old world and the new than it does on the Chinese people.

I end with a little quotation of Cicero. He said, "Arms are of little avail abroad unless there is good counsel at home." In regard to China, the best of good counsels at home will not be of much avail until we can send the arms abroad. (Applause.)

A MEMBER: Can the Lecturer tell us whether China is becoming more industrialized, and, if so, whether our exports to China will not very much increase after the war?

The LECTURER: I do not know that I am very competent to answer that question. China was becoming industrialized, and then on account of Japanese depredations she had to move all her plant thousands of miles inland and set it up again. Any industrialization which had occurred along the coast entirely ceased, and had to be carried thousands of miles inland and there opened up again. Probably, therefore, her industrial production is at present less than it was five years ago, but, of course, is potentially greater. That is how it strikes me.

A MEMBER: Would General Brownrigg kindly give us his views as regards getting deliveries into China?

The LECTURER: There are really, I believe, three "Burma" roads. The first road, which went up to Lashio from Rangoon, went out of action when Rangoon fell. The second road comes due east from India, dips down and goes through Mandalay. Therefore, if Mandalay falls, which we hope it will not, that road would also be cut. The third is not a Burma road at all. It is a road which is in the course of construction, going through a good deal further north.

There is, of course, always the way into China through Russia in the north, but, as we know, Russia in her turn is dependent on the two lines of supply, one up the Norwegian coast and the other by the Persian Gulf, and we are not at the moment sending all she wants, so it is most unlikely that Russia can possibly afford to pass anything on to China, quite apart from the enormous distance from the Russian front.

Mr. W. M. KIRKPATRICK: It was the purpose of the Lecturer to impress on us the value of China as an ally. I wish the Lecturer and we all had appreciated twenty years ago what an important ally China could have been. The Lecturer stated that, when he arrived in Malaya, he found his only connections with the Chinese were with domestics in Singapore. Our right policy would have been to make friendly contacts and allies of the Chinese, then, twenty years ago.

There were one or two points which I might criticize in an otherwise

most excellent lecture. One is that I do not think it was any threat of the Canton army which induced us to give up Hankow. It was a great and wise act of statesmanship.

I think it was inconsistent of the Lecturer to suggest that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek—who I agree will go down to history as one of the world's greatest leaders—got his first impression of, or was awed by, the might of Britain when we sent 16,000 troops to Shanghai. The Lecturer has relied on and referred to books on China. There are two I would like to mention. One is *The Great Within*, by Maurice Collis, and the other, which I am sure the Chairman and other soldiers present have or should have all read, is *A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book*, by General Ian Hamilton, where with amazing exactitude he prophesies the potential might and future of China. He arrived in Manchuria as Staff Officer in 1905, very pro-Japanese, as we all were then, but in a brief paragraph towards the end of the book he is prophetic as to the future of China, and the value or even the danger of China as a potential force some day. He also said a lot about Japanese tactics, which in the light of what happened in Malaya we seem to have forgotten.

A question I would like to ask is, whether in our efforts to maintain, to encourage China-as-an-ally propaganda, anything has been done to stress the fact that a very large proportion of the inhabitants of China are Muhammadans? Is that appreciated by Muhammadans in other parts of the world? Has there been any propaganda or education in India to point out to the Muslims of India that they already have a religious alliance with China? Is it known to, has it been pointed out to Arabs of North Africa and Arabia?

The LECTURER: May I correct a false impression I may have given when I said that my only contacts with the Chinese were domestic. I would ask you to remember that it was a mighty long time ago I first went out as a Second Lieutenant, and I was not likely to mix with the high lights of Chinese politics. The only person I was likely to meet was my Chinese servant.

I am afraid I am in no position to answer about propaganda. As to what steps are taken by our Government Departments I have no idea at all.

A MEMBER: Is there any chance, in the Lecturer's opinion, of communication being opened through the North Pacific? As we control that ocean, is it possible that supplies or munitions could be sent from Alaska or somewhere in Canada? It seems to me to be nearer than crossing the whole of Russia.

The LECTURER: When it was a question of sending American supplies to Russia, they entirely closed down at Vladivostock on account of the Japanese threat. Therefore, presumably that coast is equally closed down until such time as we have got back control of the Pacific.

Mr. PHILBY: I know nothing of the country from a personal contact, but I would like to add a word of praise to those which have been spoken already for a very admirable and lucid lecture.

There were many points which suggested questions to my mind, so perhaps you will give me a minute or two to get them off my chest.

First of all with regard to *bushido*. Surely General Brownrigg is wrong in thinking that *bushido* is a myth born in the year 1900. We have heard a great deal of talk about *bushido* in the last few months, and we have been treated to the most amazing ideas and theories about it. I took the trouble to think out where I could find the best description or some information about it which was not likely to be tinged with propaganda, and I found it in the Encyclopædia Britannica, the eleventh edition, published in 1911, which was before the last war. There I found quite a short and informative article on *bushido*, which goes back many centuries, right into the bowels of the history of Shintoism. I do not think we ought to treat it as some strange new toy produced in recent times.

Scondly, I have never been clear, and the Lecturer did not make it clear to us, what we were really doing in Shanghai in those years of which he has spoken. We know that a British Expeditionary Force was there, but what was the object of its being there? We are told that Hankow was surrendered—that has been corrected, I think rightly—to the threat of Chiang Kai-shek, and that he might have been expected to come along and attack Shanghai. I do not think he did very much in the way of military activity against Shanghai. At any rate, the position of Shanghai was not considered sufficiently precarious to force us to the ordinary precaution, for instance, of removing civilians or women and children from that area. I was travelling out in a P. and O. vessel about the time when our Expeditionary Force was in Shanghai, and was being represented in our Press as being there to protect our women and children from possible dangers from Chiang Kai-shek's army. On that boat were no fewer than forty-five women and children going to Shanghai. Why were we sending them out to Shanghai to be protected?

The third point is the question of Chinese man-power. I was surprised General Brownrigg did not refer to the very common bogy of some years ago, the Yellow Peril. That bogy did directly arise out of this matter of the potential man-power of China, and was invented by no less a person than Kaiser Wilhelm. He looked out to the Far East and saw the rising tide of Japanese power, and the possibility that that power should be applied to train this enormous potential man-power of China to form a terrific army with which to sweep all over the world. I think it is very important indeed to remember that factor, when we look at it now in relation to the present war. All one can say is that it is too late. We are scarcely likely to be able to marshal and equip this potential man-power of China in time to meet all the might and force which has already been prepared during the last twenty, thirty or forty years by the Japanese Empire.

The LECTURER: I feel I am batting against rather professional bowling here. I only said *bushido* was invented as applying to the *whole* Japanese race. I know it is a very old thing, a code of knightly ways which applied to the Samurai. The knightly ways of the Samurai were supposed to apply to everybody. I do not think it is very wise to think that all Japanese are at the present time imbued with that spirit of chivalry.

In regard to the second question I am on safer ground. Mr. Philby

asks, what were we doing in Shanghai? The story of Shanghai is this: Whether I am right or wrong about the fall of Hankow having anything to do with the defence of Shanghai, I am not convinced. At that time a man of the calibre of Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt arrived at Shanghai as our Naval Commander-in-Chief. He wired home to the Government and said, "Do you want to make Shanghai—which is international—absolutely secure, and make it absolutely certain that the vast mass of buried British capital will not be forfeited? If so, you should send a division out." It was not with the idea of so much protecting the women and children, because Shanghai was grossly overcrowded. What we were sent out to do was to make quite sure that Shanghai remained out of bounds in these civil wars. Fortunately, for once in a way, let us give them full credit, the Government accepted the estimate of the man on the spot, and one brigade was sent out from India, one brigade was made up from the Mediterranean, and one brigade was sent out from home. The Chinese troops did appear; they came down the Yangtze and there were casualties, but by that time Shanghai was defended by a perimeter of bayonets.

The CHAIRMAN: I can corroborate what the Lecturer said about Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt's telegram, because I remember the sensation it created when it was repeated to Simla from London. India was very prompt in replying, because the brigade actually left the Indian shores six days after the telegram came, which was pretty good work.

We have now had in this Society two most interesting lectures on China. The Lecturer said that the historical lessons which we could get from China were mostly contained in the last few years. I have always thought that the one object-lesson of China in old days was this. China, of all the countries in the world, was the first that ever went in for unilateral disarmament to a certain extent and to declare the futility of war. The net result was that she became the football of all the other nations for many years, and has only lately learnt, in her five years of agony, and indeed of gallant resistance, that she was wrong in the past.

I always think, too, that it is interesting to speculate a little on the future, because there is no question that this war has entirely and completely altered the situation that will be in the Far East. Because with China ranking as a first-class power, with close alliance with us, with her distinguished General commanding a portion of the forces of the Allies, in the future there surely will be nothing in the shape of extra-territorial or any other rights. Any nation that will go to China will have to trade on exactly the same terms and under exactly the same conditions as any foreigners will in future trade in this country. That seems to me to be the great picture that we must always hold before us, an entirely and completely different picture, in the Far East, with a great China, whose civilization will surely go back to the glory of her ancient days.

We are not only obliged to the Lecturer for his most engrossing lecture, but to those of the audience who so kindly took part in the discussion. Will you please express your appreciation in the usual way.

The vote of thanks was carried by acclamation, after which the meeting terminated.

WANDERINGS IN SINAI

By Joan M. C. Jullien

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on March 18, 1942, the Right Hon. Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., in the chair.

I HAVE been asked to tell you to-day about a journey I made recently through the southern part of Sinai. It is not always realized that Sinai politically forms a province of Egypt, but actually it lies in Asia, and as its inhabitants are all of Arabian—that is to say, Asiatic—origin, it is strictly correct to regard Sinai as Asiatic territory.

It is really a bridge or stepping-stone between two continents; except, however, for the northern fringe it is a no man's land, lying right off all trade routes, containing no harbours, towns, or even buildings worth speaking of, very little water, and only nomad inhabitants. Because of these conditions the Wilderness of Sinai remains to-day much as it was in almost prehistoric times, and it is a very wonderful experience to travel through it. Generally speaking, Sinai is so obscure that a pardonable ignorance prevails about its location and its scanty history, so perhaps I may first be allowed to say something about these before touching on my own travels.

A glance at the map will show the relationship of Sinai to its neighbours. Notice the railway linking Egypt with Palestine, also the principal road, running north-east from Suez, the only one, I believe, fit for motors throughout its length. It was finished six or seven years ago. Before the war it was beginning to carry tourists from Cairo to Palestine, and since the war it has been of invaluable service in providing speedy road communication from Egypt to Palestine and on to Syria. A branch goes via Nekhl and Themed to el Aqaba, at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba; this follows the old Darb el Haj, or Pilgrim's Road, from Cairo to Mecca. The pilgrims to-day all go by sea. Observe the converging boundaries of Palestine, Transjordan, and Sa'udi Arabia.

The central part of Sinai is a bleak, elevated limestone plateau, storm-swept in winter, scorched in summer, and relatively uninteresting; the really beautiful part is the Peninsula proper, lying roughly south of the Darb el Haj, or of a line drawn from Suez to el Aqaba. This is a region of huge upflung granite mountains, representing some of the oldest geological formations on our planet; much of it is precipitous and inaccessible, and there are only a few Beduin tracks. It is seamed by *wadis*, or dry water-courses, the products of erosion, which in the rainy season become raging torrents at a few hours' notice; thus in winter it is not very safe to travel through them, and you will never at any season see a Beduin pitching his camp in the middle of one. As the walls of these *wadis* may be anything from ten to a thousand feet high, there is not much hope of escape if one is caught. The few travellers who come here do so only in the spring months, when there is no real risk.

Light cars can travel some of these *wadis*, which, on the whole, do

not have any stiff gradients, but the surface can never be guaranteed, as the storms may bring down boulders, tree trunks, etc., and leave them embedded in the fairway. The easiest and far the pleasantest way of seeing the land is by camel, and, in fact, seven-eighths of the Peninsula is only accessible by this method. Visitors to Southern Sinai are very rare and consist to-day almost entirely of persons coming to the Convent of Saint Catharine. As this was a famous pilgrimage for many centuries, the western approaches to the mountains are well known, and, though the journey is extremely interesting, there is not much scope for adventure or discovery on the way. Conditions are very different in the district lying between the convent and the eastern seaboard, large tracts of which, so far as I can ascertain, have not yet been explored, and into which until a few years ago it was definitely unsafe to penetrate.

In Southern Sinai is some of the most starkly magnificent mountain scenery in the world, and it holds attractions for very different persons: ibex-hunters, mountaineers, geologists, and students of Biblical geography. The route thither from Egypt is the same as the traditional route of the Israelites in the course of their exodus to the reputed Mount Sinai, the mount of the Ten Commandments. At the foot of this mountain stands the great and famous sixth-century foundation of Santa Katerina—part convent, part fortress—in surroundings of extraordinary grandeur and desolation.

If one excepts the handful of monks who dwell here, the only inhabitants of Southern Sinai are a few thousand nomad Beduin of an especially primitive type. They hived off early from the great tribes of Arabia, and have not held much intercourse with their neighbours; so they have preserved many curious laws, legends, and usages from the days of the oldest Arab civilization, and have evolved many indigenous customs of their own.

There has never been any consecutive history of Sinai, because, except for some groups of hermits and holy men—one of which developed into the convent—there has never been any attempt at settlement. The water supply is too precarious. But Sinai was the theatre of one outstanding historical event which has dwarfed and dominated every other local happening ever since, and that is the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, their journey to the Mount of the Commandments, and their subsequent wanderings prior to their departure for the Promised Land. Everyone who rides through Sinai is acutely conscious of the influence of these half-mythical, half-historical travellers—and I say *rides* advisedly, because a car moving even at the moderate speed possible on the uneven surface must inevitably destroy all those attempts at leisurely imaginative reconstruction that form such a pleasant mental exercise when on camel-back.

The figure of Moses—"Saidna Musa," our Lord Moses, the Beduin call him—is still legendary in Sinai, and in one district he is even honoured with the yearly sacrifice of a camel. Of course, some time before the Exodus Moses was familiar with the Peninsula; he had married the daughter of a local sheikh, the Midianite Jethro, and had witnessed the miracle of the Burning Bush on a mountain that is still traditionally associated with Jethro, or Sho'eib, as the Beduin call him.

When later Moses brought the Israelites out of the land of Goshen he is supposed to have led them first to a well south-west of Suez, still called Ayun Musa, or "Springs of Moses," and after various vicissitudes he brought them to the foot of that same mountain of the Bush which was now to see the promulgation of the Ten Commandments. The exact summit cannot be positively identified, and conjecture has ranged round several peaks in southern Sinai, as well as one or two in northern Sinai, and even beyond the confines of Sinai itself, in north-west Arabia.

The Biblical record itself is very fragmentary and confusing, but the narrative, on the whole, seems best to accord with a route down the west coast for about a hundred and ten miles and then inland for another sixty to the great granite ranges of southern Sinai, and tradition, both Arab and Christian, points to a mountain which the Beduin still call Jebel Musa, or "Mount of Moses," as the scene of the giving of the Law.

Every traveller through Sinai, whatever his religious convictions and however slight his knowledge of early Jewish history, finds himself irresistibly caught up in a maze of curiosity and speculation into the origins of the Exodus story with all its attendant marvels—the dividing of the Red Sea, the pillar of fire, the manna and the quails, the devouring fire on top of the Mount, and so on. It is remarkable, when you come to think of it, that the migration which took place over three thousand years ago of one small, insignificant Semitic tribe should still to-day exercise such an influence on the minds of those who follow in their track.

The road taken by the Israelites from Egypt to Mount Sinai is well established by tradition, although scientific opinion is much divided. There is much greater uncertainty in trying to locate the next main halting-place of the Israelites after their year's sojourn beneath Mount Sinai, and that is Kadesh, or Kadesh Barnea. This has been placed variously in Petra or in the Wadi Arabah, but is now believed to lie in the Ain Kadeis area. Kadesh formed a focal point for the forty years' wanderings that ensued.

These were not the frustrated strayings of a lost people seeking a path; they were the normal movements of a nomadic race in search of pastures for their flocks, dictated by the rainfall and other exigencies of the seasons. Theoretically the wanderings could have covered all Sinai, but were probably restricted to the central highlands, the Tih, and the valleys lying between the Egma Plateau and the granite ranges of the south.

At the end of the forty years the Israelites—or rather their sons—gathered themselves together, and, passing by the sea near the ancient counterpart of el Aqaba, they journeyed through the land of Moab towards Canaan.

Although a string of place-names has survived for the period of the wanderings, none of these can be identified to-day. My own theory is that these represented purely fortuitous and ephemeral conditions, as one might say "Thunderstorm Camp" or "Camp of Many Snakes" or even "The Camp where the Old Cow Died." When the whole of the tribes marched together they probably followed the principal *wadis*, which act as arterial roads through Sinai; we could hazard a guess at their route

with greater confidence if we knew for certain whether they had wheeled traffic or not. Some paths, while quite feasible for pack animals, must be ruled out if it was a question of wheels.

There exists a vast and controversial literature on this subject, on which an enormous amount of research and scholarship has been expended. Unfortunately, the majority of the writers have not been within a thousand miles of Sinai. One misconception I would like to do my humble best to dispel: that is, the evil reputation borne by the Wilderness for gloom, terror, and a general atmosphere of deprivation and horror. I have never seen any place so wildly and marvellously beautiful as Southern Sinai in spring—the air like wine, the sweet scents, the spring flowers, the indescribable glowing colours of the granite and sandstone mountains, the amazing sunsets, the noble sweeps of the tawny or honey-coloured desert, and over all such an impression of space, silence, and otherworldness as cannot be conveyed in words.

But I must leave the Israelites and come to my own experiences. The dark line on the map shows the way I travelled from Egypt to enter Transjordan by the back door at el Aqaba. The whole journey took a month, and including various detours covered nearly four hundred miles. I should say at once that I do not claim to be called an explorer; I cannot read a compass, I dislike guns and travelled unarmed, I know hardly any Arabic, I have no scientific qualifications, I cannot even cook or put up a tent. I just had an irrational ambition to find a way into Transjordan through Sinai; although I knew that Léon de Laborde had achieved this in 1828, I was unaware of anyone else having done so, and set out without the least knowledge of present-day conditions or of what risks we ran, if any, or what our chances were of arriving at all. Nor did I receive any enlightenment from anyone in Egypt; an abysmal ignorance seemed to prevail on the subject of the country lying between the Convent and el Aqaba. It was just a glorious hit-or-miss hand-to-mouth adventure, and was attended throughout by quite undeserved good luck.

The camp organizer, an Arab named el Shaer, had got together in Cairo a bunch of splendid hard-working men—three Arabs, a Sudanese half-breed, and a Sudanese boy of fourteen. These were my companions on the trip. He had also collected a superb lot of five camels, two riding and three baggage animals. These not only carried us, our stores and equipment without a mistake to el Aqaba, but performed prodigies of mountaineering and even swimming on the way. They were all "water-camels"—that is, they were not trained to go without water for long periods—and expected to drink at least every forty-eight hours. This entailed a careful spacing out of the days' stages, and in this sort of travelling the finest maps would still have to be supplemented by the services of a local Beduin guide, who alone would know what wells and water-holes were functioning, this depending on recent rain. Therefore the discovery that el Shaer had lied to me and was not familiar even with the road to the Convent was not so serious as it might have been. As a guide he was, in fact, a wash-out from the first day. I forgot to say that the only map I had was sixteen miles to the inch and inaccurate at that, and practically useless.

We carried two water-tanks on the strongest camel, which we replenished as we could, and food for a month. It lasted beautifully, as we had just one day's supply in hand when we reached the journey's end. The only extra stuff we got *en route* was some fodder at the Convent and some fish on the sea coast. Towards the end the camels had taken to grazing as they went, which helped quite a lot. The nomad Beduin whom we met, though hospitably inclined, are so woefully poor that even against payment they can produce nothing beyond their own needs.

Our starting-place was el Kubri, near Suez, but on the Asiatic side of the Canal. From here we plunged straight into desert conditions, and the first place of interest we reached was Ayun Musa, a beautiful oasis. We then followed the low-lying coastal track to Abu Zenima, where there is a tiny European camp of seven persons engaged in mining manganese, the only commercial product of Sinai.

The simplest, though rather longer, route to the Convent—our first objective—is to follow the Wadi Feiran throughout its length, but, as we were camel-travellers and not tourists in Fords, we were able to strike inland and pursue an independent course. So, turning up Seih Baba, we broached the real mountain country at once, finding ourselves surrounded by superb and extraordinary scenery. This is largely due to the exotic colouring of the rocks composing the mountains, which are in turns yellow, black, pink, and in the case of granite a deep glowing crimson, which at sunset seems to give off a brilliant light of its own.

I got my first insight into the camels' climbing powers when we reached the steep little pass of Naqb el Buderah, which I went up holding on to my camel's tail. Soon after reaching the summit we saw far away the mountain of Jebel Serbal, one of the giants of the Peninsula. Next day we reached Wadi Maghara. Here we were near the turquoise mines, which are deserted to-day, but were worked continuously by the ancient Egyptians from about 5000 B.C. They did not colonize the country, but sent elaborate and well-found expeditions from Egypt to work during the cool months; and the remains of their ruined temples are to be seen at Serabit el Khadem, where turquoises also abounded. The Beduin still pick up the stones after heavy floods, and I was able to buy a few.

We travelled along Wadi Mokatteb, famous for its mysterious Sinaitic inscriptions on the high walls; they are carved in an unknown and very ancient writing, and may be very early Aramaic. There are many drawings of goats and ibex as well.

We then joined the great Wadi Feiran and followed its windings to the beautiful Oasis of Feiran. This contains some hundreds of acres of fertile land, carefully cultivated with dates, maize, and tobacco. It lies at the foot of Jebel Serbal, whose snows feed a perennial stream. Jebel Serbal is an isolated and magnificent mountain about six thousand feet high, and is one of the candidates to be regarded as the veritable Mount Sinai, although there is no local tradition to that effect.

The neighbourhood of the mountain is renowned for its very heavy storms, which blow up suddenly and cause severe floods in the *wadis* running down from its slopes. It has been surmised that one tremendous storm coinciding with the sojourn of the Israelites may provide the origin

of some of the marvellous events passed down by oral tradition. I witnessed myself the sequel to a violent rainstorm when we had left the mountain about twelve miles behind us. The sun came out and shone on the summit while it was still enveloped in clouds; these turned to a brilliant fiery red, and glowed like an immense furnace till the sun sank. One may imagine the effect of such a spectacle on a primitive, credulous people without any clue to its cause.

Except for the short cut through Wadi Mokatteb, we had so far followed the traditional route of the Exodus. The Oasis of Feiran is generally regarded as the same as the Biblical "Rephidim," where the Israelites met and defeated the Amalekites. By now we were ten days out from Suez, and everything had gone without a hitch. Our first camp after leaving the oasis was in Wadi Feiran, which about here changes its name to Wadi esh Sheikh. At this point I decided to abandon the *wadi* and attempt a short cut to the Convent, which would involve surmounting a steep and very difficult pass called the Naqb el Hawa, or "Pass of the Wind."

This really amounted to climbing directly up the southern escarpment of the central mountain system, instead of approaching it along the Wadi esh Sheikh by a steady and circuitous gradient. I had intended the baggage camels to pursue the easy way, but by a mistake, discovered too late to mend, they accompanied us, and the whole expedition narrowly escaped coming to grief in consequence. Our ancient Beduin guide, Selim, whom I had engaged in Suez, was not to blame, as he was dead against the enterprise. A casual shepherd lad who undertook to lead me over the pass turned out to be half-witted. I learnt afterwards that the pass is universally regarded as impossible for laden camels, and the monks at the Convent, when we reached it, told me it had never been so crossed before.

It was only by prodigious struggles and by sacrificing all the water from the heavy tanks that we managed to drag the five camels up the pass, which is over five thousand feet high, and it was really the stout hearts of the animals themselves, their dexterity and wonderful intelligence, that won the day. As each load weighed about seven hundred and fifty pounds, it was a remarkable performance. I should say there was no question of turning back, because the track had a deep drop at the side, and was too narrow for the camels to turn round safely.

The view from the top of the pass is really marvellous. One looks along two miles of level ground bordered by mountains straight to Mount Sinai itself, which rises two thousand feet sheer from the plain. It is a noble and most satisfying mountain, and fulfils exactly what one imagines the Mount of the Law must have looked like. The identification, though not unanimously accepted, rests a good deal on the proximity of the mountain to the huge plain (called er Rahah) of some two square miles, because something of this size was required to accommodate the great concourse of Israelites running, under ancient computation, into millions, with flocks and herds in proportion. To-day it is generally conceded that some ambiguity or corruption exists in the Biblical text, and that the real number was something between five thousand and twenty thousand,

which is not only much more credible, but makes the search after the mountain much more elastic. It is quite certain that this barren country, with its infrequent rain and scattered pastures, could never have supported a greater number of inhabitants.

As we have inevitably got back on to the story of the Exodus—I warned you that it pervaded the whole subject of Sinai—I would like to digress and mention a very extraordinary thing. One must not forget that the Israelites were nomads, who lived in tents and never laid one stone upon another; and when they had completed their forty years' wanderings they marched away out of the Peninsula towards Canaan, leaving not a wrack behind.

All this happened over three thousand years ago—more than thirty centuries, or, reckoned in generations of mankind, roughly ninety generations. The Peninsula in those days was sparsely inhabited by primitive Semitic nomads, the Amalekites and Midianites, whose conditions remained unchanged until the Mohammedan incursions from Arabia in the seventh century of our era. These Arabs subdued, proselytized, and intermarried with the original tribes, and it is their descendants that still form the scanty population to-day.

Of course, the Kor'an contains certain references to early Hebrew history, including the Exodus; and Moses and other patriarchs are honoured as prophets by Moslems no less than by Jews. But quite apart from what is to be found in the Kor'an, there is still extant in Sinai to-day a perfectly independent oral tradition about Moses and many of the events of the Exodus which is peculiar to the Beduin of Sinai. This tradition has been handed down from father to son, and forms a striking confirmation—perhaps the inspiration—of the tradition of the early Christian fathers who located the Mount of the Law in the Peninsula. It is safe to assume that the mere passage of a strange nomadic tribe through the land would hardly have made such a deep and lasting impression unless further accompanied by some very unusual and striking phenomena.

Here are some examples: There are some sulphurous springs on the west coast which the Arabs call "Hammam Faraun," or Baths of Pharaoh, and claim that he was drowned here. There is a large isolated rock in the Wadi Feiran, which they say is the spot where Moses rested while he was tending sheep, and meditated on how he could deliver his brethren from Egypt. In the same *wadi* they show another rock, which they say was the one struck by Moses when he produced the water, whereas early Christian tradition, upheld by the monks at the Convent, locate the miracle near Jebel Katherina.

The Beduin do not associate the Burning Bush with Jebel Musa at all, but with a lowly mountain near Jebel Serbal, which they call Jebel el Moneijah, or Mount of the Conversation, and it is here that the yearly sacrifice of a camel to Moses takes place.

The death of Aaron is placed by them at Petra, and his reputed tomb is still shown on Jebel Haraun—"Mount Aaron"—usually called Mount Hor, while the stream flowing through Petra is ascribed to another striking of the rock by Moses. The name Petra is never used locally, and the district is still called Wadi Musa. Again, one of the solid rock

carvings in Petra of an urn is popularly supposed to be hollow and to contain the treasure of Pharaoh.

As one century succeeds another the old native tradition must inevitably fade progressively, and it would be a valuable study for a trained ethnologist and Arabist to spend a year in Sinai to collect and collate the material that survives. Professor Palmer did a certain amount in that direction in the seventies of last century when he accompanied the Ordnance Survey, but he only covered a small part of the country. I feel sure there are discoveries waiting to be made.

I heard myself a local legend about a certain mythical Sheikh Abuzelime whose spirit inhabits a cave near Wadi Maghara, and who is fed by birds bringing coffee in their beaks from Mecca. Distant sounds rather like hammering are sometimes heard here, and these are said to be caused by angels pounding the coffee in a heavenly mortar. What is this if not a distorted version of the feeding of Elijah by ravens, combined with some recollection of his sojourn in a cave on Horeb (Horeb being an alternative name for Sinai)?

I might add as a matter of interest that there is also a strong local tradition in Southern Sinai that Mohammed himself once visited the Convent, travelling with a caravan of camels. This is, of course, a much less venerable history, and it is unconfirmed from any other source. There is nothing inherently improbable in it, and it is firmly believed by the monks as well as the Beduin. In fact, the monks have a very friendly feeling towards the Prophet; in the Middle Ages they permitted the erection of a mosque within their walls for the benefit of their Moslem servitors, and even to-day they are as willing to swear an oath on the Kor'an as on the Bible.

But to return to my journey. We arrived at the Convent on the twelfth day out from Suez. It stands at the foot of Mount Sinai, and is a combination of monastery and fortress built around courtyards, enclosed by massive granite walls, and flanked by gardens and orchards.

The Convent is fourteen hundred years old, and has hardly altered at all since the Emperor Justinian built it in the sixth century. By its very solitude and remoteness it survived, an outpost of Christian civilization in the midst of fanatical tribes, and separated by hundreds of miles of sheer desert from any other settled community. The monks profess the Orthodox faith and are mostly Greeks. In spirit they are still Byzantines, and pray daily for the Emperor; in this they are only five hundred years behind the times.

The real name is the "Convent of the Transfiguration," but in the tenth century a reputed miracle occurred: the monks found on a nearby mountain a skeleton which was pronounced to be that of Saint Catharine, brought hither by angels from Alexandria when she was martyred there in the fourth century. An elaborate shrine was added to the Convent church; soon a stream of pilgrims set in from eastern Europe and later from Russia, and continued for seven or eight centuries. This cult of Santa Katerina brought great prosperity to the Convent and has tended to obliterate its earlier associations.

It was a long and hazardous journey for the pilgrims, through deserts

made perilous alike by the scarcity of water and the depredations of the Saracens (or Beduin), and the accounts written by the mediæval travellers are both exciting and entertaining.

Half a dozen lectures of the length allowed to me would be needed to do justice to the Convent. It has often been visited and described, so I will only mention in passing the huge Byzantine church, with its silver lamps and hanging ostrich eggs; the shrine of Santa Katerina; the Moslem mosque placed incongruously alongside; the ancient library still imperfectly explored, where manuscripts as rare as the Codex Sinaiticus may still be awaiting discovery; the strange Convent servants, descended from Wallachan slaves settled there by Justinian to serve and protect the monks; the refectory with immense table carved with the arms of noble Crusaders; the crypt or charnel-house where the bones and skulls of all the monks of the past fourteen centuries are neatly ranged and docketed; the Chapel of the Burning Bush, where no one may enter shod, and where a ray of sunlight falls once a year upon a silver plate beneath the altar, marking the traditional spot where the Bush once grew. One is even shown a graft of that same Bush growing up a wall; it is rather like a loganberry, and a favoured pilgrim is allowed to pluck a leaf.

The monks once numbered hundreds; now there are barely a score, and pilgrims belong to the past. In olden days each pilgrim was given a silver ring as a certificate that he had achieved the journey, and I am proud to say that the Father Superior accorded one to me, though I feel it was intended more as a memento of crossing the Naqb el Hawa than of my paying any reverence to their pet saint.

Visitors to the Convent are made very welcome, but whatever hospitality may have been extended to the penurious pilgrims of the Middle Ages, the monks have now developed such a keen financial sense that their charges are only comparable to those at the Ritz.

I could not spare a day to climb Mount Sinai, as I should have liked. As well as exploring the Convent and the immediate neighbourhood, I had to supervise the overhauling of all stores and equipment, and try to secure a guide for the more exacting and adventurous journey that lay before us. It was at this stage that we first encountered anything in the nature of hostility. The monks had taken it for granted that I was now going to retrace my steps to Suez. When I disclosed that I was going further, the Sheikh of the local Beduin—the Jebeliyeh—claimed the right to provide the camels and men for my further journey, and called upon me to dismiss my caravan and proceed under his ægis.

Traditionally he has this right, as against the tribes on the western side of the Peninsula, but I contended that it could not prevail against a caravan hired in Cairo. Finding the monks supported him, he passed from demands to threats and then to browbeating my men; the monks, who are both ignorant and timid, refused to help me over supplies, and things began to look really ominous, as none of the Beduin could be persuaded, in face of the Sheikh's attitude, to incur his vengeance by volunteering as a guide.

By a lucky coincidence, when things had reached a deadlock, an unexpected saviour appeared. I was on the point of chancing our luck and

going forward without a guide when a certain independent leader, one Sheikh Suleiman el Morgi, turned up at the Convent. I liked his ugly, sun-blackened face and resolute bearing; I also liked his lordly cream camel, designing somehow to ride it myself, and, in spite of the monks' protests and prophecies of disaster, I engaged the Sheikh to lead us to el Aqaba.

Sheikh Suleiman was a tremendous asset to the party. He was guide, story-teller, and friend; he could name all the major landmarks; he was an expert tracker and loved to demonstrate his art; he galvanized the caravan into starting at daybreak—a thing I had never been able to do—and he led us with unerring skill through confusing labyrinths of *wadis* and across pathless uplands; he made me welcome at his evening camp-fire; and, best of all, he agreed to change mounts and allowed me to ride his peerless Nejdi camel practically all the way to el Aqaba.

The Sheikh of the Jebeliyeh had stated that if his extortions were not met we might expect to encounter opposition and danger from the tribesmen between us and our goal. He did not in words identify himself with the threatening element, but to counter it I set up a wholly fictitious relationship with the Governor of Sinai. This, perhaps, had some effect, as in point of fact we met with no hostility whatever; but the possibility hung over us till we were almost in sight of el Aqaba. I cannot say it unduly disturbed our rest, though we took certain precautions at night. It is worth putting on record, however, that it is only quite recently that the lawless element has been brought under control in this part of Sinai, because, apart from warring factions on the spot and a fanatical dislike of Christian strangers, it was a favourite resort of outlaws from Arabia. Anyhow, our Sheikh's sword looked a very formidable weapon, and served to supplement our normal armoury of tent-mallet and the tin-opener.

The very few travellers through these parts whose journeys are on record have usually retraced their steps at first down the Wadi esh Sheikh and then proceeded north-eastward by Wadi Akhdar and Wadi Zelegah into the Wadi el Ain and so to the sea. My own intention had been to emulate Laborde and to make first for Dahab on the Gulf of Aqaba and then follow the coast north. The Sheikh, however, insisted that he must have unfettered choice of route, and he elected to take us by a way which in part, anyhow, so far as I can make out, had not previously been used by any European traveller. Once we had crossed the watershed it lay largely over rolling downs studded with enormous thickets of crimson broom in full bloom; there was an abundance of butterflies, dragon-flies, and small birds; spring had fully come, and the Wilderness was rejoicing and blossoming like the rose.

It may have been partly to outwit our potential enemies that Sheikh Suleiman led us neither through the Wadi el Ain nor via Dahab, but stated that he intended to strike the coast at Nuweibe. He even avoided the usual watering-place at Ain Huderah. (This is generally regarded as the Hazeroth of the Biblical narrative—that is, the second main halting-place of the Israelites after they left the Mount.) From a point shortly after we left the Convent it was many days before I got my bearings again

or was able to locate on my small map the point we had reached. Actually the Sheikh struck into the Wadi Ghazala at its source. This *wadi* falls into Wadi Watir, which is the great highway from the central highlands to the east coast. The junction is marked by a lovely spring and oasis called Ain Furtaga. But before we reached this point a strange and at the time a very disquieting thing happened.

You remember Musa el Shaer, the guide from Cairo. This man was a conscientious worker and cook, but he was most troublesome and truculent with anyone not his employer or his subordinate. Although useless as a guide himself, he resented my engaging the Sheikh, insisted on treating him with rudeness and suspicion, and fell out with him over some trifle every day. Matters came to a head one afternoon in the Wadi Ghazala, when our water was running low, and Musa accused the Sheikh of incompetence and almost of leading us astray. The Sheikh, instead of retaliating, simply galloped off and left us to our own devices. We were proceeding roughly north-east at the time, and this was before I had established our position on my map. Wadi Ghazala was marked there, but it was not named, and so I had no means of knowing in which direction the next spring or well lay. We pushed on as far as we could while daylight lasted, then passed a very uncertain and anxious night. Next day the Sheikh returned and resumed his duties as though nothing had happened, but the incident was not pleasant while it lasted, and brought home that I had incurred an unwarrantable risk in undertaking a journey of this sort without proper maps or some preliminary training in the use of instruments.

We followed the serpentine wanderings of the magnificent Wadi Watir, whose walls towered in places a thousand feet above us, till it brought us out on the shores of the Gulf of Aqaba (here about twelve miles wide), and I had my first view of the mountainous shore of Arabia beyond it. I was prepared for certain difficulties on the route that still lay before us, but at least we could hardly lose our way, as we only had to set our faces northwards and follow the coastline in order to reach el Aqaba.

The obstacles in the way proved of two kinds. Speaking generally, there is a narrow gravelly beach all the way between the mountains and the sea, but in places these mountains thrust out steep spurs across our path which ran down like huge groins into the sea. Some of these we crossed by turning inland and climbing narrow, steep passes; in other cases the caravan had to be manœuvred round the base of these promontories at low tide, where the camels picked their way precariously among the wave-washed rocks. Luckily by now they had eaten nearly all the fodder we carried, and their loads were more manageable, but in one place we had to jettison some of the camp equipment which made the camel carrying it too broad to get round a corner.

Along this stretch of coast we resumed acquaintance with the human race in the form of two Arab fishermen. They had no boats, but they cast with great skill a large circular net weighted with lead while wading thigh-deep in the sea. We acquired some of their fish, which proved splendid eating. We also met an Armenian prospecting for manganese,



By the kindness of Messrs. Methuen, from *Once in Sinai*, by J. M. C. Plowden.

who provided us with a little tea and flour and shot us a raven to eat. All this was most welcome, as by now our stores were very low.

Every night we camped by the seashore. I insisted on the camels paddling morning and evening, as I had heard that somewhere ahead we had to travel some distance through the edge of the sea, and I wanted them to get used to the idea under good conditions. Nile camels always seem unduly alarmed by water in any form. One of the joys of this section of the journey was the bathing; one could follow up ten hours on camel-back by a dip in the Gulf, though it is not safe to go far from the shore on account of sharks.

Some days later we approached the critical stretch of coast where caravans must go through the sea. By bad luck we all overslept that morning; on entering the sea we encountered a rising tide and were in some risk of being swept away. My own animal panicked badly until one of the Sudanese swam round on his off side and headed him back towards the shore. We lost some stores, but no real harm was done.

Before this occurred I had had a more enjoyable adventure in company with an ancient Beduin hunter called Sheikh Suleiman el Robayeh, whom we fell in with riding along the shore. He took me for a day's excursion up into the mountains in search of ibex. The hinterland of this coast is very lofty, wild, and rugged, and remains almost entirely unexplored. Nothing lives here except ibex, hyenas and jinns. It is the jinns that keep the Beduin away; every uncanny noise made by wind or falling rock or echo is ascribed to their agency.

The country is too steep for camels, and we climbed—often on all fours—right on top of the watershed between the sea and the upper reaches of the Wadi Watir. The Sinaitic ibex was common once, but now it is rare and is strictly preserved. As Sheikh el Robayeh was responsible for its preservation, it was great fun hunting it in his company. That day we climbed three thousand feet and covered twenty-five miles on foot and eleven on camel-back.

Travelling along this shore, we passed the Island of Graia, or Faraun, another association with King Pharaoh. It is very small and completely covered by a ruined castle ascribed to Crusaders. A full account of it can be found in Lawrence's *Wilderness of Zin*. The coast in this district is much obstructed by mountain spurs, and we often had to wait our chance and get the caravan along the beach when the tide was favourable. For this reason alone no one should venture along this shore without a local guide and pretty good nerves.

About a week after we left the Convent we reached Taba, a small Egyptian police post placed at the end of a long promontory. By now we could see el Aqaba, about eight miles away across the Gulf. It is marked by a mile-long belt of palm trees along the shore. At Taba we crossed the frontier into Palestine, and the following day the frontier into Trans-jordan. Then without further adventure we rode round the head of the Gulf into el Aqaba. Men and camels, we were all fighting fit and as hard as nails; we had come through without casualty or sickness of any sort. My camel-men wanted to mark the occasion by a festivity, so I bought them a sheep, and they had a grand feast in Beduin style. At

el Aqaba I found myself among friends both in the Arab Legion and in the Transjordan Frontier Force, and after a fortnight's stay I was able, with the various help of a Desert Patrol camel, an Arab mare, an armoured car, and the mail car, to continue my wanderings for a further month in the mountains of Transjordan.

The caravan was in such good fettle that it only needed twenty-four hours' rest before setting out on its return journey to Suez by the direct route across the Peninsula. I sent Sheikh Suleiman with them to see them safely home.

Well, that is the end. I need hardly say the camels were the real heroes of the expedition. My riding-camel was an especially lovable animal who used to follow me round like a dog. I had ridden him in Egypt, and he recognized me at once after a year's interval. I shall never tire of singing praises of the camel, that prodigy of nature as Lawrence calls him. Each of my camels was devoted to his own camel-boy, and, though the big, rough *hamla* camels were a bit unapproachable at first, before long they would let me feed them, handle them, help load them, etc., till we were all the best of friends. If only the Israelites had had camels they would have had nothing to murmur about. Each of our six animals had a perfectly different character and was full of individuality; they were as affectionate and companionable as horses, and it was all due to their labours that the journey through the wilderness was successful.

When Mr. PHILBY and Professor NORMAN BENTWICH had spoken, the CHAIRMAN said that Madame Jullien had written a delightful book on Sinai, and he congratulated her on her lecture. She was, he said, a traveller in the true tradition. She did not hire a motor, a tourist guide, and, providing herself with all possible comforts, rush through the country, seeing the sights in the quickest possible time, but went as the travellers of old must have gone, travelling at the lazy pace of a camel, turning aside to make detours or short cuts across the hills on the spur of the moment, following no beaten path. Madame Jullien deserved the success she had gained. Her forbears were of a well-known English family who had served for generation after generation in India, and she was following in their footsteps. She had given them a delightful lecture and excellent views of a country the name of which had been familiar to them all since childhood. He congratulated her as he thanked her.

ACTIVITIES AT THE TURKISH "HALKEVI" (PEOPLE'S HOUSE) IN LONDON

By MAJOR H. M. BURTON

THE establishment of a branch of the Turkish cultural institution known as a "Halkevi," or People's House, in London has been more than justified, if one may judge by the interest which it has aroused since it was opened by the late Turkish Ambassador last February. When it is remembered that most people are heavily engaged with war work and have little time for relaxation in any form, the number of visitors to the various lectures and other functions arranged must be accounted highly satisfactory. Some idea of the scope of the Halkevi's activities may be gauged from the fact that besides the Organizing Committee four other helpers have been fully engaged with the work involved.

The first lecture given in the new Halkevi took place on March 24, when Bay S. Z. Özbekkan, the Commercial Counsellor to the Turkish Embassy, gave a brilliant and lucid exposition of the principles of government and methods of administration and education practised in Republican Turkey. His paper had the additional merit of being delivered in almost faultless English.

A number of lectures have been heard on archæological subjects: on April 7 Miss Winifred Lambe described some of the excavations which she has carried out in Anatolia; on April 21 Professor Sidney Smith, the British Museum authority, spoke on recent research on the Hittite Empire; and on April 28 Mr. A. H. M. Jones dealt with Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor. All these talks were illustrated by excellent lantern slides which were no doubt equally instructive to both Turkish and British members of the audience; indeed, a young Turk sitting next to me at one of these lectures remarked that he had come to learn more about the ancient history of his native land. Professor Talbot-Rice gave a most interesting account of the Seljuk civilization on June 9, and showed some lantern slides of beautiful examples of Seljuk architecture in various parts of Anatolia.

Turning to events which are perhaps better calculated to foster the primary purpose of the London Halkevi, as declared by the Organizing Committee—viz., "to give a picture not only of a People's House but also of *modern* Turkey to English people." On April 23, on the occasion of the Children's Festival, which by a happy coincidence falls on St. George's Day, a special series of visits to the Halkevi by schoolchildren was arranged. These commenced at 11 a.m. with a visit of the Gibraltar children and Girl Guides, when the Turkish Ambassador, Bay Rauf Orbay, attended the proceedings. This was followed at 3 p.m. by a visit of the London County Council schoolchildren and ending with a visit of the Girl Guides and Girls' Clubs at 7 p.m. All these children were shown excellent films of various aspects of modern Turkish life, due

emphasis being given to school and youth activities, and Sir Wyndham Deedes explained something of modern Turkey to the children in simple language. Afterwards, when questions were invited, several youngsters spoke up in a manner which showed unmistakably that they were genuinely interested. It is a pity that no Turkish children of a suitable age were available to mix with the English boys and girls, but at least the splendid films displayed will have done much to impress the audiences with the virile character of the modern Turkish Republic and will prevent the spread of those fantastic ideas about Turkey on which earlier generations were brought up.

Amongst other subjects dealt with in lectures were Earthquakes, by Mr. D. Laugharne Thornton, an authority on that subject, on May 12; the Turkish Constitution, by Professor Norman Bentwich on May 5; and the Halkevi in Turkey, by Sir Wyndham Deedes on May 26. On June 16 Bay S. Z. Özbekkan delivered a particularly appropriate lecture on Turkish civil administration to the Mayors and Mayoresses and M.P.'s of London.

In addition to all these lectures and meetings the ladies of the Turkish Embassy and Colony have been At Home once a fortnight. This is, one feels, a very important feature, for besides introducing a valuable point of social contact, the part played by Turkish women in the life of modern Turkey is a subject of special interest to Englishwomen. Moreover, it is encouraging to notice that visitors to the various functions are not drawn from one strata of society, nor from adults only, nor even, it may be added, only from British subjects, for a number of foreigners have taken advantage of their presence in London to visit the Halkevi and learn something about the astonishing progress of modern Turkey. This is most satisfactory, for the more people of all classes who can attend the meetings organized at the Halkevi the better for the achievement of its purposes.

One of the most noteworthy events yet arranged at the London Halkevi took place in connection with the Youth and Sports Festival on May 19. This memorable date in the calendar of Republican Turkey, when Kemal Atatürk landed at Samsun in 1919 to organize the Nationalist resistance in Anatolia, was appropriately selected to emphasize and strengthen the ties between Turkey and Britain in the field of sport, and more than one hundred representatives of various athletic and sporting institutions and leadings newspapers assembled at the Halkevi in the evening. The guests included well-known cricketers, football, boxing, tennis and cycling champions, the chair being taken by Mr. Alaway, Honorary Secretary of the Middlesex Wanderers' Football Association, the first British Football Club to visit Turkey, in June, 1939. Three films taken during that tour were shown by Mr. Wilson Tagg, and other films showing the work of primary schools in Turkey, the training of the Turkish Army, and festivities in Turkey on May 19 were also exhibited. The guests were given an account of the significance of May 19 in Turkish history, why it had been selected for the Youth and Sport Festival in Turkey, and the great importance which Atatürk attached to the Youth Movement and the development of sport generally. During the evening the Turkish

Consul-General in London, Bay Nebil Akçer, on behalf of the Turkish Ambassador, received a beautifully bound Visitors' Book from the Middlesex Wanderers' Football Association, in which the guests of the evening inscribed their names. Several hours were spent in a delightfully informal atmosphere, and the obvious pleasure of the guests at this opportunity to renew contact with their Turkish friends encourages the hope that it may be found possible after the war to arrange many more fixtures such as the highly successful tour of the Middlesex Wanderers in 1939. For sport in general surely provides the best possible cement in international relations, especially amongst those peoples who possess natural and true sporting instincts deeply ingrained in their characters, as is undoubtedly the case with both Turks and English.

Perhaps the most welcome feature yet introduced in the Halkevi is the commencement of lessons in the Turkish language. These are being given free of charge by Bay Ali Riza Şencan, who will be better remembered by many English students of Turkish by his former name of Ali Riza Bey, under which he taught Turkish for many years at Cambridge and subsequently at the School of Oriental Studies. He has now succeeded Bay Faruk Akçer as Secretary of the Halkevi. Classes in Turkish for beginners have been arranged on Mondays and Thursdays from 6.30 p.m. to 7.30 p.m., and for more advanced students on Wednesdays and Fridays at the same hour. The fact that over one hundred persons have applied to join these classes is some indication of the interest which this innovation has aroused, and the regularity with which students are attending the classes, in spite of the manifold distractions caused by the war, may be taken as a tribute to the novel methods of teaching evolved by Bay Ali Riza Şencan, and also to his unbounded enthusiasm. His numerous old pupils will rejoice to know that Bay Şencan has recovered so well from his recent serious illness as to be able to make this most valuable contribution to the cause of Anglo-Turkish understanding and friendship. His unorthodox but most effective methods of teaching, together with his never-failing sense of humour, will be remembered with gratitude and pleasure by large numbers of his former pupils. The inauguration of Turkish lessons at the Halkevi, free to the British public, is indeed a happy omen for the future, for, as Ali Riza himself wrote at the head of the first Turkish lesson he gave me—many years ago—" If you want to know the world, learn foreign languages " (" Bilmek istersen cihani, öğren ecnebi lisani ").

NOTE.—An important feature at the opening of the Halkevi on February 19, 1942, was inadvertently omitted from the account published in the April issue of the Journal. Shortly after the conclusion of the speeches delivered during the formal part of the opening ceremony, Sir Percy Loraine, who was British Ambassador to Turkey from 1934 to 1939, broadcast a message in Turkish to Ankara direct from the Halkevi. This is not the first occasion on which Sir Percy Loraine has broadcast in Turkish from this country, for he did so on October 29, 1941, on the eighteenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic.

In Turkey a "Halkevi," or People's House, in a city, town, or village, may be briefly described as both a centre of learning and a hive of activities, at which the members meet to pursue studies in one or more of the nine branches mentioned below, to take part in some form of recreation or to organize certain outside activities —*e.g.*, social work amongst villagers, sick folk or children. There are at present about four hundred Halkevleri in Turkey and their number is being steadily augmented.

If, for example, on any night a visit were paid to the People's House, at, say, Ankara, these are some of the activities which would be seen: a concert or lecture attended by several hundred, mostly young people; art classes; a dramatic rehearsal; classes in French and English; a library full of students, and a meeting, perhaps, of the Ankara Sports Association.

If a visit were paid to an up-country village it might be found that there was a class for adults in reading and writing or a geography lesson, and a lecture to village women on some domestic subject.

The full number of branches in a People's House in Turkey is nine—namely:

1. Sport.
2. Languages.
3. Adult Education.
4. Library.
5. Social Help (Medical Section).
6. Village Work.
7. Art.
8. Drama and Music.
9. Museum and History.

In London, of course, these activities cannot be reproduced in this form. The Turkish Community is very small and scattered, and while the House will serve them as a club and social centre, its primary purpose is to give a picture not only of a People's House, but also of modern Turkey to English people. It is proposed, therefore, to devote six sections to the following branches:

1. Education, Sport and Youth.
2. Village Life and Agriculture.
3. Archæology.
4. Literature and Fine-Arts.
5. Health and Social Services.
6. Economy,

and to display the activities of Turkey in each field by means of photographs, graphs, statistics, literature, etc. There will also always be a member of the staff of the House to give verbal explanations.

The Halkevi will possess a library and reading room, which, it is hoped, will become an authoritative centre of reference for all Turkish and Anglo-Turkish studies.

In course of time it is also hoped to be able to arrange courses of lectures for English people in those aspects of Turkish life which seem to be of greatest interest and to establish a class in the Turkish language.

After the war it is hoped to arrange exhibitions of Turkish art and occasional concerts of Turkish music.

Membership

Membership of the Halkevi in London is restricted to persons of Turkish nationality. But in order to build up a body of English people interested in the People's House and Turkish affairs a list of British honorary members is being compiled. Applications for inclusion in this list should be addressed to the Secretary of the Halkevi (Bay Ali Riza Şencan), 14, Fitzhardinge Street, W. 1, to whom all other communications about the Halkevi should be sent.

Copies of the Constitution of the Halkevi in London will shortly be available on application to the secretary.

Office Hours

Mondays-Fridays from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Saturdays from 10 a.m. to 12.30 p.m.

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE TRIBES OF THE ADEN PROTECTORATE

By R. A. B. HAMILTON

THE organization of the social classes in the small area of the Aden Protectorate is complicated. Few people have given much thought to it, and those who have, have usually erred in accepting generalizations.

In the organization one may still trace the ancient divisions of the territory as it was some two thousand or more years ago. It was then divided into four main states, which we can call kingdoms: that of Saba, which is supposed to be the ancient Sheba, in the Yemen; Qataba in south-east Yemen; Ma'an, a confederation ruled by the "Grand Council," between Eastern Yemen and Hadhramaut; and the kingdom of Hadhramaut.

To-day the territory is occupied by the descendants of the ancient people and split into many independent tribes. These tribes are all endogamous and are markedly distinct in appearance. But scientifically it would be difficult to name the distinctions, as they are all of the same race type. There is, however, a sufficiently marked distinction between the two main types to attract the attention of the casual, but interested, visitor to the country. These types are to be distinguished by their own local names, the Yemeni and the Mushreqi, the latter name coming from the ill-defined district of the Mushreq, which applies to the territories east of Yemen proper and does not include the tribes east of the Kathiri of Wadi Hadhramaut.

The Yemeni type are those bearing Sabaean names and Qatabanian names. These remain to be classified from names in inscriptions. It is sufficient to quote such names as Yafa', Qateib and Beni Saba.

Yafa' was the name of an ancient tribal deity, the centre of whose worship seems to have been the ruin of Am'Adia, in what is now the territory of the Audhali confederation, a very recent confederation of tribes. Yafa''s followers had a mausoleum at the holy city of Shabwa. They are now represented by the tribe of Yafa', one of the most eastern of the Yemeni tribes.

Qateib is the diminutive of Qatab, and we may translate it as the "remnant of Qatab." The present Qateibi tribes—"the wolves of Radfan," as they style themselves—form the centre of the war-like Ja'ud confederacy some sixty miles north-east of Aden; Beni Saba, Beni Himyar, etc., need no explanation. The Mushreq type bear un-Yemeni names. The centre of the whole type is the 'Aulaqi confederation. The word "'Aulaqi" is derived from "'alq," the spark of a camp-fire, and has little interest. But the confederation is ruled by the tribe of Ma'an and the "Grand Council of Ma'an" is called to this day when any one of the three chiefs of the confederation is to be elected. Of this type are all tribes east of the Yafa'i border and of the Eastern Yemen plateau.

In colour of skin, a light chocolate-brown, and in hair, both types are very similar, but there the similarity ends. In features, as in dress and in many customs which do not concern my subject, they are distinct from one another.

The tribesman class is the artisocratic, landowning class, and has been so for many centuries. They form 70 per cent. of the total population of the territory. All inter-tribal politics emanate from them. They form the background of the community's life. I have mentioned this class first for several reasons, but principally because we are used to a landowning aristocracy being in a minority. Here they form the majority. Having been for so many years controllers of their own destinies, the one landowning, fighting class and by far the most powerful class in the community, their insistence upon their rights to-day is understandable.

The tribal Chiefs are in three main categories—the appointed Suzerain, the accepted Suzerain and the elected hereditary tribal Chief. It will be simplest to deal with these three types of Chief in turn, giving examples of each.

In the first type, the appointed Suzerains, we can take as examples H.H. the Sultan of Lahej and the Amir of Dhala'.

The Sultan of Lahej rules over the territory of the 'Abdali tribe, and his frontier marches with the northern frontier of Aden Colony. He is descended from a Yafa'i family, who were appointed as Governors of Lahej by an Imam of San'a. Later they revolted against the Imams and declared their independence. By purchase, Imamic grants and seizure they own a considerable portion of the Lahej lands; they are of foreign origin to the tribe over which they rule.

The Amirs of Dhala' were appointed Governors of the Dhala' province, including the lands of the tribes of Halumein, Ahmad, Azraq and Shu'Ar, by the Imamas of San'a, and, later, of the lands of Sha'ib by a Sultan of Turkey. I see that the official handbook describes the Amirs of Dhala' as descendants from slaves. It is surprising how such obvious inaccuracies persist. To see that they have no slave blood in them requires no more than ordinary eyesight, and it would be impossible for an Imam of San'a to appoint a slave to any post, since there are no slaves in the Yemen at all, slavery being forbidden by the tenets of the Zeidi sect. The Amirs are of typical Central Yemeni type, such as is found on the Yemen plateau.

Later, they rebelled against the Imams and established their independence. Thus they rule over a confederation of small tribes, while belonging to none of them.

These appointed Suzerains, of whom the Sultan of Makalla is one, form a distinct class among Arab Chiefs. They do not mix with their tribesmen in the usual democratic Arab way, but stand apart, as it were, and are addressed by titles of exaggerated respect. Not being tribesmen of the tribe they rule, they have no traditional and family holds over the people and their attitudes towards their tribesmen are those of foreign rulers. They do not, as a rule, favour elected hereditary headmen in their villages, but prefer to appoint outsiders as headmen, whom they pay as retainers.

When a Suzerain dies, the election of the new Chief is held by the family only and the tribesmen are not consulted.

The accepted Suzerains are represented by one example only—the Sharifs of Beihan. It is, however, an interesting example.

In Beihan there are settlements of Sharifs and of Seyyids. There are also two tribes among whom these holy men live. Both the Sharifs and the Seyyids are arms-bearing families, and for some time were divided by a feud. Before the Great War, the elected Chief of the Sharifs, a far-sighted man called Ahmad, negotiated a treaty of protection and friendship with Great Britain. In this he gained the support of the lower tribe and of half the upper tribe, which was divided by a feud. After the Great War he concluded a truce with the Seyyids, and consolidated his relationships with his supporters among the tribesmen, who amounted to three-quarters of the population of Beihan. They accepted him as Suzerain and as their general agent for dealing with their foreign affairs. Thus, while he is undoubtedly a Suzerain, he is one of limited authority. He does not claim taxes from the land or the trade except in his own settlements, and is, consequently, very poor. But, for all that, the influence of the Sharifs is considerable in all the Beihan area. Their position is not, of course, unique in Arabia, but it is doubtful if any others than holy men could find themselves in a similar one.

The elected hereditary tribal Chiefs form the third type. In each tribal confederation there is a central tribe. Of this central tribe one family only provides Chiefs to the confederation. Normally the election of a Chief is the concern, not of his family only, but of the central tribe, while powerful petty Chiefs of other tribes within the confederation have a considerable say in it. Such Chiefs are, by virtue of the conditions of their election, truly democratic. By ancient tradition, however, they are held in great respect and are referred to invariably, as is their family, as the "Dola," or dynasty. They are accorded high-sounding titles by the Government and by other Chiefs, but their tribesmen address them by their names, and it would appear that the high-sounding titles are of recent adoption in the country. The Imam of San'a rarely uses them. Government correspondence is, for this reason, often a source of merriment.

It will be seen that all Chiefs are, whatever their type, elected in a greater or lesser degree—the Suzerains within their family circle and the hereditary Chiefs within their tribe. The main difference between the types is that, whereas the Suzerains are of foreign descent to the tribes over which they rule, the hereditary Chiefs are of the tribe and, as such, do not need to surround themselves with the trappings of imposed authority. In appearance the Suzerains are more imposing, and this has misled officials into supposing that they are of more consequence socially than other Chiefs are. This is, of course, not so.

In all these types of Chief, when the Chief dies his eldest son would appear, by custom, to have less right to succeed than others. Suzerains always try to impose their eldest or their favourite son as accepted heir during their lifetimes. This has happened in Lahej, where it led to a revolt among the Sultan's relations, and in Makalla by arrangement. The

Sharifs of Beihan have been exceptions to this, and have abided by custom. When Sharif Ahmad died, they held discussions among themselves. The eldest son was Sharif Hussein, but he was appointed Regent to his own eldest son, a young boy, who was elected Sharif. The reason given for this was that the grandson of the dead Chief had longer to live than his father and that frequent change in leadership was a bad thing. As a rule, however, Chiefly families pass the Chiefdoms from branch to branch, and, when the Chief dies, a nephew will usually succeed. Among the 'Audhali recently, the Chief was murdered by his cousin. The tribe was split in two by feud, but one half elected the murderer's son, a boy of eight years old, to the Chiefdom. This boy was accepted in 1934, when the feud ceased, as Sultan of the tribe.

We next come to the holy classes. The first of these are the Sharifs and Seyyids, the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. They live in settlements and elect among themselves in each family a headman. They have great influence in the community, but it varies, of course, with the amount of their riches. Most Seyyids—the only Sharifs are those in Beihan—do not bear arms and take no part in tribal warfare. They are peacemakers, and derive considerable income as such, and as dispensers of the Sharia or holy law of Islam. They are treated with veneration and respect and, after death, are frequently treated as saints. They marry tribeswomen and the daughters of Chiefs, and many own land and are given tithes of other land by ancient right.

The other holy class is that of the descendants of the saints, for so they claim to be. Almost every village in the territory has its saints' tomb, a white rectangular building with one or more domes. Some of these tombs are of great age, and many I suspect to be pre-Islamic. Within the shrine these older structures are similar. There is a modern wooden rail pierced by a door. Beyond this is a long plaster sarcophagus in the shape of a roughly surfaced mound, sometimes as much as twenty feet long or more. Within this the saint or the prophet is supposed to be buried. Names, however, give an indication that it is not always an Islamic saint. Such names as Mola Matr, or Master of Rain, are of great interest, and it is a pity that such shrines have been adopted into Islam and not saved for archæology.

Each shrine is maintained by public subscription, in the form of tolls on travellers and gifts to reinforce prayers. Many shrines also own land or receive tithes from land. They are guarded by families who use the title Sheikh and who claim descent from the original saint. The best description for these families is that of "Holy Sheikh." In most cases the saint is considered a miracle worker, and this power may descend upon the Holy Sheikhs as well. This fact in itself is sufficient to give the Holy Sheikhs considerable influence, and they inspire respect and fear. I would stress the question of fear, for it is important. The buried saint and, to a certain degree, his supposed descendants are credited with the power of doing bodily and personal harm, such as depriving of sanity, striking with blindness, destruction of crops and the like. They are, in effect, witch-doctors, and are feared more than are the Seyyids, since they are considered to be dangerous men. Most go unarmed. Occasionally

they arm and join in feuds and tribal wars, but such Holy Sheikhs lose much of their power.

In this class one may put the attendants at the shrines of Prophets. They cannot claim to be descended from the Prophets and therefore they are not personally capable of working miracles. Consequently they have little influence in public affairs. The Prophets buried in the Protectorate include Job, or 'Aiyub, as he is called, whose tomb is near Dhala', and Sha'ib, the supposed father-in-law of Moses, who has several tombs. We must also include those peculiar men who watch over the abodes of Jinns and spirits. They are not supposedly capable of working miracles, but they are held in awe for their spooky associations. There is a famous Jinn who resides on the headland of Ras Imran, near Aden. His attendants are all of one family, who are treated by the people similarly to the attendants of a Prophet's tomb.

All those Holy Sheikhs, whether descendants of saints, attendants at Prophets' shrines or Jinns' abodes, are called Sheikhs, and each family elects its own headman. They are frequently confused with Sheikhs who derive their titles from elected headmanship of tribal sections and of villages. While some saints are undoubtedly of Islamic origin, most are, I suspect, of very ancient origin, and all, whether saints, Prophets or Jinns, receive the same honours. A day in the year is set apart for their Ziarra, or visiting day. Early in the morning of that day the attendants unfurl the saint's flag, if he has one, and process with it, followed by the people, to the door of the shrine. Here the people dance and hold a fair, while many go in and put their requests to the saint, firing a salute outside the door and paying a present in money or in kind to the head Sheikh. Once inside, they kneel by the tomb and whisper their requests to it, saluting the tomb with a kiss. They then leave and are entertained with a cup of coffee-husk tea at the door or in the outer court.

Such shrines have another value to the community—they are the only form of poor-relief in the land. Poor travellers will always stop at saints' shrines for the night, and they are never refused entertainment. When travelling in the country oneself it is often a good thing, for this reason, to give a present to the local saint rather than to a petty Chief, and I frequently did so. The political effect is good, and one avoids causing the jealousy among petty Chiefs which is so frequently occasioned by the passage of a political officer.

In the Mushreq there is a class of men who are hereditary and appointed judges. They are probably the remnants of the legal system of one or other of the ancient kingdoms, and, by their situation, I should say of Ma'an. The Chief of these is the hereditary judge or Manqad (plural, Manaqid). The derivation of the word is from the root NQD, meaning "to pick out or investigate." He is elected from a certain family. The family itself has great influence in local public affairs, but only its elected head styles himself a Manqad, and he has the title of Manqad Al Manaqid, or "Judge of Judges." Once elected he himself, without consulting anyone, appoints four or five other Manqads. He does not appoint them from his own family, but from outside, and his choice is not limited to any class or tribe. One, recently appointed, was from the Dha'if class,

who are not aristocrats and whom I shall presently describe. These men are known as Manqads and perform the duties of a final court of appeal. Their judgments are given according to the widest possible code, which they describe as "Asharia, Al 'Ada and Al Haq," or "The Holy Law, tribal custom and the Right." Once having put his case to a Manqad, no tribesman would either withdraw it or refuse to abide by the Manqad's decision. To do so would be to forfeit his tribal honour by committing a great shame. Consequently their judgments in disputes are only sought when all other courts have failed.

When a Chief Manqad dies and a new one is elected by the family, the appointments of all other Manqads is suspended until they are confirmed by the new Chief Manqad.

Manqads dress as poor men. They do not carry arms, and behave with great humility. They are treated by the tribesmen and the Chiefs with great respect. There is little doubt as to which part of their code they prefer: it is Al 'Ada, or tribal custom, and they have a fund of ancient folklore which should not be neglected by the anthropologists. They will do everything they can to maintain custom among the tribes, even when to do so is not to their own personal advantage. Recently one of them discovered that a guest of his, whom he had just entertained for a few days in his house, had previously committed a flagrant breach of tribal customs. He at once took out of his house everything this guest had touched—carpets, matting, blankets, cooking-pots and the like—and burnt or destroyed it all. His action in so doing was so deeply felt by the guest's own family that they shot him within the week. Had any Chief chosen a similar way of showing his disapproval it is doubtful if the guest's family would have looked upon the matter with such concern and would probably have accused the Chief of insulting them.

This completes the upper classes in the community, the Chiefs and tribesmen and the holy men of various types. The picture, then, is of a community ruled over by three types of Chief, split into smaller tribes each ruled by its headman, and again split into villages under a village headman. Among them move the Seyyids, descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, and the descendants of saints, the servants of Prophets' tombs and of the abodes of Jinns, each electing their own headman within their own families and all, in a varying degree, landowners or tithe-owners.

We now come to the landless classes. These have been in the past incorrectly grouped under one heading as Raya, or peasants. We will therefore take the true Raya class first. It is small and is composed of those men who farm land not as tenants but as paid farm-hands. The Scottish "grieve" is an example. They have no land or houses of their own, the produce of the land belongs entirely to the landowners, who give the Raya pay for their labour in cash and kind. The landowner is often a distant saint or prophet. Thus, for example, a saint may, by ancient custom, receive a tenth of the crop on a tribesman's land, but from his own land he receives all, and the Chief of the Holy Sheikhs will remit a certain amount in return for the peasant's labour. This distinction has frequently led to misunderstandings when political officers have investi-

gated accusations of robbery against Chiefs. It frequently occurs that one farmer is paying the tenth allowed by the holy law to a Chief, while the other next door is paying, say, 70 per cent. On the surface it seems very unequal treatment, but it will usually be found that the first farmer is farming his own land and paying taxes, while the other is of the Raya class, farming the Chief's own land and receiving pay.

Where districts have retrogressed through loss of control on the part of the Chief, the greatest care is needed when one is setting up control again to see that the tribesmen are confirmed in their lands and that the Raya do not suddenly pretend that they are tribesmen, in an endeavour to secure land which is not theirs, and that Raya do not change service against their will during the settlement of land disputes. Although a small class they are an important one, and few officials have given sufficient study to their social position.

Their origin is a puzzle. They are of the same race as the tribesmen and can bear arms. They are probably descended from remnants of tribal sections who have lost their land in war or who have been compelled to sell it.

Very similar to these Raya are the agriculturists of the Dha'if class. The Dha'if is a large class and differs from the Raya in that they are not entirely landless peasants, but are also landless shopkeepers and artisans. Those who work as peasants are distinguished from the Raya in that they do not remain for any length of time on one plot of land, but take up all kinds of casual labour as well as farm labour. Among such one may find carpenters, gunsmiths, builders and tradesmen. The manufacture of indigo dye, with which the Mushreqi tribesman dyes himself and his clothes, and the sale of indigo-dyed cotton is, to a large extent, in their hands. Large families of this class are to be found throughout the territory in the market towns. Unlike the Raya, they do not bear arms.

The Heiq class is almost indistinguishable from the Dha'if, but there is a distinction in that the Heiq can be described as the lower third of the Dha'if class. That is, that the whole class of artisans and casual labourers can be described, in a generalization, as Dha'if, but the poorer, unskilled casual labourer is of the Heiq class. As an example, a rich shopkeeper is Dha'if, but, because of his possessions, is not Heiq. It is not a very important distinction. Dha'if in Arabic means "weak." I am unable to discover the derivation of Heiq, but we can take it to mean "of low quality."

The Asakar, or hired soldier class, are a class in themselves. They are of two kinds—freed slaves still in the service of their master and tribesmen who have lost their lands and their status and entered the service of their Chief. Once this happens to a tribesman, he or his descendants can never return again to the status of tribesmen, but remain ever afterwards Askari, whether they still serve master or not. They have dropped below the aristocratic classes and can no longer intermarry with tribesmen. I have heard of no exceptions to this hard rule.

The next class is that of the Doshan, plural Doashin. I can find no derivation to the name. They are of two kinds—wandering singers and dancers, and settled singing-men who have attached themselves to a

particular tribe. Their origin is a mystery. The wanderings ones, who give the most dismal performances of what they call dancing, can always be driven out of camp. It is best, however, to be polite to the settled ones. They are skilled versifiers, and those who treat them with contempt must submit afterwards to unmerciful lampooning. On public holidays in up-country towns one of them frequently appoints himself as Amir Al 'Id, or "Amir of the Holiday." Supported by his friends and anyone who wants some fun, he calls upon the local Chief and demands a present and entertainment. This the Chief refuses, and receives an ultimatum challenging him to war in a few minutes. The war which ensues is conducted for the most part with fireworks, blank ammunition, water and balls of dung. The Chief's fort is the centre of attack. Eventually the Chief will ask for a truce, ambassadors are exchanged and all ends in an entertainment and a present to the "Amir." At other times they will institute rhyming competitions, or will compose and sing long Qasidas on the local political situation. Some of these settled Doashin become men of mark, but they have, for all their poems and lampoons, little effect on tribal policy and no say whatever in tribal affairs.

Slaves need no introduction. The slave trade in the south is dead, but the descendants of Abyssinian slaves still serve their original masters. It would be absurd to free them; they are completely free, but slavery is their only niche in the community. Take that away and they would be homeless and workless. As in the rest of Arabia, except the Zeidi Yemen, they are a race apart and are much respected, frequently attaining positions of high rank. A man will trust his slave before his brother. Tribesmen will eat with a slave when the slave has attained a position of eminence, such as governor of a village or commander of a post, but never with a Doshan or with a Heiq. A Chief's responsibility for his slaves is a very real one, and should he sell a slave or part with one he will be considered to have committed a shame. The slaves that I have met in the territory upheld the reputation slaves have always had for loyalty and courage.

We next come to two curious races, the Akhdam and the Hajur. I am satisfied that these are quite separate races, although there are a few instances of intermarriage in the major settlements. Akhdam is the plural of Khadim, which means "servant." This race is of African origin, but I can make no guess at the date at which they came to Arabia. Whenever it was, they appear to have left no relations or traces behind them in Africa. Their main settlement is at Zabid in the Western Yemen. They are of the Shafa'i sect, but practise witchcraft, make phalli and hold snakes and snake-charmers in great respect. In appearance they are small and their skin is a dull dark brown, not a glossy East African black. The only race in the country which will do filthy work, the Akhdam are in great demand and are employed as sweepers. They have their own headman in their small communities, successful wizards appointing themselves to the post without election.

The second foreign race is the Hajur. They appear to be South-west Abyssinians and are very like the Galla. Like the Akhdam, they have long ago lost any linguistic connection with Africa and speak Arabic.

They are hardy and well-built and live in grass-hut settlements on the coastal belt between Lahej and Abyan. Some, on occasion, bear arms, but they are on the whole un-warlike and seek casual labour at harvest time. The 'Abdali tribes of Lajeh have intermarried with them to a considerable extent, and for this reason the 'Abdalis are darker than most coast Arabs and many villages in their territory are occupied by settled Hajur. In a few generations the Hajur and the 'Abdali will be indistinguishable, and I think this mingling of the two races must be very recent, and probably began during or just before the Turkish occupation of Lahej in 1916.

East of Aden, for some hundred miles, the coastal fishing communities are of Hajur or mixed Hajur stock. They elect their headmen as the Arabs do and are of the Shafa'i sect, but, like the Akhdam, they incline towards witchcraft and phallic worship. The observant traveller on the Lahej road will see plenty of evidence for this close to their settlements.

It is possible that these two African races came to Arabia during the second and third centuries A.D. as camp-followers to Abyssinian armies. But this is pure conjecture.

Finally, we come to the Jews. Jewish settlements exist all over the Protectorate. The principal settlement is in San'a, and all Jews of South Arabia claim inter-relationship and have many family connections in Palestine. They claim to be descended from the Jews of Kheybar. It is more probable, however, that the original Yemeni Jews are of South Arab race. Before the rise of Islam the people of South-west Arabia were Christians, Jews and worshippers of the many local gods. There was a Christian bishopric at Najran, and a strong settlement of Jews in Jauf. The Jews survived the rise of Islam, religious affinities have attracted to them a certain amount of northern blood, but to-day there is little apparent difference physically between them and the tribesmen of the Yemen: their features are similar; the colour of the skin is only a little lighter, which may be accounted for by the Jew being less exposed to the weather.

Certain laws are imposed upon the Jews by the Arabs. Where, as in the Ja'ud tribes, there is no real Chief, the law becomes custom. They must dress in a particular kind of smock; they must wear their hair in ringlets, hanging down either side of the head in front of the ears; they must not wear a turban; they must not build houses of more than one storey in height; they must not carry arms.

The Jews are perfectly content to abide by these customs. They own no land and their only stock is chickens, but they are, comparatively, skilled artisans, jewellers and metal workers. They have a corner in such trades. Moreover, they pay only the most nominal of taxes, their houses are rent free and no man's hand is against them. To kill a Jew is a great shame, greater even than killing a woman. The Arab leaves the Jew to his religion, and he would not dream of attempting to coerce one into working on the Sabbath, however urgent the matter was. The Jews of the Yemen, therefore, live in great security. They appoint their own heads and run their own schools. Their women are unmolested, their taxes small and their profits great. Few of them, in my opinion, even

wish to leave the Yemen, but are more than content to remain. In the capital of Yemen, San'a, the Imam deals with business concerning the Jews through their own head entirely and treats them with every consideration and respect, and his example is followed by his Governors and by Chiefs of the Protectorate. They are a contented, hard-working community. From enquiries I have made I would say that their numbers are fairly static and that there is little danger of a Jewish population problem arising in the near future.

These complete the list of classes and races settled in the Aden Protectorate. Time limits my description to a mere sketch, and I have confined myself to permanent settlers and not to those different types with which the political officer may at times have to concern himself. South Arabia is still a pilgrim route, and I have several times met travellers from the Persian Gulf and Oman and as far afield as Baluchistan, journeying on the hard road through the country to Mecca. I have not described the Somali or Dankali coast traders, nor the sailors.

It will, very soon, be necessary to correct the existing handbook or to publish a new official manual about the country. While there were a few political officers of long residence in the Protectorate such a manual was unnecessary. We all learnt on our own. Now not only has the political staff been increased, but Air Staff Intelligence Officers and Army Intelligence Officers are beginning to travel in the country. The country is being opened up and it is essential that officers who have to travel in it should make a close study of its people, their ancient social organization, their laws of land tenure and their systems of agriculture. At present those officers who have the inclination to investigate these complicated matters seldom have the time to make that investigation a thorough one. It must be added that such knowledge cannot be obtained through interpreters, but that the investigator must have a very fair knowledge of the spoken and the written language. Such things as deeds of ownership must be examined in the original, and the investigator must have a good knowledge of the language and the history of the people to enable him to form a judgment on an original document or to spot a forgery. A colloquial knowledge of the language is insufficient. My own knowledge is insufficient, I hope others will add to this short summary.

REVIEWS

The Millat of Islam and the Menace of "Indianism." (A Pamphlet.) By C. Rahmat Ali.

The events of the last months have given a new importance to the schemes for the separation of the Muslim from the Hindu parts of India loosely covered by the name Pakistan, though, strictly, Pakistan is only one of the regions with the future of which this little book is concerned. Most of us who have spent our active years in the service of India have regarded the gradual unification of that great land as the most indisputable benefit which the British *Raj* has conferred on its peoples, and until the last few years few Indians would have been found to dispute that claim, whatever other criticism they might have brought against our rule. Even during the Round-Table Conferences the major Indian parties were at least agreed on the principle of federation. To-day the scene has changed so completely that the British Government is offering any Province the right, should it so desire, to refuse to federate, and, it would seem, to enjoy Dominion Status in isolation.

It would be a work of supererogation to describe in detail the stages by which this state of affairs has come about; the facts are well known. Communal riots have always been a recurring unpleasantness in Indian life, but it was not until the progress of political reforms, and especially the years of dyarchy, had proved the value in terms of power and profit of political office and showed that the days of impartial, if foreign, rule, which had kept the scales even, were almost numbered, that communal strife, with a new motive added, became more bitter, and the politicians found in it a weapon ready for their hand. The deterioration was not continuous; there were times when the leaders of the two communities worked together, if only to oppose the Government. Even the communal franchise, unwillingly granted as the only means of soothing Muslim fears at the time of the Minto-Morley reforms, was accepted as part of the short-lived Lucknow pact in 1916. Most hopeful was the great measure of agreement reached by the Indian delegates of all parties at the Round-Table Conferences in support of federation. Yet the immediate result of provincial autonomy after 1937 was to increase the tension. It is difficult fairly to assess the performance of the Congress Governments during 1937-39, but while some impartial observers consider that they did reasonably well, most Muslim spokesmen condemned them as having been grossly unfair to the minorities. It is not irrelevant to note that, whereas in the four Muslim Provinces coalition ministries were formed, in those in which the Congress gained a majority no coalition was permitted by the Congress leaders and the minorities were represented, if at all, by nobodies in whom their own communities had no confidence.

That is where we stand to-day. The Muslim League, which claims to represent all the Muslims of India, has declared, in 1940, in favour of "geographically contiguous units," which should be "grouped to con-

stitute independent states," in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign, and has reversed its own earlier decisions in favour of federation.

To turn now to the contents of the book under review, it must in the first place be understood that its object is not to convert the opponents of Pakistan. It is a cry from the heart, like the utterance of a Jewish prophet or a crusading monk, meant for the ears and the emotions of those who believe or are ready to believe.

It makes no efforts to establish, for others, the premises from which Mr. Rahmat Ali starts, gives few arguments in support of his statements, and has little concern with the political or economic results of his conclusions. To those who approach the problem from a different starting point the violence of his declamation is sometimes perplexing. What, for example, are the "measureless sacrifices of the Millat" on which he insists? Indeed, the analysis of his book in no small degree resembles an attempt by a surgeon to dissect a disembodied spirit. If one who is not a Muslim but has a deep respect for the religion of Islam criticizes such a book, it is with no desire to cast reflections on the author's sincerity and earnestness, still less on any of the tenets of his faith.

Mr. Rahmat Ali assumes that the doctrine of the unity of Islam makes it essential that Muslims should live in an Islamic state. The history of Islam, as of other religions, shows, however, that religious unity has not connoted political unity or even harmony. To-day the most powerful state with a Muslim population has a secular Government, and has abolished, within its own boundaries, the very institution of the Caliphate. There is no sign of any ruler anywhere who is generally recognized as Caliph. The word *Millat* itself suggests, at least to Western ears, the distinction between religious and cultural autonomy and political power, since under the Sultans of Turkey Christian and Jewish communities were recognized as separate *Millats*, with the right of managing their own religious, social and commercial life. Their liberties might, indeed, be infringed at the whim of an autocratic Sultan at any moment, a danger which would persist under any totalitarian régime, but against which, in a land in which the leaders of all parties profess democratic principles and toleration for the views of others, a well-devised constitution should be able to provide. History also shows that "theocracies" have seldom been well governed or happy for long. Such is the fallibility of human nature that the rulers have almost always fallen into error: they have oppressed dissenting minorities in their own territories, committed aggression against less orthodox neighbours, or given way to the temptation to enrich themselves, their families or their favourites.

Religious unity is only one side of the question. Geographical, racial and economic factors have also to be considered. Our author condemns as "fantastic" rival schemes which spring from the postulate of the territorial unity of India. Yet India is a geographical unit far more clearly defined than, say, any of the states of Europe or even the continent of Europe itself, and in a somewhat obscure sentence our author has told us that it is the territorial unit which defines the position of a nation. The boundaries of his Pakistan are quite uncertain. It would seem that he is

willing to accept the fortuitous provincial boundaries of to-day, greatly as they have changed in the last forty years, and would change again if all separatist demands were granted. But, as they stand, who, without a surveyor at his side, could say where the Punjab ends and the United Provinces begins, or where you pass from Muslim Sind to Hindu Jaisalmir?

Racially, the Indian Muslims are not homogeneous. The vast majority are of Indian blood, descended from the diversified inhabitants of India before the days of the Muslim conquest. The Musulman Rajput is kin to the Hindu Rajput, not to the Pathan; the Gujarati Borah cultivator has far more affinity with the neighbouring Koli than with the Muslim of Eastern Bengal. India is, in fact, their Motherland, none the less if they fall out with their Hindu brothers.

Economically, the interdependence of all India on its various parts is obvious. Much of the Punjab depends on Bombay, not on Karachi, for its sea-borne traffic. Calcutta's business is at least as much with its Hindu hinterland as with the Muslim districts. Railways, roads, canals pass from one Province to the other. Except by a reversion to Mr. Gandhi's ideal primitive mode of life, few parts of India could live, let alone prosper, in isolation. Financially, Baluchistan and Sind, probably the North-West Frontier, too, are not self-supporting. To keep them going is no heavy burden on the revenues of all India, but would sorely tax Muslim India alone. Our author completely ignores these difficulties.

Another matter which he ignores is the problem of the Indian states. In his Pakistan he includes Baluchistan, only small patches of which are even administered by the British. The Kalat State and certain tribal areas cover nearly the whole of it. They cannot be swept into a new Pakistan without their consent, and it is very probable that the Khan of Kalat would stand out for conditions just as strongly as the Maharajah of Baroda. Then there is Kashmir, a state largely Muslim in population but ruled by a Hindu dynasty. In the converse case of Hyderabad our author assumes that the Muslim dynasty has the right to decide the fate of its predominantly Hindu subjects, and bases that right on the canon of international law, its *de jure* sovereignty and the treaties with the British Government. He gives no reason to his claim to Kashmir as an integral part of Pakistan, perhaps wisely, since it would need very expert casuistry to prove that titles which are valid in the one case have no force in the other. He assumes also that the North-West Frontier Province would necessarily be included. Yet the Province, ascribing its attainment of full provincial status to the help of Congress, elected a Congress majority and had a pro-Congress Government. There is nothing to suggest that this most Muslim Province of all India would now throw over the Congress and join its anti-Congress neighbours. Our author, as we have already mentioned, gives no attention to boundaries. When he writes of the Punjab he seems to mean the whole Punjab, with its 44 per cent. of Hindus and Sikhs. His " Bang-i-Islam " seems to include all Eastern Bengal and Assam and a large part of Western Bengal, with all their Hindu populations. On the other hand, he has nothing to say about the many Muslims of the United Provinces, great though their place

in history once was, nor about the Muslim minorities scattered over India—the Moplahs, for instance. He would seem to include the Sikh and Hindu states within the geographical area of the Punjab, but to exclude such states as Bhopal. For them and for the Khojas of Cutch, Kathiawar and Bombay there would seem to be no place in the Millat of Islam, as he conceives it. They are to be left to what he describes as the "miserable lot of slavery within India."

Of the relations between the three Muslim *blocs* or "nations" and Hindustan there are no hints, except that "ties with India" are severed, unless it is in an ominous phrase in the last paragraph but one of the book. After the alliance of the Muslim nations has been created, "inspired by the solemn conviction of our historic mission and united under the Crescent and Star, we would carry through our fight to final victory." A fight against whom and for what? Internationally the picture is not much clearer. Pakistan, Eastern Bengal and Hyderabad, his three nations, would be in much the same position as Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Greece would have held, had they formed an alliance before this war. If they were to look for alliances outside India, would they look for their chief friends to their neighbours in Afghanistan and Persia, or to those a little farther off, Iraq and Saudi Arabia? Combined with Afghanistan they might offer a threat to "Hindustan," but how could they hope to face Japan—or Russia? Valour in plenty they would have, but that is not enough.

"Pakistan" is not the only scheme before the public. Our author pours scorn on the "petty manœuvres" of reciprocal guarantees and political safeguards within India with which those other plans are concerned, but we have to look to them to find any political realism. The first hints came in a speech from Sir Muhammad Iqbal in 1930, and were generally regarded as the dreams of a visionary. The name Pakistan was first heard in public during the Round-Table Conference. In 1938 and 1939 Sayyid Abdul Latif proposed the regrouping of all India in zonal areas on a religious, racial and linguistic basis, with migration within India to consolidate the populations. Mr. Rahmet Ali, we may note, claims that his scheme would require no changes of population. Sayyid Abdul Latif looked to an All-India Federation as the ultimate objective, but regarded partition as an alternative if agreement could not be reached.

Next came in 1931 the proposals of Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, and in the same year those of "a Panjabi," who was more concerned with religion than with politics, and offers little constitutional detail, though he, too, thought of federation as a possibility. These and other schemes have been expounded in public and in numberless addresses, among which may be mentioned the paper which Sirdar Iqbal Ali Shah recently read to the East India Association, in which he favoured the conclusion of a *concordat* between Muslim and Hindu states for the fair treatment of minorities, not without the threat of retaliation if the *concordat* were not fully observed in practice. Memories of the Sudetenland and of the Polish frontier, with the use that Goebbels made of minority grievances, are not reassuring, nor can we be confident that the treaties by which in

the Cripps plan the minorities would be protected would prove effective unless both sides are animated by goodwill.

Sir Sikandar Hayat's scheme is by far the most carefully worked out and practical of those which we have seen; it assumes that "the necessity for an All-India Federation is universally admitted," and its chief feature is the creation of seven regional zones with rigid limitations on the powers of the Central Government. The other two schemes also propose a varying number of zones. Of the units making up the regions, some would be states and some self-governing Provinces. A number of ingenious devices are included, and with them much of the machinery of the 1935 Act. But tempting as it is to examine these further, they do not come within the bounds of our present subject. It is only necessary to remember that, although the Muslims are the largest minority, they are not the only one, and that arrangements which would suit them would not necessarily satisfy others, as is indeed shown by the displeasure of the Sikhs with the Cripps proposals.

The Muslim League has not pronounced in favour of any particular plan as against the other, and we do not yet know what line Mr. Jinnah will take in the present crisis. Nor do we know to what extent he can count on the Muslims of India in general for support if he adopts an extreme policy. The North-West Frontier and Sind will not follow him blindly, and the allegiance of Bengal is doubtful. Economic forces may be strong enough to induce some of the Provinces to remain parts of India against political pressure, and some may realize that at no time in history was it so clear that "in union is strength."

E. H.

Soviet Labour and Industry. By Leonard E. Hubbard. Pp. xv+315. Macmillan. 1942. 15s.

We are indebted to Mr. Hubbard for another work in his well-known series on various branches of the economic life of the Soviet Union. He comes of a family which has been engaged in Russian commerce for nearly two centuries, and has himself spent several years in Russia since the revolution. He writes as an impartial observer and adopts an objective attitude. In this book he deals with many of the usual controversial subjects, such as the efficiency of labour and management in Soviet industries, the standard of living, and the nature of money and prices in a planned economy. In all cases he states the official Soviet claim, or point of view, followed by the opinion of critics and his own interpretation of the facts.

The introduction is a critical study of the Bolshevik revolution, its causes and major results. The Russian character contains certain ingredients which caused the revolution to follow its own distinctive course. Whilst in the early years the influence of Marxian doctrine was considerable, in the later stages the Russian temperament, as well as the force of circumstances, gave twists to the Soviet exposition of Marxian doctrine.

The next chapter deals with the origin of capitalism in Russia under the Tzars and the reforms after 1905, and leads in the next to an account of the experimental period following the revolution. Succeeding chapters describe the introduction of planning; the results of the first Five-Year Plan; the end of rationing; and the rise of Stakhanovism, the movement to set a high standard of production in industries, which often developed into a stunt competition between factories.

The author subjects the so-called democratic constitution to an acid analysis, and describes in successive chapters recent labour legislation, the methods of fixing wages, the organization and planning of the distribution of labour, and the functions of

trade unions. There follow two long chapters on the standard of living, with many statistics and interesting comparisons with conditions under the Tzarist régime. It cannot be said, however, that these chapters, interesting as they are, by any means exhaust the subject, which is one of extreme complexity. Millions of Soviet citizens live totally different lives in industrial surroundings from the mode of life of their peasant parents, and the peasants have developed all sorts of new wants. Any final opinion on the progress of the standard of living, and its comparison with other countries, will probably have to await an objective study by a group of Soviet economists some years after peace is restored.

The later chapters of the book are devoted to taxation and savings; planned economy in theory and practice; women in industry; the industrial and agricultural proletariates, with observations on the mechanization of agriculture and the decline of peasant handicrafts; the activities and treatment of Jews; and the bureaucratic élite. The last chapter is a general estimate of the achievements of the Bolsheviks in building and controlling the Soviet State; but it is weakened by the last paragraph, in which there are hypothetical speculations as to the future, which can only be a matter of opinion. The book was completed before Russia was attacked, so the author has added a brief postscript, which contains the following noteworthy suggestion: "It is, of course, possible that the Party and bureaucratic aristocracy will endeavour to maintain its ascendancy and privileges after the war, but it is unlikely that the people, having acquired a new self-respect and confidence, will suffer themselves to be again reduced to their former subordinate position." In spite of the occasional unnecessary intrusion of the author's opinions, the book is one which no student of the Soviet economic system should fail to read.

H. S. J.

That They May Have Life. The Story of the American University of Beirut, 1866-1941. By Stephen B. L. Penrose, Jr. Pp. 347. New York. 1941. $3.75.

In the summer of 1922 I was spending a few days on holiday from Palestine in the lovely Lebanon village of Brumana. One day a friend asked me to walk over the hills to Shwaya, where Bayard and Mary Dodge were spending the summer. After tea, Bayard called me aside and told me—what was then still a secret—that he had just been appointed President of the American University of Beirut. I already knew something of the University, but I was to learn far more in the years that followed. That first meeting with the Dodges was followed by an annual visit to Beirut, where acquaintance soon ripened into friendship, and where I was privileged to become acquainted with the Faculty and staff, and several generations of students. Thus my knowledge of the University is—or was—fairly intimate, and I can testify at first hand to what it has accomplished in the lands of the Near and Middle East.

This is the first time that its history has been written. With the approach of its seventy-fifth anniversary, it is certainly fitting that the story should be told. The author, Mr. Stephen Penrose, Jr., is well qualified for his task. As a young man he spent three years on the staff at Beirut. After some years of teaching in American colleges, he became Assistant Director of the Near East College Association, the post he now holds. The book is a complete and, as far as one can judge, an accurate record of the work accomplished by American missionary effort in Beirut. The title is taken from the University motto, "Ut vitam habeant abundantius habeant"—words that have been justified, as this book proves. It is carefully written and well documented. It has some informative appendices, many good photographs and an end-paper map of the Near East. The work and character of the founder, Daniel Bliss. are well described—the "professor of story-telling," as he called himself. We can see, too, the influence of other outstanding personalities; Beirut certainly seems to have attracted some of the finest Americans to assist in the great enterprise. Howard Bliss, who carried on so bravely and successfully his father's traditions; Dr. Van Dyck, the Arabic scholar and a member of a remarkable family; Dr. George E. Post, who did so much to develop the Medical School and who wrote, in faultless Arabic, the standard book on the *Flora of Syria and*

Palestine; Edward Nickoley, friend of generations of students, whose names and characters he never forgot: these and many others pass across the stage and receive their due. It is to them and to their successors—Bayard Dodge and his colleagues of to-day—that the University owes a lasting debt.

Like many other universities, it sprang from humble beginnings. Since 1820 American missionaries had worked in that part of Asiatic Turkey fringing the Mediterranean, and by 1860 they had founded no less than thirty-three schools, mostly in Lebanon and Syria. They taught in Arabic, and printed their textbooks—and their translation of the Bible—at their own Arabic press. From the first, American influence on the development of the Arabic language and literature has been of great importance to the revival of Arabic culture. Among others, the late George Antonius bears witness to the importance of their work in this regard in *The Arab Awakening.*

The Syrian Protestant College, as it was called till 1920, was founded by the Rev. Daniel Bliss in 1862 and opened its doors four years later, though it was not until 1873 that the new buildings, erected on the present site, were completed. At the opening service, Dr. Bliss defined the purpose of the College in these remarkable words: "This College is for all conditions and classes of men without regard to colour, nationality, race or religion. A man white, black or yellow; Christian, Jew, Mohammadan or heathen, may enter and enjoy all the advantages of this institution for three, four or eight years and go out believing in one God, in many gods or in no god. But it will be impossible for anyone to continue with us long without knowing what we believe to be the truth, and our reasons for that belief." Spoken to-day by an educational missionary, such words would be considered unusual; seventy years ago they were revolutionary.

The principle thus laid down by Daniel Bliss remains. For many years Christian students formed the great majority, but more recently those of other faiths, and especially Moslems, have increased in such numbers as to form half of the total 2,000. But while there has been no attempt to proselytize, and converts have been few, the Christian influence to which the founder attached so much importance, and which still underlies all activities of the College, has had a lasting effect on the lives and characters of all those who have studied there. As Rustum Pasha, Governor-General of the Lebanon, once said to Dr. Bliss: "I do not know how much mathematics, nor how much of history, philosophy or science you teach at your Syrian Protestant College, but I do know this: that you make *men*, and that is the important thing. I wish I had one of your graduates to put into every office in my province. I would then have a far better government than I have." What, of course, he meant was "men of character"; such men could hardly have been developed in an atmosphere different from that prevailing under Daniel Bliss's régime.

Daniel Bliss was a remarkable man. Besides being a missionary in the best and broadest sense, he was also an excellent administrator, a firm disciplinarian and an inspiring teacher. The foundations he laid in those early days have endured. When in 1902 he was succeeded in the Presidency by his son, Howard Bliss, the College was already an institution recognized as a centre of learning far beyond the confines of Syria. Under Howard Bliss it progressed and expanded in many directions, and, owing to his energy and personality, succeeded in stemming the difficult years of the war. His death in 1920 coincided with the change in name and status of the College, which now became the American University of Beirut.

His successor, Bayard Dodge, brought with him family tradition as well as high qualifications. His great-uncle, David Stuart Dodge, had been connected with the College from its foundation, and, as son-in-law to Howard Bliss, he had the closest ties with his predecessor and the first President. In the twenty years of Bayard Dodge's régime the University has expanded still further. Standards have been raised, specialization developed and a new form of M.A. degree instituted, more or less corresponding with an Honours degree at a British university.

In other ways, too, advancement has been made. The Medical School had already achieved fame. By insisting on high standards and ruthlessly eliminating all who failed to reach them, the School succeeded in turning out qualified doctors whose services have been recognized in every country of the Near and Middle East.

Under President Dodge, who has always taken keen personal interest in its welfare, the Medical School has maintained and increased its reputation. Agricultural science and farm management—subjects of great importance for Syria and neighbouring lands, all dependent to a great extent on agriculture—are now included in the University curriculum; while, thanks to the generosity of the Near East Foundation, an Institute of Rural Life has been organized with the purpose of "inspiring landowners and tillers of the soil to co-operate in the use of scientific knowledge for the improvement of rural life." Another important change that has taken place is the admission to the University of girl students—including Moslem girls—an experiment that has been completely justified by success.

Political and religious difficulties have sometimes arisen. That is not surprising in an institution comprising nearly 2,000 students representing 22 sects and 50 nationalities! What is surprising—and most gratifying—is the good-fellowship and friendly atmosphere that are everywhere apparent. It is borne out through the book, and the present writer gladly testifies to its truth. No greater tribute could be paid to the religious principles (and religious tolerance) that prevail at Beirut than the answer given by a leading Moslem Sheikh of Saudi Arabia to a young teacher from the University, himself a Moslem, who asked if there were objections to Moslems attending a Christian college. "If the American University," replied the old man, "will give these boys the strength of character which it is known to give, and will save them from the materialism and unbelief which is playing havoc in so many so-called Christian lands to-day, we will call its name blessed." It is to this, more than to any other single factor, that are indebted the teachers, doctors, government officials, business men, nurses and politicians, of whom more than 2,000 educated at Beirut are now serving in every country of the Near and Middle East as well as in many countries of the West. In an article, *The Modern Missionary*, published only a few days before his death, and here reprinted in full, Howard Bliss wrote: "Few are the students from among the thousands who have studied at the Beirut College during the past fifty years who have not received a distinguishing stamp upon their lives which makes them to a greater or less degree marked men." This was written in 1920. It is still true to-day.

Mr. Penrose is to be commended on giving to the world in such readable form the history of an institution of which the influence has been so widespread and so beneficial.

Humphrey Bowman.

Diplomatic Petrel. By Sir Thomas Hohler, K.C.M.G., C.B. $10\frac{1}{2}'' \times 5\frac{3}{4}''$. Pp. xiii+246. Illustrations. John Murray. 1942. 15s.

In the glamorous days of diplomacy, members of the Diplomatic Service were supposed to lead sheltered lives, doing little else but attend parties and living on the fleshpots. Even if there was a grain of truth in this picture before the last war, it certainly never applied to Sir Thomas Hohler, and his book may serve to dispel the illusion that the life of a diplomatist is always a bed of roses.

For readers of this journal the chief interest in these reminiscences will lie in the first two-thirds of the book, in which the author records his experiences in Turkey, Egypt, Russia, Abyssinia and Japan. Not that the last part dealing with Mexico is any less interesting; in fact, it was in that unhappy land that Sir Thomas Hohler had the greatest scope for his unbounded energy, ingenuity and initiative during those years of bloodshed and chaos that followed the long period of tranquillity under Porfirio Diaz. Had President Wilson been able to descend from his lofty pedestal of idealized liberty and not persisted in backing the wrong horse in the person of the bandit Carranza . . . well, I advise you to read the book and form your own opinion. It need only be said that no diplomatist worked harder to protect the lives and property of his countrymen.

The four Oriental countries in which the author spent many years of service have all figured largely in the news since the outbreak of war. Great changes have come about in Turkey since the days of Abdul Hamid and the Armenian massacres, when Sir Thomas first went to Constantinople in 1895. Things were no better under the

Committee of Union and Progress when he returned there in 1908. "If Abdul Hamid's reign had been a monstrous despotism, yet he had kept his Empire together, however unstable the equilibrium, whereas the Young Turks had brought the whole of his edifice tumbling down."

The chapters devoted to Abyssinia and the rule of that old tyrant the Emperor Menelik are of special interest. The state of civilization can be imagined when we are told that "Abyssinia was the only country in which there was no smoking, the reason being that King Theodore, finding no mention of smoking in the Old Testament, decided that it could not be lawful, and anyone caught smoking had his nose cut off." Men were flogged with whips of zebra hide for thieving. "According to the law of Moses," said the Emperor, "I ought to have cut off their right hands, but I devised something new. I had them whipped and branded on the forehead and then gave them away as slaves."

He had two years in Egypt (1900-2) under Lord Cromer, of whom he says: "It was a liberal education to be on his staff. There was no brand of activity and knowledge in which he did not excel." When he returned in 1906 the situation had changed for the worse. Lord Cromer was older and in poor health, the Khedive was getting more troublesome and enriching himself by the sale of titles. In the case of the young Egyptians the question arose what to do with "a large class of superficially educated people who could not use their hands. As doctors they were inefficient and there were too many lawyers." The question is still unanswered.

From 1902 to 1905, which included the period of the Russo-Japanese War, Sir T. Hohler was secretary in Tokyo, and admits to having been a warm admirer and friend of the Japanese people—a most natural feeling at that time. "I think," he adds, "that the abandonment of the alliance was one of the most cardinal mistakes in our foreign policy I can remember." Viewed from the angle of the year 1905, when the first alliance had just been renewed and all seemed *couleur de rose* in our relations with Japan, that is understandable; but it ignores the fact that it was overwhelming pressure from the U.S. and Canada that forced H.M. Government to abandon the alliance in favour of the Washington treaties. Moreover, from what we know to-day of the long-planned aggression of the military leaders, it is clear that the British policy of live and let live and the open door was wholly incompatible with the ideals of the army, and in the end was bound to invalidate in the eyes of the Japanese any advantages that the continuance of the alliance might have had for them.

The book is full of good stories and never dull, and I look forward to reading in the second volume Sir Thomas Hohler's account of the exciting years he spent as political adviser to the High Commissioner in Constantinople after the war and as Minister in Hungary during the Bela Khun episode.

R. H. C.

Unexpected. By Lieut.-General Sir Douglas Brownrigg, K.C.B., D.S.O. $9\frac{1}{4}'' \times 6''$. Pp. 72. Illustrations. Hutchinson. 1942. 12s. 6d.

This is a pleasantly told story of a successful soldier's life which has included a good deal of globe-trotting. In the last war the author served in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia as a junior staff officer of the 13th Division and in this one as Adjutant-General of the B.E.F. With regard to Gallipoli a pre-requisite of success was, in his view, that "the Allied statesmen should agree that this was to be the major operation of the spring of 1915." Whether or not this was really essential, few will deny that the filling of so many of the higher posts with material that was admittedly either low grade or part worn was not the way to command success. The picture given of General Maude as a divisional commander is interesting. As regards his work, he carried emotional detachment to the point of finding "nothing incongruous in receiving the Sacrament with all reverence from the hands of a priest ordained for that purpose, in dealing with this same priest a few seconds later as an Army Chaplain who had been late for parade, and (that small matter having been disposed of) in acting as the ptrfect host and pressing the same individual to stay and have breakfast with him."

Naturally the chief interest of the book centres on the part which deals with the

ill-fated B.E.F. One could have wished for more than twenty pages. I must confess that I scanned them hoping to discover who was in fact responsible for agreeing to a plan which led to a force of 158,000 soldiers being permitted to do no more in the campaign than beat an ignominious retreat to the coast, there to be rescued through a miracle of improvisation, but ltaving the whole of their artillery, tanks and transport—25,000 vehicles in all—in German hands. Lord Gort has stattd in his despatches trat his "responsibilities wert confined to ensuring that the orders issued by the French for the tmployment of tht B.E.F. were capable of bting carried out"; and General Brownrigg remarks "that something had occurred on the first day of the new war which it had taken four years of the last one to effect: the B.E.F. had been placed under the operational control of a French general, and not even under the immediate orders of General Gamelin, commanding all the land forces of France." If by this is meant that a French general was made responsible for the security of the British Army it was something that never did happen in the last war. Haig had always the right of appeal to the War Cabinet should he disapprove of any directions given him by Foch. If this was not the case with Lord Gort, the responsibility for vetting and approving French plans must have rested on the General Staff, War Office, exercised on behalf of the War Cabinet, whose ultimate responsibility to Parliament for the safety of the army in France was inescapable.

In the event, the B.E.F. was moved forward to a position east of Brussels, with a gap of 110 miles between it and the open end of the Maginot Line; and of this distance the thirty miles immediately on the British right (the so-called Gembloux Gap extending as far as the Meuse) had no other obstacle than the River Dyle. Here untried French troops might be called upon to withstand the onslaught of ten panzer divisions, many of them already blooded in the Polish campaign. But unless the French line held, the British communications which ran through Amiens to Le Havre and Cherbourg would be immediately cut. That there were several excellent reasons for going forward cannot be disputed, but what did they all amount to when weighed in the scales against the risk incurred? As regards British action, a critical decision was involved, and the touchstone must have been a British General Staff plan based on the given conditions and worked out independently of the French either at G.H.Q. or at the War Office.

We know the result. It is perhaps pertinent to remark that this was not the first instance of defective planning in the present war, neither has it proved to be the last. What is more, with another continental expedition looming ahead and with the prospect of its being undertaken in conjunction with American troops, the overhaul of our system of planning warlike operations remains a preparation of vital importance. But it would seem that our military authorities still burn incense before the shrine of the one that has been in vogue for so long—in fact, since before the last war—and has let us down so often.

CLIVE GARSIA.

Wings Over Olympus. By T. H. Wisdom. 8″×5½″. Pp. 229. Illustrations. Cover maps. Allen and Unwin. 9s.

The author has given a true and vivid account of life in an R.A.F. Middle East squadron durisg the first year of war witr Italy. A period in which fresh commitments appeared in rapid succession, and always ahead of the means wherewith to meet them in full. To have achieved so much with so little was largely due to the splendid spirit and fighting efficiency of the air-crews, as well as to the devoted service of the ground staffs, who kept the aircraft flying under the varying conditions so ably described in this delightful book.

The duties of tht author as an R.A.F. Press officer require tact and patience. He it is who must prepare tht Prtss communiqués, in process of wrich he has to extract from a busy Air Staff the necessary material for the purpose. Accredited war correspondents are hard on his trail for "hot news." He is the buffer between them and the sometimes oyster-minded senior staff officers, who must always be on the look-out that no item of news slips out which might conceivably relp the enemy. To err on the safe side and say little is always the natural inclination of the staff.

In the preamble he makes reference to the possibilities of inaccuracies, but having

read the book through carefully, and with considerable interest, I can find none. Life in Egypt, the Western Desert, and in Greece is accurately described.

The particular squadron—No. 211—the fortunes of which he followed from Libya to Greece, built up for itself a fine reputation, and in this I agree with him that "Bish" played a leading part. I, too, have visited that squadron both in Libya and Greece, seen them at work in the desert and in the Valley of Fairy Tales. I saw for myself their joy and enthusiasm when a few Hurricanes arrived to close escort them on the Valona raids, as I happened to be with them in their picturesque valley airfield at the time. I had known Valona from the previous war when in 1918 squadrons from the R.A.F. occasionally worked from there in support of the Italian Army, or for refuelling on their return from raids on the German-Austrian submarine base at Cattaro. It is true that, however dense the clouds on the surrounding mountains to the south and east, there was more often than not a clear sky over Valona Harbour. The author must have been in very close touch with the squadron pilots to have realized and to have recorded the value of cloud cover when fighter escorts are lacking. Indeed, he had good reason to know these things, for on several occasions he was one of the party.

Another famous squadron to which he refers was No. 80, whose fighter pilots had the remarkable record of over 100 enemy aircraft to their credit during a period of three months on the Greek-Albanian front.

The tale of the Italian prisoner waiters in one of the R.A.F. desert squadrons gives some idea of the mental outlook of the Italian towards this war, which for him had lost its glamour. The author might well have included another story of the Italian prisoner mechanic who kept the captured Italian Fiat Diesel-engined lorries serviceable in one of the squadrons. He was much more concerned with the professional reputation of Italian products than in sabotaging these most useful additions to our motor transport.

The book is so interesting, and squadron life so accurately recorded, that I find myself wishing the author had also visited some of the R.A.F. squadrons in the Sudan and Aden, or the South African Air Force in Kenya. For there also he would have found the same spirit and the same slick efficiency which contributed so largely to the rapid conquest of Abyssinia, and to the capture of Addis Ababa on April 5, the day before the Germans invaded Greece.

If the author had been with me about that time on a short visit to Asmara in Eritrea, when the British forces had just occupied that well-developed and comfortable Italian town, he would have done full justice to the story of the electric light. Asmara, being in the hills, was supplied from a power station at the Red Sea port of Massawa, still, at that time, in Italian hands. However, the supply had not been cut off. On investigation it appeared that the Italian Chief Engineer, who lived at Asmara, had decided it was not worth while being uncomfortable for a couple of days, and gave instructions on the telephone for the supply to continue. This mental attitude of the Italians to the war is very interesting. It is that if the Axis Powers win the war Italy will get back Abyssinia, so why worry?

The epilogue is of particular interest and puts the Greek adventure in its true perspective. The R.A.F. can hold its head high at the mention of Greece, and *Wings Over Olympus* will give a very good impression to its readers as to the reason.

ARTHUR LONGMORE.

Turkey. By Barbara Ward. Pp. 121. 2 maps and 8 illustrations. Oxford University Press. 1942. 2s. 6d.

This excellent little work gives a rapid survey of the circumstances in which Turkey finds herself to-day, and contains all the material necessary to enable the reader to appreciate the principal problems confronting the Turkish Republic in the midst of a world war. After a brief but most effective description of the country and racial origins of the people, the author devotes a short chapter to the Ottoman Empire. By far the greater part of the book, however, is taken up with the events of the past twenty years and the policy of Westernization introduced by Kamal Atatürk. The descriptions of the character and political philosophy of Atatürk are vivid and very much to the point. The author has been impressed (as any foreign observer must

be) by the intensity of the Turks' devotion to the memory of the first President of the Turkish Republic, which amounts almost to a religious fervour, for Kamal Atatürk was the personal embodiment of the revolutionary spirit of the Republic in much the same way that Lenin is regarded in Russia as the prophet of the Soviet political and economic faith.

One of the most interesting passages is Chapter VIII., in which the author analyses the political system and discusses the question often asked, "How far can the citizens of the Republic be called genuinely free?" Her explanation is, one feels, the correct one: "The truth is, perhaps, that Turkey is a community in which the citizens are being forced to be free. This explains most of the contradictions—*the democratic dictator, the single but untotalitarian party, the coexistence of absolute* government and representation. . . . There was no popular demand for change. The advantages of change had, on the contrary, to be demonstrated again and again and again to a doubting people. For this reason, the first task of the political machine was not to reflect opinion but to create it." The chapter ends with a question mark on whether the system did not depend too much on the personality and drive of one man, and whether the revolution has produced sufficient new men to carry on his ideals.

After describing the principal features of the social revolution, educational reform and the developments in agriculture, the author devotes a chapter to the policy of industrialization and the progress that has been achieved in this direction. Emphasis is laid on the fact that only a beginning has been made in industrializing the country, and that therefore Turkey is short of equipment for her armed forces. "This radical insufficiency of arms and war material must be remembered whenever Turkey's foreign policy comes up for discussion."

Turkey's foreign trade and foreign policy are reviewed in the final chapter, which brings the story of Turkey's international relations down to 1942. The author assesses political events since the outbreak of the present war impartially and achieves a sound perspective. For example, in answer to the question, "Can the Turks be severely blamed for the steady retreat of their diplomacy?" she replies, "Hardly, for the policy of any country is conditioned not only by the ends it wishes to pursue, but by the means at its disposal for doing so. The aim of Turkish foreign policy is above reproach—the strength and independence of Turkey in a peaceful and co-operative world order. The means of achieving it—trained soldiers, tanks, guns, aircraft—are strictly limited. The first claim on these resources, the Turks maintain, is the defence of their frontiers, particularly their frontier in Thrace." It only remains to add that the sympathies of the vast majority of Turks are wholeheartedly on the side of the Allies in the present struggle, but this point cannot be fully appreciated except by someone who has been in Turkey during the present war and who possesses a sound knowledge of the language coupled with extensive and sympathetic contacts amongst all classes of the population.

In a book remarkably free from errors of fact one only need note that "Sheriat" (Holy Law) is consistently mis-spelt "Seriat," but this is probably due to a printer's error in omitting a cedilla under the "s" (the new Turkish orthography), and that on page 64 the author describes the fez as the traditional headgear of the Muslims, which of course it is not.

Although a small and most reasonably priced volume, it contains some excellent photographs and two useful maps. This is quite one of the best-informed books on Turkey that has been published in this country, and it appears at an opportune moment. It has additional merit of being written in an easy and readable style.

H. M. BURTON.

Deedes Bey. A Study of Sir Wyndham Deedes, 1883-1923. By John Presland. $8\frac{3}{4}'' \times 6''$. Pp. xi + 360. Illustrations. End map. Macmillan. 16s.

The story of Deedes Bey, by John Presland, is described truthfully on the title-page as a *study* of Sir Wyndham Deedes, 1883-1923. The author recognizes that he could not write a biography in the ordinary sense. In the first place, he was restricted to part of the life of his subject, because the narrative ends when Deedes retired from the public service in his fortieth year. The last twenty years, which have been rich in

experience and achievement, while he has been a citizen of London heading a hundred activities of social reform, are only touched on by slight reference. Again, the reticence of Deedes about himself and his unwillingness to co-operate in the writing of his Life presented an obstacle to a biographer. The writer has had the benefit of rough diaries which Deedes kept when he was in the Turkish service and in the Army Intelligence during the Gallipoli and Palestine campaigns, and of letters which he wrote to his mother. But he records that Sir Wyndham consented to read only a very few passages, and would in no case offer a comment, save on the facts as actually known to him. The author, then, has been compelled to interpret character and incidents alike by his own study and imagination. It is a considerable achievement that he has, nevertheless, been able to give a clear picture. Some readers may feel that there is too much interposition of the interpreter, who has to appear like the Greek chorus after each major incident to knit the story together. But the book is the work of a writer who not only loves his subject, but has skill as an author and has taken infinite pains to fill in the background.

Wyndham Deedes is recognized by all who have been in touch with him in any part of the world—England, Turkey, Palestine, America, Germany, Poland—as an outstanding man of his generation, a leader of wide vision, a modern saint, whose life is given to the well-being of his fellows. This book, however, deals only with that part of his life when he was a public servant, as a regimental officer in the British Army, an inspector of the Turkish gendarmerie, a military attaché, and Chief Secretary in Palestine. The account is centred round his activity in relation to Turkey; whence its title. For four years before the war he was first an officer of the gendarmerie in African Tripoli, in Smyrna, and in Anatolia, and then an inspector in the Ministry of the Interior, bringing about reforms in the Ottoman system. The next few years, during the war, were spent in the Intelligence Service of the British Expeditionary Force, trying to detach Turkey from her alliance with Germany; and the four years after the war were spent in the reorganization of government in what were, or had been, parts of the Ottoman Empire—Constantinople, Egypt, and Palestine. The affection for Turkey and the Turks has been a constant motive in Deedes' life, and has received recent expression in his part in founding the Turkish "Halkevi" in London.

Although Wyndham Deedes is—or was—as reticent in writing as he is eloquent in speech, so that his diaries and letters seldom reveal his inner thought, the story of these forty years is lively because of its constantly changing circumstance, and because of the big events with which he was intimately concerned. He went straight from Eton, as an officer in the King's Royal Rifles, to the Boer War, and had two years of exciting service chasing Boer "commandos." Then he had a period as A.D.C. with the Irish Command in Cork and with the Governor of Malta. His two years in Malta were the first step towards adventure in the Near East. He took up there the study of Turkish, and in November, 1909, was seconded for service in the Turkish force. His first command was in what is now Libya and Cyrenaica. There, as everywhere, his gift was to establish close personal relations with everybody serving with him or under him. He had powers of endurance like those of T. E. Lawrence. He also had the gift of winning devotion from all manner of men. Those gifts were called for when he was removed to Anatolia and Turkey in Europe in the grim days of the Balkan War, when cholera and typhoid stalked the land. It was then, perhaps, that Deedes conceived his determination to devote his life to the help of suffering humanity; and it was in Turkey that he first learnt a critical attitude towards governments. The writer notes that he has little in him of the rebel. But in the Gallipoli campaign his concern, on the one hand, for the common soldier, and his awareness, on the other, of the muddles in high places, led him, with his friends the late Lord Lloyd and Major-General Guy Dawnay, to take a stand against Sir Ian Hamilton's refusal to see the hopelessness of continuing a campaign after the repeated failure.

A few extracts from his diaries and letters at this time throw light on the "revolt on the beach."

> "We are such good improvisers, one is told," he writes, "but we carry that to such an extent that we for ever improvise and never organize, and the con-

fusion existing at the moment here, with prisoners, Greek workmen, labour bands from Alexandria, is quite appalling. . . . A hundred times a day I find myself saying as I used to at the War Office: How do we come to possess such an Empire, and how have we kept it?"

He saw that the trouble was not just local incompetence, but a lack of thoroughness in the nation.

> "When criticizing the whole war I always come back to the before-the-war days and lay the whole blame for all our misfortunes on the country itself for refusing to be woken, and on those in power in particular for refusing to try and wake them. All our errors have their root in our pre-war unpreparedness. You can't run an Empire on gallantry."

Here is the conception of the ideas which were to determine his activity when he retired from public service.

It was in 1918, when Dr. Weizmann went out to Palestine, that Deedes, then Political Officer in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, first came in touch with the Zionist movement; and he was immediately convinced of its significance for the world.

> "This question, Zionism, can, I think, almost be called one of the big world-questions. . . . Those who do not wish, as yet, to consider the question of a Jewish Government rely on the creation in Palestine of a 'cultural home' for Jews throughout the world. One tangible form which this idea will take will be the creation of a university, but their idea is that Jews throughout the world should look towards Palestine as their spiritual centre and the cradle of their race, thereby making a bond of union between them, and emphasizing the fact that they are a nation and not only a sect. Others who see further (whether their vision is true or faulty I know not) see in Palestine and the polity there to be set up the nucleus of the future international state."

The passage is a typical example of his reticence in writing, due to "that judiciousness of mind which permits him to appreciate the validity of all reasoned argument, whether opposed to the tenets which he holds dear or not. . . . But he does not allow himself to be deflected by them from his purpose when, to his mind, the issue is clear in the realm of spiritual values."

A letter written a year later, when it was suggested that he should become first civil administrator or Governor of Palestine under the Mandate, illustrates another aspect of his character—his meekness: "Is it really and seriously contemplated to give a post of this nature to a person of my ability, standing, and experience? I cannot bring myself to believe that such an error could be committed; and let me add that, if it were, I could not consent to be a party to it, except under compulsion. . . . I entertain no illusions whatever as to my abilities. The post, of first-rate importance, must be given to a first-, not a second-, rate man." He was prevailed on, however, by Sir Herbert Samuel to give two and a half years of service in Palestine as the first Chief Secretary. The record of those years is the last part of the narrative; and this review may conclude with a passage from a letter which illustrates another, and most engaging, characteristic of Deedes—his sense of fun, which every now and then bursts through his asceticism and austerity. He is describing a visit to an Arab fair at a time of great political tension. He had his fortune told amid a big crowd of Arabs: "The man who told my fortune in the sand said I was deliberating between a choice of two decisions of great import and had not made up my mind! Now, whether he wanted to refer to Pro-Zionism or Pro-Arabism I know not, but I, addressing the crowd, said: 'You have indeed a very clever fortune-teller. I am deliberating between two opinions of great moment—namely, whether I shall give him for his trouble five piastres or ten, and I have decided to give him ten!'"

NORMAN BENTWICH.

Palestine: A Policy. By A. M. Hyamson. With a Foreword by Sir Ronald Storrs, K.C.M.G., C.B.E. 7½"×5". Pp. xiv+214. Methuen. 1942. 7s.

This book clears up many misunderstandings about the Jews, Zionism, and Palestine, and suggests a basis on which Arabs and Jews can settle their problem

within the accepted policy of the Palestine White Paper of 1939. It is, therefore, a book which should be read by all concerned in that problem.

Hyamson went to Palestine as an idealist, and was for seventeen years Director of Immigration, and is an acknowledged historian of the Jewish people.

He is a spiritual, not a political, Zionist, and he describes the difference between spiritual and political Zionism, the many types of Jews in different countries, their diverse opinions and sections.

He explains the sympathy of British people for the Jews during the last hundred years, and their former attempts to settle Jews in Palestine, though not to create a Jewish State there.

He shows that misunderstanding arose because the Zionists intended the Balfour Declaration to read, "The reconstruction of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people," whereas the British Government only undertook "to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people." The difference is explained on pages 108 to 111 in the words of Ahad Ha'am, the greatest of all Zionist thinkers and Weizmann's own mentor, and it is shown that Zionists still adhere to their own wording as though it were correct. In consequence, they are unable to accept the summing-up of the Palestine Conference on which the White Paper of 1939 was based, nor do they recognize it.

He states, further, that the Balfour Declaration and the Hogarth message were practically simultaneous and should be read together. To the latter King Hussein, Feisal, and other Arab leaders consented. He agrees, therefore, that all apparent justification for opposition to the White Paper of 1939 disappears. This White Paper was, in effect, the summing-up of various promises which Lord Grey advised in March, 1923, and which was all that the Arabs asked for.

The final chapter sketches an outline of a solution on which Arabs and Jews could come to some agreement, and certainly forms a basis for discussion within the principles of the White Paper.

The book is most helpful and sympathetic and written with understanding. It should form a counterpart to George Antonius' *The Arab Awakening*.

S. F. W.

The following is an extract of a letter sent to Mr. Hyamson by an eminent Jewish professor in Jerusalem:

"I want to thank you heartily for your kindness in sending me your book *Palestine*. It has appeared at the right moment. Let us all hope it may exercise a sobering and moderating influence on the many readers which I am sure it will have.

"It is particularly valuable, so I think, in its historical section. You have comprised in a few pages a large number of basic facts, some of them thus far unknown, and you have presented them so that any reader of intelligence may understand them.

"You are so mild in your advocacy of some solutions through collaboration that I am hoping the very gentleness and moderation of your words may be persuasive in quarters where more combative language has been resented.

"Yours is the kind of book which I am sure will be helpful to those who will have to give the answer to the problems that disturb us.

"For myself, I find that too many people think only in terms of what the Peace Conference may be able to give, and not enough in terms of what to-day may give. I am convinced that ever so many things could be done now which it will be most difficult to do later on. Men's hearts and minds are more open at the moment than they will be later on, and there is more force and authority near at hand than can be expected later on. It is, I am sure, a cardinal mistake on the part of the British and American Governments not to make it clear once and for all, and now, to both Jews and Arabs that, whatever the solution of this problem here, it will not be in the nature of the Jewish State or of the Arab State. A decisive statement of that kind might help prepare the minds of many people for compromise who now are talking in the most extravagant of terms."

British Contributions to Arabic Studies. By Bernard Lewis. Published for the British Council by Longmans, Green and Co. 1s.

In some thirty pages Dr. Bernard Lewis has given us a scholarly, well-written, and very readable account of the history of Arabic studies in Great Britain. After an introduction explaining the place which these studies occupied in English learning during the Middle Ages, the remaining chapters deal with the beginnings of orientalism properly so-called and its development through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries until the present time. The book was originally composed at the request of the British Broadcasting Corporation, in the form of talks for transmission in their Arabic programmes. These were subsequently printed as a serial in the *Arab Listener*, from which they were widely reproduced in the Arabic Press. As Dr. Arberry mentions in a short preface, it was then decided to issue them in pamphlet form in English so that "a wider public might become informed of the truly remarkable achievements of eight centuries of British studies of Islam and of the Arabic language and literature." The work is enriched by portraits of several eminent British orientalists, by two examples of interesting Arabic script, and other illustrations.

D. N. B.

Arabia and the Isles. By Harold Ingrams, C.M.G., O.B.E. With Foreword by Lieut.-Colonel Sir Bernard Reilly, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., O.B.E., Governor of Aden, 1937-1940. 9¼″ × 6″. Pp. xvi+367. 41 plates, 2 maps. London: John Murray. 1942.

Sir Bernard Reilly remarks on Mr. Ingrams' varied career in the Colonial Service that "it is in his nature to be an enthusiast." And indeed the very diversity of subjects treated, and the author's enthusiasm for them, make it difficult to do justice to his book.

In the first of its three parts the author writes of his almost lifelong interest in the lands round the Western Indian Ocean, of old the Erythræan Sea. Relating his experiences as an administrator in Zanzibar and Pemba between 1919 and 1927, he shows how intimate acquaintance with the settled Arabs of Zanzibar, and meetings with men who had sailed in dhows from Southern Arabia, fanned his ardour to reach the latter country. Many of the Arab sailors were what the Swahili classifies as *Wa Shihiri*—immigrants from Shihr or (by extension) from any part of the Hadhramaut. As to the immemorial connection between South Arabia and East Africa, Mr. Ingrams recalls how the author of the *Periplus* wrote that the Zanzibar coast had, in his time, long been a possession of the State which had taken first place in South-West Arabia. This State, Ausan, independent about the seventh century B.C., appears to have originated from, and been eventually absorbed by, Qataban. Though its power had vanished some seven hundred years before the *Periplus* was written, the Zanzibar coast was then still called the Ausanitic coast; it was governed by the Mapharitic chief, or head of the Ma'afir, a tribe still extant in the lowlands of the Yemen. This and an outline of later events, among them the immigrations from 'Oman and the Yemen in the seventh and eighth centuries, and the foundation of the scattered empire of Zinj by Persian invaders in the late tenth, are partly recapitulated from matter set forth by the author in an earlier work.*

What survivals from the remote past! The worship of Poseidon, introduced by Greek traders of the first century or earlier, perpetuated in a Zanzibar village by a dance of forgotten origin, played with tridents and model canoes! And what links with the Zanzibar of only some forty to fifty years ago! We are introduced to a stepson of Tippoo Tib, the famous slave-trader and explorer; even Sir Lloyd Mathews, the great Prime Minister to the Sultan, who died in 1901, reappears—as a ghost, repeatedly heard though not seen. It may be hoped that students of psychical research have taken note of this occurrence.

Through an interlude, during which the author was Assistant Colonial Secretary in Mauritius (1927-1934), and with fleeting glimpses of Nossi-Bé, Réunion and the

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* *Zanzibar: Its History and its People.* London, 1931.

Comoro Islands, Aden and the Aden Protectorate are at length reached. In 1934 Aden itself was still administratively part of India (so continuing till it became a colony in 1937), but the Protectorate was already under the Colonial Office. As Ingrams remarks, there is no part of the dependent Empire at all like it, the fact being that it is not administered. It is hoped that contact with the tribes will ripen into friendship, and that gradually they will learn to administer themselves. Formerly "The Aden Protectorate" and "The Hadhramaut" were the official terms used. Till 1937 there was little intercourse with the latter, and the "Protectorate" meant in practice what is now called the "Western Aden Protectorate." Then came the organization into Western and Eastern divisions. The Eastern Protectorate now consists of the Hadhramaut States proper—*i.e.*, the Qu'aiti Sultanate of Mukalla and the Kathiri Sultanate of Seiyun, together with the Wahidi Sultanates of Bir 'Ali and Balhaf and certain small sheikhdoms in its south-western part, and, lastly, the Mahri Sultanate of Qishn and Soqotra in the north-east. To all these principalities of the Eastern Protectorate Ingrams was appointed Resident Adviser in August, 1937. The second and third parts of his book are devoted to the exploration and work which led up to his appointment, an outline of present conditions, and of hopes for the future.

First, however, he tells something of his doings in the Western Protectorate, which comprises many of the more than fifty chiefs, of varying status, who are in direct correspondence with the Aden Government. His opinion of the Sultan of Lahej is very high. Ingrams regards this prince as the premier native ruler in the whole Protectorate. Besides lordship of his own 'Abdali tribe, the Sultan has established suzerainty over the Haushabis and Subeihis to the north-west and south-west. He has so wisely dealt with his northern and eastern neighbours, while carefully abstaining from interference in their domestic affairs, that even large tribes with old-established chieftaincies of their own place themselves more and more under his leadership. No ruler in the Eastern Protectorate, not even the Qu'aiti Sultan of Mukalla, has yet attained such pre-eminence.

At the other end of the scale (in the Western Protectorate) the author shows us the Fadhli Sultan, carrying his State Treasury everywhere with him in a tin box; and the Fadhli Sultan's feudatory, the Sultan of Yeramis, who had been so long at feud with his own nephew, living in a house a hundred yards away, that shops and cultivation had disappeared from the vicinity.

As regards the future of these chieftaincies, the opening at Aden of the Aden Protectorate College for the sons of chiefs meant the realization of a scheme thirty years old. (Some readers will recall a photographic group of rather frightened-looking chiefs' sons, waiting for their college, published in 1923.*)

To those specially interested in the Hadhramaut much of Part II. will be already familiar, in part from the author's own earlier writings. For in these chapters his main concern is the survey made late in 1934 by himself and Mrs. Ingrams, on which was based "Colonial No. 123: A Report on the Social, Economic, and Political Condition of the Hadhramaut." Yet it is good to read a connected account of all their journeyings and personal contacts, told more fully and personally. Moreover, the author has succeeded in recapturing first impressions of scenes with which he must now be familiar. From an exploratory standpoint the Mahra country is of peculiar interest: the extensive north-easternmost province of the whole Aden Protectorate, with coastline stretching from Museina'a in the west to Ras Dharbat 'Ali at the frontier of 'Oman. Though its capital is at Qishn, on the coast midway between the mouth of the Wadi Maseila and Ras Fartak, its Sultan lives in Soqotra. Mr. and Mrs. Ingrams were the first Europeans to journey in the interior of Mahraland, when they traversed its south-western corner down the lower part of Wadi Maseila (the continuation of Wadi Hadhramaut).

But Part III. is the most distinctive. In few other books can a story be told like that of the moves leading up to the Three Years' Truce signed early in 1937 by nearly 1,400 signatories, from rulers of large tribal territories down to chiefs of small independent villages; a truce which the vast majority have agreed to continue for a further period of ten years. Few books, too, contain illustrations parallel to the striking photographs of mass surrender of arms by tribes previously among the most

* In the late Colonel Harold Jacob's *Kings of Arabia*.

lawless. At first the Aden Government hoped that the native rulers might attain and keep peace among the tribes with no more than advice and encouragement from above. The disappointment felt by some highly placed Arabs at the Government's attitude is well shown. When at length the Government was reluctantly compelled to intervene and use force (after due warning), there was general relief, even among tribes which had been subjected to this drastic treatment. The contrast between conditions before and after the truce is truly amazing. Before, tribes and villages were at war with one another; villages divided against themselves; single houses at feud with neighbouring houses, so that the inmates had not gone about openly for long periods—a householder is instanced who could only discuss peace from a second-story window because he was at war with *all* his neighbours! The cultivable land was neglected or actively devastated, every man burning his neighbour's palm-trees—and now such places are becoming green again, for the truce has changed the very landscape; while murders are reduced to a tiny fraction of the number perpetrated a few years ago. The story is complicated and not the easiest reading for those unacquainted with the personages involved. The large number of persons in high positions, the repetition and similarity among Arab names, and the fact that some regents and governors under the great Sultans have also the title "Sultan," make the actors in the political events at times difficult to distinguish and the events themselves difficult to follow. But the reading is well worth while, and all must surely echo the hopes for further progress on strictly Arab lines expressed in the closing chapters.

Since the writing and proof-reading of the book had to be done during sea voyages and at other times between spells of very heavy administrative work, small typographic errors may be mostly passed over, but attention should be called to the following: On page 340, "Merhat" (in Dhufar) should presumably read "Merbat"; on page 364, Museimir is indexed as "capital of Lahej" instead of capital of the Haushabi country. If the Arabic letter *ain* is to be indicated by an apostrophe, why is this printed the reverse way from that commonly accepted? In this respect the text disagrees with the maps, and the eye is sometimes confused between *ain* and the apostrophe marking the English possessive case. When scientific names of plants and animals are given in the text of a general work, abbreviations of the names of those who described the species are probably best omitted. These authors' names (or abbreviations thereof) should be inserted after names of species in appendices or other technical writings, but in a general text they are liable to puzzle the layman and to be wrongly rendered. Thus on page 161 "Dene" is not immediately recognizable as the name of the botanist Decaisne, commonly abbreviated *Decne*.

HUGH SCOTT.

Middle East Window. By Humphrey Bowman, C.M.G., C.B..E. With an introduction by Sir Ronald Storrs, K.C.M.G., C.B.E. 8″ × 5¼″. Pp. 346. Twelve illustrations. Longmans, Green and Co. Price 14s.

This is indeed a pleasant book. The author tells us that it is his first. We can only rejoice that he has made a beginning, and, while we may regret that he has delayed our enjoyment for so long, we cannot but recognize his wisdom in waiting for "the time when anger gives way to tolerance and humour takes the place of indignation—the young call it old age!"

To those who look through Mr. Bowman's Window, so suggestively portrayed on the cover, to scenes and personalities with which they have been familiar, the book will recall many an incident and many a face which it is a delight to remember. The New College man will hear again the "Yeth, thah; thertainly, thah!" of George Bennett, the trusty servant of Junior Commonroom, and what pleasant and poignant memories that will recall! With what affectionate delight will the Sudan official of early days visualize the sturdy figure and pawky humour of Andrew Balfour with his sanitary "Juggernaut" and his mosquito campaign! And for those who knew Baghdad under the Mandate, how typical is the picture of Gertrude Bell entering an At Home for Arab notables, beautifully dressed and "looking very queenly" as she walked round the room shaking hands with each Arab in turn, and not only knowing by name all the forty or fifty present, but what to say to each!

But the book has a general interest far beyond the pleasure which it will undoubtedly give to those familiar with its background. Education under British guidance in the Middle East has had a chequered career, and Mr. Bowman's analysis is not only just and sympathetic, but highly instructive. Not that he professes to instruct, but his narrative of educational experiments in Egypt, the Sudan, Iraq, and Palestine is replete with lessons which he who runs may read. Could anything, for example, be more significant than the contrast between the results of public instruction in Egypt under the guidance of Dunlop and the attitude of the author's own teaching staff in Iraq, when the rising of 1920 put an end to his two years of educational work? In Egypt, when the Nationalist movement began to show its strength, led by Mustafa Kamel and Shaikh Shawish, "it was in the schools that the movement was chiefly fostered, and it was the students who led the demonstrations"; and, in the view of Sir Ronald Storrs, Mr. Bowman's appraisal of this epoch in Egyptian education "would prepare the most casual student of twentieth-century Egypt for the hard truth that Dunlop was one—indeed, the chief—of the Big Four indirectly responsible for the Egyptian Revolution." In Iraq, on the other hand, when the Nationalist rising of 1920 swept away not only Mr. Bowman's promising department, but led to a reconstruction of the very basis of the civil administration, he is able to say: "The one bright spot for me was the attitude of the teaching staff. Instead of joining the rebels, or even passively aiding them, they all came to Baghdad and reported personally to me. We could do nothing except applaud their loyalty; we could offer them no regular work, as most of the country schools were perforce closed. But it was a great satisfaction to me, and indeed to all concerned, to find that so many young men, while yielding to none in their national aspirations, realized that force was not the best means of attaining them. The fact was that they had confidence in the department, as the department in them, largely owing, as I like to believe, to the close intimacy of our personal relations."

The moral of Mr. Bowman's story lies in these last few words. They are the secret, not only of his success, but of his evident enjoyment of his task, which makes his book such pleasant reading. In countries rapidly moving towards independence the alien adviser or administrator must be not only the guide and philosopher, but also the friend of those with whom, and for whom, he labours. Ability, industry, integrity, even sympathy and understanding, are not enough. Social and personal relations must be mutual and intimate. The reviewer is constrained to quote again from Sir Ronald Storrs' admirable introduction: "He realized far more clearly than did most British departmental officials in Egypt, Palestine, and Cyprus, even than one or two British Representatives, the absolute necessity of constant and close personal association with the people he had been summoned to serve (and from whom, incidentally, he was deriving his livelihood). He was, indeed, almost the only Director or Controller who kept open house, not only for his British, but also for his Arab and Jewish friends, and invited all three together, and that not as 'parents,' not even as members of the P.N.E.U., but as *Abu Ahmad* or *Umm Hasan*, Ahmad's father or Hasan's mother. Thirty years' service in those countries impel me to add that any executive officer to whom such association is not a pleasure (as well as a duty) had best remain at home."

In Egypt and in the Sudan Mr. Bowman joined an administration already in being; in Iraq and Palestine he was responsible for formulating an educational policy for countries which have never possessed one. It is easy to see the value of his contribution to the Egyptian Ministry of Public Instruction. When he joined in 1903 "P.I." was the Cinderella of the departments. The British recruit was apt to regard it merely as a stepping-stone to higher things, on the principle of Mr. Bernard Shaw's Revolutionaries' Handbook—"He who can, does; he who cannot, teaches." Not so Mr. Bowman; with a sense of proportion not less admirable because it was humorous, he stuck to his last, and the measure of his success can be seen in the happy and intimate relations which he was able to maintain (and has so amusingly described) with Ahmad Pasha Heshmat, the Minister who succeeded Zaghlul.

The author's short sojourn in the Sudan must have been a refreshing interlude. He found himself, educationally speaking, in another world. Here the problems of the educationist, as of the administrator, were of a simple and direct character. Here were no native ministers, no lawyers, no half-baked politicians, no jealous intelli-

gentsia. Here was a clean sheet to write on. Part III. is a vivid picture of what the British, with a free hand, have achieved in a few short years, not only for education, but for the whole administration of the vast territory, rescued at last from a bloody and unintelligent tyranny. From the dawn of history the Sudan had figured only as the unhappy hunting-ground for gold and ivory and slaves. But, to borrow the author's quotation from John Buchan, "The end, as in all great tragedies, was peace—the Gordon College in Khartoum, a just law for all, protection for the weak, bread for the hungry, square miles of tillage."

The chapters dealing with Iraq (Part V.) are interesting chiefly for the author's description of the country and of the personalities with whom he came in contact, especially that of Gertrude Bell. The educational system which he was successfully developing was swept away by the National Arab rising of 1920; and the whole administration to which he had belonged was remodelled to conform with the new policy of the Mandate.

Mr. Bowman, however, was not to escape the difficulties of implementing a Mandate. These were sufficiently arduous in Iraq, though not, as it proved, insurmountable; but in Palestine, to which he now proceeded as Director of Education, the problem of squaring the Balfour Declaration for the establishment of a National Home for the Jews with a Mandate designed to establish an independent government in accordance with the wishes of the population has so far proved insoluble. Undaunted by this ominous background, Mr. Bowman set about his work fortified by enthusiasm for his task and what was now a ripe experience of the Middle East. The success of his own department cannot be doubted, and the reader will find in Part VI. a narrative which, if it does not point to the solution of the political difficulties, does at least provide some grounds for encouragement.

N. G. D.

A Handlist of the Arabic, Persian and Hindustani MSS. of New College, Edinburgh. By R. B. Serjeant. Pp. 16. London: Luzac. 1942. 3s. 6d.

A small collection of manuscripts presents a problem which has not been settled satisfactorily. The best thing would be for all such collections to be catalogued on loose sheets of a standard size so that they could be collected in a loose-leaf binder. The next best is a separate publication. This list has been prepared carefully, common MSS. are disposed of in a few words, references to the standard histories of literature are given, and rarities are noted. The list of *errata* is longer than it should be.

A. S. T.

Unveiled Iran. By Angela Rodkin. $7\frac{1}{2}'' \times 5\frac{1}{2}''$. Pp. 158. Illustrations. End maps. Hutchinson. 1942. 8s. 6d.

This is an exceedingly good little book. It is simple, straightforward, sincere and well written. It is unpretentious in the sense that the author made no sensational journeys; she trod well-travelled roads as a rule and visited the places made familiar by many before her—Shiraz, Isfahan, the Bakhtiari, Tehran. She does not profess to give us catalogues of administrative reforms or statistics or such dry bones, nor does she stir up the dark and dangerous waters of Anglo-Persian relations or delve in the political dustbin to search for the strange causes of ancient differences. She does a much better thing: she gives us a vivid and sympathetic picture of modern Iran, that country which quite obviously has exerted its compelling charm on Miss Rodkin as it has done on so many others.

Yet she steers clear of that fatal romanticizing over Iran and its past which is so easy to slip into and which is so misunderstood, even resented, by the modern Iranian. In a penetrating chapter in *Baghdad Sketches*, Miss Stark sounds a warning to the "sentimental traveller." It is not, she says, by enthusing over "picturesque untidiness" that one will find oneself in sympathy with the young generation, which is thinking of the future, not the past with all its glories. Miss Rodkin deals

fairly and sensibly with both. She pays tribute, and very well-informed and readable tribute, to the architectural masterpieces of the country; but has much to say of great interest about the living force, and its various expressions, which is changing the face of the country. Her first and last chapters express the spirit of alert and eager understanding which informed her sojourn in Iran.

There are many misprints, but they are all quite obvious—perhaps pardonable in war-time. And the map is not good. Roads which in fact exist are not shown, and it is quite impossible to distinguish between roads and railways. Some well-known places, such as Bam and Nīshapur, are omitted, while others, such as the strange "Kashmer" in the Dasht-i-Kavir, shown in the same type as Kerman, can scarcely be said to earn their distinction.

But these things do not really matter very much. What matters is that a delightful addition has been made to the long list of travel books of Iran; a charming introduction for those who do not know the country and would like to know about it now when it is in the forefront of the world's news; and for those who know and love Iran a very pleasant reminder of the days when they, too, lost their way in its deserts, or wandered through its bazaars, or sought coolness and green shade in the gardens of Shiraz.

H. D. G. L.

British Contributions to Persian Studies. By Dr. A. J. Arberry. Published for the British Council by Longmans, Green and Co.

Dr. Arberry's booklet may, perhaps, be best described as a brilliant *tour de force*. By way of preface it deals with the four phases of European contact with Persia, and points out the clear affinity of its language with those spoken in Europe.

In the sixteenth century great Anthony Jenkinson was the first Englishman to appear at the Court of a Persian monarch. As Captain-General of the Muscovy Company, he entered Russia from the White Sea. Strongly supported by Ivan the Terrible, in 1561 he sailed down the Volga and proudly hoisted the flag of St. George in the Caspian Sea. At Kazvin, at that time the capital, he presented a letter from Queen Elizabeth to Shah Tahmasp, but the fanatical monarch, learning that he was an "unbeliever" in Islam, expelled him.

This great journey was perforce undertaken by land, but in 1588 the destruction of the Spanish Armada opened the sea route to India and to Persia. Before long the East India Company, which had been founded in 1599, opened up relations with the Great Moghul, at whose Court the language spoken was Persian. In due course the representatives of the Company studied and admired Persian literature, this important period culminating, towards the end of the eighteenth century, in Sir William Jones, whose many published works included a translation of the lyrics of Hafiz.

Coming down to the nineteenth century, our author describes FitzGerald's translation of the *Rubaiyat* of Omar Khayyám as "certainly the most celebrated translation ever produced after the English Bible"—high praise, but yet undoubtedly fully earned.

In still later years, Edward Brown, born in 1862, was not only the greatest scholar, but also "the most sympathetic interpreter of the Persian mind and genius who has ever lived." His works included a magnificent *Literary History of Persia*, to which we are all indebted, while his championship of Persia politically was whole-hearted. Shortly after his death, when asked to pay a tribute to this great Englishman, I said that he built a bridge between the dreaming East and the material West and dug himself in permanently on the Eastern side of the bridge.

In this brief review, due to war conditions, I have been unable to mention Palmer, Guy le Strange, Miss Gertrude Bell, and many another outstanding figure, but to all who are interested in Persia, whatever their nationality may be, I can warmly recommend Dr. Arberry's valuable epitome of the important part played by our countrymen in this field.

P. M. Sykes.

British Merchant Adventurers. By Maurice Collis. (Britain in Pictures Series.) 9″ × 6½″. Pp. 48. 8 coloured plates, 24 black and white. Collins. 1942. 4s. 6d.

Within the compass of this small book Mr. Collis gives a brief but lucid and interesting sketch of the careers of six selected "Merchant Adventurers," all of whom, except Mungo Park, contributed to the establishment of British influence throughout the greater part of the East Indies. It would be hypercritical to object that the title of the book is hardly applicable to three out of the six; that Mungo Park was a doctor by profession and, though employed by a trading concern, was himself essentially an explorer, interested only in the search for the River Niger with which he had been entrusted and which his tragic death prevented him from completing; that Sir Thomas Roe, accredited by King James I. as Ambassador to the Court of Jahangir, was far from being an "adventurer" in the usual sense; or that Clive won fame not in the commercial career for which he went to India but as a soldier, whom fate had chosen to carry out the new policy of territorial expansion, which replaced that of peaceful trading about the time he landed in India and from which inevitably followed the conquest of all India. For the careers of these six outstanding men, so different in their character and motives—from the self-seeking and utterly unscrupulous Samuel White at one end of the scale to the prim and upright Mungo Park at the other—have this in common, that they illustrate how the British Empire was founded not on the policy of statesmen but on the amazing enterprise, courage and vision of individuals and on the persistent refusal of English merchants from Elizabethan times onwards to recognize the exclusive rights claimed by other Powers in the riches of the East.

In the light of recent events and the temporary loss of much that was built on their foundations the stories of Ralph Fitch and Sir Stamford Raffles are of particular interest. The former, not content with his fruitless mission to the Moghul Court, proceeded to investigate the trade possibilities of the unknown kingdom of Burma and of the East Indies as far as Malacca. The shrewdness of his observation has been grimly proved, for he noted the fatal weakness at sea of the otherwise powerful king of Burma—"This king," he says, "hath little force by sea, because he hath but very few ships"—and the supreme importance of command of the Malacca Straits to a maritime power trading to the Far East.

Sir Stamford Raffles, it may not be remembered, first rose to prominence by his enlightened rule of Java, then a British possession. He zealously upheld the new principle of trusteeship for backward races and established an administration aimed primarily at the welfare of the Javanese. This principle was at that time hardly understood and found little favour with the directors of the East India Company, who were more interested in their dividends. (In passing, it is curious to note that Mungo Park, humane and kindly though he was, appears to have seen nothing reprehensible in the appalling cruelties of the slave trade as carried on in the Africa of his day.) The end of the Napoleonic wars stopped Raffles's work in Java, which was handed back to the Dutch. Somewhat distrusted by the directors, he spent a period of suppression in the backwater of Bencoolen, a small trading post in North Sumatra. His schemes for developing the whole island for the benefit of the inhabitants alarmed the authorities in England, who feared complications with the Dutch, and he was censured and ordered to desist. Then with supreme foresight he noted, like Fitch, the importance to our trade of the command of the Straits and the potential value of Singapore, which the Dutch had overlooked. Nobly supported from India by Lord Hastings, in face of discouragement from home, he seized it and developed it into one of our most valuable possessions in the East.

The book, as befits one of the series "Britain in Pictures," is well illustrated with eight plates in colour and many black-and-white reproductions. L. S. W.

Poetry and Prophecy. By N. K. Chadwick. Cambridge University Press. 1942. 7s. 6d.

In this book a great amount of research over a vast field is condensed, and the conclusions are given based on theories which the author has accepted definitely. Some quotations will give an idea of the scope of the work.

"The object . . . is to stimulate interest . . . in the history of thought . . . among people who have no writing." "The study of thought and the study of poetry, current among unlettered peoples, are inseparable." "Spiritual thought and its expression are largely of a traditional character, derived ultimately from the great centres of civilization." ". . . poor and backward communities are capable of transmitting, combining, adapting, and perfecting inherited culture, but not of originating new ideas." "Tradition and ritual need to be enshrined in an artistic form in order to persist." "Similar ideas and literary forms which may be found in areas far apart cannot be regarded as of independent origin. Wherever their history can be traced step by step it can be shown that their immediate forerunners are derived from common cultures nearer to a common centre in the past rather than from primitive origins."

Although condensation makes it difficult for the reader to follow the steps, it is clear from the author's other works that we have here a profound study of diffusion.

She concludes that the function of the seer was practically universal in early Europe. Neither the words "seer" nor "shaman" are defined, and the two seem to be used indiscriminately. This is unfortunate, as shamanism is generally recognized in a technical sense as spirit possession, the shaman becoming the vehicle through whom spiritual agencies speak. The prophet, the seer, and the visionary, though they may receive inspiration during trance states, give utterance to their divine messages in their own persons. It is probable that in the early European context true shamanism is not implied, but confusion arises as the practices of Siberia and Polynesia are compared, and derived from the same source without any distinction being made.

The spiritual journeys to the land of the dead are seen to be found in similar form over a great part of the Northern Hemisphere, and, from evidence taken from modern peoples of Asia and Polynesia, to show a close correspondence with the ancient practices in Europe, which in turn are traced to the great ancient cultural centres of the Mediterranean, the Near East, and the Far East. Africa is brought into the context, so it is difficult to see why America is left out of consideration.

The ritual of the seer or shaman is enshrined in poetry, and his function is to make contact between the living and the dead, or the supernormal. The power that he acquires from his mystic ability can be used in many ways, chiefly in curing sickness and warding off disaster, and he may show the way to perfect life or immortality.

When treating such a complex as a cultural unit which may be carried by direct or indirect culture contact, certain aspects should be considered critically. First, it must be stated what is meant by poetry. If it be defined as the use of metaphor combined with a tendency to repetition and rhythm, then it will be common to all languages and cultures. Types of metre and specialized modes of treatment might be considered as diffusible elements. Shamanism also contains elements that may be regarded as universal. Awareness of images from the unconscious is normal in dreams and common in states which may be abnormal or pathological. The intensification of this awareness, with heightened meaning given to the content of dreams, dissociated states, or hallucinations, cannot be regarded as an invention or a new idea to be spread from any cultural centre. That such states should be associated with the supernormal would appear to be a truism that needs no elaboration. Next the types of supernormal agencies must be considered. Shamanism in its most widespread form makes contact between the living and the dead, who are requested to continue their care of the living and to avert evil. The attachment of the younger generation to the older generation is normally compounded of love and fear; the helplessness of the infant towards the all-powerful adult who dispenses good and evil lives on in the unconscious, even if it becomes much modified in conscious adult life. That these sentiments are carried on after the death of the elder is not surprising, so that the dead become supernormal and a cult of the dead in some form is probably universal.

Evidence for cultural diffusion may be sought in the type of ritual and in the gods and heroes who are invoked, their lives and traditions, and perhaps also in the function of shamanism, where this is highly specialized, not in the mere fact of the incorporation of trance states, with an evaluation of trance utterances, in the social heritage of a culture.

Brenda Z. Seligman.

In the High Yemen. By Hugh Scott, Sc.D., F.R.S., F.L.S. 9⅛″×6¼″. Pp. viii +268. 113 Photographs taken by the Author and E. B. Britton. 4 Maps. 5 Figs. in text. John Murray. 1942. 18s.

Here at last is an authoritative book on South-West Arabia. Dr. Scott is to be congratulated on this book as well as on his most important scientific collection and survey in the expedition he here describes.

His easy narrative and excellent photographs will show this little-known land to the ordinary reader. Those few who have travelled in the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate will rejoice at Dr. Scott's store of accurate information, his humorous acceptance of Yemeni obstructiveness, and his understanding of the southern Arab.

The arrangement of the book is good and very clear. It adds a new chapter to Arabian exploration. If, as T. E. Lawrence wrote, Mr. Bertram Thomas, in his crossing of the Empty Quarter, closed an epoch, Dr. Scott in this expedition has opened a new one—that of the scientific exploration of the country. The Germans were before us in this field, but it is our field, and Dr. Scott has given the lead to British scientists.

One hopes that Dr. Scott may find time for another expedition after the war. The great eastern spurs of the Yemen range have been crossed by only one scientist, Dr. Von Wissman. The high plateaux of the Audhali Dhahir should provide much of interest, and—if one could tempt Dr. Scott from his high mountains—the southern borders of the Great Desert await his observant eye from Harib to Shabwa and beyond. If he follows this route he will have on his right hand the ancient lands of Jardan, Hadhina, Markha, and Yeshbum and the ragged mountains of the Aulaqi and Azzani confederations: I have written the names to tempt him. If they do not, one can only hope that he may be able to travel north to Najran and north-east to Marib, and that the Yemeni Government may be less suspiciously jealous of their high places.

The book should be in the kit of every British official in the territory. In it the official will see how much he has previously missed and how much there is which he can now do in the matter of observation and collection. The scientific eye is trained in observation, and the administrative eye should be also. Because from the thorough study of such territories by administrative officers and intelligence officers will come the thorough understanding necessary for the advancement of their peoples, under our guidance. What English countryman will listen to the man, however large his watch-chain, who is ignorant of the trees, beasts, and birds of his countryside?

It is dangerous to venture into the field of the ancient history of the territory. Here Dr. Scott is inclined to mix, although not to confuse, myth and fact. But this is a small criticism. It is in his picture of the country as it is now that most of the interest of the book will be found, and in his all-too-short notes as to its future. Dr. Scott camped on Jebel Harir, on the edge of the vast blood-feud territory. From that camp the multitudinous settlements of Halumein and Yafa cannot be seen. All that wild but productive land lies under the rule of the rifle, and its people perish by their own hands. The Dhala area, to which a chapter is devoted, had been pacified only a year before Dr. Scott's visit. The contented people he describes there are in themselves an encouragement to those who wish Arabia well.

This book, whether for the expert or for the armchair traveller, is one to buy and one to treasure.

John Murray is to be heartily congratulated on the production and thanked for the relatively small price.

R. A. B. Hamilton.

British Rule in Eastern Asia. A Study of Contemporary Government and Economic Development in British Malaya and Hongkong. By Lennox A. Mills, D.Phil.(Oxon.), Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. Issued under the auspices of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations International Research Series. 8vo. Pp. viii+581. Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1942. 25s.

This book is divided into two parts; the first part of 372 pages deals with Malaya, the second (pages 373 to 513) with Hongkong. It is evident that the author has taken

pains to produce a complete, up-to-date, and straightforward account of these two Crown Colonies, and he has succeeded, as the result is a full and fair history of the growth and condition of these two possessions of Britain. The author shows throughout a reasoned judgment and a temperate attitude. He necessarily relies largely on official reports, those valuable, unromantic, but too often neglected compilations and he gives in a series of notes the references to the authorities quoted. Let it be made clear that this book is not a mere compilation, as Professor Mills has studied the problems of these two colonies on the spot. The author remarks in his introduction (pages 1 to 23, and perhaps the best chapter in the book) that it is fatally easy for a traveller in the tropics to misunderstand what is before his eyes, but by personal examination and by study and interviews, both in Asia and at home, he has avoided this danger. Chapter by chapter he discusses the various forces and influences that have affected or developed these countries: government, finance, trade, education, enjoy a separate and fully documented treatment.

It might be thought that the book is no more than a glorified private blue-book, without the standing and cheapness of the official volume. But it is not so. There are inevitably many statistics, which accompany with slender conviction all modern discussions on human activity, and no one can make these dry bones either alive or picturesque.

The style is easy and agreeably relieved with humour, and with original remarks such as that tin and rubber are the twin explosives of international trade.

There can be no happier description—and, for that matter, justification—of the Crown Colony system of government than that given on pages 3 and 4, and in greater detail on pages 28 and following. We are told (p. 3) that of the governed "the vast majority feel that the government has been impartial, honest, considerate of their interests, and reasonably efficient." Indeed, the whole book defends this system of administration, which may have faults, as have all human institutions, but which on the whole succeeds.

Attention should be given to the remark on page 7 that from recent administrative changes in Malaya a new centralization may arise in Singapore to replace the old one at Kuala Lumpur. It is sometimes suggested that this new centralization did arise, and did replace the old Malayan one, and that the fate of Malaya has been largely caused thereby.

The book will be found both constructive and enlightening. The author makes it clear that it has ever been the intention of the British authorities to safeguard the rights of the Malay Sultans, and he dwells on the difficulties that this policy creates, such as in the reforms of Sir John Anderson in 1909, which were meant to increase, but tended to decrease, the authority of the Sultans (p. 49).

"This was the beginning of the unofficial suspicion of Singapore control which has continued ever since." The Residents and the Sultans had become the forgotten men of the over-centralization of Kuala Lumpur. This may be so, but it is as well to point out that Kuala Lumpur was in Malaya. The secretariat dealt with and were in sympathy with the Federated States, but in Singapore, under a subordinate under-secretary, they were but the pawns in an immense official chess-board which stretched from Christmas Island and Labuan to the Siamese frontier. It was Sir John Anderson who was determined to make the High Commissioner the real responsible head of the Federated Malay States—absentee landlord though he was—who in his other capacity as Governor of the Straits Settlements had more than enough to do. The whole account given by Professor Mills of these relations between the suzerain and the Malay States deserves careful study, for they are of far more than local interest. As the author says, it was the divergence between intention and action (p. 56). The Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements has been correctly treated and classed with the rest of the peninsula, for the differences of administration are slight and the common interests many.

The book describes the resident Chinese population, the Straits Chinese with their real appreciation of British rule and their strong affection for China; the non-resident or immigrant Chinese, much affected by the Kuomintang and Communist agitations from 1920 onwards, and the manifold problems which the Government had to face. The book sets forth very clearly and forcibly the malign influence and tendencies of the Kuomintang, which did its best to set the local and very well-

disposed administration at defiance. It was a curious state of affairs. Thousands of Chinese came to the Straits to earn money and return to China, and at the same time the Kuomintang did all it could to embarrass the rulers of the colony, who alone enabled the Chinese workmen to make a decent living. It was cutting off one's nose to spite one's face.

Two chapters in the book are of especial interest. Chapter iv. on the trade of Malaya gives the melancholy tale of Japanese monopoly with the consequent decline of British imports. It is difficult to exonerate the Government for their complacency shown to the flood of Japanese trash which inundated the country, where the bazaar trade was in the hands of the Japanese (p. 145). Doubtless high politics were the cause of this indifference to stark realities, and a little of the patriotic selfishness in trade, shown by the French, Dutch, and Portuguese, in their Eastern possessions would have been salutary and effective. The causes of Japanese success (p. 170) are discussed.

Chapter vi. on labour will go far to clear up a vexed question, as much capital has been made, in India particularly, by agitators on the treatment of coolies in Malaya. The truth is that immigrant labour was well satisfied with conditions there and shared in the prosperity of the country.

The other chapters on Malaya well repay reading.

The second part of the book, on Hongkong, is inevitably less interesting because the problems and features of that colony are urban and resemble conditions in all great Eastern or tropical cities. There was never possible that remarkable development which was made in Malaya. The desolate island of 1841, thirty-one square miles in area, the home of poor fishermen and pirates, has become one of the greatest ports of the world, an outstanding tribute to British genius, tolerance, and good sense. Professor Miles says that its prosperity was based on geography, free trade, and security (p. 373), or the *pax Britannica,* as he puts it elsewhere (p. 432). Yet its prosperity depends on forces beyond its control—the trade of South China and peace in that region.

In chapter xi. the author gives an excellent account of the relations between the colonial authorities and the Chinese, and it is evident that throughout British fair play, moderation, and remarkable patience are vindicated. It is a great tribute to the qualities of our race.

The three tribulations of Hongkong were the Japanese (bad neighbours ever and everywhere), the Kuomintang, and the disturbed state of China. Compared with these, pirates and typhoons are very small annoyances. The great difficulties of water supply, medical and sanitary precautions, and education are all discussed, and should be studied.

In conclusion, this work by Professor Mills is a marshalling of all the facts and details of colonial administration in Malaya and Hongkong. The author has been diligent and accurate, and he has let the chapters speak for themselves. Boredom and over-detail are absent, and there the case is, for all to judge how the Empire has dealt with these two Eastern possessions. Nevertheless, after this masterly exposition of his subject, it would have been useful to have a critical summing-up by the author of what he finally found to praise and to blame. It may be true that his account speaks for itself: so it does. But after so acute and exhaustive an investigation some summary of the good and bad would have been welcome. The author is so well qualified to give his opinions.

Throughout the book the Japanese menace has been consistently borne in view, and the inroads of Japan on the prosperity and peace of its neighbours have been well stated.

One lays down this excellent description of the results of British justice, enterprise, and foresight with a heavy heart. Two great and prosperous places, which have brought happiness and comfort to not only our fellow-countrymen, but to innumerable humble and hard-working Asiatics have been lost to us, if not totally destroyed. Gone is the easy-going British administration with its efforts to give all a fair deal; gone are the free ports with their exports of tin, rubber, and other wealth; gone, too, is the honourable commerce of the West. A grinding and selfish exploitation such as Corea and Manchuria have groaned under for years has taken the place of the opportunities once open to all. The Malay and Chinaman have now become the serfs

of a harsh and contemptuous race, and will surely lament the loss of that generous British rule which is so often abused and decried in Britain. Surely neither Britain nor the Netherlands will acquiesce in this spoliation.

There are three maps at the end of the book. These are of the most miserable kind, unworthy of the author, the subject, the publishers, and certainly of the price charged for the book.

The Japanese Enemy. By Hugh Byas. 7¾″×5″. Pp. 88. Hodder and Stoughton. 1942. 3s. 6d.

Most recent books about Japan—many of them excellent—have been written by American journalists, who have shown great enterprise in probing into the aggressive policy of successive Japanese Governments, and not hesitated to warn the world whither that policy was inevitably leading. Yet the unprovoked attack on China five years ago took the world by surprise, although for the previous five years, in spite of booming trade, the insatiable demands of the fighting services for more and ever more armaments had left the country with a growing load of debt and a big deficit in her annual budget. Pamphlets issued in thousands by the War Department since 1934 had been broadcast throughout the country preaching the need for expansion and preparedness for war. "The army in Japan is not only a fighting force, but a political force, exercising a control over policy roughly comparable to that of a party with a permanent majority and the chief of state in her pocket."

These words are quoted from the preface to *The Japanese Enemy*, a really admirable little book by an experienced British journalist who had spent over twenty years in Japan as correspondent of *The Times* and of the *New York Times*.

Mr. Byas sets out to answer some of the questions that have puzzled people here and in the States; in fact, the book is primarily written for American readers. For instance, it has been said that Hitler dragged Japan into this war. But nobody who knows Japan would say so. The thoughts of Japanese are for Japan first and only. They would not lift a finger to save Hitler. Why should they? It was a German, Kaiser Wilhelm, who forty years ago first pointed to the Yellow Peril, and the Japanese know perfectly well that the last thing the Germans want is complete Japanese domination of the Pacific.

Again, who runs Japan? The Cabinet has become a bureaucratic rather than a political institution, for there are no longer any parties. It is the Army and Navy and Nazified bureaucrats who rule the country, but a few months before Japan entered the war a General, by becoming Prime Minister, assumed direct responsibility for policy. Just as 1,000 years ago military rule took the place of a reformed civilian Government based on Chinese institutions, so again has the attempt failed to graft on to the Japanese stock an imported form of government. The Emperor is a mystical figure in whom all power subsists, but who can act only on the advice of his responsible advisers, "a tribal figurehead sitting silent and helpless like a wooden Buddha among the incense." But there is no dictator in the accepted sense, for in all great decisions of State the influence of the family system is profound.

On the vexed question of economic pressure which apologists for Japan like to put forward as an excuse for her aggression, Mr. Byas states the facts objectively and sums up as follows: "The position of Japan as a nation deprived of living room is *not* a description of an actual situation, but a highly coloured anticipation of imaginary future troubles."

Unparalleled secretiveness shrouds all industry remotely connected with armaments, and the world was left guessing especially as to the size and efficiency of the Navy and Air Force. But though the Army is very definitely the Senior Service, war could not be started against the great democracies until the Navy had sounded the All Clear. It was not until the Navy, having convinced itself the mandated islands —"anchored aircraft carriers"—were the key to domination of the Pacific, came to the conclusion after a careful calculation that Japan had more than a fifty-fifty chance of winning that the attack on Pearl Harbour was launched.

Finally, we are warned to be prepared, as Japan is, for a long war. "Japan's entry into the war is an insurance against German defeat more than a gamble on

German victory." Even were Hitler forced to bid for peace, this would not mean that Japan would do the same. A book that can be wholeheartedly recommended.

R. H. C.

The Great Within. By Maurice Collis. Pp. 349. 16 illustrations, 3 sketch maps. Faber and Faber.

China Rediscovers her West. A Symposium edited by Yi-Fang Wu and Frank W. Price. Pp. 20. Illustrations and 2 maps. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.

In *The Great Within* Mr. Collis continues with success the series of studies on Oriental history which he began some years ago. In a prefatory note he explains that the book is an essay on the interactions of China and Europe from the seventeenth century to the present day; it is not addressed to the sinologue, but to "that large and intelligent public whose reading takes it occasionally upon a tour in China." The list of principal authorities used shows that the book is based on works of international European origin dating from the end of the sixteenth century down to the present day.

The narrative is divided into three parts. The first part is devoted to a description of the decay and ruin of the great Ming dynasty owing to the luxury and effeminacy of the later Ming Emperors and to the rise to controlling power in the state of the worthless Court eunuchs. The reaction on the permanent Chinese civil service, which for 2,000 years had governed the nation according to principles based on the traditional Confucian philosophy of good conduct and good government, inevitably led to the lowering of all standards and to a period of unbridled tyranny and corruption. The ordinary reader of Chinese history may well be surprised at the ease and rapidity with which the great Chinese dynasties were overthrown one after another. In this case a bandit from the Shensi province effected the *coup d'état* amidst circumstances of terror and tragedy in the Great Within, or Royal Palace, at Pekin. The intrigues carried on between the bandit, the disloyal Ming general, and the Manchu Regent resulted in the accession of the Manchu or Ch'ing dynasty to the Dragon throne at Pekin and the assumption by the new Emperor of the Mandate of Heaven.

The second part of the book is entitled "The Great Ch'ing's Opportunity." The theme developed by the author comprises three main points. Firstly, the system of Confucian philosophy taught to the Chinese intellectuals and applied by them to the government of China had completely isolated China from the outside world. The educated classes, from the Emperor downwards, considered their country as the perfect and self-sufficient type of civilization. Secondly, the immense progress of scientific thought and the corresponding development of applied mechanics which took place in Europe after the Renaissance were completely ignored in China. The attempts made by highly trained members of the Society of Jesus to introduce Western science into China as a vehicle for converting the Chinese Court and *literati* to the Christian faith failed in their religious object, eventually aroused suspicion, and gradually petered out. Thus the chance of modernizing China and of saving the new Ch'ing dynasty was completely lost. Thirdly, the knowledge of Confucian philosophy, and of certain branches of the Chinese arts acquired in Europe during the eighteenth century, mainly through Jesuit agency, caused widespread interest and admiration in intellectual circles.

The third part of this book is concerned mainly with British dealings in China. Mr. Collis stresses the immense expansion of British trade and navigation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the need of seeking new and distant markets which caused the establishment of the China trade. This was carried on under humiliating restrictions at Canton, where permission to set up a small factory or depot was granted in 1715.

Of the four expeditions described, the first two were naval and the last two were diplomatic missions, sent out in 1773 and in 1816, with the legitimate object of establishing regular trade and diplomatic relations. The complete failure of these two missions proved conclusively to the British Government that the Chinese authorities

would not modify their policy of isolation, and their contempt for the Western European nations as untutored "red barbarians" whose representatives came to China bearing tribute to the Chinese Emperor as lord of the civilized world. This produced a complete revulsion of feeling in England and led to a deplorable period of suspicion and hostility which lasted during a great part of the nineteenth century. The "gunboat policy" was the British answer to the Chinese attitude.

In conclusion, the author describes the gradual undermining and the final ruin of the Ch'ing dynasty, followed by the ever-growing aggression of a neighbouring Power which had adopted in time the methods of the Western nations so long despised and neglected by China. The last chapter contains a penetrating analysis of the ancient Chinese system of the "Universal State" as applied to modern Europe and even to the world as a whole. In the third century B.C. China established an immense international unified state from many warring nations, thereby ensuring peace, stability and periods of great prosperity on the Far Eastern mainland. The European system, on the other hand, gave rise to many national units producing constant and ruinous internecine wars. Europe is now trying tentatively to adopt similar ideas and to bring about similar arrangements for the future which eventually may cover the whole world. Thus, "China and Western Europe have at last found that their political aims are the same and the union of East and West is feasible."

The book is a notable contribution to the comprehension of past Anglo-Chinese relations. The illustrations are mostly reproductions of charming old engravings from the books describing the travels and adventures of various diplomatic missions to the Chinese Court.

It is a far cry indeed from the China of the Mings and the Ch'ings to the new China which is being born amidst such suffering and tribulation as have never been experienced on the mainland of Asia since the Mongol invasions.

China Rediscovers her West is a collection of short essays written by American and Canadian missionaries and by leading Chinese Christians, all working actively in the stricken fields of Western China. Madame Chiang Kai-Shek contributes the first essay entitled "The Spirit of New China," in which the keynote is the civil and military courage developed in face of the common menace. In a prefatory note the publishers state that the literary material making up this book was sent at various times in the early months of 1940 by mail planes from West China to Hong Kong and thence by air to New York. Consequently it provides first-hand information and experiences which, in the present state of world affairs, must evoke interest and sympathy among a wide public, both amongst those who know China and the Chinese and amongst those who do not.

The book is divided into two parts. The first nine chapters deal with "China's New West," and the last nine chapters with "Christianity in the New West."

The first nine chapters cover an immense field. In "West China—The Land and the People," Dr. R. O. Jolliffe presents a striking and romantic bird's-eye view of this huge, varied territory, which includes the six western provinces of China proper, two central provinces, and four important but thinly populated outlying dependencies. The great industrial and material progress of all kinds is well summarized in Dr. G. A. Fitch's essay entitled "The Opening of China's New West." Social, cultural and educational achievements are all adequately treated. Dr. Yen is already well known as the pioneer of education amongst the rural population of China. His contribution, "New Life for the Rural Masses," must be of particular interest to those whose avocations have brought them in contact with China's toiling millions. The essay dealing with the forced western migration of thirty million people—that is, one-fifth of the population of Eastern China, presumably the largest folk movement in history—is, unfortunately, hardly written with sufficient objectivity to present a clear picture of this extraordinary and tragic event.

It is more difficult for a layman to judge the contents of the second half of this book, describing in nine essays the progress of "Christianity in the Far West." The numbers of practising Christians residing in this vast area are given as 350,000 Roman Catholics and 80,000 Protestants of various denominations. However, it is clear that three salient features emerge. Firstly, the supreme government of Free China is controlled by Christians, and it is giving all possible support to Christian

missionary effort. Secondly, the Protestant missions in Western China have shown a most praiseworthy spirit of tolerance and inter-denominational co-operation. Thirdly, the missionary bodies of all denominations are carrying out devoted and self-sacrificing work in the field to alleviate the suffering and misery of the local population.

The book is illustrated with clever little sketches by Chinese artists, and the maps inside the covers are useful in showing the great extensions of road and rail communications.

D. B-B.

China. By P. M. Roxby. Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs No. 54. Price 4d.

Japan and the Modern World. By Sir John Pratt. Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs No. 55. Oxford University Press. 1942. Price 4d.

These two booklets of the "Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs" are fully up to the standard set by the Oxford University Press to give the British public sane and sound information on current events. In small compass they deal with salient points about the countries described—a bird's-eye view of the whole situation.

Though Professor Roxby has not lived in China, he has, as a leading geographer and from the literature at his disposal, collated many material facts on the land of China, its national economy and politics. He shows to what extent China has been influenced by the legacy of historic civilization which, originally springing from widely separated tribes and groups with distinct governments, has provided a rich heritage of Chinese culture that does not in the least imply a separatist nationality movement. Within China proper there is only one nationality, and that is Chinese.

From the Han Dynasty, 2,000 years ago, down to the opening of the present century the Chinese *type of society* underwent no essential change, and a comprehension of this constancy gives the key to a great many of the problems that China is facing to-day. For these 2,000 years the only recognized aristocracy in China has been the aristocracy of learning. They had no warring caste like the Samurai of Japan, or the state of serfdom possessed by the old Russian nobility, or the hidebound social caste system of India. The author says: "The mass poverty of the peasants has always been the dark side of the Chinese picture, in spite of their industry, traditional skill, and unfailing cheerfulness." One has, however, only to live in the country to recognize that this poverty is not in reality a dark side. The simple life and the absence of material wants enable millions of these people to lead a happy, contented existence (barring, of course, the accidents of famine and aggression) which we in Europe could well envy.

Professor Roxby describes the impact of the West and the Nationalist Movement and Reconstruction in an impartial way. He sums up favourably the achievements of the Nanking Government, and concludes with a summary of the present Sino-Japanese War and its consequences.

In *Japan and the Modern World* Sir John Pratt, who, like Professor Roxby, has no residential experience of Japan, has been able from the years he spent in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office to trace the course of Japanese foreign policy, and his pamphlet is almost wholly concerned with the course of events that date from the first Anglo-Japanese alliance to the present war.

Sir John makes out a very good case for the British Government's constant aim to seek and maintain good relations with Japan, but the Japanese do not agree with his contention that their wealth and prosperity can only be obtained in full measure through international collaboration. To understand the way in which Japan regards this subject, one should read *Japan Must Fight Britain*, by Lieut.-Commander Ishimaru, published in London in 1936. The author's conclusions as to the many miscalculations made by Japan, and the certainty that her war stocks would one day be exhausted without possibility of replenishment, also his assertion that it is now difficult to see any end but the complete ruin of Japan, are somewhat premature and do not sufficiently take into account the long, hard, and stony path that lies in front of us before we regain what we have lost.

Both these pamphlets, though lacking in originality, are replete with useful

information gathered together by men who have a good knowledge of their respective subjects. They will serve as mental refreshers even to those of us who maintain a close interest in the Far East, and there is no part in either pamphlet that can be said to be incorrect.

G. D. G.

Footprints in Malaya. By Sir Frank Swettenham, G.C.M.G., C.H. 8½″×5¾″. Pp. 176. Illustrations. Cover map. Hutchinson. 12s. 6d.

Sir Frank Swettenham arrived in Singapore in January, 1871. He took part in the Perak expedition of 1875-76, was subsequently British Resident in Selangor and Perak, Resident-General of the Malay States, and from 1901 to 1904 Governor and Commander-in-Chief. In 1906 he published a book entitled *British Malaya*. The book now under review is, as its title indicates, a book of reminiscences.

"In recording facts within my personal knowledge concerning the introduction of active British influence into the affairs of certain Malay States, my object was to show that, while that influence has brought peace and innumerable benefits to Malaya and its people, it has also resulted in developments of a very great importance to the British Empire and British subjects." Some figures for 1940 are then quoted: Revenue, £11,493,059; expenditure, £9,166,303; imports: Straits $50,575,455; exports, £67,239,544; duty on tin: Straits $23,317,513; duty on rubber—Federated States: Straits $7,349,303. The rubber production of only two of the Unfederated States, Johore and Kĕdah, was worth that same year over £50,000,000.

Captain L. D. Gammans, M.P., in a recent address given at Overseas House, said that the chief weakness of the Colonial Empire at home was that the people of this country had never been able to appreciate the enormous potentialities of that Empire both for themselves and those who live there.

On January 30, 1819, Sir Stamford Raffles hoisted the British flag over Singapore. Nearly a hundred years later Sir Frank Swettenham met in an English country house an "Under-Secretary in the Education Department." This eminent gentleman had never heard of Sir Stamford Raffles. Well might Captain Gammans urge that colonial history and colonial economic affairs should be taught as compulsory subjects in every school in the United Kingdom.

Had this been done, we should hear less of the exploitation indictment and not accept at its face value the picture, so often now drawn, of a horde of avaricious British capitalists hovering like vultures over a rich but peaceful and happy country, lusting to get at the riches of the Malay Peninsula. As a fact, though Raffles, when he left Singapore in 1821, never to return, did impress upon his successors the desirability of cultivating the friendship of the Rulers of the Malay States, his advice was neglected, and for more than half a century the British Government deliberately and consistently ignored the efforts which these Rulers made to awaken an interest in their affairs and to get help. In 1872 the Singapore Chamber of Commerce complained to the Governor that British subjects who tried to do business with the Malay States were not encouraged, nor were their interests protected. The Governor's reply has become historical. It was: "If persons knowing the risks they run . . . choose to hazard their lives and properties for the sake of the large profits which accompany successful trading, they must not expect the British Government to be answerable if their speculations prove unsuccessful." The Secretary of State, Lord Kimberley, had nothing to add; he simply approved.

But the Chinese—always shrewd people—were there already, busily mining tin, especially in Perak. A district in that State called Lârut—a district very rich in tin—was almost entirely peopled by two factions of Chinese miners whose quarrels, rendered more acute because the Mantri was backing one of the factions "without any proper attempt to deal with the case judicially," had resulted in such disorder, that thousands were said to have been killed in one day. In 1873 the Mantri asked the Governor, Sir Harry Ord, to send a British officer to teach him how to rule the country. Meanwhile the Colonial Office had thought again furiously, and on September 20, 1873, Lord Kimberley addressed a despatch to Sir Andrew Clarke—a most irregular act, for Sir Harry Ord was still reigning at Singapore—requesting him to ascertain and report on the actual conditions in each State, and to suggest what steps

could properly be taken to promote the restoration of peace and order, and to secure protection to trade and commerce with the native territories. Two caveats were added—the full consent of the native Government, and the cost to be defrayed out of the revenue of the Straits Settlements. Treasury vigilance is not a thing of yesterday. This started the process from which there gradually emerged the four Federated States of Pêrak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Păhang, and the five Unfederated States of Johore, Kĕlantan, Trengganu, Kĕdah, and Perlis. All these States were guaranteed the protection of the British Government.

The relations between the Government of the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States is a tangled and not a very inspiring story. There were first of all Residents, then Residents working under a Resident-General, then the abolition of this office and the substitution of a Chief Secretary. Now the Chief Secretary has gone, his place having been taken by the Federal Secretary, under whose immediate control the Federal Government is, subject to the control of the Governor of the Straits Settlement in his capacity of High Commissioner. Sir Frank Swettenham is critical of some of these changes, notably the abolition and title of the Resident-General. He speaks of resentment felt by the Malays, if not expressed, and observes that Malays have no Hyde Park speakers, and disapprove of squealing when hurt.

A clever journalist recently remarked that one trouble with democracies is a mania for tinkering with the machinery of administration. Perhaps if there had been less tinkering with the administrative machinery of Malaya, there would have been more time for less obvious but deeper problems.

Our author left Malaya long before the recent débâcle. He is now a very old man. But writing last year in London in a street to which German bombers paid special attention, he does ask what steps have we taken to defend our strategic outposts. The British Navy cannot be everywhere. It would not, he contends, have been unreasonable to expect the local people to man the guns and hold the defences. This would admittedly cost money, but the Straits Settlements and the Malay States could have found it. The Straits Government have for years paid for the British garrison in Singapore—an imperial outpost—and the Malay States have contributed more than £15,000,000 towards the Empire's war efforts.

Recriminations are futile; they raise bitter controversy about the past, whereas it is the future that is important. Did the Japanese want Singapore? Of course they did! But they wanted Malaya even more. The Peninsula with its rubber, its tin, its iron and bauxite, but, above all, its space, for this empty land in a crowded Asia will, with deforestation, take ten million emigrants.

What are the Japanese doing in Malaya at the moment? We don't know, but here is a picture drawn by Francis Hayley Bell, a realist who knows something of Malaya and a good deal about China and Japan:

> "In a few months from their successful entry into possession of the Peninsula the Japanese in tens of thousands will have swarmed into the Malay States. Planters, miners, prospectors, surveyors and engineers, experts and functionaries of every kind *with their families*—such is the plan—are without a doubt now descending upon and populating the estates, mines, and works left by Europeans, deporting or in other ways ridding themselves of Chinese landowners and labourers. In nowise waiting for the decision of war or the convenience of transportation, within a surprisingly short period Malaya (a very different story from Manchuria) will have been salted with a carefully selected agricultural, industrial, and technical tenantry. In this manner, subtly against a possible day of negotiation by counters in a war-weary world, Malaya, failing a complete triumph, is to be marked as obviously a Japanese sphere."

Colonel Hayley Bell adds that the delicate predicament of the Malayan Rulers in such an eventuality would be a factor which would have to be borne in mind, and asks: "Whose protection would they invite in such circumstances?"*

W. W. HORNELL.

* "Letters from Singapore," by Francis Hayley Bell, *Blackwood's Magazine*, May, 1942.

Nepal, Land of Mystery. Adventures in Burma, China, India, and the Kingdom of Nepal. By Hassoldt Davis. Pp. 345. 24 illustrations. London: Robert Hale. Price 15s. 1942.

This is the saga of the Denis-Roosevelt Asiatic Expedition. The author left Amsterdam by plane, and was accompanied by Armand Denis and his wife, Leila Roosevelt, together with Leroy G. Phelps and Joe Kenney. They were to make a new film in the East. It was clear that at the start the expedition was resolved on meeting with adventure, and the narrative moves, and not unnaturally, like a "movie" from one dramatic scene to another. All is for effect; and every place and every person have some strange or startling label affixed.

The journey starts in America, but when the party leaves Amsterdam by aeroplane for Rangoon the tale begins. At Jodhpur we learn that the Maharajah had been refused leave for many years to build the hotel, as the Government mistrusted the power he already had. It was here that the author saw "moustachioed and weak-chinned young Indians, nearly strangled by their high jacket collars, minced by towards inconceivable amours" (p. 26). But this is no stranger than the Parsees at Karachi, who maintain their ritual in a climate that would set salamanders gasping for breath (p. 25). The story goes as quickly as an aeroplane, and we soon forget the multi-concubinal beds, the vultures' nest (one vulture leered hopefully at Leila), and other incidents, and we find the party at Rangoon. Here we have more purple patches, shallow generalization, and superficial description.

It is all rather difficult to take seriously, but the pace of the story hustles the reader along through a panorama of oddities.

The expedition wanted to go to China along the Burma Road, but there were difficulties about a permit, so the party started off hopefully without one. At Tharawadi they met "what the British call a civil servant. This one was a surveyor, though he looked like a painless dentist, goatee and all" (pp. 38, 39). He travelled with his *mali,* apparently his sweeper, and the account is Rabelaisian.

The expedition really did have adventures, plenty of them, thick and strong and of the highest degree of improbability. Indeed, the author himself could hardly believe his eyes when, after the cars had stuck in a river in spate, they were rescued by an American Indian in costume, feather hat on head, name of Chief Michael Joseph Thunderface, of California Missionary College. Thunderface chaperoned his fellow-citizens for some way, and was certainly a humorist. So is the author, in spite of his love for marvels and horrors. When they objected to Thunderface calling a snake a serpent—for they were all lovers of good English—he remarked: "Serpents is to snakes what trousers is to pants. They're higher class."

There is a long and alarming chapter on tattooing in Burma. Tattooing is very unpleasant, as the reviewer knows from personal experience, and the strange details and stranger symptoms are all set forth in chapter 5. One cannot help thinking that there is a good deal of bunk in film-making, and the unwinding of the necklace of the Padaung belle proves it. The adventures continue to be perpetual, harassing, and hair-raising, and when the party moves along the Burma Road then indeed do incidents flow faster than any film.

We should have welcomed a clearer description of the road. The author is decidedly confused, but after such a racking series of breathless escapes a little incoherence may be excused. Chapter 14 says that the expedition left China, but does not say how or why. A pity, as it would have been nice to know what really did happen. But this chapter sees them in Calcutta, where there were "haughty British blondes and liverish men in topi and spinal (*sic*) pad." Shades of the Saturday Club!

Chapters 16 and 17 make very curious reading indeed about an Englishman who turned native.

After a series of incidents in Calcutta, leave was given to the expedition to visit Nepal, and off the travellers went by road. Benares "was bedlam, a lush jumble of spires and squatting death-houses" (p. 171).

On the way to Khatmandu the party used "dandies," but with great reluctance, as the author puts it (p. 200), as it was not the conveyance for democratic explorers.

The whole account of the stay in the capital of Nepal should be read, for the presentation is indeed a singular one. The British Resident is given favourable

mention—" the loneliest man in the world, with tense and tender eyes." Perhaps the External Affairs Department of the Government of India may not appreciate this physical attraction.

The reader will find that the account of the expedition's doings in Khatmandu is most peculiar, and indeed regrettable, with undue emphasis on the unpleasant, eccentric, and barbaric. It is quite unfair to give such a picture of Nepal, just as it is unfair and most discourteous to refer to the King of Nepal as " slumped in debauch behind curtain windows " (p. 251).

The account of the visit to the Maharajah of Nepal is in the worst possible taste. After all, the visitors were given the privilege, admittedly denied to most travellers, of leave to enter Nepal. They were hospitably entertained, allowed to move freely about Khatmandu and the environs, and to see what they wanted. Yet the whole description of their stay is pure caricature, and no one escapes the general pejorative narrative, not even their host.

Perhaps the author wrote from sheer exuberance and from desire for effect, but whatever may be the cause or the excuse, the general impression given of Nepal is false. This is an imperfect world, and Nepal does not claim to be an exception, but on reflection the author will agree that he has given a sorry return for much spontaneous and gracious kindness and hospitality.

[It must be remembered that American films have tried to convince the world that Chicago is inhabited solely by gangsters and gunmen. If they see their own town thus, is it any wonder that they tend to produce the same effect when filming other places?—Ed.]

To be reviewed in the next number, Edward Mouseley's important book, Democratic Advance *(Dakers. 6s.).*

OBITUARY

LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., LL.D.

FRANCIS EDWARD YOUNGHUSBAND was born in 1863 and, in due course, passed from Clifton and Sandhurst to India, joining the 1st Dragoon Guards at Rawal Pindi in 1882.

His maternal uncle, Robert Shaw, had, in 1868, crossed the Karakoram to Yarkand, where he was welcomed by its ruler, Yakub Beg. He was the first Englishman to explore this unknown country, and Younghusband, who had studied his maps and reports, determined to follow in his footsteps and to be an explorer.

In 1886 he reached China by sea and joined Sir Evan James and a member of the Chinese Consular Service in an expedition to the interior of Manchuria; and the experience he gained on this journey undoubtedly constituted invaluable training for the young cavalry officer.

He next decided, in conjunction with Colonel Mark Bell, to travel from China across the Gobi Desert and Chinese Turkestan to India. It was arranged, in order to cover more ground, that the two explorers should follow somewhat different routes, and actually they next met at Simla.

From Peking, Younghusband reached the Mongolian frontier at Kalgan, and from Kara Khoto an unexplored route across the forbidding Gobi Desert was followed. During this arduous march the *Equus Prjevalsky* and also tracks of the wild camel were observed.

Following the caravan tracks from Hami to Kashgar and Yarkand, at this latter city he not only heard of an unexplored route into Skardu from some Baltis, but was able to engage them to guide him along it. The crux was the Mustagh pass, which was a sheet of ice and appeared to bar all further progress. The Balti guide, however, rose to the occasion, and, painfully cutting step by step, brought Younghusband and his party across this dangerous pass and finally led him to a small village and supplies. He thus, albeit entirely unskilled in mountaineering experience, accomplished a notable feat of exploration.

I first met Younghusband at Rawal Pindi in 1889. I naturally listened eagerly to his adventures, and I owe much to his advice. We did not meet again until 1901, when, after my return from the Boer War, where he had been acting as a correspondent, we met in London. He informed me of plans to found what is now the Royal Central Asian Society; that he intended to retire from the Army to take up the post of Honorary Secretary; and that he hoped to be elected to Parliament. I was shocked at a man of such parts giving up his career until he had reached high office, and, partly owing to my being able to propose a suitable Honorary Secretary in the person of Sir Edward Penton, he finally agreed to accept my advice.

In 1903 he was appointed to treat with Chinese and Tibetan frontier officials on the serious frontier questions that were in dispute with India. Making small progress, he pluckily visited their camp unarmed, but entirely failed to persuade the fanatical officials to see reason. Finally, not without some fighting, he marched into Lhasa at the head of British troops. There he found a state of utter confusion, due to the flight of the Dalai Lama. However, nothing daunted, by sheer force of character, Younghusband finally negotiated a treaty on reasonable lines, and, leaving a not unfriendly population behind, he recrossed the passes to India just before they were blocked by snow.

Younghusband was blamed by the India Office for exceeding his instructions, and the conditions he had imposed were reduced. Since the power of the British *Raj* had been clearly demonstrated, this was probably a wise decision, while history has decided that Younghusband deserved high praise for his conduct of this important mission.

After his retirement, the great frontier officer was an admirable President of the Royal Geographical Society and organized, albeit not successfully, the three assaults

on Mount Everest. Failure had to be acknowledged, but valuable lessons were learned by the gallant explorers.

To conclude, Younghusband, in addition to his own journeys, undoubtedly by his example inspired young officers to explore, with great benefit alike to themselves and to the Government they served. He also represented a fine type—honourable, brave, calm, determined—and was one of the founders of this Society, and remained an Honorary Vice-President until his death. It is sad to know that he has left no son to make the sixth generation of a fighting family.

P. M. SYKES.

H.H. SHAIKH HAMAD BIN ISA ALKHALIFAH, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., OF BAHRAIN

HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH HAMAD BIN ISA ALKHALIFAH, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., died on February 20 at Rumaitha, one of his hunting-lodges on the island of Bahrain. He made his last public appearance four days before his death, when he took the salute at a ceremonial parade which was carried out by the State forces at the Manamah Palace to celebrate the tenth anniversary of his accession day. The next day he had a stroke, from which he never recovered consciousness.

Shaikh Hamad was the eldest surviving son of Shaikh Isa bin Ali, who ruled Bahrain for sixty years and died in 1932 at the age of about ninety. Shaikh Hamad became deputy ruler in 1923 and succeeded to the shaikhdom in 1932. He visited England in 1925 and again in 1936; on the second occasion he was decorated with the K.C.I.E. by His Majesty King Edward VIII. Shaikh Hamad was nearly seventy years old when he died. He leaves eight sons; the eldest, Shaikh Sulman, succeeds him.

Shaikh Hamad was a wise and loved ruler famed for his kindness and his lavish generosity. He was democratic and tolerant, but at the same time he was a strict Moslem; he allowed Christian churches to be built in his country, but forbade the use of liquor; he was accessible to all people and gave everybody a sympathetic hearing. He was entirely without guile, a characteristic which is rare in Oriental rulers; in many ways he was very simple, but he had a strong vein of common sense and humour. His education was of the simplest; he spoke no other language except Arabic, and, although he could read, he wrote only with difficulty. When he was in England he was constantly besieged by people asking for his autograph, and each signature was a lengthy procedure. Although not actively interested in details of administration, he was progressive and spent much of the wealth that came to Bahrain after oil had been discovered in improving the country and the conditions of his people; he built schools and hospitals and carried out many important public works such as the causeway and swing bridge connecting Manamah, the capital of Bahrain, with the adjacent island of Muharraq, one and a half miles distant across a stretch of shallow sea. He opened this bridge last December. Nominally he was an autocratic ruler, but he deputed much of his authority to his brothers, his eldest son, and his adviser. He was a true friend of the British Crown, and his personal contacts with the late King George V. and King Edward VIII. did much to cement his staunch loyalty.

Unlike most of the neighbouring rulers, Shaikh Hamad did not himself assimilate Western ways. In spite of his wealth, he lived the simple life of an Arab gentleman, and was most happy when in his country house at Sakhir among his horses, camels, hawks, and hounds. He was very fond of hunting, especially hawking, and was very knowledgeable in all matters connected with animals. When he was in England he saw greyhound racing for the first time, and, although he did not bet himself, his skill in recognizing winners was remarkable. He had a love of fresh air and open spaces; nothing upset him so much as being in a stuffy room. He would not allow smoking in his presence, not because he disapproved of it, but because he considered that the smell tainted the fresh air. Most evenings one could see the Shaikh sitting cross-legged on the stone seat in the shade of the white walls of his country house, which was like a miniature town, with his favourite black and white silugi at his feet. A long row of Bedouin would squat on the ground in front of him while he listened to their tales from the desert; when they spoke to him they would address him simply as

"Hamad." Beyond, the Shaikh's servants would be training the hawks or driving up camels for him to inspect. He would break off during the most important discussions on matters of State to send a servant with some order about feeding a camel or a hawk.

In appearance he was tall and dignified, outstanding among the other members of his family, with a light complexion, a blue-black beard, good features, dark brown eyes, and fine hands. He always wore Arab clothes and dressed handsomely in richly embroidered robes, with the gold *agal* signifying his rank binding his Kashmir head-shawl. When he visited England his dress and his gold sword scabbard and jewelled dagger made a great impression on the public.

Shaikh Hamad was buried, on a grey afternoon, in the little cemetery among the graves of his ancestors on the plain below the old fortress town of Rafaa in the middle of the island. Europeans, Indians, Persians, Jews, and Arabs attended the funeral. Bahrain has lost a deeply respected and wise ruler, those who served him have lost a kind and thoughtful master, and Britain has lost a true and whole-hearted friend.

C. Dalrymple Belgrave.

LIEUT.-COLONEL R. L. KENNION, C.I.E.

The death of Lieut.-Colonel Roger Lloyd Kennion, C.I.E., brings back memories of a typical frontier officer whose fine physique, courage, and love of sport made him popular and respected wherever he was posted.

After Sandhurst he was gazetted to the King's Own Scottish Borderers in 1887, but, joining the Central India Horse three years later, he soon entered the Political Department and made his first acquaintance with the Indian borderlands at Gilgit and Leh. In 1900 he was sent into Tibet on a mission.

Six years later he was posted to Eastern Persia, where, alike in Seistan or from Meshed, where he was Consul-General, he made constant tours which revealed not only the special flair needed by a successful frontier officer, but permitted him to enjoy remarkably good sport. Indeed, his publications, *Sport and Life in the Further Himalayas*, and still more, as far as I am concerned, *By Mountain, Lake, and Plain*, make delightful reading. His military services during the above period included the Kurram Field Force, 1889, and the Tirat Expedition in 1897.

During the last world war Kennion served with the Indian Expeditionary Force in France, 1914-15; later, in 1915-16, he was Consul at Mohammerah. He then served on a mission with Russian troops in North-West Persia, and was awarded two decorations by the Tsar. Afterwards he was Political Officer at Kermanshah, and ended a fine career as British Envoy, Nepal, in 1921.

No political officer was better seconded in these remote frontier posts by his wife than was Kennion. In 1900 he married Alice Marion, daughter of Major-General Kenyon-Stow, who bore him a son and a daughter. Mrs. Kennion, a champion golfer, immediately threw herself into her husband's career with extraordinary vigour and delight, both of them revelling in a life which to many would have appeared to possess more drawbacks than advantages. It is, however, to such human personalities that we mainly owe peace and progress on remote frontiers.

P. M. Sykes.

MR. GEORGE ANTONIUS, C.B.E.

The death of George Antonius at the age of fifty, which took place in Jerusalem on May 21, "has deprived Arab Nationalism" (in the words of *The Times* of May 27) "of a notable interpreter to the English-speaking world."

George Antonius, who, with his equally talented elder brother Michael, was among the first to be educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, then under its first headmaster, Mr. C. R. Lias, showed as a boy that intellectual promise which was so markedly fulfilled in later life. From school he went to King's College, Cambridge, where he took his degree shortly before the outbreak of war in 1914. During the war years he found employment in the censorship office in Egypt, where his thorough

knowledge of English and French, in addition to his native Arabic, was of special advantage.

In 1921 a chance encounter brought him to Palestine, where he entered the Department of Education as chief inspector. Though not a trained educationist, Antonius threw himself with enthusiasm into his duties, and was of great value on the administrative side in helping to build up a vigorous and growing Department, where he served for some years as Assistant Director. But his tastes lay more in the political than in the educational sphere, and it was not long before special use was made of his services. He accompanied the late Sir Gilbert Clayton on more than one mission, the most important occasion being in 1927, when he helped Clayton to conduct the negotiations with Ibn Saud that led to the Treaty of Jedda. For these services he was made C.B.E.

For some years Antonius was seconded to the Secretariat in Jerusalem, where he was responsible for advising on Arab affairs; but he resigned from Government service in 1930 and entered the employment of Mr. C. R. Crane as Senior Associate for the Near East of the New York Institute for Current World Affairs. It was at this time that he began to collect material for his book, *The Arab Awakening*, by far the fairest and most embracing work on the Arab movement in general. Both in interest and in style it attracted immediate attention, and did much to explain to the English-speaking world in both hemispheres the origins and aims of the Arab movement.

As time went on, Antonius was gradually drawn more into the forefront of Arab politics. This was not his own wish; he would have preferred to remain in the background, acting as a moderating influence on the Mufti's party and as an un official interpreter of Arab views to the British authorities. But when in 1939 the Arab Delegation went to London for the Palestine Conference, and Antonius was offered by them the post of General Secretary, it was felt by all that he was right to accept the offer. Certainly the post could not have been in better hands.

He maintained to the end his contacts with and his loyalty to England, and his other loyalty to the Hussaini party must have undergone a severe strain when Haj Amin openly joined the Axis camp. Antonius was widely read in three languages, and he had a love of the best in literature as in art. A man of forceful—even unyielding—determination, he was a lively and charming companion, who will be as greatly missed by his friends in England as in Palestine, Syria and Egypt.

H. E. B.

MRS. CAROLINE A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, D.LIT.

We lose in Mrs. Caroline Rhys Davids, President of the Pali Text Society, who died suddenly on June 26 at the age of eighty-four, one of the last of the "old guard" of Orientalists who were to give the study of Buddhism in general, and of the Hinayana in particular, a new direction. No longer relying mainly on Sanskrit sources, they turned to Pali texts from earlier periods and thus succeeded in conveying a much clearer, purer idea of the real significance of Buddha's teaching than the preceding scholars, such as Sénart and Kern.

Professor F. W. Rhys Davids was of this school, which included Oldenberg, Neumann, di Lorenzo, Dr. Allan MacGregor (Ananda Metteya), Fausboll and Max Müller, and he found in his wife a very able and devoted collaborator. Before her marriage in 1894, Caroline Foley had worked in the economic and social field, and was for many years a convinced fighter for women's suffrage. With her husband she took up the study of Buddhism, however, and attained such distinction that on his death in 1922 she succeeded him as President of the Pali Text Society, of which he was the founder; she had indeed been the honorary secretary since 1907.

They were joint authors of the *Dialogues of the Buddha*, but she was also responsible for many independent publications.* In my opinion her chief significance nevertheless lay in her successful efforts to make Buddhism better known in Western Europe, as Edwin Arnold and Fielding Hall had done before. In *Gotama the Man* the authoress presents Buddha as himself explaining the real meaning of his teaching, rejecting the concept of godly or supernatural attributes, and emphasizing instead

;at serious research into existing methods and profound meditation were at the basis ı his system. Mrs. Rhys Davids tried thereby to prove that Buddhism, far from ›eing a "passive" system, was more active than the creeds or philosophies then exist-.ng, the element of will-power being dominant.

Her scientific works and translations from Pali have, however, also contributed much towards a more thorough understanding of Buddhism, and one must marvel at her energy in recent years. Mrs. Rhys Davids was over seventy when she wrote *Gotama the Man*, and her last work, *Poems of Cloister and Jungle*, was published only a year ago.† It was a pleasure to find her at Mrs. Hilda Seligman's lecture on Açoka to this Society in 1941, and to hear her participate in the discussion. It may truly be said that she died still an indomitable fighter in the noble struggle for the evolution of mankind along the path of humanity as shown by the great Light of Asia.

A. MUHLENFELD.

* Among these were various first editions of Buddhist canonical and other works; *Old Creeds and New Needs* (1923); *Buddhist Psychology* (1914, 1924); *Buddhism* (Home University Press, 1912, 1934); Buddhist translations (1910-31); *The Will to Peace* (1923); *Will and Willer* (1925); *Gotama the Man* (1928); *The Milinda Questions* (1930); *Sakya* (1931); *A Manual of Buddhism* (1932); *Indian Religion and Survival* (1934); *Outlines of Buddhism* (1934); *Birth of Indian Psychology* (1935); *What is your Will?* (1937); *To Become or not to Become* (1937); *What was the Original Gospel in Buddhism?* (1938).

† See *J.R.C.A.S.*, April, 1942.

The Society has suffered many losses in the past months. The Council regret that full notices cannot be given in this issue.